THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS

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BOOK REVIEWS

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A BEHAVIOURIST THEORY OF ART

James K. Feibleman

I

IN THIS essay an attempt will be made to construct a theory of aesthetics by employing a theory of human behaviour which has been extended from the theory of animal behaviour as developed by Pavlov, Watson, Hull and Skinner. By 'behaviour' then will be meant here the movement of individuals so far as it has any structure, and by 'need' what a material object can supply to an individual which is necessary for his or his species's survival. The theory supposes that all behaviour is an attempt to reduce some one of a number of organic needs, and that such reduction is necessary to the individual's welfare.

Animal behaviour can be accounted for by supposing that it is appetitive—behaviour in accordance with needs. When a stimulus is introduced from the outside—usually some material object which appears to offer need-reduction—the animal makes responses intended to reduce the need, usually in two parts: a preparatory response leading to a consummatory response. The consummatory response offers the reward of need-reduction which reinforces the pattern of behaviour.

Human behaviour can be accounted for by assuming that the individual is an animal with added properties. The human additions are many, but I shall single out chiefly three.

(1) The preparatory responses are more elaborate. A man does not lean over and lap up water when he sees it, as a dog does. He pours it into a container and then drinks from the container in accordance with the customs of his particular society, and all this usually after constructing reservoirs, purification plants and an elaborate system of underground conduits and indoor plumbing.

(2) There is a feedback from the material objects which have been altered by the behaviour. A horse tends to behave on every occasion just

as it behaved in the past on a similar occasion. Not so man. With the use from childhood of chairs, he loses the use of muscles which enable him to sit with his heels flat on the ground, after the manner of East Indians.

(3) Responses to stimuli may be considerably delayed. Behaviour patterns of any elaborate nature are not usually retained for any length of time among the lower animals. But the human response to stimuli may occur many years after the stimuli. A young business man may learn of excellent commercial opportunities in another country, yet wait several years before exploring them.

All human behaviour, then, like all animal behaviour, can be accounted for as a series of responses to stimuli. The responses are made in terms of needs, or of drives to reduce the needs. The chief needs are thirst, hunger, sex, curiosity, activity and survival. The human individual has developed the first three—the primary drives—in terms of the preparation for responses, and the second three—the secondary drives—in terms of education, science and religion. Thus while the human behaviour is similar to that of the lower animals it is also far more complex and constructive. Both the complexity and the constructiveness can be seen in the transformations which human individuals effect in material objects. Let us call such material objects 'artifacts' and define them as objects which have been altered through human agency. They are of two kinds: tools and signs. 'Tools' are material objects employed to move other material objects. 'Signs' are material objects employed to refer to other material objects. 'Symbols' are signs with attached qualities.

There are lower animals which fashion material objects, such as the beaver and its dam or the bird and its nest. But with man the case is stronger. He has succeeded in surrounding himself so completely with altered material objects that it can be almost said that he has transformed his environment. One reason for the existence of such objects is that he has learned to anticipate his needs and provide for them. He stores water and food, marries, establishes scientific laboratories, builds cities and joins churches. Wherever he may look he will find himself surrounded by the material objects which he has changed so that they may help him to reduce his needs. That is in a sense what human culture, what civilization, is: a collection of such objects, the calculated sources of need-reductions.

There is nothing degrading in the consideration of human individuals as animals with needs similar to those of other animals. While it is true that human individuals are not dogs conditioned to salivate to a bell by ringing it at the same time that they are given food powder, still they may be men conditioned to respond to the beauty of a landscape by being presented with a picture in which its most beautiful features have

been intensified. It is certain that if works of art did not satisfy some human need they would not be made. Works of art are material objects in the world, they owe their existence to human agency, and they have their effects on need-reduction in the human individual.

The thigmotaxic response to the work of art is the sensitivity to confronted objects, in consideration of their perfection. The universe is large and its unity can best be apprehended through feeling. The appropriate feeling, as we shall presently see, is one of exaltation. The permanent objects in the world are both large and far away. The individual needs them for their permanence which he wishes for himself, and so he reaches out for them in his longings, and experiences a drive towards them. But he cannot reach them and could not touch enough of them if he could. And so he falls back upon a substitute technique. The unity which is apprehended through feeling is beauty, and it can be symbolically represented in a nearby object which he can reach and touch: the work of art. Beauty is the reflection of far-away objects, which reduces them to unity whatever their size and distance. The need for art is the need to be included through feeling in the whole in which all things are parts. The need for far-away objects is what the work of art reduces. As an object the work of art is nearby and as such is a surrogate for objects which are not. It symbolizes for the individual within the reach of his feelings the immensity of existence which lies beyond his reach.

Thus art and the individual are connected in at least two ways. The first is the way in which the individual artist stimulated by something in his environment responds by making a work of art. The second way is the way in which the individual who is not an artist stimulated by something in the work of art responds with appreciation. The artist is primarily responsible for altering a material object in such a way that it is regarded thenceforth as a work of art. And the appreciator is stimulated by the work of art to make a certain response. We shall deal, then, first with the artist and the artistic process, secondly with the work of art itself as it leaves his hands, and thirdly with the art appreciator, reserving a few words for a last look at the entire involvement.

II

What is it in the environment that stimulates an artist? Obviously, it is not the whole environment but only some part of it. But which part? What are its characteristics?

Taxically what orients an artist to a particular material object is a quality it may suggest to him so that he sees how he could in another object exhibit a similar quality as the quality of the relations between its

parts, that is to say, as the quality of its internal relations (beauty).

Perhaps art arose as a secondary development of physical technology. Men who made for themselves crude tools, such as chipped stone arrowheads and clay pots, may have seen the comparison between those well done and those better done. The delight in the difference may have exceeded the utility of either. Hence there may have arisen the notion of things excellent for their own sake, that is to say for the sake of the excellence rather than for the sake of the thing, and the product was the first work of art: superfluous beauty probably first produced and afterwards recognized as a by-product of craft excellence.

Scientific empiricism is new but empiricism is very old. The artists always were empiricists. Every discipline in fact has its own empiricism, which may here be defined as the derivation of abstractions from sense experience. Every abstraction has to justify itself by such experience. In science what is abstracted is naturally occurring relations and these can be represented in equations. In art what is abstracted is naturally occurring qualities and these can be represented only in other material objects in which they can be featured in a way in which they were not featured in the material object in which they were found, namely, as the bonds between the parts. Something in a face, say, or a landscape orients an artist in such a way as to compel him to react towards it. It releases in him a need for perfection. Somehow he sees in the form to which some accessible material object lends itself an element of perpetual novelty. He knows nothing exists like that—but it could. And if he succeeds it will. Aesthetic apprehension is a fusion of feeling, thought and action, all operating together in a single organic response centred on an image.

Imagination of this sort is a kind of analogical thinking. Strictly speaking it is neither inductive nor deductive, though it more nearly resembles the inductive variety. Analogical thinking needs both empathy and the facile ability to combine, separate and recombine very disparate elements, to which profound belief can serve only as an impediment. The releaser is the sensitivity to confronted objects, in consideration of their perfection, which is stronger in the artist than in others and precipitates him into action. The response to the stimulus of beauty is the work of art.

The activity of the artist is a species of human doing, an activity intended to transform some material object in the environment into a form in which the quality of internal relations is put forward as a symbol of the internal relations of the universe. Qualities in this context have a suddenness which is a result of the character of their presentation. It is by means of such featured qualities that naturally occurring relations can be bonded.

Art raises the question of the distinction between the artificial and the natural. The artificial is only the natural rearranged in order to concentrate certain of its properties—in the case of art, certain of its qualities. The natural contains all possible aspects, including beauty and ugliness. Art is more single-propertied; the artificial is either beautiful or ugly. And it requires the services of an artist to call attention in the artificial to the beauty of the natural. Every insight means that some subtle component of the external world has been apprehended. In this sense nothing is peculiarly subjective if it is true. But an artist depicts things in the condition in which we could wish everything was; so that if an artist builds better than he knows, it may still be because he knows and can express his knowledge best only by building. When mysticism does discharge into logical channels, as it does in the controlled imagination of the artist, there are powerful effects. Thus it stretches the individual's limited being out towards the wider being of the universe, through a common quality.

What the artist does is to ready through his consummatory response a preparatory response for others. The artists are life-givers. Without them existence would be empty and without significance, meaningless, a mere hollow round of habitual actions to satisfy primary needs. But the arts carry the secondary needs, they show the individual how to reduce our needs to know, to do and to be. They make nearby sources of need-reductions out of infinite yearnings, proximate rewards for needs which had extended too far in space and time beyond man's limited powers. To experience lawfulness—to know that something is right, to construct a symbol of such knowledge in a material object, and to feel some measure of surrogate survival—such is the need-reduction accomplished by the artist.

Making a work of art is 'qualifying' an object, undertaking an extended qualification as a preparatory response, in view of operant learning. A technique must be known, a material object aggressively transformed, and a generalized being adequately represented. Qualitative research is a form of need-reduction for the artist as part of his need to survive, to put himself in touch with the long-range properties of existence, and in this way to associate or identify himself with the universe as a whole.

Art is the only true acceptance. That is why it may be a mistake to think of art too narrowly in connection with the beautiful. For the artist does not try to make more beautiful the beauty he encounters but he tries also to find beauty in the ugly, for it is the ugly which illustrates more graphically that beauty is the qualitative infinite in nature. Religion asks why, philosophy asks what, and science asks how. Only art does

not ask; instead, it rejoices. It likes things as they are however they are, and strives to include them, the ugly as well as the beautiful, the evil as well as the good.

From the philosophical point of view art is the practice of phenomenology. It involves the reading of meanings by means of the appearances. There are signs on the surfaces of material objects not ordinarily seen, signs of inner significance and of outer value. The inner significance is an essential quality susceptible of much condensation. The outer value comes from the suggested similarities of remote and otherwise dissimilar items. The qualities of far-flung relations indicate a unity of being by discovering the qualities of relations which had not even been thought to exist.

Such analogies are new discoveries—they require new languages. Unless an artist speaks a new language he is hardly worth listening to. If he employs in addition a new syntax, our joy at comprehending him at last will be in proportion to the difficulty we experienced at first. In this sense every artist strives towards an ideal language of his own devising, and many obstacles are encountered in getting from one ideal of this kind to another.

III

What is a work of art? The deliberate apprehension of beauty in a material object. We have already seen that beauty consists in the quality of the bond between the parts of a material object, but this needs elaborating somewhat. Beauty is the quality which emerges from the perfect relations of parts in a whole, it is the quality of internal relations. The artistic method consists in apprehending in a material object the quality of such relations. Beauty is in readily accessible form when the qualitative correlate of the relation of consistency in a material object dominates the appearances of that object. Where the quality of internal relations is featured in a material object (as it is in a work of art), it symbolizes a unity in which every separate part is represented as a necessary part of the whole.

A work of art, then, is a material object made for the quality of its internal relations. But let us consider such objects with respect to the representation involved. Another element then enters. A work of art is a material object in space and time and has to be understood against the background of other material objects in space and time which are not works of art. When the quality of internal relations is featured in a material object, as it is for instance in art, there is a symbolism involved of the unity of the universe in which everything—including, by the way, the appreciator of art—is represented as some necessary part of the

whole. But such symbolism involves qualities in the present derived from possibilities which are only described.

That art has a formal quality can hardly be denied. We have grown so accustomed to the achievements of logic and mathematics that when we say formalization we seem to refer only to abstractions, but the question occurs whether there are not other kinds of formalization. To formalize could mean to render as precise as the material to be included would allow. Then we should have to admit that in art we are rendering something precise, but we should need another kind of precision to handle another kind of subject-matter, in this case values. To render values precise presents a problem of formalization in art. We shall have to find for it a different logic—provided we are to be allowed to use the word 'logic' at all.

Thus we could speak of dream logic as the reason why scenes are juxtaposed in dreams in ways which are inconsistent with actual time and space relationships yet exhibit their own type of consistency. The consistencies of qualities have not been studied and dreams have been considered chiefly with respect to their psychological content. In a dream it is possible to walk out of one room and into another without difficulty, where in actual life the adjacent room may have been miles, and decades, away. But there was in the dream—and the dream will of course justify this on its own ground—some reason for joining these two rooms. They may for instance have figured in important episodes in a man's life which are quite closely connected despite many superficial differences.

A work of art, then, may be an example of dream logic come alive in a material object. In a work of art the artist tried to capture in a material the impact of an intuition. He never completely exhausts the intuition although he approximates it as nearly as possible in words, in clay, in the actions of characters, in the movement of human bodies, in sound or in architectural structures. Works of art are equivocal as the logic of dreams is equivocal. Only in this way is it possible to obtain the tensions which will invoke the proper values. In dream logic we cannot formalize without residue, but we can suggest the presence of what is omitted. The formalization of dream logic in a work of art makes of the formal work of art a system which includes in an important way what is excluded or omitted in other ways.

In art what is present is not merely present but represents the absent in the present. Just as a universal represents absent as well as present objects, so the work of art stands as the prerogative instance of a supreme quality, that member of a class which can represent so completely the other members as to be, qualitatively at least, identical with the class.

The relation of a work of art to what it represents that is absent

requires further analysis when we remember that the work of art also represents what is present. The distinction is similar to what objective idealists call the possible and epistemological realists the potential. Works of art can now be further defined in relation to their environment as 'the qualities of negative constructions'. By 'negative constructions' I mean configurations of objects and events representing other material objects which do not exist and other events which do not happen. It was Proust who said that 'The pleasure an artist gives us is to make us know an additional universe'. (*Letters*, 228.) Art is negative in the sense that it stands in exclusion from the positive contents of actual existence and in contrast with them. Art is the picture of possibilities.

Art exists in order to verify the authenticity of alternatives, through an endorsement of the genuineness and intensity of each of them by means of the use of a model. A statue, for instance, is a configuration in bronze of a man who does not exist as an organism. A novel is a configuration in language of human events which do not happen in any existing society. By the 'qualities' of negative construction I mean the total effects of each of such objects or events considered as wholes. Works of art are negative constructions which are made, in fact, with a view to producing just such qualitative effects.

A work of art is a selection of possibilities which are not actualized except in symbolic form. The work of art is a surrogate of the representation. There is no such Wonderland as Alice inhabited, no such individual as Hamlet. In this sense they are both negative with respect to actual existence, and if they exist at all it is in the form of qualitative effects which because they are symbols are more powerful than the qualities of their actual and positive counterparts. Works of art are concrete only with respect to their qualities, and otherwise exist only as lower forms of matter, such as clay or stone, or marks on paper. But as qualities they enjoy a persistence which would not be the privilege of their actual and positive counterparts. Hamlet has a different sort of existence from that of the live King of Denmark but one which lasts much longer.

IV

Works of art are material objects transformed through human agency, things made. But what is more, they are things made for a reason. The purpose of art is appreciation. The unconditioned response is the response to beauty, the 'all-well' signal. The appreciation of art is a conditioned response, learning by means of the feelings something of the depth of the external world through the qualities peculiar to the objects disclosed to experience. The individual who is sensitive to natural beauty

can be shifted to substitute works of art, with the result that the quality of his response is intensified. The art is useful because it is stronger and more concentrated. Works of art may be considered preparatory responses providing the permanent possibility of conditioning. Art appreciation is active self-conditioning. The man who has been conditioned by works of art will retain his intensity of appreciation when he returns to the contemplation of nature. In this way his aesthetic conditioning is an enrichment.

In animal psychology there are certain experiments in which electrodes are implanted in the brain of an animal and the animal given a switch, a foot pedal say, so that he can stimulate himself as he wishes, on the ground that he will do so if the resultant sensation is pleasant and not if it is not. In the work of art, conceived as what Mill called matter, 'a permanent possibility of sensation', the human individual is 'given the switch' when he is allowed access to the work of art, either through ownership or availability, concert hall or art gallery. The analogy should not of course be carried too far. The animal experiment belongs to physiology since it is not conducted with the intact animal, but the human individual confronted with an art object belongs to psychology because the individual *is* intact. I am not suggesting, either, that the values involved are the same. But the situation is similar in type. In both cases, an animal is allowed to stimulate himself if he wishes.

Works of art as artifacts constitute stimuli. We build them ourselves, it is true. But then they stimulate us. An artifact of this sort is a calculated and direct source of need-reduction. All artifacts serve need-reductions, but most of them do so indirectly. A stove does not reduce hunger but it cooks the food which does. But a work of art may reduce a need directly. It is not used to facilitate the servicing of the need by another material object but accomplishes this itself. Building a work of art is a preparatory response, but appreciating it is consummatory. The equipment of art plays an indirect and secondary role: studios, art galleries, theatres, symphony halls are parts of the preparatory response as much as the work of art itself is. But the work of art has a dual function to perform, for works of art—poems, paintings, concertos, novels—are preparatory responses providing permanent possibilities of need-reduction.

The moment a work of art is finished and takes its place as something existing separately, the activity of the artist is replaced by the passivity of the appreciator. For the appreciation of art is passive in relation to the activity of art. It exerts a force upon anyone entering its field of attraction who is equipped to take up the proper perspective. Appreciation, then, becomes an act of submission, a decision to be influenced or affected.

The appreciator will feel what the work of art demands of him that he feel.

Responses to works of art consist in the more advanced sort of feelings which for want of a better word we call exaltations. Exaltation is the feeling of uplift. It is simple in that it consists of a single, uncomplicated feeling, entirely without parts, as any quality inevitably must be. But it exists at a higher level than simple sensations such as taste or smell. Implicit in the force of a feeling is a representation of the world. There is something external corresponding to the feeling, and no less so when the feeling is one of exaltation. What the work of art stimulates in the appreciator is the world-quality of exaltation suggesting it as a property of the world without change.

The appreciation of art, then, is a response to the stimulus provided by a work of art. What is to be obtained from the work of art is the quality of pleasure which comes from loving the world as it is. Not the passive 'entertainment' of pseudo-art but an invitation to participate in the quality whereby things are related, which the artist has managed to elicit from the object. Art appreciation is an active enterprise, requiring effort on the part of the appreciator. Superficial feelings occur like waves on the surface of awareness, but deeper ones lie at deeper levels. They call for exertion in order to be reached. It is necessary to face in their direction such capacities of attention as we have at our disposal.

The necessary degree of formalization may occur as a result of the exigencies of rigorous communication whereby the artist informs his audience. There is a sense in which a work of art is the formula for a perspective. A formula of this sort tells us how to take up a new perspective on value, how to freshen up an old perspective, how to acquire a more penetrating perspective, or how to include more in our perspective.

Works of art suggest to the appreciator more than he is capable of experiencing without their aid. They point beyond the limits of experience, and bring 'immortal longings' to man. Thus they remind him of his participation in being, which however small and temporary is none the less authentic, and offers as much of a hold on being as anything has. The purpose of art is not to give pleasure, though assuredly it may do that, but to intensify the senses and give depth to experience. Those who appreciate great art have learned to live more intensely. They have learned to know that there are in the world qualities corresponding to their most intense feelings.

Art is an effort to intensify feeling as another way of understanding the sources of being, self-conditioning by artifacts making possible a further penetration of the external world. Because of the artist we are

able to see more deeply into the nature of things. Matter has at tremendous depths enormous complexities and powerful qualities, but they do not lie wholly on the surface. And if physics through the study of elementary particles can show us something of the complexity, art through the study of the conditions under which beauty arises can show us something of the quality. As consistency is to the mathematical system, so beauty is to the object of art. And as the consistency becomes more difficult the more complex the mathematical system, so beauty becomes the larger the greater ambition embodied in a work of art.

From the viewpoint of the appreciator the feelings quickly tire, and the more intense the more quickly. What stimulates is novelty. Thus the work of art must possess the property of perpetual novelty. The great work of art is capable of presenting to the appreciator a sort of permanent surprise. It is ever fresh, ever new. It is not common to find the world-quality disclosed in such an humble context phenomenally revealing itself as the similarity of diverse elements, and it is always unexpected, because feelings which resist resolution stubbornly remind us of their existence as feelings. A work of art is a stimulus in a given place that has its effects elsewhere, and appreciation reacts upon cognate experiences in the individual.

V

It is time now to step back and view the artistic process in the round.

The method of art consists in reacting to the quality of internal relations by building a material object with a view to featuring them, in order that the process of self-conditioning through exposure to them will be available to others. Such exposure is known to have certain affective and stimulating properties, through the intensification of the senses and the deepening of experience.

Thus in terms of entire man there is a feed-back mechanism at work. What he makes, makes him. The stimulus-response system begins with an interaction but ends by spinning off a product. Nature and man interact to produce the work of art, and then the work of art assumes a permanent form. It takes over when there are no further changes in it, and henceforth continues the function of stimulating man in a certain way which we have endeavoured to describe. The only protest which man can make to this now one-way process is through habituation. Too much stimulation from the same object evaporates the effect of the novelty and leads to an eventually negative stimulation. The cumulative effects of exposure too prolonged are deadening.

But then there are always new works of art. Studios are needed as

well as art museums, and artists as well as curators. It is the new which keeps the old alive. The artist who is our contemporary is capable of reviving for us an interest in the classics of art by giving us a new perspective from which to view them. In art we are always standing still while the influences go rushing by. We withstand the impact of the past only to be carried off headlong into the future. We exist, however, at that point between past and future where the current is most intense, and we can feel in our bodies the tremendous passage of forces which lie beyond us, which are of a tremendous beauty, but which we can hope to feel only so much as our limited sensibilities permit.

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ART AND ILLUSION*

Richard Wollheim

I

THERE IS a question that few of those who feel a concern with painting and have the habit of looking at pictures cannot have asked themselves at some moment or other. The moment most likely was an early one in their experience of art when, on opening some illustrated history of art or trailing through the long endless galleries of a museum, they first became aware of the astounding variety of styles, modes, manners in which at different times different artists have recorded the one unique unchanging reality. Once asked, however, the question is usually put aside, quite rapidly, probably with embarrassment, as revealing a naïvety or literal-mindedness quite unsuitable in a serious and sophisticated lover of the arts.

It is around this question that *Art and Illusion*[1] has been constructed. And if I may for a moment contravene the self-denying ordinance that I have for the course of this lecture passed upon myself and indulge in a brief tribute to the author of the book, I should like to say that I regard it as typical of the fundamental and radical character of Professor Gombrich's thinking that he should take as his starting-point a question that nearly all of us find it natural to raise, but then instead of, as many do, thinking it superior to ignore it and pass on, he should prefer to press into the service of answering it a formidable and dazzling erudition.

The question might be put like this: Why has representative art a history? Why did Duccio and Rubens, Van Eyck and Monet, Ucello and Watteau, all of whom, it must be granted, were interested in depicting the visible world, depict it in such different, such bewilderingly

* This paper was read in a slightly shorter form to the British Society of Aesthetics on 6 June, 1962. An earlier draft of the lecture appeared under the title 'Reflections on "Art and Illusion" ' in *Arts Yearbook* (New York) for 1961.

different, ways—so different, indeed, that we have no method, even in the mind's eye, of abstracting these differences, but invariably see the manner as part of the picture, take in the subject together with the style? Are these differences, we might ask, essential, or merely accidental? Could the Egyptians, for instance, have depicted the human body in the way the Florentines did, and could the Florentines have represented nature as did the Impressionists?

II

The question why art has a history does not itself fall within the domain of art history. The art historian has done his work when he has recorded the changes that together constitute the history of art, and if we go on to ask why these changes occur, or (more accurately) why change at all occurs, we stand in need of some general body of theory to which we can appeal. There are, however, both in the literature of the subject and in ordinary reflective thought, a number of theories which set out to answer our question, and as good a way as any to approach Gombrich's book would be to do so via a consideration of them—not just because Gombrich himself has something to say about each of them, but because, in an uncertain terrain, they provide fixed points by which his own theory can be plotted.

The first theory we might consider is what could be called the *perceptual* theory of artistic change.[2] According to this theory, each painter paints the world as he sees it, but each painter sees the world for himself, idiosyncratically, and in consequence the range and diversity of representational art can be accounted for in terms of the varieties of human perception. Giotto, Rembrandt, Van Gogh painted things differently because, and to the degree to which, they saw things differently. Secondly, there is what might be called the *technological* theory of artistic change,[3] according to which the course of art follows the history of technical advance in the skill of representation: to specific inventions and discoveries are attributable the capacity of painters to render certain effects of likeness, to achieve certain tricks of verisimilitude, that were quite outside the range of their predecessors. According to this view Egyptian art exemplifies childish methods because Egyptian artists could do no better, whereas in the work of later artists, say of the Quattrocento, or the High Renaissance, or the nineteenth century, we see evidence of an ever-increasing body of skill in the technique of representation. And, thirdly, there is the theory of '*seeing and knowing*',[4] regarded by many as the most sophisticated account of the matter obtainable, according to which successive artists are engaged in a collec-

tive and continuous struggle to rid themselves of the burden of knowledge in their efforts to portray the world precisely as they see it. Knowing how things really are—for instance, that the human face is symmetrical along the axis of the nose—is an obstacle in the way of depicting things as they appear to be—with, for instance, only half the face visible when seen in profile. To achieve a purely visual art, what is required is to see the world directly, without preconceptions, and it is this battle against the corrupting power of knowledge, this determined effort to recapture the vision of the innocent eye, that accounts for the evolution of the visual arts from, say, the fully 'conceptual' art of Egypt to the fully 'perceptual' art of the Impressionists.

III

None of these theories is in Gombrich's eyes without interest or, indeed, without its element of truth; but against each of them as it stands he brings, either implicitly or explicitly, what amounts to a fatal objection.

The perceptual theory is defective because it accounts only for the fact that art displays diversity, and not for the further fact that it possesses a history. For if art were merely the expression of personal vision, we should have no reason to assume, as we do, that pictures produced in proximity would be marked by a certain 'family likeness', nor should we be able to account for the temporal sequence of styles, which is not just an assumption, but a fact, about the course of painting. To remedy this defect in the perceptual theory some writers of a more speculative temper have postulated a history for human vision or 'seeing' itself,[5] tracing its evolution from the simple schematic vision of children, to be found at the dawn of history, to the subtle and sensitive perceptions of modern man—the idea being that art could then be geared to the history of vision and so, indirectly, acquire a history of its own. But any such supplementary hypothesis either straightway takes us out of the empirical world into a realm of unverifiable entities or else turns out to be narrowly circular: for when we ask for the evidence in favour of the hypothesis of visual evolution, either we are entertained with empty metaphysical speculation or else we are referred back to the changes in artistic style that the hypothesis was originally invoked to explain.

By contrast the technological theory has the dual virtue both of accounting for the historical character of art and of admitting into its framework of explanation only sensible entities. On the debit side, however, the technological theory might be said to allow art a history only at the price of denying it value. For if the story of art is to be

interpreted purely as a story of technical advance, of ever-increasing skill in the production of certain admired effects, it is hard to see why we should esteem the outmoded experiments of the past. In their day they had value, being the best that could be achieved. In our day they may have historical interest, like a spinning jenny or a daguerreotype, or even for some a certain nostalgic charm, like a vintage car—but certainly no intrinsic value. Furthermore the technological theory, while giving us an historical account of artistic production, leads to a curiously a-historical conception of artistic psychology. For according to the theory Giotto differs from Michelangelo and Michelangelo from Degas in that Giotto couldn't do what Michelangelo could do and Michelangelo couldn't do what Degas could do. But this in turn suggests that it was not alien to Giotto to want to do what Michelangelo did, perhaps even what Degas did. And this conception of earlier painters hallucinated by images which only later painters were able to realize—conceiving these images in the mind's eye with a clarity and finesse of execution that far transcended the limitations of their art, but incompetent to set them down in line or paint because of the technical backwardness of their age—such a conception betrays a disordered historical imagination.[6] And yet it seems demanded by the technological theory.

Finally, there is the theory of 'seeing and knowing'. In various ways an advance upon its rivals, able at once to provide an explanation for many of the phenomena of pictorial evolution and also to furnish a terminology in which a great deal of representational art can profitably be discussed, the theory fails because of its attachment to the simple unexamined distinction between perception and inference, between what we really see with our eyes and what we know through the intellect. But it is to be observed that the acceptance of this distinction is not peculiar to the theory of 'seeing and knowing'. For both the technological and the perceptual theories contain in their different ways a reference to a kind of art which is occupied with the direct transcription of what the artist really sees: in the one case as the end, in the other case as the pattern, of all pictorial art. According to the technological theory a completely naturalistic art is that towards which all representation aspires; according to the perceptual theory, it is its inevitable achievement. The question then arises: Is Naturalism possible?

IV

'Neutral Naturalism', as Gombrich construes the term, means a form of art that, outside any reference to style or convention, can be regarded as *the* transcription or portrayal of a particular scene or incident, in

which every line or stroke made by the hand is uniquely determined by what is given to the eye. And it is Gombrich's contention that such an art is a chimera. 'There is no neutral naturalism', he writes (p. 75). To establish this point he uses, as far as I can see, three sets of arguments, which have to be collected from across the length of the book.

In the first place Gombrich employs arguments—most of them familiar enough but here restated with fine lucidity—which relate to the limitation of the artist's media. Take, for instance, the essential problem of colour. Nature produces, as we are all aware, a vast range of chromatic effects, and to achieve this she has at her disposal two variables: local colour, that is the actual colour of the object, and light, the ever-changing light that plays on the object. The painter, by contrast—and this is a fact of which we sometimes lose sight—has only one resource: the actual colour of his pigment, which is always seen in, or at any rate as if it were in, standard conditions. The light in a gallery or a drawing-room may vary, brighten and fade, but such fluctuations are something with which the picture has to contend, not something that the painter can make use of.

However, even if *per impossibile* the painter were able to match what he sees area for area, it still does not follow that there would be an identity of colour between the picture and the scene it depicts. For to assume this in the first place ignores the fact that tone varies with size, so that a small patch painted with one pigment will most likely not resemble a larger patch painted with the same pigment (pp. 262–3): and it is of course most unlikely that a painting will be life-size with its subject. Secondly, the 'mosaic theory of representation' as Gombrich calls it at one point (p. 263), leaves out of account the further fact that tone is affected by the relations between the areas (pp. 259–62). In this context Gombrich cites the 'spreading effect' in the famous von Bezold arabesque (Fig. 251), but this is only a singularly striking demonstration of the more general truth that if you alter the relation between two shapes they will look different even if they are of the same local colour. And it seems inevitable that the relation between two shapes on a flat canvas will be different from those which exist between the two elements in reality that they are supposed to represent.

The second set of arguments that Gombrich employs against neutral naturalism relate to the phrase 'what we really see'. For it must be evident that the artistic ideal of portraying things as we really see them, or of setting down what we really see—and it is around this ideal that neutral naturalism is constructed—could not long survive a demonstration that the phrase 'what we really see' has no clear reference. It seems to be an aim of Gombrich's to provide such a demonstration.

I must say now that I do not follow all of Gombrich's argument on this point, but I get the impression that much of it does not really engage the target upon which he wishes to direct it. For whereas what he claims to be attacking is the proposition that in all cases of seeing there is something that we really see, the proposition that much of the time he in fact attacks is a more specific one: namely, that in all cases of seeing there is some *one* thing that we really see. In other words Gombrich flings down his challenge in the direction of the very general thesis that all our vision has a determinate object. But the thesis that he actually fights and (I would say) conclusively defeats is one that accepts this and then goes on to identify this object in a special way with a configuration of flat coloured patches lying in a two-dimensional field. And this is, of course, merely a particular version or interpretation of the more general thesis. One could continue to think that in all cases of vision there *is* something that we really see, without thinking that it is always something of a specific and identical kind and *a fortiori* without thinking that it is of the kind that, traditionally, empiricist philosophers and psychologists have thought it to be. One could agree (and I am sure one should) with Gombrich that 'We do not observe the appearance of colour patches and then proceed to interpret their meaning' (p. 219), without being forced to maintain that there is nothing that we really observe.

There are passages in *Art and Illusion* where Gombrich certainly shows himself aware of the difference between the avowed and the real object, of his criticism. So, for instance, he writes: 'We "really" see distance not changes in size: we "really" see light, not modifications of tone; and most of all we really see a brighter face and not a change in muscular contractions' (p. 282); and championing Constable's naturalism he writes: 'What Constable "really" saw in Wivenhoe Park was surely a house across a lake' (p. 278) as opposed presumably to a 'flat patchwork of colours' which he had denounced above as being a fabrication of false theory. Now in these passages Gombrich explicitly admits that there is something we really see, and if he still insists on placing inverted commas around the word 'really', this is no more than a pious tribute he pays to the more extreme thesis that he advocates elsewhere: namely, that whenever we see there is nothing at all of which it can properly be said that it is what we really see.

Of this more extreme thesis I shall have more to say later. Here I only want to point out that the particular form in which Gombrich subscribes to it, *i.e.* that all seeing is interpretation, might seem to be not only not the obvious contrary, but not even a proper contradictory, of the thesis that it is designed to supplant, *i.e.* that in all cases of seeing there is something that we really see. For it might be held—I would say justifiably—that in

the context of perception the expressions 'what we really see' and 'interpretation' secure and maintain their significance from their mutual contrast: so that someone who wanted (like Gombrich) to deny that there was anything we really saw, ought also to deny the existence of interpretation—instead of (as Gombrich in fact does) asserting it universally.

On the question whether the more limited thesis that Gombrich does establish in this connection is in any way fatal to Neutral Naturalism I find it difficult to arrive at a stable opinion: partly because the theory of Neutral Naturalism is itself somewhat indeterminate. What the thesis certainly does is to weaken the naturalistic ideal considerably, by breaking any connection that one might have supposed to exist between it and a specific or identifiable style—for instance, Impressionism. For if there is no one kind of thing that we really see whenever we see, then the art that sets out to depict what we really see will not have any consistent look; there is no pictorial manner in which we can say *a priori* that a Neutral Naturalist should work. And it certainly seems as though in the three theories of artistic change that we have considered the assumption was that there is such a manner.

The third and final line of argument that Gombrich brings against Neutral Naturalism derives from the role of projection in our vision of art. For even if the artist were able to set down on the canvas an image that literally resembled exactly what he had seen, there would be no certainty as to how the spectator would see the image. For the image would be ambiguous: and ambiguous not just in the theoretical sense that it could be seen in different ways, but in the practical sense (though Gombrich is not always careful to keep these two senses apart) that it almost certainly would be seen in different ways. Strictly speaking, this fact need not be seen as an objection to Neutral Naturalism when this is defined, as it was above, as a form of art in which every stroke was uniquely determined by what was given to the eye. But such a definition, I suggest, seemed satisfactory because it seemed natural to assume that if there was a one-one correspondence between what the eye saw and what the hand did in obedience to it, there would also be a one-one correspondence between what the hand did and what the eye saw of what the hand had done. If what is uniquely transcribed is ambiguously seen, Naturalism loses much of its point.

V

At this stage of the argument, however, when Naturalism appears to be fatally trapped, Gombrich suddenly calls off the chase. For has not the argument gone too far? 'The old insight that it is naïve to demand

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that a painting should look real is gradually giving way to the conviction that it is naïve to believe any painting can ever look real' (p. 209). And such a conviction, however ingeniously argued for, must ultimately be absurd. For do we not unhesitatingly regard some painters as more realistic than others—Masaccio, say, than Cimabue, or Gainsborough than Perugino? Are there not even certain painters, like Constable or Monet, whom we consider to have achieved about as much in the mastery of appearance as is humanly possible?

The problem, then, is not so much the existence as the definition of Naturalism: for if there is a respectable form of naturalism, it cannot be the 'neutral naturalism' whose discomfiture we have observed. At this juncture Gombrich suggests a redefinition of Naturalism in terms of the information that the picture conveys. To say, for instance, that a drawing of Tivoli is correct or truthful means 'that those who understand the notation will derive no false information from the drawing' (p. 78; cf. p. 252).

This redefinition has two great merits. In the first place it respects the simple logical point that truth and falsehood cannot properly be predicated of objects: strictly speaking, they are properties of statements, and if we loosely talk of a picture as correct or truthful, this is an oblique way of talking about a certain set of assertions that can be derived from the picture (p. 59). The question then arises: What assertions are we entitled to derive from a picture? —or, to put it another way: How much of the picture are we justified in interpreting or decoding? and this connects with the second merit of Gombrich's redefinition, namely, that it emphasizes the 'conventional' element in any form of naturalism. For in order to know how much of the picture is to be decoded we must be acquainted with the convention or—to use a locution which Gombrich at one point (p. 76) insists is 'more than a loose metaphor'—with the 'language' or 'vocabulary' in which the picture is composed. For instance, it would be quite erroneous to infer from the fact that our drawing of Tivoli is correct 'that Tivoli is bounded by wiry lines' (p. 90). To make such an inference would be to misunderstand the contour-convention in a drawing.

From Gombrich's redefinition of Naturalism two consequences important for his general theory are derived. The first is that though certain forms of art are clearly non-naturalistic, there is no unique form of naturalistic art towards which all forms of representational painting approximate to a greater or lesser degree. To posit the existence of such a style would be to make two further assumptions. First, that the conveying of information is a simple cumulative task, so that a picture containing a certain amount of information could always be revised so

as to convey some further piece of information. But it may be that some information can be conveyed only at the expense of omitting other information: in constructing a picture we may have to make a choice. Indeed, Gombrich points out not merely that this may be so, but that in fact it is so—and he illustrates his point ingeniously by comparing three representations of a boat, one by Duccio, one by Constable and one by Turner (Figs. 243, 5, 245), and he shows how, as we cast our eye across the paintings in historical sequence, we get progressively more information about the appearance of the boat as at a certain moment and in a certain light, and progressively less information about the structure of the boat. We are told new things at the price of having to take familiar things for granted. And the second assumption that seems to be involved in the idea of a unique naturalistic art is that there is only one way of conveying a given piece of information. But this also is clearly false. 'The world may be approached from a different angle and the information given may yet be the same' (p. 78).

The other consequence of this revised conception of Naturalism is that we can now see that a 'correct' or 'truthful' form of art could not conceivably have been the starting point of artistic evolution. Defined as it is, it could only be 'the end product' (*ibid.*) of a long process of trial and error.

And here at last we have the stage set for Gombrich's account of the evolution of representational art: the theory of 'making and matching'. In the beginning, the artist makes a diagram of what he wants to depict —a crude model, which, for those who understand it, succeeds in conveying a modicum of information about its object: a schema. Gradually, however, as the schema is matched against the object, deficiencies in its informativeness are brought to light. Suggestions are made as to how these deficiencies could be made good, and both the accuracy and the amount of the information it provided be increased; and so we have the schema corrected. The corrected schema, however, also has its deficiencies, and so the process of making and matching, of schema and correction, unfolds itself. At each step the resultant schema can always be said to be more lifelike than the schema of which it is a correction. And so it might seem that, as the process enters an advanced stage, we attain to an art of verisimilitude, a fully fledged Naturalism. And so, in an historical sense, we do. But we should not conclude from this that if only we had used our eyes properly in the first place, this kind of Naturalism could have come into being without the long, painful struggle that led up to it. For such a conclusion would not merely be false; it would be absurd.[7]

VI

But, we might reasonably ask, absurd in what sense? What kind of impropriety would attach to the supposition that representational art did not evolve in accordance with the principle of schema and correction? In other words, what is the status of Gombrich's hypothesis?

It must be admitted at the outset that on this point Gombrich himself is singularly unenlightening. In various places he talks of the 'psychology' of artistic procedure as though his theory were a contribution to our understanding of how the artist's mind actually works. But I do not think that this could really be his intention, for, if it were, one consequence would be that his hypothesis would be purely empirical. It would rest simply on observed fact, and would be overthrown if it could be shown that some artists worked or had worked in a way other than that of schema and correction. But I do not think that Gombrich really envisages the possibility of a counter-example to his hypothesis, and this suggests that he puts it forward as a *logical*, not as a *psychological*, truth.

Gombrich's contention is, then, I take it, that the idea of representation necessarily involves the idea of trial and error. It is not merely that in the history of art, as we have it, making always does in point of fact precede matching, but that making must precede matching.

But if making must precede matching, what this means is that we cannot have matching without (*i.e.* without being preceded by) making. But it does not mean that we cannot have making without (*i.e.* without being succeeded by) matching. Now this asymmetry is of great importance to Gombrich, for it is in virtue of it that the hypothesis of making and matching acquires its secondary role in his system: that of an *historical* as well as a *logical* principle. In Chapters IV and V Gombrich attempts to define certain very general phases in the history of art by reference to the extent to which making was linked with matching.

In Egyptian art making was virtually independent of matching. And this was because of the peculiar function that the Egyptians attached to the image. As far as we can reconstruct the situation their main concern would seem to have been not to secure a representation of an aspect or element of life—which would naturally have led them to correct the image, once they had made it, in the interests of verisimilitude—but simply to make an object. It is only with 'the Greek revolution' that we have the desire for an image that not merely existed but was 'convincing', that not merely stood for itself but also spoke of things outside itself; and it is at this juncture that, for the first time, we come across the restless, dissatisfied reappraisal of the object with the constant aim of bringing it closer and closer to the reality it attempts to mirror.

Again, Gombrich suggests that the connection between making and matching can be used to bring out the difference between medieval and post-medieval art. For in the Middle Ages the impact of 'the Greek revolution' was comparatively spent. The image was still regarded as primarily representational, but there was no longer that burning discontent with each and every effort to make it convey information about the world. For this we have to wait till the Renaissance. 'To the Middle Ages', Gombrich writes, 'the scheme is the image: to the post-medieval artist, it is the starting point for corrections, adjustments, adaptations, the means to probe reality and to wrestle with the particular' (p. 148). Between the Middle Ages and the world of the contemporary artist there lies a period where not only is there no matching without prior making (as is necessarily the case) but there is no making without subsequent matching. In this period occurred the apogee of European Naturalism.

VII

The highly compressed summary that I have been offering of Gombrich's doctrine might suggest an obvious title for his book: *Art and Naturalism*. Yet if we look to the book, what do we find it called? Something quite different: *Art and Illusion*. Nor is this a mere vagary of the title-page. For when we go on to examine the text itself we find that, throughout, the two sets of terms, 'naturalism', 'naturalistic' on the one hand, 'illusion,' 'illusionistic' on the other, are used interchangeably. And there corresponds to this linguistic practice a substantive doctrine. It would appear to be Gombrich's considered view that, within certain limitations, Naturalism *is* illusion, and that a painting is to be regarded as more naturalistic the more effective it is in creating its illusion.

Total effectiveness will of course seldom be within its reach: 'that such illusions are rarely complete goes without saying', Gombrich concedes (p. 234). And there are reasons for this, some of which at any rate in no way reflect upon the skill of the artist. In the first place there is the evident or all but invariably evident setting or context in which the work of art is displayed, which is bound to provide a contrast with the work itself. As the eye passes over the picture, across the frame, to the wall on which it is placed, it cannot but become aware, however cunning the painting may be, of a discrepancy or discontinuity which is fatal to the illusion. In this connection Gombrich refers to the work of Baroque decorators or *quadratisti*, who were as successful as anyone could be in overcoming these difficulties: and he points out how their choice of subject-matter—the sky, a frieze, a cornice, always something which might actually have existed in the very place where it is portrayed

—was guided by their determination to reduce or blur as much as possible 'the transition between the solidly built and the flatly painted' (p. 221).

Secondly, there is the fact that a two-dimensional illusion can only ever work for a stationary eye. Not only must the eye not take in the context of the picture, but it must not move either inside the picture or relative to the picture. For as soon as it does, it will require in the interests of consistency modifications in the perspectival profiles of what is depicted, which of course will not occur. 'As soon as we move' Gombrich writes à propos of a Fantin-Latour, 'the illusion must disappear, since the objects in the still life will not shift in relation to each other'(p. 234).

Finally, even if the visual illusion is complete, totally working, that is, for the stationary eye whose field of vision is wholly contained within the picture frame, it is unlikely to be accompanied by all those other 'expectations', which are, according to Gombrich, an integral part of our recognizing or identifying something as an object of a certain kind: expectations of what we would see if we moved, of what we would feel if we touched the object. 'All perceiving relates to expectations', Gombrich writes (p. 254), and he describes how all painters from the Greeks onwards have struggled to supplement the direct pictorial effects that were within their power with induced expectations. Yet these expectations, even when induced, hang by the slightest thread. We may feel that if we craned our neck a little, the dinner plate would look circular, or that if we reached out our hand, we could touch the bloom—but we have only to try to crane our neck or to contemplate reaching out our hand, and the expectations will vanish and with them the completeness of the illusion.

Gombrich allows, then, that very few naturalistic paintings are totally illusionistic. 'Only in extreme cases . . . are the illusions of art illusions about our real environment' (p. 234). But this does not militate against the view, to which he continues to adhere, that Naturalism depends upon illusion. The illusion may invariably break down: but then who says that a painting is ever totally naturalistic? It would seem an accurate formulation of Gombrich's thought to say that for him the more naturalistic a painting is, the more closely it approximates to a successful and sustained illusion—an illusion, that is, as successful and sustained as the medium permits.[8]

Such a conception of Naturalism is, it seems to me, quite untenable. In the first place it is clearly impossible for Gombrich to hold to such a conception, for it is quite inconsistent with the rest of his thought. Not merely is it out of line with his general notion of art as something conventional, which, for instance, offers up its secrets only to those who

'understand the notation' (p. 90), but more specifically it makes total nonsense of the definition he offers elsewhere of Naturalism. For a picture, it will be recalled, is said to be naturalistic in so far as it conveys (or, more precisely, in so far as there can be derived from it) correct information. But how can we be said to gain information about an object from something that we take to be that object? A *trompe l'œil* painting of a duck, for instance, cannot, at least as long as it succeeds in being *trompe l'œil*, tell us anything about a duck: it is no more informative about a duck than the duck itself would be. If we are to talk meaningfully of information, it is ordinarily required that we should be able to discriminate between, on the one hand, the medium of communication and, on the other hand, the referent or what is communicated. 'It is ordinarily required' I say, but then there is no reason to think that Gombrich feels free to dispense with this convention: indeed it would seem that his leading ideas depend for their significance upon it.

But quite apart from issues of consistency within a particular system, which relate especially to Gombrich, there are other and stronger reasons for rejecting the equation of Naturalism with illūsion: if, that is to say, we take illusion *literally*, which, I maintain, we are required to do by the theory. In the first place such an equation completely distorts the attitude that we adopt to naturalistic painting.[9] It is surely quite untrue to suggest that, in looking at the masterpieces of Constable or Monet, we have any temptation, even a partial or inhibited temptation, to react towards them in a way similar to that in which we would to the objects they represent: that we in any way wish to stretch out a hand and join in the picnic, or to assume dark glasses against the glare of the sun.

But not only is Gombrich's conception of Naturalism false to our ordinary attitude to paintings of this kind, but—more seriously I should say—it also conceals or distorts the kind of admiration that we feel for them. For surely when we admire the great achievements of naturalistic art, we do so because we think of them as very lifelike representations of objects in the real world: but to think of them in this way is clearly quite incompatible with taking them to be, or seeing them as (even in the most attenuated sense of either of these two expressions), the objects themselves. Indeed if we took the picture of an object to be that object, it seems unclear that there is anything left for us to admire. Now this is precisely what Gombrich appears to deny: 'It seems that the better the illusion' he asserts, 'the more we see it as a mirror' (p. 237) and a mirror-image he has already characterized, in the same paragraph, as 'a real illusionist image'.

Of course Gombrich does not deny—that is, he does not explicitly deny—what he appears to be denying: namely, that we admire naturalistic pictures as pictures. Yet I maintain that in substance he does—at any rate in the section about illusion—and that why he is able to suppress this fact or conceal it from himself is because of the particular analysis to which he adheres of what it is to see something as a picture of an object. For Gombrich, to see something as a picture of an object is to see it sometimes as a picture, and sometimes as that object. To admire something as a good or naturalistic picture of an object is to say something about the speed or facility with which we can move between these two different ways of seeing it. What excites us, in other words, is something potential, not something actual or visible: it is the capacity of the picture to arouse a capacity in us.

But now, we must ask, why does Gombrich adhere to this particular analysis of what it is to see something as a picture of an object? And to understand his answer here—which is, roughly, that any other suggestion would be absurd or self-contradictory—we must consider a notion that plays an important role at this stage in the argument: and this is what Gombrich calls 'the inherent ambiguity of all images' (p. 211.) Now part of the time what Gombrich means by this is quite clear. He introduces the notion at the very beginning of the book by a consideration of the (now) famous duck-rabbit figure (Fig. 2): a drawing which originally appeared in *Die Fliegenden Blätter* and which can, when accurately reproduced, indifferently be seen as a duck (turned to the left) or a rabbit (turned to the right). Later on Gombrich illustrates the notion by reference to the outline drawing of a hand (Fig. 201), of which it is impossible to tell whether it is a right hand seen from the front or a left hand seen from the back. Having, however, introduced the notion of 'ambiguity' by means of these special cases, Gombrich later goes on to point out (pp. 209–17) that in one significant respect all configurations drawn on a flat surface are ambiguous. For if we take any given configuration there is an infinity of shapes in space of which it is the correct perspectival profile. Of course, if the angle and distance from the spectator are known, the shape is determined—just as ordinarily, assuming the shape to be a conventional or familiar one, we can work out the angle and distance. But if the angle and distance are not determined, we must in principle allow the shape to have any one of an infinite number of values. In this sense, then, all configurations are ambiguous.

So far, I think everything is clear. Starting from a few particular cases which he characterizes as being ambiguous, Gombrich soon extends the application of the concept. But in doing so he extends solely its denotation, but its connotation remains constant. To say of the duck-rabbit

figure, or of the drawing of a hand, or of all perspectival profiles, that they are ambiguous is to say, in the first place, that they can be seen in two or more ways, and secondly, that they cannot be seen in more than one way at once. This point Gombrich makes at several places by saying that 'ambiguity . . . can never be seen as such' (p. 211: cf. pp. 198, 200, 223).

But from the very beginning of the book Gombrich assimilates to these cases and wishes to subsume under the general heading of ambiguity another feature that is universally possessed by images: namely, that they are both pictures (canvas) and of things (nature). Just as the duck-rabbit figure can be seen sometimes as a duck and sometimes as a rabbit, so a picture can be seen sometimes as canvas and sometimes as nature. And (this is where the assimilation becomes crucial) just as the figure cannot be seen simultaneously as a duck and as a rabbit, so the picture cannot be seen simultaneously as canvas and as nature. It was the achievement of the earliest artists, Gombrich suggests, that 'instead of playing "rabbit or duck" they had to invent the game of "canvas or nature" '(p. 24): as though these two games were identical in structure. And later the same point is more specifically made. 'Is it possible to "see" both the plane surface and the battle horse at the same time? If we have been right so far, the demand is for the impossible. To understand the battle horse is for a moment to disregard the plane surface. We cannot have it both ways' (p. 237).

But by what right does Gombrich assume that we can no more see a picture as canvas and as nature, than we can see the duck-rabbit figure as a duck and as a rabbit? Because—it might be said—canvas and nature are different interpretations. But if this is Gombrich's argument, it is clearly invalid. For we cannot see the duck-rabbit figure as duck and as rabbit, not because these are two different interpretations, but because they are two incompatible interpretations. Gombrich states the principle correctly when he writes: 'We can train ourselves to switch more rapidly, indeed to oscillate between readings, but we cannot hold conflicting interpretations' (p. 198). But it does not follow from this that we cannot hold different interpretations. For Gombrich's specific argument about canvas or nature to be effective, he requires a criterion for distinguishing between conflicting and merely different interpretations. In the absence of such a criterion he has no right to insist, against common sense, that seeing something as a picture of an object *must be* sometimes to see it as a picture and sometimes to see it as that object.

Finally I should like to consider two lines of thought in Gombrich's book which go some way to accounting for his equation of Naturalism with illusion: one which might have led him into the belief, the other

which might have helped to sustain him in it. The first is to do with Gombrich's use of the notion of 'projection', the second with his use of 'seeing as'. Gombrich emphasizes, quite rightly, the immense importance of projection in the viewing of naturalistic art. But under the general heading of projection he brings together (I want to suggest) phenomena which, though they can be arranged on a scale, need also to be distinguished rather carefully: by assimilating the phenomena that lie on one end of the scale to those which lie on the other, Gombrich finds support for his view that Naturalism is illusion. The different kinds of phenomena he has in mind can be brought out by a consideration of three examples that he gives of projection. First, the case of Shadow Antiqua lettering (Fig. 172), in which letters are indicated only by what would be their shaded side if they were ribbons standing up, but where we tend to see a top to each letter: secondly, there is the case of the Giandomenico Tiepolo etching (Fig. 185) where we read the garments of St. Joseph and the Virgin Mary as coloured (even if indeterminately coloured): and finally there is the case of *all* representative painting (pp. 158, 170, 191), of Frith as well as of Manet (p. 181), of Van Eyck as well as the Impressionists (p. 184), where we project on to the dabs of paint people and objects as they exist in the world. But 'projection' here has no single simple core of meaning, though all the cases may have what it is now fashionable to call a family resemblance. In the case of the Shadow Antiqua lettering we see something that definitely is not there: in the case of Van Eyck, or even Manet, the most that can be said is that we would not see what we do if it were not for something outside, or in addition to, the 'visual situation'. In the first kind of case there is a genuine deception: in that the man who makes the projection will differ in his beliefs from the man who does not. In the third kind of illusion there is no such deception: and correspondingly there is no difference of belief between the man who makes the projection and the man who cannot make head or tail of an Impressionist or even of a Quattrocento painting. By assimilating the latter kind of case to the former, by subsuming all cases of projection under the single pattern, Gombrich is drawn towards the view that to look at naturalistic art is to experience a kind of illusion.

The second line of thinking to which I have attributed some responsibility for Gombrich's equation of Naturalism with illusion, at any rate by way of sustaining him in a position he might otherwise have found unacceptable, is connected with his use of the phrase 'seeing as'. Here however we are already in the environs of a subject to which I shall soon have to turn and address myself directly: Gombrich's general theory of perception. For it is because of this theory that the phrase 'seeing as' has

such great importance for Gombrich: since it is a central tenet within the theory that all seeing is seeing as. Here I only want to point out that this equation (*i.e.* seeing = seeing as) serves to take the sting out of the other equation with which I have hitherto been concerned (*i.e.* Naturalism = illusion). For if all seeing is seeing as, this suggests that all vision has a faulty or defective or, as philosophers would say, 'non-veridical' or at least *optional* aspect to it—for is not this the implication of talking of 'seeing something *as an x*?[10] Accordingly, if we believe that all seeing is seeing as, then the vision of naturalistic art would no longer appear to have anything peculiar to it: at worst it would only be an extreme case of the sort of deception in which all vision participates.

But I cannot any longer delay turning to the theory upon which this last consideration depends.

VIII

Gombrich's general theory of perception cannot be passed over even in a consideration of his aesthetic theory, for it stands in a rather peculiar and certainly significant relation to his theory of artistic change: at all times mirroring it, at some moments purporting to provide it with a ground or base. For it is, as we have seen, Gombrich's view that aesthetic change occurs by means of the mechanism of schema and correction. Without some initial schema, which gradually, step by step, we correct and refine, we would never arrive at anything reasonably naturalistic in the arts. But it is also Gombrich's view that perception displays this same pattern. We acquire visual knowledge of the world by first applying schemata to it and then correcting and refining them in accordance with anticipations rewarded or frustrated, until we arrive at an undisturbed or, as we might say, 'naturalistic' vision. 'The very process of perception', Gombrich writes, 'is based on the same rhythm that we found governing the process of representation: the rhythm of schema and correction' (p. 231).

To some it might seem that this more general theory about schema and correction provides some kind of confirmation for the specific theory. For if the phenomenon of schema and correction is very widespread, as widespread as human vision itself, it is not surprising—one might think—that it is to be found also in the more limited domain of art. And it seems that Gombrich himself is sometimes of this view. I want to argue that the opposite is true and that if the general theory about human vision were true, the more specific theory about representational art would be false.

For if it is true that we can move towards Naturalism in art by means

of the progressive correction of schematic images, this implies that we have some means of correcting the images by reference not to other images but, directly, to the object that we are trying to depict. For alteration of one schematic image so as to make it conform to another schematic image could scarcely be called correction; and if this were all that lay within our reach, any progression towards verisimilitude in art would be purely accidental.

Now, of course, Gombrich nowhere explicitly states that we can correct one image only by reference to another; on the contrary, he insists that we can correct the crude (and the less crude) schemata of our making by appeal to perception. But if we accept the general thesis that perception itself operates in accordance with the principle of schema and correction—and if 'schemata' and 'correction' are here used *in exactly the same sense* as that in which they are applied to the process of representational art—then the appeal to perception is no better than an appeal to another image. In both cases we try to judge one schema—namely one we have created on paper or on canvas—by reference to another schema; and whether this second schema has been created by someone else on paper or canvas or (as the general theory of perception asserts) by ourselves in the mind, is surely immaterial.

It would seem, therefore, that Gombrich, by his insistence on the thesis that perception also requires schemata or that there is no reality without interpretation, has cut the ground from under his own original thesis: namely, that by means of a progressive correction of schemata we can arrive at a naturalistic art. And, indeed, it is to be observed that when Gombrich is thinking most evidently under the influence of this view of perception, he does, implicitly at least, abandon his redefinition of Naturalism and settle for a very different view of the matter. On such occasions, that is to say, he suggests that naturalistic painting is painting that satisfies one or other of the two following conditions. Either it is such that nature can be seen in terms of it; that is to say, the test of Naturalism is 'the tentative projection of works of art into nature' (p. 273). Or, alternatively, it is such that it can be seen in terms of nature: 'the question is not whether nature "really looks" like these pictorial devices but whether pictures with such features suggest a reading in terms of natural objects' (p. 304). But it does not seem that either of these further definitions is adequate to what we ordinarily understand by Naturalism—so long, that is, as we also adhere to the view that perception involves interpretation. But it is, of course, only so long as we adhere to this view that we have any need for either definition in preference to the original definition in terms of information.

It would, however, be wrong to conclude from this that we have

here a powerful argument against Gombrich's theory of artistic change. For I think it can fairly readily be shown that the thesis that perception always involves interpretation or the application of schemata, is untenable. Not that it is false. For though the thesis is popular with a certain school of experimental psychologists, by whom Gombrich has been strongly influenced, it can be faulted not on empirical but on logical grounds. For to say that a certain perception involves interpretation or the application of a schema surely entails that there is something that is perceived and on which the interpretation is imposed or to which the schema is applied. Now unless we are to be caught up in an infinite regress of perceptions, we must allow that *this* perception itself was not a case of interpretation.

Gombrich seems at times to admit this. He admits it *implicitly*, for instance, when he writes: 'Whenever we receive a visual impression, we react by docketing it, filing it, grouping it in one way or another' (p. 251)—for he exposes himself immediately to the question: What is the 'it' that is the object of all these processes which are, I take it, the various species of interpretation? And he admits the same point *explicitly* on the occasions when he puts forward the retinal stimulus as the candidate for being the original uninterpreted raw material upon which we place our various interpretations. 'Without some initial system, without a first guess to which we can stick unless it is disproved', he writes at one point, 'we could indeed make no "sense" of the milliards of ambiguous stimuli that reach us from our environment' (p. 231). Or again he writes: 'The stimulus pattern on the retina must of necessity allow of an infinite number of interpretations, none of which can be further confirmed or refuted except on grounds of probability' (p. 278). But of course this particular candidate will not do and elsewhere he produces the argument that effectively disposes of it—'We can never see our own retinas' he writes (p. 217)—for it is clear from his whole discussion that, at any rate in his sense of interpretation, a visual interpretation must be of something visual or seen. But none of this alters the fact that *a* candidate for being the object of our interpretation, for being that which is interpreted, is required if the theory is to be coherent.

IX

The strength of *Art and Illusion* must, then, rest upon the more restricted thesis: that of the necessary connection between the progress of representation in art, on the one hand, and the employment of pictorial schemata, on the other.

The efficacy of this thesis for resolving Gombrich's central problem

is something that we have already considered: it provides a clue to the question why representational art has a history—although, of course, it makes no attempt to answer the more specific question why art has the particular history that it has. But even within this limited, though by no means narrow, context the thesis still suffers somewhat from a certain ambiguity or imprecision in its formulation. Representational art owes its history, we are told, to the use of pictorial schemata. But what, we might ask, are schemata? Now it is fairly clear what Gombrich does not mean by talking of 'schemata'. And it is fairly clear what, in a very rough way, he does mean by talking of 'schemata'. But to say exactly what he means is not without its difficulties. I am not going to say that Gombrich uses the word 'schema' in different senses. That would be unwarranted. But what I think would be true to say is that at different times he seems to be working under different conceptions of what a typical instance of a schema would be, and these different conceptions lead to an elusiveness in the thesis taken as a whole. Let me explain:

1. The most ordinary and the most evident thing that Gombrich has in mind when he talks of 'a schema' is any form or configuration that an artist uses to represent, depict, portray an object in the world. In this context a schema has no special degree of complexity or sophistication; it can vary from the simple diagrammatic shapes employed by Gombrich's niece in her delightful copy after Wivenhoe Park (Fig. 244) to the minutely detailed (though inaccurate) image of the whale which figures in the two engravings (*c.* 1600), one Italian, one Dutch (Figs. 57, 58), which Gombrich reproduces. It is in this general, extended usage of 'schemata' that Morellian connoisseurship might be said to be characteristically concerned with the morphology of a particular sub-set of schemata: roughly, those used to portray certain parts of the body (notably, the hand and ear) or certain natural objects.[11]

2. At other times, however, Gombrich in talking of schemata would appear to have in mind forms or configurations that satisfy a further condition: namely, that they are highly simplified. The divided oval or egg-shape as an abbreviation of the human head—a matter on which Gombrich has some highly illuminating things to say (pp. 144–8)—is a typical example of a schema in this sense; and it is, I think, very significant that in so far as Gombrich writes or thinks under the direction of this conception of the typical schema, he identifies 'schematic' art with what used to be called 'conceptual' art (*e.g.* pp. 122–3, 247).

3. At yet other times Gombrich appears to work with a very different conception indeed of what a schema is, and this is when he identifies schemata with those very general and elusive elements which conjointly make up what we call a style. So, for instance, in the course of describing

Constable's artistic evolution, Gombrich talks of the painter's 'dissatisfaction with ready-make idyllic schemata, his wish to go beyond them and discover visual truth' (p. 325). But what are the 'idyllic schemata' with which Constable grew dissatisfied? It is evident from the context of the discussion that they are not to be narrowly identified with useful pictorial devices for portraying such things as distant mountains or spreading oaks and ilex. They are, rather, to be taken broadly to include things as general and as 'non-formal' as the choice of subject-matter, the atmosphere in which the subject is invested, and the preference for a certain kind of over-all finish, or lack of finish, in the picture.

Of course, Gombrich performs a useful service by employing the word 'schema' so generously, for he brings home to us how different elements in a picture can have a common function. But at a price. At the price, that is, of making the thesis of schema and correction a bit imprecise.

Basically, the hypothesis of schema and correction relates to the first usage of 'schema' as equivalent to any configuration employed to represent an object. But the existence of the other two usages I have specified leads to confusion in the following ways. First of all, by failing to distinguish clearly between schema as *any* inherited or invented configuration and schema as always an abbreviated or simplified configuration, Gombrich slides from the view that representation always begins with some configuration into the rather more specific view that representation always begins with a simplified configuration: in other words, setting out to explain why art has a history at all, he commits himself in an entirely *a priori* way to a specific, though still very general, account of what that history was: namely, that in the beginning there were simple forms. This assumption emerges clearly in Gombrich's discussion of Paleolithic art, where he treats the complex cave-paintings of Lascaux as constituting a potential threat, or providing a *prima facie* counter-example, to the thesis of schema and correction: and he feels that he can get around the difficulty and save his thesis only by postulating 'thousands of years of image-making' which must have preceded these so-called 'primitive' works (p. 91).

Again, the existence in Gombrich's vocabulary of 'schema' as the correct appellation for highly general pictorial elements such as the preference for one kind of subject matter or method of illumination rather than another, makes it very difficult at times to see how much of the phenomenon of art Gombrich thinks his thesis covers. More specifically, does the hypothesis of schema and correction provide an over-all explanation of 'stylistic' change? Whether it does or does not depends, presumably, on the prior question whether a style can be analysed without remainder into a set of schemata. I am sure that, on the whole,

Gombrich thinks that it cannot be (*e.g.* p. 310). But there are, as I have indicated, passages where he suggests that it can. Until such problems are resolved, the scope of Gombrich's hypothesis remains indeterminate. It is an imperative demand of science that for any quantified statement an unrelenting effort should be made to specify the range of phenomena over which it holds good.

X

In this lecture I have singled out certain elements of Gombrich's book for praise, and I have suggested a number of criticisms. 'But why criticism?' I can imagine an impatient listener saying: 'If you have so high an opinion of the book, as you politely say you have, why spend so much time on criticism? For criticism is easy enough.' And that would be a profound and an enlightening mistake.

The great difficulty in any modern book of aesthetics is to find anything to criticize. For, by and large, what is not unintelligible is truism. The supreme merit of *Art and Illusion* is that it permits criticism. It states a large number of decidable questions, and gives to them answers that are interesting, clear, and lucid. In other words, Professor Gombrich has taken hold of a subject that is habitually given over to vacuity and pretentiousness, and he has bestowed upon it some of the precision, the elegance and the excitement of a science. And eccentrically enough he has achieved this by writing a book that is both erudite and witty.

REFERENCES

[1] E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion* (London and New York, 1960). All page and figure references are to the Second London edition, 1962: the second edition was reset and references will not correspond to the First edition.

[2] Gombrich quotes James Barry as expressing a perceptual theory of artistic change in a lecture delivered to the Royal Academy (pp. 12–14): but the major advocates of this theory are Franz Wickhoff (p. 18) and Alois Riegl (pp. 17–20).

[3] Gombrich attributes some such theory as this to Pliny and to Vasari (pp. 11–12): though he is careful to observe that Vasari at any rate 'could not disentangle the idea of invention from that of the imitation of nature'.

[4] 'Seeing and Knowing' is, of course the title of a book by Berenson in which the theory is expounded in its simplest form. Gombrich's major references are, however, to it in the versions held by Ruskin and Roger Fry (pp. 296–9).

[5] Gombrich points out that it was Wölfflin who first gave currency to the catchword the 'history of seeing', though 'it was also he who warned against taking this metaphor too seriously' (p. 17).

[6] 'We catch a glimpse of the reasons why these limitations will never obtrude themselves' within the domain of art itself. Art presupposes mastery, and the greater the artist the more surely will he instinctively avoid a task where his mastery would fail to serve him. The layman may wonder whether Giotto could have painted a view of Fiesole in sunshine, but the historian will suspect that, lacking the means he would not have wanted to, or rather that he could

not have wanted to. We like to assume, somehow, that where there is a will there is also a way, but in matters of art the maxim should read that only where there is a way is there also a will. The individual can enrich the ways and means that his culture offers him; he can hardly wish for something that he has never known is possible' (p. 75).

[7] In the Preface to the Second Edition, Gombrich writes: 'I am grateful to one of my painter friends, who helped me to formulate my problem afresh by asking me to tell quite simply what would be the opposite of the view I hold. It would be a state of affairs in which every person could always achieve fidelity to nature. The mere desire to preserve the likeness of a beloved person or of a beautiful view would then suffice for the artist to "copy" what he sees' (p. xii). This is not the contradictory of Gombrich's thesis but a contrary; as such it seems to me a highly misleading means of conveying the content of Gombrich's views. It is certainly true that someone who subscribed to Gombrich's views would reject the view that 'every person wielding a brush could always achieve fidelity to nature'. But so would anyone else in his sane mind. The content of the thesis of schema and correction seems to me to consist in two propositions: (1) The notion of 'naturalism' or 'fidelity to nature' is properly speaking a relative notion, so that when we describe a painting as naturalistic we are really saying that it is more naturalistic than certain other paintings. (2) There is no single serial order in which paintings can be placed according to whether they are more or less naturalistic than others, but there are a number of such serial orders corresponding to different conventions or notations. I am convinced that both these propositions are true: as well as being inconsistent with some things said in *Art and Illusion*, *e.g.* the equation of Naturalism with illusion. There is a third proposition, which I also believe to be true, and which is possibly, though not certainly, part of Gombrich's thesis: namely, that the notion of 'what we see' is essentially bound up with how we would depict it or the schema we would use to portray it. Gombrich's preoccupation with the constancies—which are, after all, no more than specific instances or exemplifications of this proposition—confirms the supposition that this is part of his general doctrine.

[8] It is perhaps significant that Gombrich at this juncture does not consider sculpture where these limitations of illusion—at any rate the first two—do not apply, or apply to a lesser degree. The fact that *trompe l'œil* can be more readily obtained here might have led Gombrich to shy away from it as the limiting case or ideal of naturalistic representation.

[9] I mean by this the psychological attitude that we adopt. My argument would not be affected by any demonstration that, in looking at a picture where a river is depicted as being behind a tree, the eye makes the same kind of accommodation movement as if the river were actually farther away than the tree. (This note is stimulated by an observation made by Gombrich in private discussion.)

[10] For 'seeing as' see J. L. Austin, *Sense and Sensibilia* (London, 1962), pp. 100–2.

[11] *e.g.* 'Only a close observation of the forms peculiar to a master in his representation of the human figure can lead to any adequate results', Giovanni Morelli *Italian Masters in German Galleries* (London, 1883), p. 2, or the statement quoted by Layard: 'What I maintain is that the forms, more especially those of the hand and ear, aid us in distinguishing the works of a master from those of his imitators, and control the judgement which subjective impressions might lead us to prounounce.' Giovanni Morelli *Italian Painters* (London, 1892), p. 32.

THE QUALITY OF FEELING IN ART

Harold Osborne

IN THIS paper I propose to discuss the view that qualities of emotion and feeling may be ascribed to works of art without implied metaphor, so that when I call a piece of music cheerful my words may sometimes mean what they seem to mean and will not always need to be reinterpreted by the philosopher as if I were saying for example that I, or others, feel cheerful when listening to the music or that I regard the music as a sign that the composer was cheerful when he invented it. This theory of straightforward emotional realism about works of art has been advocated in two papers which have recently appeared in *The British Journal of Aesthetics*. In an article entitled 'Emotions and Emotional Qualities' Professor R. W. Hepburn argued in favour of the account 'which claims that emotional qualities can be described, with perfect propriety, as *in* works of art'. And in 'The Language of Feelings' Mr. Huw Morris-Jones wrote: 'The connection between a work of art and feeling must be described in such a way that one can locate the feeling in the work of art itself, in such a way that one can legitimately talk of discovering and discriminating the feelings appropriate and relevant to it. So that when we say that a play or music or sculpture is tragic or happy or sombre, we are not describing what the artist felt like nor are we describing how we feel when we look at or listen to them. It is not I who am tragic or happy or sombre, but the play, the poem, the song, the painting or whatever it is. What I do in saying that they are such is to *recognize* the sadness or happiness, and I implicitly claim that others should recognize them, too, if they have undergone those perceptual and imaginative experiences which constitute an exhaustive appreciation of those works of art.'[1]

To avoid talking at cross purposes the point should be made at the outset that this theory is not concerned to assert merely that emotions and feelings may be objectively present in works of art in the same sort

of way that thoughts and ideas are sometimes present in them, as part of their representational content. It is not in dispute that emotional situations are described or depicted by some works of art just as they are described or depicted in newspaper reportage, amusement novels, comic strips, advertisement posters and musical reviews. What the theory alleges is that a work of art itself, or some part of it, may be apprehended as characterized by emotion or feeling. Emotional epithets are applied to non-figurative art where there is no evocation of anything other than the work itself. Where a work of art is representational it is a common thing for critics to pronounce whether the emotional character of the work itself, or some part or aspect of it, is congruent or at variance with the emotional situations depicted or described in it. The theory to be discussed is a theory about the attribution of emotional qualities to works of art themselves not a theory about the mechanisms by which information can be communicated about emotional situations real or imaginary.[2]

I do not propose to dispute the factual basis upon which the theory rests. It seems to me to be sufficiently attested that our experience of works of art does sometimes carry with it apprehension of apparently objective qualities such as cheerfulness, melancholy, boisterousness, restlessness, severity and so on. Even with very simple stimuli such as uncombined colours and sounds some experimental psychologists, following Bullough, classify subjects who tend to report the emotional effect of the stimulus upon themselves apart from those who ascribe to it an emotional character objectively. In *The Experimental Psychology of Beauty* (1962) Professor C. W. Valentine records that in certain experiments by Bullough and C. S. Myers in order to clarify whether the comment 'cheerful' meant that a colour itself was cheerful or that it made the observer feel cheerful subjects were asked for an explanation 'and generally they were very decided, some emphatically asserting that it was the colour itself that appeared cheerful, not that it made them feel cheerful, while to others it appeared absurd to speak of a colour being itself cheerful' (p. 56). There are indeed many people to whom upon reflection it seems absurd to speak of a work of art or a sense impression as having feelings and who nevertheless find it the aptest description of their experience in contact with aesthetic objects. It is undoubtedly a very odd way of talking unless you assume that sentences attributing emotional qualities to works of art are to be understood in a figurative sense. We have not direct awareness of the feelings of other people but infer them from observed demeanour, and we verify our inferences by their subsequent behaviour and their verbal reports of their own introspective observations. Yet the theory seems to be claiming that we

directly apprehend affective states in aesthetic objects which are not sentient beings. Nor would matters be helped by assuming that we are indulging in the ancient practice of animism and employing the language of personification, as when the poet speaks of 'the remorseless stone'.[3] For always of a sentient being or an object personified as if it were a sentient being it makes sense to ask whether it is really cheerful or only seems cheerful. Despair may lurk concealed beneath the antics of the clown. But of a piece of music it makes no sense to ask whether it is really sad or only sounds sad; for the music is the sound. The picture is the visual appearance: it makes no sense to ask whether that appearance is really sombre or whether it only appears so.[4] And in its modern form at any rate this theory of straightforward emotional realism in aesthetics does not invoke personification. Professor Hepburn says explicitly: 'People experience emotions: works of art do not.' Yet on the next page he can say: 'A piece of music may be in despair, but I who listen enjoyably need by no means be in despair.'

I do not wish to repudiate but rather to accept that our experience of works of art brings with it *prima facie* apprehension of 'phenomenally objective' emotional qualities. But I am puzzled to know what import attaches to such statements as 'the music is cheerful' after you have said that the cheerfulness to which the statement refers is not something experienced by the work of art (for works of art do not experience emotions) nor something experienced by the listeners nor something experienced by the composer. There is something there which is apprehended; but in what sense is it 'there' and in what sense is it apprehended? I do not believe that the solution lies in a theory that aesthetic experience involves the cognition by direct acquaintance of non-experienced mental states. Professor Hepburn himself says that: 'To claim that the emotional quality can be in the work of art is not of course to say that the word "in" is used in precisely the same sense as when an emotion is said to be "in" you or "in" me.' I want to carry on from that point and ask in what way this apprehended but unexperienced emotion is 'in' the work of art, if indeed it is in fact there.

Theories of the sort we are discussing, which maintain the objective presence of feeling quality in experienced objects other than sentient beings, are not entirely new. An article by Virgil C. Aldrich which appeared in *The Kenyon Review* in 1939 proffered an account of how feeling 'may become objective and thereby be converted into aesthetic quality', and the author opined that the lack of such an account hitherto had been 'the cardinal weakness of current aesthetics'. His argument, which proceeds by analogy, starts with the premise that visual and aural sensation are modes of feeling by which we put out as it were sensory

tentacles and so become cognizant of objective qualities—colours and sounds—located in an external environment. When we attend to colours and sounds for their own sake, neither as qualities of physical things in external space nor as 'subjective qualities in and of the native organism of the subject' (he calls this passing from the practical to the aesthetic attitude), we experience secondary (emotional) feelings towards these primary (sensation) feelings and similarly become cognizant of emotional qualities which objectively characterize the visual or aural complexes on which our attention is directed. Aldrich held that objective emotional qualities belong only to constellations of colours and sounds and not to works of art regarded as physical objects; for, he says, 'no physical object as *physical* is ever an object of aesthetic enjoyment'. But in a much discussed article on 'Art and Feeling', published in 1924, Otto Baensch had maintained a still more radical view.[5] He denied that feelings exist only as internal states of sentient beings and claimed on the contrary that they exist 'quite objectively and apart from us' and are directly cognized as non-sensory qualities of perceived objects. 'The landscape does not express the mood but *has* it.' In opposition to the then popular theory of empathic projection he maintained that direct apprehension of emotional qualities is integral to all our awareness of external reality and their separation from sensory qualities results only from later theoretical abstraction. But affective states, he thought, are little susceptible of conceptual scientific study and are not easy of access by attentive contemplation. It is the special function of art to capture and fix the fleeting feelings so that their content may be presented to non-conceptual awareness and be apprehended with precision. 'According to this view', he says, 'the function of art is not to give the percipient any kind of pleasure, however noble, but to acquaint him with something which he has not known before.' Baensch also foreshadowed the view later developed by Collingwood, and hinted more recently by Professor J. M. Cameron in his Inaugural Lecture *Poetry and Dialectic*, that by the articulation of feeling in the construction of works of art we have an instrument of emotional cultivation and of self-knowledge. 'The separation, the selective condensation, and the internal grouping of the feeling complex to be shaped can only be accomplished', he wrote, 'by simultaneously creating and forming the object in which the complex of feelings achieves its existence. In practice, the shaping of the feeling and the shaping of the object into which it will be embedded coincide in one and the same activity.'

Both Aldrich and Baensch assume that the emotional quality apprehended as objectively present in a work of art will be identical with an emotion evoked in the percipient. (Aldrich believed that it is the feeling

experienced by the percipient in response to a work of art which reveals the corresponding feeling-quality objectively inhering in the work just as the sensation-feeling of yellow reveals the presence of an objective colour-quality yellow in the object. Baensch states: 'We become aware of objective feelings only when we feel them ourselves.') For this reason, besides the rather wild nature of their attribution of feelings to non-sentient things, their theories were open to many of the objections brought against the doctrine of empathy. This defect is absent from the formulations of Morris-Jones and Hepburn, both of whom allow or indeed insist that the percipient need not always himself experience the feeling which he apprehends objectively in the work of art.

Once we have made up our minds to the initial shockingness of language which speaks of feeling qualities inhering in things which do not feel, it is possible to hold with Aldrich that they belong only to aesthetic objects or one may go the whole hog with Baensch that although works of art excel other things as repositories of objective feelings, objective feeling qualities permeate all our experience of reality. A modified form of the latter view has recently gained the ascendant among psychologists of the Gestalt school of thinking who under the influence of Wertheimer's criticisms have become dissatisfied with the explanations offered by empathy and in place of empathic projection and association have advanced a theory of tertiary qualities. In the context of this theory tertiary qualities are perceptual 'regional' properties which are 'emergent' and not summative (or in the language of C. D. Broad, 'collective' properties which are not 'reducible'). They are held to permeate and suffuse all perception but are thought to be most prominent in works of art, where their apprehension is a large part of what is understood by 'appreciation'. According to C. C. Pratt writers who have adopted this new outlook 'tend to agree on at least three points: (*a*) Tertiary qualities can only be described by words which also connote subjective moods, but they themselves are not subjective; (*b*) they are intrinsic properties of visual and auditory perception, not borrowed from any other modality; and (*c*) they are probably correlated with higher-order stimulus variables.'[8]

The notion that constellations of visual and auditory perceptions display regional, non-summative properties emergent at various levels is by now well established. What is new, and indeed strange, is the idea that emotional qualities are objective in this way, that there are perceived properties of things which are expressive of emotion without provoking emotion in the percipient or being interpreted as the sign of emotion in some other sentient being. The advocates of this new way of looking at things do not, I believe, intend to cut across commonsense notions to

the extent that Baensch is supposed to have done. I shall therefore assume in the discussion which follows that the following propositions will be common ground between us. When I speak of feelings I shall mean states of consciousness such as some of those with which I have acquaintance in myself by introspection. I have no acquaintance with feelings of any being except myself. I have grounds for believing nevertheless that some other sentient beings at any rate have feelings, and I do so believe. I do not believe that anything which is not a sentient being has feelings: and in particular I do not believe that constellations of my own or other people's sense impressions have feelings other than the feelings which I have when attending to my own sense impressions or which I believe other people have when they attend to theirs. On the basis of these assumptions the question before us is still what meaning attaches to the statement that emotional qualities are objective properties of appearances or, to put it the other way round, why we think that tertiary qualities, being objective 'regional' properties, are appropriately describable in words which connote feelings and emotions. How do these qualities 'express feeling' if they are neither stimulus nor sign of actual experienced feelings?

The simplest of the answers given alleges that constellations of visual or auditory impressions are said to express an emotion or to have an emotional quality when their configuration is identical with, or very similar to, the pattern of configuration which we often see in the posture and demeanour of persons whom we believe to be under the sway of that emotion. We do not call the swan proud because it makes us feel proud (proud persons do not make us feel proud either), nor yet because we believe that the swan feels proud. We call it proud because the tense grace of the curving neck and smooth stately sweep of its motion through the water make a pattern identical with a pattern we have observed in the demeanour of proud persons. When Milton calls the nightingale 'most musical, most melancholy', he does not necessarily mean to suggest either that the bird is unhappy or that he is unhappy when he hears its voice. He is rather suggesting an objective pattern of melancholy in the nightingale's song—as, indeed, Christina Georgina Rossetti makes explicit in the lines:

> I shall not hear the nightingale
> Sing on, as if in pain.

According to this explanation experienced feeling is the ultimate term of reference for all talk about emotional expression. I say that I am dejected when I am aware of a feeling of dejection in myself. I call a whole group of visual patterns 'dejected-looking' because they have a

certain drooping, listless pattern of appearance which many people (including myself) often display in their posture and gesture when I believe them to be feeling dejected. As Kant and afterwards Herbert Spencer believed, the expressive character of music is according to this theory attributable to structural identities with the patterns of sound in ordinary language when spoken under the influence of emotion.[7]

This explanation breaks down in face of the greater potentialities for the expression of feeling in art and the relative crudeness of our abilities to communicate or diagnose emotion from facial expression and bodily gesture alone unless one is also given a clue from the situation and context.[8] It would, for example, not seem plausible to reduce the expressive power of the dance to our familiarity with the quotidian use of gesture. Rudolf Arnheim expressly rejects the explanation which derives the expressive character of tertiary qualities from any similarity to the actual physical manifestations of emotion in human beings. On the contrary, he holds that 'expression is an inherent characteristic of perceptual patterns' and that 'its manifestations in the human figure are but a special case of a more general phenomenon. The comparison of an object's expression with a human state of mind is a secondary process. . . .'[9] He gets over the difficulty by making feeling irrelevant to the expression of feeling. Music which is sad sounds like a sad man looks. But the look of a man who is sad is not sad because it is the look of a man who feels sad. The appearance of the sad man and the sound of the sad music are intrinsically sad irrespective of any reference to an experience of sadness. And once again we must ask, granted that the sad appearance and the sad music have a similar configurational pattern, what is the significance of calling that pattern 'sad' rather than 'jolly' or 'rude' or any other name at all unless there is an inherent connection between tertiary qualities and experienced feelings? Some Gestalt psychologists and some aestheticians have sought to find a bridge in a doctrine of psychophysical parallelism which postulates structural identity between 'expressive' perceptual configuration qualities and patterns of experienced feeling. According to this view, an observed configurational quality expresses an emotion not because it arouses the emotion in us which we unconsciously project upon it, and not because it is structurally similar to the visual pattern of a human being expressing the emotion by bodily demeanour and gesture: it does so because its structure is identical with the structure of the experienced feeling. As was said by Paul Guillaume: 'If the two aspects (inner and outer) are expressions of one and the same psychophysical dynamism, profound analogies should be encountered between them. . . . The mental or central part of the emotion obeys the same dynamic law as the peripheral part; the same rhythms can be

detected in the conscious feeling of a man during emotion as in his muscular reactions; the hidden movements of the psyche and the visible or invisible movements of the body image one another; in the language applied to emotions there is often no difference between the terms applied to the internal feeling and those applied to the external symptom.'[10] The pattern-qualities which we observe in the deportment and gestures of other people and the more refined pattern-qualities which we perceive in works of art are therefore expressive because they are identical with the patterns of our own feelings. The music sounds the way an emotion feels.[11] This, if I have understood her correctly, is the sort of thing which Mrs. Susanne Langer was saying when she has spoken of 'symbolic presentation'.

I am myself profoundly sceptical of the notion that a tonal or a visual structure can be isomorphic with the pattern of an affective state. Besides specific emotions (fury over the loss of a penny) we know in introspection unattached, 'objectless' feelings or moods which while they last colour the whole content of conscious experience like a floating charge on the furniture of the mind. Moods of sadness or joy, elation, depression, serenity, restlessness (Locke's 'uneasiness'), apathy, vivacity, irritability and so on are not directed upon any particular stimulus in awareness or tied up with any impulse to particular action. Their causes are often obscure. The feeling fills the whole mind and tinges our attitude to whatever our experience is. When we are sad even joyful news gladdens us the less and we welcome sorrow almost with sympathy. These vague moods of feeling become qualitatively articulated and more precise when they enter into this or that concrete emotion as its affective element, when they are linked to a specific stimulus involving a tendency to action (as sadness becomes grief when linked to the news of a death) or tied in with some situation appraisal (as despondency becomes contrition when joined with a belief that one has committed a sin). But when we use emotional language about works of art we attribute to them the qualities of moods not the feeling tones of concrete emotions. We say that a tune is merry or gay, lively, languorous, melancholy or serene. We do not hear in the music the emotions of regret, remorse, shame, disappointment, jealousy, fear or amazement. Music may express yearning but not home-sickness, amorousness but not love. But the moods are not highly structured as works of art are structured. So far as I can observe, my feeling of sadness or elation is as nearly structureless as anything I know. While it lasts it is here and everywhere, like an atmosphere or an odour, or a diffused toning of colour, lending a special flavour of melancholy or joy to anything that comes into my mind. It has duration, but it has no internal structure.

And the word 'rhythm' seems inappropriate to describe the fluctuations and interplay of the various moods in experience. I can find nothing useful in postulating that the higher-level emergent configuration properties of works of art resemble the patterns or rhythms of feeling. It is a statement hard to refute but incapable of proof. It may seem prematurely plausible but takes us nowhere.

I do not believe that we can solve the problem posed by the phenomenal objectivity of feeling qualities except after examining more closely the ways in which emotion-epithets are applied to aesthetic objects. In order to show one way in which such an examination might proceed I propose in the remainder of this article to distinguish three points at which emotional language breaks in upon descriptive accounts of perceptible objects.

1. Speech is fashioned for practical needs and recognizable perceptual qualities exist far in excess of the words available to name them in any language. We draw upon a rich stock of epithets descriptive of visible shape: we describe the things we see as short, long, slender, straight, bent, crooked, bulbous, bloated, pinched, spare, tapering, undulant, crimped, angular, pointed, blunt. . . . We use another group of epithets which belong primarily to descriptions of the human body but are applied by metonymy to other things: obese, lank, gaunt, svelte, plump, chubby, snub, squat, dumpy. . . . Some few shapes have names such as squares, circles, cubes, triangles. . . . But even so we soon run out of words. Specialists who habitually attend to the shapes of natural objects or artifacts for other than the practical purposes of living know a multiplicity—indeed perhaps a very great multiplicity—of shapes for which they have no names even in the esoteric languages which they often invent. But shapes do not become subjective when language is no longer productive of names by which to give them a label. They are apprehended in perception as objective shape-qualities of things perceived. Yet when we need to talk about unnamed shape-qualities we are at a loss and begin to use the language of metaphor, analogy and emotion. Our vocabulary for naming three-dimensional shape-qualities is far more jejune. The epithets available for describing configurations of colours are poorer still. And there are no words for naming the shapes which are used in building up structures of musical sound. In exchanging ideas about music, sculpture and colour the scope for descriptive talking, lying between technical language on the one side and metaphorical-emotional language on the other, is very narrow indeed.

It is further to be observed that apprehension of unnamed perceptual qualities is with many people inclined to be charged with feeling and indeed most people sometimes achieve awareness of recondite qualities,

recognize and pinpoint them, in the first instance at any rate by means of feeling. At this point in the inquiry it becomes necessary to admit the existence of cognitive feelings.[12] It is the experience of many people who have habitual commerce with the fine arts or who otherwise attend to the perceptual qualities of things beyond the ordinary needs of daily living that the more recondite perceptual qualities, those which transcend the ingenuity of descriptive linguistic devices, obtrude into awareness first as feeling tone; only as they become more familiar, or clearer to cognition, the feeling fades and the quality which was first intimated through feeling is later apprehended without affective tone in a more penetrating and lucid perceptual act. Feeling seems as it were to grope ahead of perception and to put out cognitive tentacles in advance of clear apprehension. At this level of apprehension competent appreciation cognizes perceptually without the misting haze of feeling.

2. In aesthetic cognition perceptual qualities which are common to more than one mode of perception—sometimes called 'intersensory qualities'—come into prominence. They are mostly if not entirely emergent regional properties of more or less high-level configurations. Examples of epithets corresponding to intersensory qualities are: pretty, decorative, delicate, stately, majestic, turgid, bombastic, flamboyant, jejune, simple, austere. . . . These are descriptive terms denoting perceptual qualities which are none the less objective because a certain degree of vagueness or imprecision attaches to the language by which we speak of them. It is by reference to characteristics of this sort that critics describe and demonstrate artistic styles and make stylistic comparisons between the various arts. Groups of intersensory qualities form the basis of those definitions of style upon which many art historians rely. Such general characterizations of style as were proposed, for example, by Wölfflin in his *Principles of Art History* and applied more systematically by Wylie Sypher in *Four Stages of Renaissance Style* over the arts of poetry, painting, architecture, sculpture and theatre are justified only in so far as there are high-level configurational properties common to more than one perceptual mode.

But in this sphere also the intersensory qualities which we discern outstrip the fertility of language to name or discriminate them and where language falls short we communicate perforce by metaphor and analogy. Though 'poignant' is an epithet applicable to emotion, it may well be applied in the reaching for exactness to an intersensory quality of perception. Furthermore although intersensory qualities are objective characteristics of perceptual appearances, our awareness of them is often achieved by means of feelings which are cognitive in character. We *feel* that a work of art is dainty, austere, florid, compact. But the feeling is

not awareness of an emotional response in ourselves, deflecting attention inwards; it is an outward directed, cognitive feeling. The extent to which apprehension of complex intersensory qualities depends upon feeling varies from person to person; but in general as appreciation becomes more competent and sure, reliance on feeling diminishes and perceptive cognition is cleared of feeling tone. In this sphere also feeling seems to probe ahead of perceptual awareness and as our sensitivity expands our reliance upon feeling recedes. The choice is not, as is sometimes represented, between emotional response to an art object and technical or intellectual analysis. People of greatest talent and experience appreciate for the most part by lucid and comprehensive perceptual apprehension of high-level emergent qualities.

3. The recondite sensory qualities merge without any sharp dividing line into the intersensory qualities, and there is no fixed boundary between the latter and emotional qualities.[13] Whether such terms as serene, pompous, majestic, stately, solemn, lugubrious, sprightly, comic, express perceptual or emotional qualities, or a combination of the two, can only be decided—with difficulty—from the context in which they occur. The emotional or 'expressive' characteristics *are* intersensory and *are* configurational or emergent and often impinge directly upon awareness in the act of perception.

Much of the confusion which attends emotional qualities and their attribution to aesthetic objects derives from a failure to segregate two categories of emotional qualities. They are too often all lumped together wrongly as 'physiognomic properties'—a term introduced into psychology by Heinz Werner and adopted generally without sufficiently careful analysis.[14] Physiognomic perception refers primarily to perceiving expressions of anger, joy, fear, sorrow or any other emotion in the object perceived. When a man is described as tall or short, contorted or suffused, we are mentioning his perceptual qualities. When we say that he is angry or merry we are speaking of pshysiognomic properties. But since we do not believe that feelings are experienced except by sentient beings, we cannot sensibly ascribe physiognomic properties (in this primary meaning of the term) to anything which is not a sentient being or for the time being regarded as such. If we perceive something as joyful, sad, friendly, etc., we assume it to be the appearance of a person who is experiencing (or simulating) these emotions or we more or less deliberately personify what we see. With children and primitives the separation between sentient and insentient is less sharp than with sophisticated adults. But in so far as the distinction is there we do not attribute emotions to insentient things except by analogy or phantasy. Artists, and particularly poets, personify natural objects and speak of

'angry sunsets', 'weeping willows', and the rest. Children, to whom personification comes easily, tend to project their own emotions upon the inanimate, and it would be idle to deny that empathic projection plays an important part in many people's appreciation of literary art. Since we do not personify musical compositions as such—nor indeed pictures or buildings or poems—it is not meaningful to describe them as joyful or sad, merry or morose, any more than we should refer to them as friendly or hostile, angry or afraid, rancorous, hilarious, jealous or contrite. It is a manner of speaking in which the words do not say what they seem to say.

It is necessary on the other hand to recognize that there is a more elementary, less differentiated manner of perceiving, sometimes called 'perceiving emotionally', in which the thing perceived is not held aloof from the percipient but is apprehended in terms of the significance it bears for him. When I become aware of something as awesome, ominous, sinister, menacing, reassuring, stimulating, charming, soothing, interesting, I am *perceiving emotionally*. The qualities apprehended in the object stand in polar relation to the attitude of the percipient and the one is complementary to the other. The anger of the angry man and the repentance of the penitent belong to them whether or not I perceive it or interpret correctly what I perceive. But when a man perceives emotionally the perceived qualities of the object and his attitude towards it are correlative and complimentary. In his genetic study of value judgement W. M. Urban spoke of 'affective-volitional meaning' in this connection. Heinz Werner used the term 'signal things'—things 'whose characteristics are determined by the condition of the perceiver, not by their physical properties or relationships to other objects'. And it was with this mode of experiencing the world in mind that J.-P. Sartre, in an essay written in 1939 under the influence of Husserl, said: 'L'émotion est une certaine manière d'appréhender le monde.' A recent study by Sylvia Honkavaara explicitly distinguishes this type of perception by the name 'dynamic-affective attitude' from physiognomic perception.[15]

In practical and scientific perception the emotion of the percipient is separated from the perception and attention fastened on those aspects of the appearance which serve as signs of the properties which an object has independently of the relation in which it stands to the subject. In aesthetic perception the attitude of the subject changes and attention fastens upon the appearance itself without ulterior motive but with the sole purpose of apprehension. Or, still within the aesthetic, non-practical attitude, one may attend rather to the emotional qualities of the presentation: one may perceive the object as menacing, louring, exhilarating, comic or sombre.[16] (Some works of art make a point of emphasizing

such emotional qualities while blurring or suppressing the objective perceptual qualities of what they depict.) But because in the aesthetic attitude one is not only detached from practical interest and concern but also from normal emotional involvement, the emotional qualities themselves appear as detached in perception and enter into awareness as it were cut off and anchored in the object, as if presented for observation and savouring rather than as the polar obverse of the observer's own emotional response. For in aesthetic perceiving I cut adrift from emotional involvement just as I cut adrift from practical involvement: when I perceive a design as sinister or mysterious I do not respond as if to the implication that I am in danger from it or with curiosity to discover the secret. I savour and enjoy the quality it has of being sinister or mysterious. When spontaneous practical concern is held in abeyance the close fusion of mood and object which is characteristic of emotional perceiving is disrupted and the mood-implications of the object are enjoyed without the vicissitudes of the mood-experience.

Language is very but not quite consistently defective of terms by which to discriminate moods and their complimentary mood-qualities at this level of experience. Most but not all mood-words have to do double duty to indicate both the felt mood and the objective counterpart. We do not indeed have an inclination to apply the word 'merry' to the object of merriment: we call it 'comic' or 'funny'. We do not say that a person confronted with a ghost is in a 'sinister' mood: we have in this case no word for the emotion, though 'awe' comes nearest to it. On the other hand we apply the words 'gay' and 'cheerful' to that quality of a landscape or a colour ensemble which is the correlate of a mood of gaiety and it is difficult to find any alternative way of saying what we want to say. But we do not want to say that the landscape is experiencing a cheerful mood. Nor do we intend to imply that we can only perceive cheerfulness or gaiety by being ourselves in a gay or cheerful mood. We condemn gay colours as incongruous to our mood at a funeral. Like most mood-words 'sad' (and still more clearly the French *triste*) has a dual connotation which is readily apparent to those who are at all sensitive to the uses of language. In its primary signification of mood we cannot say that music is sad, for nobody really wishes to imply or pretend that a constellation of sounds can feel the mood we call sadness. We can say the music is sombre, dismal, depressing, lugubrious, mournful, grim. But 'sad' has not only this primary sense. When we call the pudding sad we do not mean that the pudding feels sad. We can say that music or other art objects are sad, cheerful, gay in the secondary senses of these words, when they connote a mood-correlate (as 'funny' is—nearly—the correlate of 'merry') for which there is no separate term.

It is therefore the contention of this paper that a more careful examination of the language in which we describe our emotional experience of works of art would safeguard us from the bizarre theory that unfelt feelings are perceived 'in' aesthetic objects and would release us from the temptation to postulate an implausible isomorphism between the structures of works of art and the unobserved patterns and rhythms of our moods.

REFERENCES

[1] *B.J.A.*., Vol. 1, No. 4 and Vol. 2, No. 1.

[2] In the language of criticism different categories of emotion statements are habitually mingled in a way which makes them difficult to disentangle. For example on a single page (p. 223) of Erwin Christensen's *The History of Western Art* one may find three short descriptive statements about paintings by Raphael. Of the National Gallery *St. George and the Dragon* he writes: 'The mood is reposeful, hardly what one might expect in a life and death battle.' The *Cowper Madonna*, also in the National Gallery, is 'calm and serene . . . Mother and Child are emotionally united, their minds fixed on the future, the Passion. A meditative, serious spirit and a sweet, subdued melancholy underlie the peaceful scene'. And thirdly, in the *Sistine Madonna*, where the Queen of Heaven descends from the clouds as the curtains are drawn back, we are told: 'Though a heavenly vision, she appears simple and unaffected; the unassuming quality is perhaps the secret of her appeal. The Christ Child's serious expression seems to reveal his divinity, as his unchildlike gaze is contrasted with *putti* below. The Virgin, slightly embarrassed at presenting a divine Child, remains floating above the clouds. St. Barbara sinks into the clouds with eyes modestly removed from the Virgin.' The last of these quotations offers the critic's interpretation of the attitudes and demeanour of the depicted figures exactly as though he were describing a scene from real life or a photograph or *tableau vivant*; he says nothing about the emotional qualities of the picture. The second passage combines characterization of the painting, attributing to it serenity and calm, seriousness, sweetness and melancholy, with physiognomic interpretation of the emotions displayed by the depicted figures of the Mother and Child. The first passage attributes an emotional quality to the painting and notes that it is oddly at variance with the theme depicted. In a description of a painting by Domenico Ghirlandaio, Thomas Bodkin has noted that the emotional quality of the picture (which he assumes to be a sign of an emotion felt by the artist when he painted the picture and to be capable of evoking similar emotion in observers) is at variance with the subject depicted. 'The artist has depicted an old man, clad in the scarlet fur-trimmed robe of a Florentine senator and hideously afflicted with elephantiasis, who caresses his grandson. Most of us would be repelled by the appearance of the living man. But the emotion of the artist, reflected through the pictorial harmony he has devised, recreates in us a mood of unruffled serenity and allows us, as well, to recognize in his presentment the unquenchable nobility of the human spirit shackled in decay.' (*The Approach to Painting*, p. 63.)

When Fra Pietro da Novellara wrote of the lamb in Leonardo's cartoon of *The Madonna and Child with St. Anne*

and St. John Baptist 'that sacrificial animal, which signifies the Passion', he was referring to ideas contained representationally in the picture. So was Vasari when he wrote: 'She (The Virgin) looks down sweetly on a little St. John, who plays with a lamb, while St. Anne looks on smiling and overcome with joy at the sight of her earthly progeny become divine—ideas which were truly worthy of Leonardo's intellect and imagination.' But Peter Murray was referring to the emotional character of the picture itself when he said that it is 'one of the few great masterpieces which stand at the beginning of a formal evolution but have never been equalled in depth of feeling'. (*B.J.A.*, Vol. 2, No. 3.) It is in this sense that Yrjö Hirn writes of 'the melancholy which can be expressed, without any anthropomorphic element, by a mere relation between light and shadow' (*Origins of Art*, p. 138). And it is in this sense that Van Gogh said: 'J'ai voulu représenter par les couleurs les terribles passions humaines.'

[3] *Odyssey*, xi, 598. Cited by Aristotle as an example of 'vividness' (*enargeia*) in Homer, along with *Iliad*, xi, 574: 'the spears stood upright in the ground anxious to devour their fill of flesh.'

[4] Professor Hepburn has pointed out to me that the distinction between 'seems' and 'is' does have an application in artworks, as when I say 'All modal music may seem melancholy to you at first: but it isn't really.' He adds that this comment does not conflict with the arguments I am here deploying. I believe that I would seek to explain the phenomenon to which he alludes in terms of more and less complete 'actualization' of the music by the hearer. Could his 'but it isn't really' be rewritten: 'but if you successfully apprehend modal music as organic patterns of sound, you will not always hear it as melancholy'?

[5] Both this article and that by Aldrich are reprinted in Mrs. Susanne Langer's compilation *Reflections on Art* (1958). In her Introduction she confesses that Baensch's theory strikes her as 'slightly mad'.

[6] *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 12, 1961, p. 76.

[7] Herbert Spencer believed himself to have shown that 'what we regard as the distinctive traits of song are simply the traits of emotional speech intensified and systematized' and that 'vocal music and by consequence all music, is an idealization of the natural language of passion'. *The Origin and Function of Music* (1857). The theory was the subject of a brilliant attack by Ernest Newman in *Musical Studies* (1905). Kant attributed the charm of music to the following facts: 'Every expression in language has an associated tone suited to its sense. This tone indicates, more or less, a mode in which the speaker is affected, and in turn evokes it in the hearer also, in whom conversely it also excites the idea which in language is expressed with such a tone.' (Kant's own attitude to music was, however, somewhat ambivalent. He thought that: 'If we estimate the worth of the fine arts by the culture they supply to the mind, and adopt for our standard the expansion of the faculties whose confluence, in judgement, is necessary for cognition, music, since it plays merely with sensations, has the lowest place among the fine arts—just as it has perhaps the highest among those valued at the same time for their agreeableness.' None the less, he opines, 'music has a certain lack of urbanity about it. For owing chiefly to the character of the instruments, it scatters its influence abroad to an uncalled-for extent (through the neighbourhood) and thus, as it were, becomes obtrusive and deprives others, outside the musical circle, of their freedom.' (Kant was happy to have lived before the days of public broadcasting.)

[8] We need not go all the way with psychologists like Carney Landis or Samuel Fernberger who in opposition to Charles

Darwin claimed that it is impossible ever to diagnose emotion from facial expression and bodily gesture alone unless one is given also a clue from the situation and context. Darwin himself admitted in *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and the Animals* (1872) that the possibilities of external expression are not adequate to differentiate the varieties of emotion known to popular wisdom and enshrined in the common language.

[9] *Art and Visual Perception* (1956), pp. 367–8.

[10] *La Psychologie de la Forme* (1935).

[11] C. C. Pratt, 'Structural vs. Expressive Form in Music', *The Journal of Psychology* (1938), 5.

[12] Whether one speaks of a vague perception strongly charged with feeling or a feeling which is cognitive in that it carries awareness of a presented quality in the way that perception is cognitive, is a matter of convenience. I propose to use the latter way of talking, if only to counter a too sharp distinction between feeling and perception which has been encouraged by the terminology of classical psychology. It is a way of speaking which seems natural to many who have examined this sector of experience carefully but without linguistic preconceptions. Thus, for example, in *Poetry and Experience* Archibald MacLeish says of the word-structure of a poem: 'There is an enhancement of their meanings or perhaps, more precisely, of the significance of their meanings. It is not an enhancement which can be defined by abstract analysis and measurement. But the inability to define in abstract terms does not mean, contrary to notions now in vogue, that an experience is fanciful. It is still possible, even under the new vocabulary, to feel as well as to define. And what is present here is *felt*.' And again: 'Emotion *knows* the difference even though mind is defeated in its busy effort to pinch the difference between the thumb and finger of reason and so dispose of it. Emotion—and this is perhaps the point precisely—cannot dispose of it. Emotion stands there staring.' And: 'And the shape of total meaning when it begins to appear is a shape not in the understanding mind but in the recognizing perceptions—those fingers which can *feel*.'

[13] Heinz Werner says that we may speak 'in a very real sense not only of the softness of velvet, but also of a colour or a voice'. But it is easy to be led astray by linguistic habits and ingrained metaphor. In this case the opposite of tactile softness is hardness; the opposite of soft sound is loudness; and the opposite of a soft colour is vivid or contrasty colour. The only common feature of these three 'softs' seems to be a low degree of obtrusiveness.

[14] *Comparative Psychology of Mental Development* (1948).

[15] W. M. Urban, *Valuation. Its Nature and Laws* (1909). J.-P. Sartre, *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions* (1939). Sylvia Honkavaara, *The Psychology of Expression* (*The British Journal of Psychology*, Monograph Supplements XXXII, 1961).

[16] Aesthetic perceiving has been described as 'living in the immediate present'. In practical life present experience is subordinated to the future and the past. Whenever we are expectant, anxious or apprehensive, when we are hopeful, confident or exultant, these attitudes shape the present experience in the light of its implications for the future. When we are surprised, disappointed, filled with self-congratulation or regret, soothed with the comfortable feeling of familiarity and recognition, we are experiencing the present in the context and colouring of a selected past. All these attitudes are inhibited in aesthetic contemplation: but we may still become aware of 'polar' emotional qualities adhering in the object.

AESTHETIC VALUE AND THE ETHICS OF LIFE AFFIRMATION

Rolf Ekman

THERE ARE two possible lines of approach to aesthetic problems: from below and above (in the terminology of G. T. Fechner). The former way is usually considered to be the correct one by modern aestheticians; indeed, most of them are of opinion that this is self-evident. It is the empirical method. One begins with an analysis of works of art in order to understand artistic value criteria and the interrelation between art and reality, or with a psychological study of artistic experience or creativity. In the other case (the approach from above) the point of departure may be a philosophical system, when interest is not primarily in doing justice to the manifold diversity of reality but upon filling a gap in the system. One does not start from beautiful objects but from the concept or idea of beauty, often in such cases conceived as a metaphysical essence. So too Kant's aesthetics is conditioned by an interest 'from above', although it is perhaps not metaphysical, the purpose of his aesthetic theory being to eliminate a tension in his system between the theoretical and the practical.

But there is also another way of approaching the problems of aesthetics from above, that is from a moralistic or cultural philosophical doctrine. Instances are Nietzsche and Tolstoy, who while not constructing metaphysical systems nevertheless do not study aesthetics empirically. Plato may be said to combine the two methods of approach 'from above', his doctrine of art and beauty being both metaphysical and moralistic. I think we can take a positive interest in his moralistic arguments against art and his identification of the beautiful with the good without having to bother much about his metaphysics. Another kind of moralistic attitude is to be found in Marxism, which regards art as an instrument for social amelioration. Most aesthetic doctrines

with a moralistic basis display a reluctance to do justice to, or even recognize, purely aesthetic experiences or attitudes. As metaphysical aesthetic theories are inclined to favour abstract construction at the cost of sacrificing the richness of empirical reality, one may think that there are strong arguments for adopting instead an empirical method of aesthetics.

Still it seems that the empirical method is not quite sufficient if we want to reach durable criteria of aesthetic value, however important the various empirical methods may be within aesthetics. He who wants to establish criteria of the beautiful from an empirical point of view has to investigate a lot of objects which are considered by educated people to be aesthetically valuable and find out what they have in common (the relativity of evaluations then constituting a serious difficulty, of course). Let us say that he finds such a thing, for example a certain coherence in all those works of art which are most often considered important, a unity in variety, and that he also finds that the experience of this inner coherence is something specifically aesthetic which distinguishes aesthetic experience from experiences of, for example, the useful and the true. Then we might easily think that this would be an aesthetic value criterion with universal validity, and that all those works of art which have this quality would be valuable. But let us imagine a critic who cherishes a Marxist doctrine of morality, believing that a thing has value only in so far as it contributes to social amelioration. It is evident that he would not be satisfied. He would say that this purely aesthetic value, and the experience of it, could, it is true, be empirically confirmed but that it was a kind of luxury, something of inferior worth, and that a work of art which describes social evils ought to be more highly appreciated, even if it is not so well adapted to be experienced in a purely aesthetic way because of such qualities as coherence, composition and colour.

On the other hand, he who is of opinion, for example, that certain formal qualities should be regarded as the specifically aesthetic value *and* that a work of art should be appraised in terms of this value, must also maintain that this specifically aesthetic value occupies an important position in a general scale of life values. He must hold that this aesthetic value is, in its turn, something valuable and that people ought to strive for the experience of this value. Thus he too is forced, finally, to take refuge in a general doctrine of value, or an ethics, in order to bulwark his aesthetics.

Several modern aestheticians admit that aesthetic evaluations must have some connection with a general philosophy of life, though they have not developed this thought more fully. Others have deliberately

approached aesthetics from the standpoint of a cultural philosophy or an ethical doctrine, but the results they have reached may seem too narrow. Is it possible to find an ethical point of departure which can be accepted by and seem reasonable to most people and base on it a more plausible doctrine of aesthetic value criteria, a doctrine which would be firmly grounded and at the same time free from one-sidedness and narrowness?

I have tried to develop such an aesthetics in my book *Estetiska Problem* (in Swedish) and, more briefly, given an account of it (in English) in *Problems and Theories in Modern Aesthetics.** In the latter work I try, however, to present my own standpoint more indirectly, by indicating how my opinions diverge from those of others. In this essay I want to complete that account by a more direct statement in which I hope, despite its compactness, to be able to clarify certain points.

As my point of departure I choose a very broad principle which should appear reasonable to the majority of educated and intelligent people and which has played an important part in the history of culture: the affirmation of life. There are outstanding personalities who have maintained the opposite principle—the negation of life. But they have done so on the basis of certain arguments which do not seem to us to be tenable: for example that there is another existence after this earthly life and that we should prepare ourselves for that other existence by asceticism, the denial of this life; or that life, to him who can see through it, is and must be, at bottom, continuous suffering. It seems as if the representatives of the negation of life, by some psychological necessity, must find refuge in such doubtful or untenable arguments, and if we are of opinion that an ethical system should not rely on arguments that are logically defective, this is a fundamental weakness of the ethics of life-denial. Here also I shall make the assumption that an ethics fit for use must not be encumbered by such defects. Of course, much more could be said about this, but I must here content myself with these brief suggestions. He who accepts an ethic of affirmation will be able to continue with this presentation. He who does not will, on the contrary, find no common ground with it. But perhaps I should first make somewhat clearer why I consider the arguments mentioned above to be untenable.

As to the first-mentioned opinion, I can be brief—it means giving up that life which we know something about for the sake of another about which we do not know anything at all. It is connected with a kind of metaphysics against which we should be critical. The second opinion seems to hold a certain amount of truth when it says that our lives are ruled by blind will, struggle, or libido and that satisfaction lasts only

* Reviewed by R. W. Hepburn in Vol. 1, No. 3, of this Journal (Ed.).

during short intervals between periods of tedium and of desire. Life is a painful pursuing of that happiness which is never really permanent because as it tends to permanence, it changes into satiety.

But those who have adhered to this philosophy of profound disillusionment (and, of course, I think of Schopenhauer in the first place) have also maintained that there is a possibility of evading the tyranny of the will. By this trait their radical pessimism is, in fact, overcome. A true psychology must admit the possibility of liberation, of inner freedom, and this is an argument for a philosophy that does not deny life but affirms it. The negation often seeks support in arguments that are defective. The affirmation of life does not seem to need such arguments, and in this respect it has an advantage.

But is not this often a matter of temperament? There are deeply melancholic characters with whom the above arguments do not avail to turn them from their pessimism. Therefore we may have to abandon the absolute universality of our principle of life-affirmation. But most people would accept it. And those who are not able to do so are probably often conscious that it is an incapacity in themselves—they would like to take up an affirmative attitude to life, even if they cannot.

To some extent the question is susceptible of discussion, as, I hope, has been made clear by the above. Since we must adopt some starting-point, I shall choose that of the affirmation of life. What conclusions follow from this principle with reference to aesthetics? Is it not too general? I do not believe so.

Affirming life means wanting to continue living. There are elementary needs that must be satisfied in order that the organism may survive, and there are others (also elementary) which although not necessary to survival must nevertheless be satisfied if life is to be endurable. Of course it is in the interest of the affirmation of life that these needs be satisfied; otherwise the inclination to continue living would be undermined. There are other needs that are neither so necessary nor so important, but whose satisfaction still brings enrichment and augments the life-desire since they hold out promise of pleasures to come. Thus in the ethics of life-affirmation it follows that many needs should be satisfied. It should be observed that 'need' in this context does not include only those which are necessary for the organism, but also appetencies which are not always *felt* as needs, for example the urge for intellectual clarity or beauty.

A need for beauty? It may seem as if we had here come close to an aesthetic value criterion. The work of art would be good if it could satisfy a need for beauty, a specifically aesthetic need, and then it would 'only' be a question of finding the common characteristics of all beautiful

things. But now new difficulties arise. 'Beauty' has different meanings, and opinions differ about what is beautiful in the arts. Many aestheticians are of the opinion that it is possible to find a specifically aesthetic satisfaction which is experienced both before works of art and before beautiful landscapes. On this assumption those things would be beautiful in the aesthetic sense which have such qualities as to evoke this aesthetic satisfaction. Formalists define the beautiful as that which has 'significant form', that is that which has internal or structural perfection. The configuration of any beautiful thing must be stamped with a kind of inner necessity. It is internally coherent and has 'unity in variety', an inner *order* that gives special satisfaction. From this 'pure' aesthetic enjoyment all interest in an emotional content of the work of art (or of the reality represented) is missing; it is the enjoyment of the necessity or order of internal structural coherence, reminiscent of the perfect solution of a mathematical problem.

Without doubt there is such aesthetic satisfaction, even if not everyone experiences it. But art can also satisfy other needs, and must we not take that fact into account too? The formalist would reply that these other needs could be better satisfied by other activities than art. But could, for instance, the intellectual enrichment conferred by the depiction of human characters in the great novelists (such as Balzac, Thackeray, Dostojevsky) be better obtained in any other way? Or the particular emotional stimulation which can be achieved through sympathetic experience of great lyric poetry? The formalist could still say, it is true, that though these satisfactions can be given by art and though it may even be an important function of art to give them, yet they are not purely aesthetic satisfactions. Even if the work of art (whether it is literature, music, painting or anything else) gets an enhanced value by its capacity to satisfy such needs, it does not get an enhanced aesthetic value.

But can it be appropriate to use a terminology which excludes from aesthetic experience a great deal of what educated people do evaluate as of central importance in great art, and to try to construct aesthetic value criteria without taking such qualities into consideration—especially as art is an activity which is peculiarly adapted for communicating such experiences? Such a terminology seems artificial and must cause confusion. Moreover there remains the further problem, which has merely been postponed: With what criteria should a work of art comply in order to be able to confer these so-called non-aesthetic experiences? They cannot be criteria that are to be found also in science, since in that case science could serve as a substitute for art in this respect. The terminology in question is also unsuitable in that it can easily lead to neglect of essential values in art.

On the other hand, of course, not all the needs which a work of art can satisfy are such that we should take them into consideration when establishing criteria of aesthetic value. We have a need for warmth, and this can be satisfied by books if we burn them—to mention a drastic example. Of course we must also make a distinction between *e.g.* science and art, even if the boundaries are not always sharp. We should try to find a comprehensive definition of 'aesthetic' (the use of this word in a narrow, formalistic sense can be admitted at the same time, even if it is not appropriate here) that still is not so wide as to be nonsensical. Instead of connecting the word with a certain experience we can, as many aestheticians have done, let it denote a certain attitude in which it is possible to experience values of very different kinds. We could say that it involves isolation from all purposes except that enrichment which is felt in direct contemplation. In aesthetic contemplation the object contemplated is not a means to anything except the joy felt in this contemplation, even if it may *also* serve other purposes than this immediate aesthetic enrichment (and the capacity for serving other purposes, such as scientific and social ones, can be dependent on qualities which give aesthetic satisfaction). A work of art could, then, approximately be defined as a work which in some way appears as an incentive to the onlooker to behave aesthetically (even if not always only aesthetically).

But would it then be possible to establish aesthetic value criteria on such a heterogeneous basis? The work of art has value by being able to satisfy a great many various needs, the most elementary biological needs being excepted however. But what sort of appearance must it have in order to be able to do this? Perhaps we may obtain a criterion by asking what are the presuppositions of these various value experiences (I cannot here go further into the meaning of 'value' but only suggest a close connection with the satisfaction of needs) and then seeking a sort of common denominator?

One kind of satisfaction derives from the stimulation of our feelings or emotions. We experience those emotions which are expressed in the work of art. The presupposition is, of course, that we can *believe* in the work of art: that we do find these emotions in it. The work gives an illusion of them, but an illusion in which there always remains a consciousness that what we are experiencing is art and not reality—we are, even if only implicitly, aware of the illusion. Or we are deeply depressed by a certain emotion, and when we find it in the work of art this gives us liberation, a 'catharsis'; vent is given to that which oppresses us. In this case, too, we must believe in the emotional expression in the work of art; we must obtain a convincing semblance of the emotion in question. Or we read a realistic novel and experience a kind of enrich-

ment; we detect new areas of human life or see more clearly what we to some extent already knew before. But then the description must convince us—it must provide an illusion of reality. In all these cases the convincingness of the work of art, its capacity for making us believe in it, is a criterion of its value.

And what is it then that makes us believe in it? We do *not* believe in a description of, for example, a jealous man if he sometimes acts in a way that contradicts what we know about jealous people. Shakespeare, Ibsen, and the great novelists were, it is true, no scientific psychologists, but they had a profound knowledge of the human soul, from which scientific psychology has profited. Their works have a psychological truth, they are true to life, even if they are not historically true. Their truth lies on a more universal plane. But what about the phantastic and supernatural element in art? In this case there is a lack of scientific truth, be it physical or biological. But are they deficient in psychological truth too? Swift's *Gulliver' Travels* and Hans Andersen's tales do violate realism, but only, it seems to me, in order to emphasize various kinds of psychological truth. (For example, *The Emperor's New Clothes* tells us something about the human soul, about human vanity, in a more pregnant and emphatic way than a realistic description would do.)

Thus aesthetic verisimilitude has a kind of connection with truth, especially general psychological truth. And a criterion of truth is coherence or consistency. A person who is very greedy should consistently be described as being such. One element in the work of art should not run counter to the total impression. If it does so, the work lacks general psychological truth and we cannot believe in it. But this negative requirement is not enough. In addition every part of the work should have a function within the totality—nothing should be otiose. Further, especially in certain works of art (not so much realistic works but rather expressionistic ones), traits that are considered most essential are highly emphasized.

Consistency has often been erected in the history of aesthetics into a prerequisite of verisimilitude, but it has often been conceived too narrowly. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for instance, people were often of opinion that the tragic and the comic should not be mixed, or that music should express only *one* feeling. Or it was maintained that every element in the work of art should be so important that the work would be totally destroyed if this element were eliminated —a demand in keeping with the classical spirit of concentration. It is evident that these alternative ways of conceiving unity must limit the universal validity of this criterion.

Speaking of unity people often think of the classical. But the demand

that the work of art should be an organic unity was made also by romanticists, and modern aestheticians interested in ambiguity at the same time declare that the various meanings of a word or expression should converge towards the same goal.

Unity should not be conceived in such a way that it implies that the work would be destroyed if any part were taken away, but it should mean that the work would become less valuable if any element were taken away. It should mean, conversely, that a work is defective (more or less) if it contains one or more elements that do not serve any function whatsoever (or, of course, anything that conflicts with the totality). An element that has no function has in reality a detrimental function. Why? Because it then detains the beholder without profit, it hampers his attention to the valuable and thus weakens the illusion. There are picaresque novels that contain a great number of episodes (*e.g. Don Quixote*). Many of these could be excluded, and still the work would be worth reading. But these episodes do not conflict with the total impression; they are written in the same spirit as the rest and each of them has the power to catch our interest. They all have a function. The work of art should be a unity, like an organism, in the sense that everything must *function.*

The fact that artists often use different styles in the same work should not be adduced as an argument against this. These stylistic contradictions, too, must have a function if they are to be defended; by means of contrast they may high-light this or that episode and give it prominence. And complicated human characters cannot be forbidden in fiction—but they must be portrayed in such a way that we can believe in them all the time, *as* complicated characters of this special kind.

There are here three intimately connected requirements. Illusion (I like better the German term *Fiktion*, which means, in Hans Vaihinger's philosophy, conscious illusion or *bewusste Selbst-Täuschung*) is a function of the relation between the work of art and the beholder, truth a function of the relation between the work and reality, and organic unity (or coherence) a function of the internal relations within the work of art itself. This combined 'illusion-truth-coherence' criterion is very general as it is here conceived, but it is not so general as to become nonsensical. When we consider a work of art as defective it is often, I think, just because it does not 'hang together'—some element in it runs counter to the impression of the totality or seems superfluous.

If we keep to the last member of this threefold criterion, a formalistic aesthetician too would ascribe to our view. But he does not interest himself in anything else but the internal relations *within* the work; illusion and truth (when not defined as 'inner truth' only) are, according to him, aesthetically indifferent. He would point to some cases where it

is difficult to speak about these qualities. What feelings do architecture or non-figurative art represent, and how can you speak about truth to reality in those cases? How can music express anything? But this overlooks a kind of expressiveness which belongs also to non-figurative art. Different sorts of lines or curves have different emotional values; they suggest different sorts of feelings or emotions. And something similar can be said about music, which can represent feelings by tempo and rhythm.

I believe that the best works of art can often, or always, give formalistic satisfaction. We can stay before them in aesthetic admiration of the necessity of their internal coherence. But there are also works of art which may give a certain formalistic satisfaction but seem too schematic, dry or cold. From the standpoint chosen here it must be an advantage if a work of art is not only adapted to give formalistic enjoyment but can give also other kinds of enjoyment. On the whole it must, I think, be better if it can give several kinds of pleasure than if it can give only one? At any rate if we do not assume that the formalistic satisfaction which it may give is more valuable than others and cannot easily be combined with them.

In this illusion-truth-coherence principle I think we have found an elementary and universal aesthetic value criterion. And we have arrived at it from the ethics of life-affirmation. A second universal criterion seems to be originality. This should not be conceived too narrowly. A work need not arouse astonishment by deviating in a revolutionary way from what we are already acquainted with. It *can* be original in that way. But it can also be original by developing tendencies already known, or by conquering new areas of reality for art, or indeed by having a certain individual stamp—as I think all important works of art must have—the stamp of a creative personality.

Originality implies something new. Why should this be a value? Of course, an exact copy of a good work of art already known can give an aesthetic satisfaction—perhaps about the same satisfaction as the original. But it does not add anything new to the rich world of art and we have a certain need of variety. We cannot be satisfied by having the same objects always before our eyes. To those who do not know the original of the copy this does not matter. But it means a lot to those who already know it. They may be satisfied by a replica. But they need something new too, a certain variety, and this need is not satisfied by the copy. Moreover the copy is not a performance in the same way as the original.

However, it is obvious that this criterion is not exactly on the same plane as the one discussed above. It is not a necessary condition (in *any* degree) for aesthetic satisfaction, but it is a necessary condition for our talking about valuable *art*.

Thus, art should be able to give us various kinds of experiences, or to satisfy a variety of different needs. The condition for this is its verisimilitude, with which its coherence, in a wide sense, is connected. This is something elementary, a common denominator. To this we add, as a second criterion, originality, the importance of which is explained above. Can more criteria be established? Well, is it not clear that an artist, or a work of art, that can give the beholder several different satisfactions must be better than an artist, or a work, that can give him only one? In this case it is a question of the value of that complex of experiences itself which is communicated by the work of art, not of its originality, which necessarily implies comparison with other works, or of its truth or verisimilitude, which must also imply a comparison, *i.e.* with reality. A richer complex of experiences must, in the light of the ethical standpoint chosen here, be considered better or more valuable than one that is not so rich.

It seems plausible, too, to assume that of two experiences which are alike as to quality and both worthy of being striven for, that one should be preferred which has the greater intensity (if the intensity is not, as may sometimes be the case, so great as to become detrimental to the organism). One work of art may be adapted to satisfy more needs than another, it may be more diversified and in that way richer—and yet we may sometimes ask if the experience it communicates is really more valuable, if for example it is less intense while our experience of the simpler work has greater intensity.

But there is still at least one important factor to take into account besides richness and intensity. In order that we may assume that a richer work is better than a more homogeneous one it is not enough to estimate that the experiences communicated by them are equal in intensity. We can imagine that one work might give a greater number of valuable experiences than another but that the experience given by the latter would not be given by the former and might be so much more valuable as to make the work as a totality more essential, even if it is less diversified. If it is possible to compare different experiences in respect of their purely qualitative value, we should thus have here a third factor besides richness and intensity. Yet all these factors have in common, in contradistinction to the criteria discussed above, that they relate to the aesthetic experience itself, and the contents of the work of art in relation to it, and do not involve any comparison with reality or with other works of art (even if both truth-value and originality-value *can* be ingredients of this experience).

Sometimes we also talk about the 'profundity' of a work of art or an artist. By this we often perhaps mean the intensity of the experience

(and most often, I think, its emotional intensity). An experience that has little intensity is called superficial. By 'profundity' we can also mean wisdom. But then we are back, I think, with the factor which is above called 'quality' (as distinguished from richness and intensity) and the meaning of which I will now try to clarify.

What sort of experience should be striven for from the point of view of an ethics of life-affirmation? That which is richer and more intense, but also above all that which in its qualitative aspect implies nothing other than the affirmation of life in contradistinction to its negation. Life-affirmation is then that third factor which we sought. He who affirms life strives for richness and intensity of experience; but naturally he also seeks to avoid mental states involving life-negation and to achieve states of affirmation. An experience of affirmation is to him higher, better, and more valuable than an experience of life-negation, of purely pessimistic or morbid feelings.

But there are different kinds of life-affirmation. There is an affirmation of life that implies acceptance of the desire for glory, money, love, and other 'outward' or sensuous satisfactions. But is such an attitude ultimately in the interest of life-affirmation? Must not he who eagerly wants these things suffer from dissatisfaction as long as he does not own them, and then, if he wins some of them, be worried about losing them? Must not his situation necessarily be unsafe in this changeable world? Must he not always be exposed to the danger of severe disappointments, by which his positive attitude to life can be seriously shaken?

At bottom, from the perspective of life-affirmation, that attitude must be preferred in which we do not eagerly desire any 'outward' goals but are rather independent of these enjoyments, an attitude in which aesthetic and intellectual satisfactions are considered more valuable, more indispensable than power, glory, wealth, or erotic enjoyment. For we are more completely masters of the former kinds of satisfaction. That attitude to life should therefore be preferred which is marked by a certain restraint or self-control with regard to the needs of self-preservation, other people's estimation, erotic pleasures, etc. He who has achieved this attitude will feel safer in life. The natural aesthetic correlate of his evaluations is an art stamped with balance and control in contrast to exuberance or abundance. A safe and calm affirmation of life and a balanced, concentrated form—it is clear that this ideal belongs to the spirit of classicism, not of romanticism. At the same time the ideal of control and inner independence is that of classical antiquity.

Yet another distinction must be made, that between different kinds of affirmation. It is not only the affirmation which involves enslavement to wishes and desires that is easily changed into its opposite. The same

is true of the affirmation which closes its eyes to the manifold deficiencies of reality, to the sufferings of humanity. A life-affirmation with power to maintain itself resistant to change, immune to disillusion and bitterness, must have learnt the wisdom of pessimism. Often it is in this context that we use the opposite terms 'profundity' and 'superficiality'.

Now it could be argued that an art of disharmony and thoroughgoing melancholy, or one which pessimistically denies life, can also have a hygienic mental effect and so serve life. Against Plato's disapproval of poetry which is unharmonious or melancholy and his demand that only 'happy songs' should be heard, the purifying function of art has been advanced—Aristotle's doctrine of art as a 'catharsis'. A poet can (as Strindberg did) talk about 'writing himself free' by giving vent to that which oppresses him (in accordance, too, with the doctrine of the psychoanalysts). However, Aristotle too seems to accept Plato's standpoint in the main. It may be that melancholy or elegiac music can serve as a medicine sometimes—yet it should be used for this purpose only now and then. It is true that pessimistic or melancholy art can serve as a release or an *Ab-reagieren* when this is necessary, but it is also true that people are too often tempted to enjoy such art because of the emotional stimulation it gives—and thus are subjected to a detrimental and unhealthy mental influence.

It may be alleged that in this matter also we cannot talk about universality. People are different, and some have a greater need for melancholy art since it corresponds better to their own characters. However, a man can develop even in matters of this sort; he can train himself out of a state of basic disharmony. But he will not do this if he is always seeking things which are an expression of such a state, even if they give him momentary relief. The 'catharsis' argument can be dangerous by preventing the possibility of development, by excusing the perpetual search for dangerous emotional stimulants. We are not always guided by correct insight into what is good for us. It may be mentioned that Plato as well as Goethe and Vilhelm Ekelund (a Swedish author in the twentieth century, outstanding aphorist and moralist), that is those authors by whom I have been especially influenced to this superior evaluation of life-affirming art (later on I have found something similar in the well-known Swiss eighteenth-century aesthetician Sulzer), were all characters with dominant traits of melancholy. Their aesthetics is founded on a deep insight into both health and sickness, on a deep experience of disharmony.

And even if, in fact, we are very often in need of the catharsis which melancholy and pessimistic art can offer, there remains the principal aspect. If we consider mental health to be a goal worth striving for

generally, then we must also consider it a goal of our aesthetic experience to reach in it the state of mental health. That art which expresses this state expresses an experience that is in itself worth striving for, an experience that at any rate should dominate our aesthetic contemplation. (Nevertheless pessimistic art has a value not only as catharsis but also as a background that gives emphasis to the opposite states—and, of course, as showing an important aspect of reality.) We may need stimulating medicines, but it cannot be desirable to live on them.

What most modern aestheticians would find especially difficult to accept in all this is, I think, this last criterion (the value of the very experience communicated), at any rate in so far as concerns the factor of life-affirmation. Still I have found, even if only in the form of hints, in well-known modern aestheticians (such as Sir Herbert Read, Thomas Munro), the thought that an art that affirms life is better than an art that denies it.

So much for aesthetic value criteria. It is another question how to apply them. One must remember that there are many degrees, and that a work may be bad compared with the work of a master but still have a value. As was maintained so energetically by the Swedish eighteenth-century philosopher Thomas Thorild (optimist, influenced by Lord Shaftesbury), a work should not be judged by its faults, but by its merits. Anyhow, in art as well as in life, we should try to notice the positive at least as much as the negative—according to that mature wisdom which is to be found in the great Goethe.

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE OF ARCHITECTURE

E. F. Carrit

SINCE I read Croce's *Estetica* on its publication and heard Andrew Bradley's lectures on *Poetry for Poetry's Sake* about the same time I have not doubted their theory, which was what Wordsworth had said of poetry—'the recollection (or contemplation) of emotions or passions in tranquillity'. This seems to be true of poetry, painting and sculpture, and rather less obviously of music, as being all representational. We can roughly say what Sordello's story is about though Browning forgot it, and what the Medici tombs are about though not about the Medici, and what Beethoven's *Battle Symphony* is about—which last, like Botticelli's *Primavera*, the *Discobolus* and *Sense and Sensibility*, tells its own tale. But can we offer the same theory for the interior of Chartres Cathedral, the dome of Florence, the Parthenon, the ruins of Paestum or the Radcliffe Camera at Oxford? This problem was brought home to me during the Second World War, when an American soldier asked me: 'Why is the Camera round?' I said: 'Perhaps because it looks good so.' He answered: 'But they must have had some idea.' And I asked myself what passion or emotion am I recollecting? The thought of the students and pedants who like myself have worked there would hardly bear such a name. Milton begs:

> But let my due feet never fail
> To walk the studious cloister's pale,
> And love the high embowèd roof,
> With antique pillars massy-proof,
> And storied windows, richly dight,
> Casting a dim religious light.
> There let the pealing organ blow,
> To the full-voiced quire below. . . .

Dr. Johnson was evidently sensitive to architecture, at least through the

more familiar medium of poetry. Of Congreve's account of the temple in the *Mourning Bride* he says: 'If I were required to select from the whole mass of English poetry the most poetical paragraph, I know not what I could prefer' to this:

> How reverend is the face of this tall pile,
> Whose ancient pillars raise their marble heads,
> To bear aloft its arch'd and ponderous roof,
> By its own weight make stedfast and immoveable,
> Looking tranquillity! It strikes an awe
> And terror on my aching sight; the tombs
> And monumental caves of death look cold,
> And shoot a chillness to my trembling heart.

I think the Doctor would not have given the lines this idolatrous eulogy had he not felt the same experience. Indeed, he goes on to say: 'He who reads these lines enjoys for a moment the powers of a poet, he feels what he remembers to have felt before; but he feels it with great increase of sensibility; he recognizes a familiar image, but meets it again amplified and expanded, embellished with beauty, and enlarged with majesty.' But the question remains: What emotions were Congreve and Johnson tranquilly contemplating? I will not call them unconscious for I suppose nobody has any recollection of such, but I will rather mystically suggest they were that dim subconscious questioning of fundamentals which makes us all of necessity agnostics—'Had time a beginning, if so when?' and 'Has space a boundary, if so where?' To either of these questions each alternative is incredible: and this drove Kant to say that neither space nor time is real. I suppose he would say so of Infinity.

Most efforts to identify the emotions which are tranquilly remembered in the aesthetic experience of architecture in fact describe the ancillaries and not the actual buildings themselves—the sculptures, stained glass, or accidents such as music, sunset or moonlight.

Of course different buildings have different effects upon us. It is said that a lofty spire turns our thoughts to heaven,[1] but this is not said of a factory-chimney or a radio-pole.

Reynolds (*Discourse* XIII) says: 'Whatever building brings to our remembrance ancient customs and manners . . . is sure to give this delight.' But that gem of architecture the staircase to the Chapter-house of Wells Cathedral does not make a richer impact in aesthetic experience because the waves of everlasting stone were worn out by pious feet and not cut by masons, though this is morally interesting.

Herbart (*Introduction to Philosophy*, III, i. 8. 5) says: 'A solemn vaulting, a solemn chorale, a Doric column—begin their effect upon sensitive

people simply with the aesthetic judgement, which then very likely occasions emotions, but allows them to subside and actually quiets them.' A *locus classicus* for this question is perhaps to be found in Ruskin's *Seven Lamps of Architecture*, where he puts almost the whole of aesthetic experience in what I have called the ancillaries of the art. Only one lamp is a 'lamp of beauty'. He classifies 'the emotions generally felt by well-educated people respecting various forms of good architecture' under four heads: (1) Sentimental Admiration, (2) Proud Admiration, (3) Workmanly Admiration, and (4) Artistic and rational Admiration. Only the last is really aesthetic and that is said to consist in 'reading' the sculpture or painting on walls, capitals, the friezes, etc. The first depends on accidents of weather, music, etc., the second is in no sense aesthetic; the third can be found in the ugliest buildings; the fourth depends wholly upon the meaning of the sculpture and colour. (I cite from the Preface to the Second Edition.) Clearly, on this theory I could have no aesthetic experience of the Radcliffe Camera nor of the quadrangle of Magdalen College, Oxford. It is noteworthy that Proust, who after reading the *Seven Lamps* in French became an enthusiastic disciple, made his chief pilgrimages to a statue of the Virgin and the sculpture of a ludicrous dwarf on a capital, as is recorded in Painter's biography of him.

The answer I have suggested to this aesthetic problem does not satisfy me. A theory applied to the aesthetic experience of pure architecture should surely be applicable to experience of pure 'abstract' painting, sculpture and music, when indeed these are not figurative and have no representational meaning. I am unlucky in being unable so to apply it as I have seldom or never enjoyed such experience. I do enjoy it in contemplating pure architecture.

The other arts have no aim save aesthetic satisfaction but architecture must be useful. Hegel, for whom nature is not beautiful in itself and hardly ever when represented by us, treats architecture as the most rudimentary form of art, merely symbolic, while the others are more or less expressive. It may be rudimentary in the temporal sense that men gave their skill to shelter from sun, rain and frost before they gave it to beauty. Aristotle's *catharsis* may have meant that our own pains and our pity for others are mitigated by their contemplation on the tragic stage —an anticipation of Wordsworth and Croce. Is such a mitigation of the crushing concept of infinity attained in contemplation of architecture even if sublime? I doubt it.

REFERENCE

[1] Sptitzboegiger Zenit erhebt den Geist; Solch ein Gebau erbaut uns allermeist. Goethe, *Faust*, Part II, Act, 1, 6413–4.

SOUND AND SENSE IN A LINE OF POETRY

David I. Masson

THIS ANALYSIS seeks to show how the authority and power of a line of poetry may be precisely and closely linked to its sound-patterning, fine as well as gross.

Our example is from G. M. Hopkins, *The Wreck of the 'Deutschland'*, st. 15, l. 5:

And frightful a nightfall folded rueful a day

The boldest features of this line, phonetic and semantic, are:

/'aytf–l/	/'aytf–l/	/f–l/	/'–f–l/
–FUL	A NIGHT–		–FUL A DAY

But if we examine just what sequences of sounds are repeated we find, first, two *submotifs*, as we shall call them, /'ayt/ and /f–l/, and secondly three *motifs* which include them, as follows:

(a) /r'–f–lɔ/ occurring twice, each time on an adjective, the two adjectives being intended to be parallel (*frightful, rueful*);

(b) /'aytf–l/ occurring twice, respectively on the adjective and noun of the first or *subject* nexus (*nightfall*);

(c) /f–l(–)d–/ occurring twice (the first time stressing its first syllable, the second time stressing its last), first on the verb, secondly on the *object* nexus (*day*), chiefly the noun. We should also take note of certain atomic fragments of motifs, namely the first /f/ of 'frightful', the /d/ of 'And', and the second /d/ of 'folded'. The word 'And' also contains one occurrence of the only other significantly recurrent sound, the /n/ which recurs in 'nightfall'. Taking /n/ (nasal 'gingival') and /d/ (non-nasal gingival stop) as related entities here which we may label x_1 and x_2 respectively, we now have the pattern: x_1 x_2 f(a,b) x_1(b) (c) x_2 (a,c); or, if we expose *all* the occurrences of /d/ whether part or not part of a motif:

x_1 x_2 f(a,b) x_1 (b) (c) x_2 x_2 (a,c) x_2; labelling semantic units: *conj.* *adj.*$_1$ *noun*$_1$ *verb* *adj.*$_2$ *noun*$_2$. Thus we have /n/ and /d/ branching out separately from their combination in the opening conjunction, /n/ to begin the noun 'nightfall' and /d/ to begin the noun 'day'. The regularity of this pattern is disturbed, but in a way that is rhetorically satisfying, by the two occurrences of /d/ in the verb.

All motifs may be classed together here as representing a single *theme* of sound, A, which 'means' (is rhetorically connected to) the wreck's crescendo of horror indicated in Hopkins's words. This theme is manifested as motifs (a), (b) and (c); of which (a) is linked to the adjectives of dread, (b) is linked to the nightfall (and its greater plangency reflects the greater horror of that night), and (c) looks backward through the verb to its past object the day (and its stress-shunting, the absence of a syllable between /l/ and /d/ in the verb, and the verb's doubled /d/, all subtly reflect the syntax and thought, packing off the now minor agonies of that daytime). In fact we may now re-state (a) in the guise of (a'), /r'–f–lɔD'/, where /D/ represents /n/ or /d/, formerly denoted by x_1 and x_2; (a') now symbolizes both subject- and object-nexus, distinguished by the manifestation of /D/ as /n/ and /d/ respectively. Motif (b) contains submotif ((*b*)), /'ayt/, which functions mainly as a startler but also as a label for the subject-nexus. All three (or four) motifs contain submotif ((*a*)), /f–l/, which occurs four times; this submotif has the effect of binding the meaning and feeling of the whole line intimately together (thus 'heightening' its appeal and authority) by the relatively high number of aesthetic *bonds*, as we may call them, between its occurrences. The number of occurrences of a given entity — n — is related to the number — q — of links or bonds between them by the formula $q=(n^2-n)/2$, so that these four occurrences correspond to six bonds.[1] But ((*a*)) also reflects the syntax in that three of its occurrences are unstressed and immediately after a stress, while the stressed occurrence is on the verb. We have already dealt with the use of /n/ and /d/ as motivic fragments or sub-submotifs and their relation to the meaning.

Lines in which the sound is as tightly welded to the meaning as here are not very frequent, but they are to be heard here and there. They are not, one supposes, constructed in cold blood or from theory, nor could the poet, one imagines, analyse in the slightly shocking way we have pursued. They are a combination, in genius, of hard work, experience, and luck or the accidents of language, *i.e.* they amount to what is usually recognized as inspiration, and no doubt flashed blindingly on the poet. Readers are invited to try close analysis of this kind on such lines or line-groups as: 'The hungry judges soon the sentence sign,/ And wretches hang that jury-men may dine' (Pope); 'The pallor of girls' brows,

shall be their pall' (Owen); 'Describe the horoscope, haruspicate or scry' (Eliot); 'Ses ailes de géant l'empêchent de marcher' (Baudelaire, on the albatross [or poet]); 'Die, and endow a college, or a cat' (Pope again); and any line in any language that attains a great pitch of rhetorical authority.[2] Sound-patterning is everywhere in poetry, but the closest analysis is most rewarding when it can be brought to bear on such special tags, and can show how their most blatant effects are merely outgrowths from an intricate but meaningful total.

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[1] Apart from ((*a*)) all the motifs and submotifs have a bond value of unity. Applying the same formula $q=(n^2-n)/2$ to the individual phonemes in this isolated line, we find a value of 10 for /f/, of 6 for /l/, of 6 again for /d/, of unity for /n, r, ə, y, t, ɔ/ as cited in the analysis; but of 3 for /y/ if we include the end-phoneme of 'day' /dey/; of up to 15 for all possible occurrences of /ə/, and of 15 for the *ad hoc* archphoneme /D/. But a nearer approximation to a true reflection of the aesthetic strength of the patterning may be achieved by positing, for each motif or submotif, a bond between *every* phoneme-occurrence (or similar entity) which occurs in a given motif-occurrence, and *every* phoneme-occurrence (etc.) in each of the other motif-occurrences; thus, to clarify by one example: once the submotif /f–l/ is established in the reader's mind, a sensation of affinity or expectation arises, linking the /f/ in any such pair of sounds, not only with the /f/ in all other pairs in the neighbourhood, but with their /l/ occurrences (though not with its own /l/). The formula for these fuller bonds turns out to be $r=m^2q=m^2(n^2-n)/2$, where m is the number of different phonemes involved, and n is, as before, the number of motif-occurrences. This gives new values, debatable for phonemic reasons in the case of (b) and ((*b*)), of: 25 for (b) and (a'); 24 for ((*a*)); 16 for (a); and 9 for (c) and ((*b*)). If these figures are felt to jump up too quickly, they can be damped by taking log*er* as the true measure. A minor modification to the equation will take care of cases where one or more phonemes recur *within* the motif. But even if this is not the full story: severe modifications are needed to reflect accurately the effects of a sound's position relative to syllable, to word, to foot, and to line; the effects of ictus and of natural stressing, or their absence; and the effects of pattern-scrambling (transpositions, reversals, interpolations, etc.). This last would bring us to the mathematics of permutations.

[2] But the reader should note that all these quotations, unlike the example from Hopkins, involve some motifs in which the order of the phonemes is not rigid for each motif-occurrence, but is sometimes changed; and that some of these quotations have voiced and unvoiced (or other different) phonemes which echo each other (*e.g.* /b/ and /p/ can function in the line from Owen as manifestations of an archphoneme /P/).

BOOK REVIEWS

Il Giudizio Estetico. Atti del Simposio di Estetica. Venezia 1958. Edited by LUIGI PAREYSON. Rivista di Estetica. 1962. Padua. pp. 288. Lire 2,500.

ANY CONGRESS, any symposium, any round-table discussion tends to spread to many different subjects. Nowadays it is usual to fix a theme for any meeting, but even this does not give real unity to the results of a meeting of minds. The danger is greatest in the case of aesthetics. A paper on aesthetics can range from the latest artistic programme of some obscure school or from a particular poet to the largest issues of the philosophy of art. Something of this kind happened at the International Congress of Athens two years ago. In the Venice Symposium of 1958 even the care taken by a good organizer, as Professor Pareyson undoubtedly is, to fix a definite subject could not avoid the spread.

Evidently Professor Pareyson meant that every paper should refer to the four main addresses (by Gilson, Gadamer, Hodin and Hungerland) but this did not always happen. The so-called 'interventions' and other papers always included the term 'aesthetic judgement' in their title but very seldom referred to the main subject. On the other hand the very term 'aesthetic judgement' is rather imprecise. It can be understood in several senses. This was hinted at by Professor Caracciolo. And Mr. Redpath maintained that 'aesthetic judgement' is vague and can be taken in six senses. Starting from this good point Mr. Redpath did not seem interested in eliciting the most legitimate sense of 'aesthetic judgement' and went on to an almost sceptical conclusion in which he maintained that 'aesthetic judgements' can often be supported by value-descriptions, so that in practice we don't know what Mr. Redpath himself means by 'aesthetic judgement'. The same scepticism is shown in the address by Professor Gilson, who suggests many lines of research but after having stated that any aesthetic judgement contains both individual elements and intellectual terms of reference, ends by saying nothing enlightening on the subject.

The first conclusion we may draw from these two examples and from other pages of these *Proceedings* is that a general scepticism prevails amongst the philosophers who deal with aesthetics, this latest philosophical field of research. This might arise from the heterogeneous collection of people who deal with aesthetics. The novelty of this line of research has induced many who are not professional philosophers to enter the lists and to propose their own standards for artistic judgement. This has been mainly due to the enhanced consciousness of latter-day artists towards their work, specially poets and painters who have issued manifestoes or programmes and tried to build schools of cognate spirits by justifying their acceptance of new concepts or their use of new techniques on the

basis of this or that version of what aesthetics is about.

But to come to the theme of this congress, 'aesthetic judgement' brought some most interesting contributions to the real source of modern philosophical aesthetics —the third *Critique* of Kant. This is clearly expressed in the most profound paper of the Symposium, that by Gadamer, followed by Kuhn and Dufrenne. Even Herbert Read begins by discussing Kant against Croce—and indeed we may regard it as significant that in a Symposium held in Italy Croce was not often quoted. His aesthetics, which seemed of paramount importance such a short time ago, is now obsolescent. The dreary discussion of the contrast between form and content in the work of art—the main staple from which Croce's aesthetics started—reads today (as for instance in the paper by Professor Caramella) as a thing antiquated and almost forgotten.

The name of Hegel is quoted, but (as I have said) 'aesthetic judgement' was understood mainly in the sense of Kant. A sort of belated reaction against this trend is to be found in the paper of Professor Formaggio who (strangely enough) maintains that after Kant the question of aesthetic judgement has become too 'complicated' to be solved on a Kantian basis. One could think that the question has become 'complicated' because so much extraneous matter has been allowed into the field of legitimate philosophical aesthetics as delimited by Kant. Professor Gadamer proves indeed that Kant's statements are today still valid if properly developed and restated. A main point is that the coincidence of the individual and the universal must be found by taking into account not only the isolated judgement of the artist or of his critics, but the development of judgements throughout the ages. An important constituent of a work of art is its *Nachleben*, as Professor Kuhn puts it. What happens to a work of art after it has been perfected is a sort of historical existence which makes it really *alive* after it has been made. Into all aesthetic judgements both the judgement of the creator of the work of art and the judgements of critics of any time and age should enter. Although the word 'history' may have many meanings, and perhaps no meaning at all, it is undeniable that judging a work of art is not a matter of personal taste because to this individual judgement we are committed by our whole life, which belongs to a certain moment or epoch against the background of a certain style and spirit. This is what Professor Gadamer means when he states that the search for the meaning of a work of art is a process to which the very historical existence of the critic is committed. On the other hand our judgement as to the work of art itself is free because it is just the historical development of past criticism throughout the ages which fixes the real worth of the work. What Professor Gadamer, Professor Kuhn and Professor Dufrenne evidently feel strongly, is the main point of Kant's theory of aesthetic judgement—that beautiful art is the work of genius. Having stated that the distinction between natural and artistic beauty is bound to disappear in the perfect work of art (against Croce's famous statement that there is no natural beauty) Kant comes to the idea that through the mind of the genius, through the great artists, nature itself gives to art its rule. From this derives the importance of originality in art.

In this connection we may observe that Gadamer's and Kuhn's insistence that aesthetic judgement is a matter also of historical consciousness leads to a sort of reversal of the usual position. The work of art, to use the words of Kant, is in itself exemplary—it is a paragon. And it is just this paragon as accepted by succeeding ages which constitutes the basis of aesthetic judgement.

Properly interpreted, Kant's theory might be considered a revival of the Renaissance theory of beauty which was based on imitation. On the other hand we

must admit that Kant's theory allows for some non-intellectual element as the foundation of creative art—an element which is not *eo ipso* contrary to reason or intellect (as the intuitive theory of art maintains) but something going deeper than intuition in the very subconsciousness or at least in the *natural* bent of the spirit of the artist. How far this theory could justify the school of 'poésie pure' and surrealism, is obvious enough.

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Proceedings of the IVth International Congress on Aesthetics. Athens. 1960. Edited by P. A. MICHELIS. pp. xxiii + 835. $8. ($6 for members of the Congress.)

THIS BOOK consists of a collection of 182 papers presented to the IVth Congress of Aesthetics and so nobody is to be credited with the selection of papers published, but only with the planning of the field beforehand. A glance at the table of contents gives this plan, and a closer look yields the information that, as one might expect, it is impossible to classify satisfactorily the problems people tackle under the general heading of aesthetics. Since each speaker in the plenary sessions was limited to 15 minutes and in the sub-sections to 10 minutes, the papers on the whole confine themselves to the making of one point and its placing in a context. Thus the table of contents functions almost as an index and the book is a useful survey of what is being done in aesthetics in the Universities and in the Institutions devoted to the various arts all over the world.

Naturally enough, since the Congress was held in Athens, the largest single section is the one headed *La notion du classique et les conceptions modernes de l'art*, but the questions canvassed in the whole Congress range from questions of general aesthetic principle to problems raised by the use of technical devices, gramophones and tape recorders, from the sculpture of ancient Greece to *la musique concrète*. The traditional aesthetic of the pleasurable apprehension of rhythm, harmony and form is opposed to the aesthetic of power and its not necessarily pleasurable apprehension.

There are some surprises. Only one paper is directly concerned with Existentialist aesthetics and that by an American, and only one with social realism. Nobody writing in English has contributed to the section headed *L'art et la technique moderne*, and there is only one paper each on the art of the film and of the animated cartoon. These both occur in the final section headed *Mélanges*. 'Semantics' appears as a sub-section of the section headed *Méthodes de recherches*, and again there is only one contribution in English. Nine of the fifteen papers on *L'art et la psychologie des profondeurs* are in English, and six of the ten papers on *Psychologie et l'expérience esthétique*.

The official languages of the Congress were Greek, French, English, Italian and German, and there are some oddities of expression in the papers translated from other languages. There are also some misprints, but considering the vastness of the undertaking, not as many as one might expect.

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Il Concetto di Fare in Aristotele. By GIANNI VATTIMO. Publicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia. Università di Torino. Turin. 1961. pp. 148. L. 1,000.

L'Estetica e i suoi Problemi. By LUIGI PAREYSON. Marzorati. Milan. 1961. pp. 408. L. 3,200.

GIANNI VATTIMO takes as his starting point the distinction from the *Nichomachean Ethics* between man's acting and man's making (*agire* and *fare*), and the respective realms of practical wisdom and art. We know that according to Aristotle the τέχνη

(*techne*) of making—any kind of making—differs decisively from the intransitive activity of acting (which remains within that which it produces, *i.e.* human action) in being essentially transitive, productive of artefacts which can be, but need not be, integrated in the final scheme of human happiness. Aristotle faced the problem of the artefact's perfection lying apparently outside the moral as well as the natural sphere. As we are shown by the author of this careful and fully documented study, it clearly emerges from Aristotle's protracted struggle with the placing of τέχνη (*techne*) as 'productive disposition' that the relation (in difference) between art and nature provides the ground for the genuine Aristotelian contribution to aesthetic thought: the distinction of the world of art as neither causally within nor, in any strict sense, *contra* nature—leading to the distinction, in short and un-Aristotelian terms (not discussed by the author), between fiction and fact. The book treats in the second chapter of the principle of becoming in art and nature. Art, as the production of that which was not previously there in nature, is not movement παρὰ φύσιν (*para physin*), but always κατὰ φύσιν (*kata physin*)—of which three different senses are distinguished in order to show that even such movement is not necessarily 'against' nature, though certainly not, in a physical or biological sense, within nature either. Chapter III therefore follows the almost inevitable course of such an argument into a full and fair discussion of the concept of μίμησις (*mimesis*)—*fare come la natura*, making *how*, not *what* nature does, and it has some illuminating, though hardly by now controversial, things to say on the reading of Aristotle's bland statement that 'art imitates nature'. Of course it does—if we do not demand objects or situations reproduced from nature and life, but concentrate instead, as Aristotle in the *Poetics* well knew and advised us to do, on the principles of structure, of organization, of action; on the artistic making as a τέχνη (*techne*) of sustained sensuous recognition of what can be, ought to be, and of what is significant, in or over and above what happens to be the case. Artistic making as making manifest is mimetic in the sense in which it takes its clue for organized construction from nature, but adds to nature that in which nature's forms and possibilities and ends are laid bare for reflection.

That such reflection is accompanied by pleasurable excitement of a specific kind was insisted upon by Aristotle when he elaborated his views on the pleasure we derive from tragedy. That such pleasure lies less in the simple recognition of objects imitated and likenesses achieved (it *also* arises from this), is clear after what has been said on the Aristotelian as against the Platonic version of μίμησις (*mimesis*). More importantly, the pleasure at stake—aesthetic pleasure to later thought—is that peculiar concomitant of achieved and satisfied contemplation of purposive structure, of form in the art work, not necessarily based on any simple one-to-one correspondence with 'real life'. With the cathartic effects of great art, the connection (earlier on put into question) between the *mundus artis* and the *mundus moralis* is re-established: the artistic microcosmos is seen as firmly rooted in man's moral cosmos after all; creation κατὰ φύσιν (*kata physin*) brings about the most intensely felt recognition of man's humanity and frailty, universally expressible, but only irreducibly experienced through the presentation, not representation, of human destiny in the concrete, the new, the imagined reality.

As one would expect from this brief outline of directions, the central chapters of the book concentrate on the problem of artistic form. The question of the genesis of form in non-imitative arts, such as architecture, is squarely faced. Form, in the Aristotelian sense, is never created *ab novo*, but only transferred, and thus in an artistic sense, produced. Of the two ways of 'giving' from, that via νοῦς (*nous*) and that via αἴσθησις (*aisthesis*), the latter only is

relevant, making fully apparent in the sensuous the forms which are dominated in the last resort by the εἶδος (*eidos*) of human happiness. To the extent to which it exhibits the rational structures of the particular occurences, art is more universal than history, yet not identical with abstract philosophical considerations of generalities.

The old problem of truth in art is raised by the author as the connecting link between a renewed and fuller discussion of τέχνη (*techne*) in Chapter VI, and the investigation of the Aristotelian notions of necessity, contingency and finality in Chapter VII, so that the consideration of the *processo produttivo* (Chapter VIII) in general can lead to the final chapter with the crucial Aristotelian solutions: *il produtto come organismo*, with the stress on *come*: the work of art, though not living and breathing or growing real roots, demonstrates in its autonomous context *how* something adds up to the structural completeness and integrity of an organism. Yet the artistic product is an 'organism' only 'in use', as functioning, '*solo per la mediazione dell'uomo producente o fruente*' (p. 134); it lives through production and in participation, where it is 'useful' in the full Aristotelian instrumental sense of serving the final ends of humanity.

The author concludes his survey of the Aristotelian development of the conception of artistic making by reaffirming the starting point of modern aesthetics: art transcends nature by constituting '*il mondo della civiltà e della storia*'.

For its general orientation towards emphasizing those Aristotelian concepts which are basic to an aesthetics as the theory of man's formative endeavour, the author's acknowledged debt is to Luigi Pareyson's *Estetica: Theoria della formatività* (1954).

Pareyson's *Estetica* was followed in 1961 by his collection of papers on a wide range of aesthetic topics under the title *L'Estetica e i suoi Problemi*. The first part '*I problemi attuali dell'estetica*' is relatively self-contained; it could serve admirably as an introduction for the outsider to the terminology and conceptual geography of the lively post-Crocean Italian aesthetic scene. In Part II, *Lineamenti*, Pareyson gives an expository outline of his own aesthetic programme, '*La mia prospettiva estetica*'. Art as *formatività pura*, a kind of making which, in the course of making, both invents and finds its own rules and modes, is productive of the exemplary; for the manner in which artistic success is achieved becomes paradigmatic and serves as a possible point for future reference in criticism. Beauty in any spiritual achievement is the quality of that which is *fato bene*; beauty in art, more specifically, arises from *formare per formare*, which is freed from any purpose other than that of the formative intentionality of an irreplaceable creative personality.

It is thus not surprising that Pareyson's book concludes with three *Ricerche* into the thought of those who above all others wrote and created in the same spirit: Aristotle, Vico, and Goethe.

EVA SCHAPER

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Histoire de l'esthétique. By RAYMOND BAYER Paris. Armand Colin. 1961. pp. 403.

THE PURPOSE which this book is intended to serve is not entirely clear. It is cast in the form of a manual, and reviews the history of aesthetics (after a preliminary chapter on prehistoric art) from the pre-Socratic philosophers to the twentieth century in five chronological sections, each subdivided into national chapters for the post-medieval periods, and liberally provided with numbered sub-headings. Useful bibliographies conclude each chapter and there is an efficient index—an asset which is still regrettably rare in French publications. The material is presented for the most part in the form of a tightly packed survey, with succinct accounts of the ideas of writers following one upon the other, but little attempt at synthesis or at elucidating

organic relationships of wider philosophical or historical significance. These characteristics might perhaps have allowed the book to claim a certain forbidding virtue as a work of reference; but, in fact, its utility as such is impaired (and especially perhaps for the English reader) by serious omissions and defects.

The author's conception of his subject is commendably broad, in that he readily admits that it is not really separable from philosophy on the one hand or from the history of art and literature on the other, but his approach is generally a very conservative one: to the extent indeed of revealing a notable lack of awareness of modern critical interests and scholarly progress in certain fields.

The scope of the work is in fact confined to the line of development in aesthetic thought and attitudes deriving from, or closely linked with, that of Greek and Roman classical antiquity in Western Europe. In the earlier sections there is no reference to the Byzantine world, and no consideration of the influence of the civilizations of the Near East on the European artistic tradition. In later sections there is a striking neglect of non-classical movements in art and literature. Mannerism and the baroque are passed over in silence —no painting or architecture between Leonardo and Poussin is discussed; the interesting conflicts created in seventeenth-century England by the introduction of classical aesthetic ideas are similarly ignored; and seventeenth-century France is presented as in the grip of a rigidly intellectual Cartesian classicism—a view which leans heavily on Krantz's long since demolished *Esthétique de Descartes* of 1882, and runs counter to the whole trend of critical scholarship in the present century. (One is frankly staggered to find a Sorbonne professor in 1961 speaking of 'la passion raisonnable et disciplinée que nous trouvons chez Racine' (p. 116)). Apart from three pages on that perennial French obsession Edgar Allan Poe, romanticism is given little attention. The chief emphasis in the chapters on the nineteenth century is upon Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (the last two oddly described as contemporaries) in Germany, Ruskin, Herbert Spencer and William Morris in England, and the eclectics Taine and Guyau in France.

The vagaries of Professor Bayer's treatment cannot, however, all be accounted for by what one might perhaps call an academicist intellectual bias. His choice of material is in some respects so idiosyncratic as seriously to undermine the value of his book as a work of reference, without the reader's being compensated by any reasoned exposition of a personal viewpoint which might make that choice understandable. One may perhaps accept on one ground or another the omission of any detailed analysis of such authors as Burke, Coleridge, Pater, Roger Fry and Collingwood, of the Abbé Batteux, Delacroix and Bergson, or the allotment to Croce of slightly less space than to d'Annunzio; but what is the student to make of a history of aesthetics which fails to discuss such seminal works as Horace's *Ars Poetica* and Longinus's *On the Sublime*?

W. H. BARBER

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Schiller's Writings on Aesthetics. By S. S. KERRY. Manchester University Press. 1961. pp. x + 178. 18s.

EVER SINCE Schiller's own admission that he felt himself to be half philosopher and half poet, it has been usual to say that his poetry is too philosophical, and his philosophy too poetic. Dr. Kerry, working in this tradition, has set out to show where, and with what results, the poet enters into the writings on aesthetics. He examines four texts, the *Philosophie der Physiologie*, the *Kallias* letters, the treatise *Über Anmut und Würde* and the *Aesthetische Briefe*, and finds typically that Schiller begins with

strict logic, but that eventually ideas that are poetic, irrational, intuitive and unsystematic (these terms are used interchangeably) invade the argument and obstruct it. None of this is new; Kerry's work, if true, provides us with more detail, but not any noticeably different results.

Aestheticians will note that their field of study is not the centre of interest in this book; the emphasis is on the mind of Schiller and how it works. The title is therefore something of a misnomer, and should perhaps read 'Schiller as revealed in his writings on aesthetics'. Dr. Kerry himself does not make this distinction between the genesis of Schiller's ideas and their significance for aesthetic philosophy, because he confuses it with another distinction, that between two elements in the genesis, these two elements being Kant and Schiller himself; in other words, what Schiller took from Kant and what he added of his own. So that when he says that in investigating Schillerian aesthetics we must not confine ourselves to the 'criteria of philosophy proper' (Kerry always equates Kant with what he calls strict or pure philosophy, or just philosophy) but must take into account the total Schiller, including his poetic impulses, he is confusing two quite different assertions: (1) in considering the genesis, Kantian philosophy and Schiller's poetic nature are both important, and (2) the genesis of Schiller's ideas on aesthetics is relevant in some way to how one judges their truth or falsehood. The first statement is plainly true, the second is surely false. Kerry could not have made this mistake had he not assumed that Kantian logic was the only logic; if Kantian logic is inadequate for dealing with these texts, as it is, then better logic is needed not biographical explanation, which involves a totally different order of statement. This tells us how Schiller came to hold these views, not anything about their coherence. Another symptom of this limitation of the scope of logic is the opposition of rational (Kantian) ideas and intuitive or poetic ideas. Poets as poets do not make statements that are rational or irrational.

In the discussion of the texts some interesting statements are made, but owing to its very inadequate framework the book cannot as a whole be said to be very successful. By far the most basic reason for this—and it is a very common failing in writers on Schillerian aesthetics—is the complete acceptance of Schillerian perspectives. The programme is one suggested by Schiller himself; by 'philosophy' is meant the philosophy available to Schiller; and the statements about Schiller himself are all in terms of the faculty psychology of the eighteenth century. To say that Schiller constantly switches from his intellectual to his emotional faculty may sound interesting but modern psychology, dealing as it does with processes rather than faculties, is quite used to the idea that there is emotional involvement in activities such as philosophizing. It might be possible to make out a case for Schiller's being extreme in this respect but it could only be made in terms of modern psychology, just as the aesthetics needs examination with the best logic now available. Dr. Kerry fails to do either; his bibliography betrays the fact that he has consulted only five works on the subject written in the last quarter of a century, and most of the other thirty were written fifty years ago.

To sum up; this is a confused book, though not an untypical one. It does not meet the great need for a re-examination of the aesthetics of this profoundly interesting thinker.

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Muntu. An Outline of Neo-African Culture. By JANHEINZ JAHN. Faber and Faber. 1961. pp. 267. 30s.

THIS IS an English translation by Marjorie

Grene of a book published in Germany in 1958. The author is joint editor of *Black Orpheus*, a journal of African literature and art.

Mr. Jahn argues that there exists a traditional African culture which, withstanding the pressure of Western civilization and more specifically technology, is now putting forth the shoots of a Neo-African culture. *Muntu*, Bantu for man, stands for a distinctively African image of mankind. The image is analysed into its component parts in chapters on religion, dancing, philosophy, magic, the plastic arts, poetry, and the conflict of cultures.

The reader is told that he 'is expecting a living portrait, not a textbook. He expects doctrines only when, thanks to his experience he can visualize something in connection with them' (p. 26). This imputation is probably unfair to most readers who expect any well-written textbook to be fully documented, and who distrust the notion of a living portrait, or aids to visualization. There is no substitute for critical selection of evidence and for close reasoning: it is unfortunate that Mr. Jahn spared the reader and himself that effort.

For, meeting the author on his own ground, one finds that the major inadequacy of the book is precisely that it does not offer the 'experience', the living feel, of the culture he claims to describe. The book consists of abstract discussion and unsupported assertions. Ideas are reproduced from second-hand sources without critical principle, and are never related to the cultural context. In short, *Muntu* is a manifesto rather than a detached appraisal.

Mr. Jahn gives us no narration we can attend to in order to understand the meaning of the terms he uses, though such narrative filling out, or particularity of observation, is essential to a book written to show that traditional African culture is adequate to the demands of the modern world. The term culture has of course several uses: in the present context it must surely mean a way of life from which ideas and art forms draw their nourishment, and which they in turn fertilize. It is not, then, a question of whether the contemporary African can master technology and yet retain his own distinctive culture (p. 12), *i.e.* his religious cults, belief in magic, or social organizations. For technology is not wanted for its own sake but as a means to a way of life, a new style of living, in which magic, the spirit world, ancestral masks and so on, will have no place or meaning.

In the chapters on carving and 'poetry' the same lack of balance, the same unreflecting indulgence in abstraction are found. It is true that we are shown how these 'art forms' grow out of certain social situations and beliefs, and there is again great play with definitions. But there is no *critical* discussion of either the artifacts or of the mentality behind them, although this would be essential to the main argument that these forms can survive in the changing Africa. We are told about sculpture that 'the designation of the image determines what the image expresses' (p. 157). Two identical pieces of carving are supposed to have entirely different meanings by simply giving them different names. 'In virtue of this act of designation African sculpture was able to dispense with all individual expression and psychology.' But this merely begs the question of how an utterance like—'let this piece of wood mean the king of Ondo'—can give meaning to a piece of plastic art. Designation, meaning, expression, are placed in a closed circle without refence to anything the reader knows or understands. (Not to mention the reduction of 'meaning' to portraiture.) One's first, and I think correct, reaction to the practice of designation, is that here we have a piece of childish magic: the onus of showing that it is more is not accepted by the author. To show that African carvings are expressive (using this term in a more or less recognizable sense) one would have to go outside the African closed system and look

elsewhere for critical and analytical instruments.

Another instance of the author's approach to the arts: he shows that in African tradition the word has magical properties. Words and deeds are not clearly distinguishable; therefore, he says, there is an African tradition of poetry. But this holds only if we accept the major premise that poetry and the magical use of words are identical. 'According to African philosophy man has, by the force of his word, dominion over "things"; he can change them, make them work for him, and command them. But to command things with words is to practice "magic". And to practise word magic is to write poetry—that holds not only for Africa' (p. 135). In fact, there is no traditional African poetry, though there are magic spells, ritual incantation, and proverbs. To prove that there is a very real distinction here, would require detailed study of texts. Mr. Jahn does not provide the material, he only asserts. The work of poets like Léopold Sédar Senghor and Aimé Césaire deserves appraisal by universal standards. Their rejection of cities, their technique of free association and synaesthesia, all this belongs to the French tradition from Baudelaire to André Breton. The poem quoted on page 119, especially the middle stanza, is a curious mixture of the romantic longing for the absolute experience and of Baudlairean delight in odours and hair. The only distinctive aspect the poets of *Négritude* share is a strident rhetoric that ruins their verse on African themes, and which probably shows that they do not feel at home in their mythical Africa. 'The incantation is at the same time transformation,' asserts Mr. Jahn, writing off all the work of subtle and acute minds who have over twenty-five centuries wrestled with the distinction between poetry, magic and life.

Muntu gives us unexamined doctrines rather than the realities of African culture. It is, of course, much too early to attempt a survey of Neo-African culture: we (black or white) know scarcely enough of traditional Africa. Consider, for example, the use of the term 'understanding', used when the ethnographer assumes that the villager understands his 'philosophy' of life, or the meaning of a mask. It is precisely because there is no traditional African art (in any recognizable sense of that word) or systematic, or imaginative presentation of experience, that we lack the feel of African culture. Mr. Jahn's shuffling of terms is no substitute for this. An African ethnographer does not respond to traditional masks: they are for him meaningless. *Muntu* is the result of familiar though complex emotions: foremost being the European's desire to work out his spiritual salvation in Africa. The burden of European traditions is a heavy one; and the contemporary situation so threatening that one is tempted to look for a vicarious solution to man's (*Muntu's*) problems in a culture of which one knows in fact very little. One can suspend one's tiresome critical intellect and re-enter a world where fantasy and hard facts need not be kept apart.

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Seventeenth Century Science and the Arts. Edited by HEDLEY HOWELL RHYS. Princeton University Press. London: Oxford University Press. 1962. pp. vi + 137 and 8 plates. 24s.

THIS BOOK contains the text of four lectures delivered at Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania, in 1960 under the William J. Cooper Foundation; their intention is indicated in the Preface thus: 'The simultaneous occurrence at the beginning of the modern era of a vigorous art and a seminal science invites questions that cannot be avoided or resisted. Was there a connection between these two modes of thought? Was there a continuity of feeling between them? If so, how did they affect each other?

Which, if either, was dominant?' The series was introduced by Professor S. Toulmin in a lecture on 'Seventeenth Century Science and the Arts', following which Professor D. Bush dealt with 'Science and Literature', Professor J. S. Ackerman with 'Science and Visual Art', and Professor C. V. Palisca with 'Scientific Empiricism in Musical Thought'.

Considered first as individual essays, without regard to the overall purpose, the last three are excellent, the first disappointing. Professor Toulmin not only contributes little of positive interest, but shows a disregard for factual accuracy which would be excusable, if at all, in the representatives of the arts rather than science. Tycho Brahe did not observe Halley's comet; it did not appear during his lifetime. It was not Donne's 'dull sublunary lovers' who, we are told, 'must, as chimney-sweepers, come to dust'. The statement that 'even Tennyson did not respond as quickly to Darwin as the seventeenth century poets did to Galileo' reads strangely when one remembers that *In Memoriam* was published in 1850 (and mostly written long before) and *The Origin of Species* in 1859. True, Haydn, in a sense, 'was to proclaim' that the heavens were telling the glory of God, but he was anticipated. First Folio spelling notwithstanding, Lorenzo's description of the constellations is ludicrously presented nowadays as 'pattens of pure gold'. And so on.

Professor Bush restricts his attention to English literature and selects passages from the great writers of the period who refer more or less openly to the available scientific knowledge. It is a fine survey, but by its very nature it is misleading because it ignores the great bulk of literature (to take but one example, *The Pilgrim's Progress*, perhaps the most influential literary work of seventeenth-century England) which exhibits no scientific influence. The conclusion that 'one large effect of science was to circumscribe, blunt, and impoverish the rich, all-embracing sensibility and expressive power that had flourished in the earlier period' is therefore open to question. Though we may grant the inferiority of late to early seventeenth-century English literature, it is by no means clear that this was an effect of science.

Professor Ackerman's essay is even more restricted in scope than Professor Bush's. 'Art', he remarks, 'was as little use to scientists in the seventeenth century as scientific discovery was to the artists.' His consideration is devoted almost entirely to Italian art and to the contrast between the realistic and the idealistic representation of nature. There is nothing of, for example, Dutch science and art, both of which flourished exceedingly during this period. His conclusion, which he confesses surprises him, is that 'we have, after all, found a certain community in seventeenth-century culture, but it was due less to the influence of scientific discovery on the artist than to the influence of aesthetic and ethical traditions on the scientist'.

Professor Palisca's very interesting article seems to have got into its present setting through an oversight, since it is concerned almost entirely with the sixteenth century. Its theme is the conflicting views of the relation of the musical to the numerical aspects of intervals, and much of it—particularly that relating to the contributions of Galileo's father—will be new to most readers. A surprising omission is even a brief account of Kepler's *Harmonices Mundi*, not only one of the outstanding scientific products of the seventeenth century, but also perhaps the most intimate association of science and the arts that exists; Kepler gives, indeed, the particular melody characteristic, in his view, of each planet. Palisca's conclusion is that 'by creating a favourable climate for experiment and for the acceptance of new ideas, the scientific revolution greatly encouraged and accelerated a direction that musical art had already taken'.

These essays are most suggestive, but when one considers them as contributions to the general question of the relation of

science to the arts in the seventeenth century, one is left bewildered. There seems to be no community at all between them, with regard either to the subjects treated or the conclusions reached. Professor Bush's science is cosmology; Professor Ackerman's, anatomy; Professor Palisca's, mathematics. Their relations with the respective arts are, as has been indicated, quite diverse. What can one conclude from this? Probably that whatever relation existed between science and the arts in the seventeenth century was anything but direct—that they were, in fact, independently influenced by a general change of mental climate whose origin is to be found in neither of them. As both Professor Toulmin and Professor Bush indicate, two of the predominant influences of the period were those of Bacon and Descartes, but both, I think, wrongly regard these thinkers as immediate originators of the science of the period. This was not so. Bacon's method of discovery bears little resemblance to the science of Newton and the present day, and, apart from his mathematical work, most of Descartes' so-called scientific achievements had to be undone. What they did was to create or release two elements necessary for both science and art—the experimental and the critical attitudes. Bacon, with his exhortation to do whatever you could, and Descartes, with his exhortation to doubt whatever you could, inspired the scientists to do the profitable things and doubt the unauthenticated things, and this double enterprise produced science. The relations between that science and the art of the period probably arose from the operation of the same sceptical, adventurous spirit in the arts, and are to be sought in parallels rather than in interactions.

HERBERT DINGLE

The Biology of Art. By DESMOND MORRIS. Methuen. 1962. pp. 176. 36s.

DR. MORRIS is probably familiar to many people from his television programmes in which he has presented many animals from the London zoo to the curiosity of viewers, and some of the work which he describes in this book has been seen in his programmes. He was also, as he admits rather ruefully, responsible for the 'boom' in the ape-painting market following an exhibition at the Institute of Contemporary Art some time ago. But if he has at any time been guilty of undue showmanship he more than compensates for it with the publication of this admirably level-headed and completely fascinating account of the artistic achievements of the great apes.

As he remarks, the paintings of the so-called 'primitive' races which are now to be found in the world are in fact already at a very advanced stage of development. If we are to understand the genesis of artistic talent—strictly speaking its emergence in the course of evolution—then we must look much further back. Even the various cave paintings are far from primitive. Dr. Morris suggests that there are two sources which are available to us, the work of very young children and the work of the great apes, which latter show a remarkable capacity and love for drawing once they have been introduced to the skill.

We are provided in this book with an elaborate and carefully compiled history of reports of drawing and painting among apes, which are found to extend back as far as the early 1930s, and to have occurred in many zoos throughout the world. All the major groups of the apes have shown this skill, and it is clear that when an animal has once learnt how to draw it is very strongly motivated to do so, preferring this activity to other sorts of play, and even (in an animal living on a normal zoo schedule of feeding) to food.

The pictures themselves are reproduced in abundance and there is a large range of individual styles, sufficiently characteristic for one to be able to tell one animal's drawings from another. The paintings, whether done with brush or finger, are

reminiscent of children's drawings, or at their best, of some *tachiste* work. Morris himself remarks at one point that some modern art has come full circle in its attempts to get away from the representational, and has 'returned to a state motivationally similar to the primates, namely pure aesthetic experimentation'. But he does not want to make claims that these paintings are comparable to human work where the adoption of the abstract forms might be called primitive if one did not know that they are the outcome of extreme sophistication. Nor is his remark intended to decry modern art. He is concerned simply to examine the range of talent which is at the disposal of the great apes, and to see what light it may throw on the origins of those physical mechanisms which underlie all artistic work.

Three fascinating lines of thought spring from the work. Firstly, he compares the development of ape paintings with the development of paintings in children. If we accept his evidence, the very interesting fact emerges that both the ape and the child go through similar stages, beginning with random scribbles and then passing successively through stages at which various symmetries and directions of lines predominate, until the stage is reached at which the animal or human spontaneously draws a closed circle, and then decorates it. What is of particular interest is that the next stage to which the human child proceeds is to the drawing of a 'sun' figure—a circle whose circumference is intersected by radial lines, and the next stage is the addition of 'eyes', and the beginning of true symbolism. This stage has never been reached by any of the apes. One might speculate on the connection between the passage from circle drawing to pictorial symbol and the possession of other sorts of symbolic activity, notably language, in the human. Is there some radical change in the structure of the nervous system which carries with it a vastly increased capacity for symbolism as the human species appears, and which carries with it also the capacity for self-conscious artistic expression?

Secondly, Morris uses the word 'mandala' to describe the stage beyond that reached by the apes in their drawings, and this word brings to mind, of course, the theories of C. G. Jung about the origins of symbols in the collective unconscious. Now there are strong logical objections to the idea of the collective unconscious if by this is meant some sort of 'group mind'. But if what we mean is that the nervous system of the human species shares the capacity of being particularly sensitive to certain kinds of visual patterns, then in this book we may see evidence for this. Morris suggests that some of the patterns produced may reflect not so much the aesthetic sense of the animal as the natural sensory-motor patterns which the anatomy of the animal forces upon it. And one might well imagine that the nervous system is especially sensitive to certain arrangements of horizontal or vertical lines, and that such sensitivity may be genetically inherited in the structure of the nervous system. If so, the 'collective unconscious' is seen in its most primitive form in the common developmental patterns which the apes show, and through which the human child passes on its way to artistic maturity.

Finally, as the Gestalt psychologists were able to show, there appears to be a tendency which is fairly strongly marked in human visual perception to see things as wholes, often to see incomplete figures as complete, to like 'good figure' and symmetry in visual displays, and so on; and it is very interesting to see these characteristics apparently present also in the artistic tendencies of the subhuman primates.

Dr. Morris has given us a book that is completely fascinating, and which would be a best seller were it not for the rather high price. This price is no doubt due in part to the high standard of production. The book is very well printed, and a special note may be made of the attractive type

used for chapter headings. The standard of photographs and figures is excellent. It is to be hoped that the book will rapidly make its way into a cheaper paper-back edition.

NEVILLE MORAY
University of Sheffield

On Knowing. Essays for the Left Hand. By JEROME S. BRUNER. Harvard University Press. 1962. pp. 165. 30s.

THAT ACADEMIC psychology should have become increasingly divorced from the humanities and ever more a slave to methodology is, I suppose, the inevitable price it has had to pay for the pursuit of scientific status. It is all the more refreshing therefore to find in Professor Bruner an experimental psychologist of the front rank who can straddle with such ease and grace the two halves of the cultural divide. But this collection of essays is not just a demonstration of the author's versatility; it is offered in the profound conviction that science itself must suffer if we persist in regarding it as a completely formalized and impersonal activity, ignoring those intuitive springs of creativity which, in the figure of speech with which the author introduces his reflections, are the gifts of the 'left hand'.

The psychology of knowing, which has always been Bruner's central preoccupation as an experimentalist, here provides him with a thread with which to bind together the scientific and the aesthetic. 'We have learnt', he explains, 'that the "arts" of sensing and knowing consist in honouring our highly limited capacity for taking in and processing information. We honour that capacity by learning the methods of compacting vast ranges of experience in economical symbols—concepts, language, metaphor, myth, formulae. . . .' These essays, then, deal with those aspects of the mind that can be understood by studying the processes of acquiring and creating the kinds of knowledge by which we live. Many of them are primarily of interest to the educationist. The aesthetician is catered for mainly in Part I: The Shape of Experience, especially perhaps in 'Myth and Identity' and 'Art as a mode of Knowing'. Neither essay is saying anything that is very new but they contrive to say it in an engaging way.

Yet much as I have enjoyed this miscellany I have some misgiving as to whether the author and his publishers have succeeded in producing a truly viable book. Although the author has exercised commendable ingenuity in imposing some sort of unity on these assorted progeny of a fertile intellect, he cannot disguise their heterogeneous origins. They are all in point of fact based on talks he has given to various learned bodies on various occasions and one suspects that their transmutation into cold print has not always been to their advantage. Ideas are constantly tossed at us but no theme is sustained and no argument is pursued for more than about a paragraph. No doubt the left hand has its proper mode of expression which is not that of the right hand, but in the end one feels the lack of something more nourishing. Bruner, in fact, has given us here an enticing set of appetizers; aestheticians can only hope he will one day vouchsafe us a meal.

JOHN BELOFF
Queen's University, Belfast

Mirror of Minds. Changing Psychological Beliefs in English Poetry. By GEOFFREY BULLOUGH. Athlone Press. 1962. pp. viii + 271. 35s.

THIS BOOK, we are told, is an enlargement of five Alexander Lectures delivered in the University of Toronto, themselves the result of an invitation to expand Prof. Bullough's 1955 Warton Lecture on English Poetry. In short, it is that sometimes risky thing, an expansion of an expansion.

The reference to psychology in the subtitle seems faintly misleading: in his preface, Prof. Bullough explains that his 'chief aim' (which he achieves) is actually to illustrate 'the ways in which English poetry has reflected current views of the mind or soul, with special reference to such topics as its place in the cosmos, its relations with the body, its origin, operation, limitations, and possible survival after death'. Strictly speaking, of course, none of this is irreconcilable with the *O.E.D.* definition of 'psychology'; but it does rather seem to extend the scope which, in practice, is normally given to that term. Hence the (unfair) irritation one feels at Prof. Bullough's seeming readiness to label almost anything, apparently quite arbitrarily, as 'psychological': given the catholicity of his view of psychology, of course, he is not really being arbitrary at all. But is so catholic a concept really of much use? For instance, can one imagine a poem that would *not*, on these terms, excellently illustrate many aspects of poets' 'changing psychological beliefs'?

The obvious answer is to justify one's particular choice of illustrations by going deep. Prof. Bullough of course knows this; indeed, he emphasizes that in many areas of literature, the latent psychological assumptions cry out for deeper study. Yet, barring some interesting pages (notably on Wordsworth in relation to Hartley and Akenside), he himself declines this challenge—at times quite explicitly—and offers instead a virtual conspectus of the whole course of English poetry from Chaucer to Kathleen Raine—all in 255 uncramped pages well spaced with (often delightful) quotation.

The result is uncomfortably predictable. Major writers appear and vanish within a page or a paragraph, longer descriptions conclude with unsurprising judgements (. . . '*one concludes that, although Shakespeare knew that men, like dogs, could be put into categories, when his plot needed a man of any type he usually created him as a unique person*') while occasional interesting asides are left quite unsupported, presumably for lack of space (*e.g.* the rejection of Eliot's 'dissociation of sensibility' theory on p. 90). The average English Literature graduate, though he may relish the continuous quiet good sense of the narrative (*e.g.* the comments on Donne), will find little really unfamiliar material; and should perhaps, read instead Prof. Bullough's original, rather crisper, Warton Lecture—plus, possibly, the sections on the Romantics and the Victorians here. But of course this book may, in fact, have been written more with the non-specialist in mind: certainly the latter should find both interest and enjoyment in it. Yet even so, Prof. Bullough still seems rather to underestimate his prospective readers. (Surely, for instance, few of them will nowadays really need to be told of *The Wasteland*, that 'the poetic intention is to induce the reader to synthesize a succession of apparently unrelated details under the pressure of an overmastering emotional apprehension of life.')

Yet this is a more worthwhile book than these criticisms suggest. For the more the points of view from which the perhaps familiar story of the evolution of English poetry is surveyed, the more our own sensitivity to it is likely to increase. Prof. Bullough's view, backed by so much experience, such quietly humorous good sense, and unrancorous enjoyment of his subject, is worth having. Whether he quite needed an entire book to present it depends on one's estimate of his potential audience.

KEITH BROWN
University of London

The Historical Novel. By GEORG LUKÁCS. Translated from the German by HANNAH and STANLEY MITCHELL. Merlin Press. 1962. pp. 363. 36s.

LUKÁCS, AS he says, is not interested in writing a complete literary history, but in tracing the rise and fall of the historical

novel by analysing typical examples. He has produced a very impressive study of the interaction of social and economic development with artistic form, if I may say so here without impertinence, because the methodology leads to (or comes from) a bright and not a blinkered vision. It is a book which the critic and the aesthetician must read, despite shrinkings from method, dogma and jargon. While sympathizing with the translators' modest apology for their rendering of a highly theoretical idiom, I must say that apology seems to be called for. The turgid prose might have been made more readable by more thoughtful punctuation and better proof-reading. But this is literary history of a rare kind: admirable in judgement, scrupulous in definition, and concrete in analysis.

The argument rests on two solid pillars: the initial discussion of Scott, the beginning and classical instance of the form, and the final account of the weakness of the modern (pre-war) anti-Fascist novel in Germany. Rise and fall are not imposed terms but given substance by judgement. Lukács is a critic who has his eye on the object, and who demands that the novelist should have his eye on his object. He gradually exposes a fundamental paradox in the development of the historical novel, and this could perhaps have been exposed only by a Marxist critic, and one who has a humane conception of the novelist's art and an artistic conception of its humanity. It is Scott, the conservative philistine, who gives the truest rendering of the process of history, and it is the modern social-democrat whose very passionate purposes distort the truth.

Lukács agrees with Balzac about the limitations of Scott's psychological powers, and with Belinsky about the appropriateness of this epic form where a neutral hero gives the right emphasis to the events of history. Scott's morally and nationally 'average' heroes, who have realistically and functionally divided loyalties, provide the right axis for a human and political conflict, and his active and loving delineation of more individualized minor characters is true to the 'old epic directness of social life, its public spontaneity'. He refuses to distinguish between Scott's insight into the power of the people and his triumphant particularity. Scott's sense of historical necessity and his patriotic pride combine to create the appropriate form, and this expresses, with historical and artistic realism, the political crisis, the continuity of national daily life, and the role and nature of the great man, or 'world-historical figure'. The great man, who may be imaginary or real, appears at the fringe of the main action, and appears, too, at a late stage in its ripening. He emerges as psychologically 'complete'—not treated developmentally—and he is neither stereotyped nor monumentalized. Again, artistic truth and a grasp of history march together, placing the emphasis on the continuity of social change, on the powers of popular activity, and on history's creation of the hero rather than his creation of history.

When we come to such modern historical novelists as Feuchtwanger, Heinrich Mann and Bruno Frank, Lukács gives us, in antithesis, an analysis of inappropriate form. Instead of individualized ordinary people we have a conceptualized symbolic presentation, romantic and often mystical. Instead of the living relationship of past with present we have the past turned into 'a parable of the present'. Instead of the displacement of the political hero we have a central and biographical treatment which exaggerates the individual, diminishes economic necessity, and cuts out the element of chance. And here Lukács has an interesting *caveat* for the aesthetician, warning him against the premature canonization of new forms, and suggesting that 'an aesthetic which is afraid to approach the question of criteria, of the rightness of a particular trend or genre, has abdicated from aesthetics'. Lukács has the specialized

skill of the critic, and makes good use of it as an aesthetician.

In bringing out the exposure of this paradox I have had little time to indicate the richness of this book. Related to the conception of this appropriate form, for instance, is a fine explanation of the much-criticized theoretical *excursus* in *War and Peace*, and shrewd comments on the use of history as background in *A Tale of Two Cities*, on the political accidentality of Thackeray's historical novels, and on the decorative archaeology of *Salammbô*. He is good on the weakness of Utopian novels, on the strength of Balzac, and has a very important and substantiated discussion of formal differences between the novel and drama. Local reservations might include some doubt about the socio-economic account of Flaubert's 'brutality', disappointment at the handling of Zola, and some uneasiness about the applicability of his total developmental scheme to the novel as a whole, which seems to be implied in his refusal to accept the historical novel as a separate genre. As an account of the forms and fidelity of the historical novel, where a sense of history is most sharply and formally present, it is certainly convincing. The argument ends with what at first sight seems to be a highly doctrinaire speculation about the future of the historical novel, with a demand for the necessary return to Scott's epic form and realism. If we give some weight, however, to the conspicuous absence of Soviet novels, for which Lukács apologizes by a comment on their inaccessibility, this last section appears as much more than a speculation which neatly completes the dialectic pattern with its plea for 'a renewal in the form of a negation of a negation'. It is, I suggest, a subtle and substantial conclusion to a profound argument, and a word to the wise.

BARBARA HARDY

Birkbeck College

Dance Craze and Sacred Dance. By JOOST A. M. MEERLOO. Peter Owen. 1962. pp. 151. 35s.

DANCING PLAYED an important role in the ancient Hebrew religion, just as it did in other ancient religions, and it continued to take an important place in early Christianity as this evolved out of the Hebrew religion. But puritanical movements within the Christian church finally succeeded in outlawing the dance almost completely, the dance of the Seises in Seville cathedral remaining as a strange living fossil. The result is that in the Western world people take it for granted that the arts of painting, sculpture and music should reach their highest achievements when associated with religion, but cannot imagine dancing in this context.

East of Suez things are very different. The whole of Indian dancing—classical, semi-classical and folk—is religious, being concerned with stories about the gods, and some of it is still performed in temples (in Kerala, Orissa and elsewhere). Even when performed for Moslem patrons—like the Kathak dance which flourished at Moslem courts—the Indian classical dance held fast to its religious themes; and the same thing happened in Java, where a branch of Indian classical dancing greatly flourished. In Japan the blend of Buddhist and Shinto ideas in the classical dance-drama (Nóh and Kabuki) is very complex, but the religious substructure is still evident: a performance is thought to get off to a good start if it begins with some sort of Sambaso, derived from an ancient folk-dance associated with fertility rites. Folk-dances, indeed, all tend to have some sort of religious origin, wherever they are performed—and however little their performers may be aware of their origin and significance.

Apart from specialized studies there are some general books dealing with this field (notably *The Sacred Dance* by W. O. E. Oesterley, 1923), but they have tended to take the form of a miscellany, and so the

way was clear for a book which dealt in a searching, analytical way with the whole field, taking advantage of the insights achieved by Freud, Jung and others into the inner meanings of works of art and also of the work of social anthropologists and ethnologists.

Dr. Meerloo is a Dutch doctor (the book was originally published in Amsterdam in 1961) and the evidence of his text suggests that he is a psychoanalytically orientated psychiatrist. He is also greatly interested in the ritual dance. Looking at the dance from a specialized point of view, he is able to make some interesting and original observations, though much of the introductory text (pp. 11–42) is superficial and has the same miscellaneous quality as the books from which it is derived. In fact his most original statements derive from anatomy and physiology rather than from psychology—though the two cannot of course be entirely separated. He writes of what he calls the 'nirvanic dance' of the embryo within the mother's womb, linking it with the snake dance and illustrating this with examples of Australian aboriginal painting which show snake, embryo and womb; as he says, 'the peristaltic movements of the motherwomb, pressing the child out of its personal paradise, are inadvertently compared with the movements of the treacherous snake'. He even treats a head of Medusa (with snakes as hair) as a symbol of a snake dance, representing 'the ancient myth of birth; the snake-dance as a struggle for individuality'. Here he stretches a genuine insight much too far, ignoring the wide range of meanings embodied in the snake-archetype.

The above two quotations are taken not from the general introduction but from captions to two of the illustrations which together make up two-thirds of the book. Here the book is quite frankly a miscellany: a fascinating collection of pictures, arranged in groups and provided by Dr. Meerloo with useful captions. In fact Dr. Meerloo makes his points very largely by careful choice of illustration, and sometimes by witty juxtapositions or two or three illustrations on facing pages. Marching penguins, for example, are compared with marching soldiers and with an ancient rock-drawing of groups of men walking in line in some strange ritual. Other comparisons emerge from close study of illustrations far apart in the book—such as the rough medieval *danse macabre* (No. 29) and the much more violent and stylized dance of the Tibetan skeletons in one corner of Illustration 66.

Some of the captions make it clear that Dr. Meerloo is more familiar with representations of the dance than with the dance itself. He writes, for example, of the 'American choreographer Leonide Massine', and says of a photo of a work by José Limon—a most ungifted choreographer—that 'In this "free-style" the creative impulses of modern dance are integrated': to justify this comment he should have obtained a photo of a theatre-piece by Martha Graham.

FERNAU HALL

Creative Photography: Aesthetic Trends, 1839–1960. By HELMUT GERNSHEIM. Faber and Faber. 1962. pp. 258. 84s.

IN THIS well-produced volume illustrated by 244 reproductions of photographs, Dr. Gernsheim gives a detailed historical survey of photography from its beginnings, and uses the occasion to put forward a theory of its aesthetic. To anyone with the slightest interest in the subject this is a fascinating book. The illustrations are well chosen: since many of them are celebrated, it is stimulating to have them all here together.

The author has excluded photography in colour from his subject matter because of the high cost of reproduction which still prevents the use of it on a really wide scale. He assumes, somewhat rashly perhaps, that the considerable amount of colour photography used in advertising is

without artistic merit and therefore beneath discussion. He also excludes photographs intended to serve scientific or technical purposes, and the vast output of snapshotters whose cameras merely record family events or holidays. Of their products he aptly remarks that they 'bear the same relationship to a composed creative picture as noise does to music'. If, however, as he asserts, 'only a minute proportion of the immense output of photographs has any pretension to art', the creative element in photography must indeed be elusive!

Gernsheim's thesis is that 'the most important contribution of photography as an art form lies in its unique ability to chronicle life'. He accordingly presents the successive movements of 'fine art' photography, imitation paintings, impressionist photography, photo-montage, schadographs, photograms, surrealist photography and abstract designs from nature as interesting byways of photography contributing nothing to its progress as an art. 'Most of the "isms" in painting', he tells us, 'have been reflected in photography, only the reflection was never as good as the original.' Art critics have been mistaken in admiring those photographs which have been closest in style and feeling to contemporary painting and in ignoring the fact that to be true to its medium the photograph must do only that which cannot be achieved through some other medium: when painting imitates photography and photography painting, each is false. Gernsheim contrasts the jobs of painter and photographer, pointing out that whereas the photographer is the better equipped to record the visible world, the painter is free as the photographer is not to create subjective abstract designs. If each is to do only what he can do best, the creative photographer must specialize in realistic pictures of the world around him, expressing his personal vision through choice of viewpoint, lighting, differential focusing and alternation of wide-angle and telephoto with standard lenses. Gernsheim speaks of the camera as 'intercepting images' whereas the painter's brush 'reconstructs' them. The painter records his own experience of a scene while the photographer records 'a selected aspect of the event itself'. The emphasis is on selection, through which a performer like Paul Strand can demonstrate a new vision of the world, 'discovering in the most ordinary objects significant forms full of aesthetic appeal'. In illustration we are given a shot of kitchen bowls forming an abstract pattern, an overhead view of tumbledown buildings in a New York suburb, and Gernsheim's own suggestive impression of the muddy ruts of unmade roadway dominating a new town. The most moving pictures in the book, however, are those which do indeed chronicle human life; they supply the only possible arguments for his thesis which must be established by illustration. The sharpness of detail, the ability of the modern fast lens to record phases of events lasting only a thousandth of a second or less, and above all its objectivity, make photography an unrivalled witness of the contemporary social scene. Beside these brilliantly captured moments of significance, the work of the various 'arty' schools seems faded and trite. Let us by all means leave tachisme and impressionism alike to painters and concentrate on what the lens excels in!

The majority of photographic magazines do indeed, as Gernsheim says, stress problems of technique and apparatus while neglecting aesthetic considerations. He may well be correct in imputing this bias to the educational and cultural deficiencies of many photographers, both amateur and professional. He goes on to castigate the leading photographic societies for their pictorialism, their banal and sentimental taste which rejects the modern naturalistic approach. Also there are those who publish for the astonishment of an undiscerning public all manner of distortions properly relegated to the waste-paper basket as instances of faulty technique. Another

object of the author's indignation is R. H. Wilenski's view of photography, which he refutes point by point.

Altogether this is an absorbing, if somewhat testy survey of its subject and should be read by every serious photographer today.

WINIFRED M. WHITELEY

Birmingham

Surface Structures in Building. By FRED ANGERER. Tiranti. 1961. pp. vi + 142. 18s.

THIS BOOK, written by an engineer and addressed primarily to architects, might be thought to be too specialized for the lay reader. And yet the author's exposition is so clear that anyone with the slightest interest in structures should leave it with a very clear idea of the concepts behind Surface Structure.

The author is concerned not only with the broad outlines of statical theory, but also with aesthetic form. In his attempt to establish a relationship between these two aspects of structure his conclusions are necessarily less final.

The difficulty, one suspects, arises from the fact that the engineer's and the architect's orientation to the problems of structure are often radically different. The engineer, applying complex solutions to simple problems, produces elegance of form out of considerations of logical economy. The architect, on the other hand, applies simple solutions to complex problems of which purely structural considerations are only one aspect. When we we talk of the beauty of a bridge by Maillart, or of a stadium by Candela, we are admiring the energetic principle; in the case of a building the energetic principle is subjected to metaphorical refraction.

Herr Angerer says rightly that all structures derive from a subtle relation between resistant material and ideal form, and points to the danger that the almost limitless possibilities of Surface Structure may lead to meaningless fantasy. Yet the answer to this does not lie in a dogmatic and over-simple type of functionalism, and it is just to this that he seems to be attracted when he misquotes Vitruvius as saying that *Vanitas* follows from *Firmitas* and *Utilitas*.

But in spite of such solecisms, the author's analysis of the various structural types is pleasantly free from dogmatism. He sees the science of Surface Structures as in the process of continuous evolution, with no one solution more perfect than another. Particularly enlightening in this respect is his discussion of Fuller's geodesic dome.

This is a useful and unpretentious book, and it succeeds in its aim of helping the architect to understand the principles behind one of the most important branches of modern structural engineering. But it is a pity that neither the author nor his translator appears to consider the problems of good writing to be relevant to the clarification of mathematical or philosophical ideas.

ALAN COLQUHOUN

The Rhythmic Structure of Music. By GROSVENOR W. COOPER and LEONARD B. MEYER. 1961. University of Chicago Press. pp. ix + 212. 48s.

ONE OF the most baffling problems in the psychology of music and the study of aesthetics is that concerning the nature of musical ability. We now know that it is not just the summation of cognitive abilities such as sense of pitch, time, rhythm and memory, though naturally all these are involved. Indeed, it is remarkable that each of these factors may be examined quite separately by practical experiments using both musical and non-musical material. This has been especially the case with rhythm, since parallels are often drawn with the other arts leading to associations of rhythmic phenomena or

facts that may be too readily used as analogies that obscure their particular musical bearing. Possibly this explains the confused and even irreconcilable definitions that various writers have adopted for the term 'rhythm'.

It is a pleasing feature that Cooper and Meyer's book is entirely musical in character, being copiously illustrated by musical quotations drawn from a wide range of composers and compositions, all skilfully selected not only to elucidate the text but to help the reader to develop the rhythmic features in his own musicianship, whatever the field in which he works. The authors define their use of the term 'rhythm' clearly and simply: it is 'the way in which one or more unaccented beats are grouped in relation to an accented one. The five basic rhythmic groupings may be differentiated by terms traditionally associated with prosody—iamb, anapest, trochee, dactyl and amphibrach'. They carefully point out, however, that rhythmic grouping is a mental fact not a physical one, hence its recognition as such depends upon the judgement of the cultured musician. This is really the key to the whole volume, which may be regarded as a textbook to be used in conjunction with courses in harmony and counterpoint during musical training. Indeed, the authors claim that this is probably the first systematic textbook of its kind in English. Undoubtedly a careful study of the work, together with the musical compositions cited, would open up new vistas for both the interpretation and appreciation of musical compositions. The chapters on *Rhythm, Mobility and Tension* and on *Rhythmic Development* would be of outstanding value when read in conjunction with the full scores of the works they mention.

A new field of music study has been opened up by this psychological approach to a traditional topic. Although not specifically mentioned in the book, the treatment might well be regarded as reinforcing the aesthetical argument made by Samuel Alexander in his *Beauty and other Forms of Value* (1933). It will be remembered that Alexander set great store upon what he called the human constructive instinct, preparing the way for the creation of beauty through craftsmanship and its transformation into the so-called 'fine art'. Cooper and Meyer succeed in treating rhythm as an aesthetical structural element in music; the treatment of a tune as a rhythmical evolution is most revealing. Their book is as much a thesis in aesthetics as in music.

H. LOWERY
South-West Essex Technical College and School of Art

Emotion and Meaning in Music. By LEONARD B. MEYER. The University of Chicago Press. Phoenix Books. Fourth Impression 1961. pp. x + 307. $1.95.

SINCE ITS publication in 1956 this book by the Professor of Music in the University of Chicago has established itself as a basic text in musical aesthetics and its appearance in a paper-back edition is welcome. Eschewing general aesthetic philosophy, Professor Meyer takes as his subject the problems of meaning and communication in music and restricts himself further by excluding those aspects of meaning which are derivative from a reference to extramusical experience. For him meaning is inherent in emotional response. Defining it as a triadic relation between stimulus, that to which the stimulus points, and conscious observer, he then distinguishes 'referential' meaning where the stimulus indicates events or consequences different in kind from itself and the 'embodied' meaning proper to music, where the stimulus implies consequents of the same kind as itself. He traces at some length how musical stimuli activate and inhibit emotional tendencies, create expectation and build up suspense, provide relevant and meaningful resolutions for the emotional tendencies which

are excited. It is one of his basic hypotheses that 'affect or emotion-felt is aroused when an expectation—a tendency to respond—activated by the musical stimulus situation, is temporarily inhibited or permanently blocked'. Thus musical meaning is for him a product of expectation and only those musical stimuli have meaning which lead us to expect 'a more or less definite consequent musical event'. Despite this identification of musical meaning with emotional arousal, in his discussion of communication, Professor Meyer recognizes that the hearer may either 'lose himself in the music' or adopt the more self-conscious and objective attitude of those who are musically trained. One would have liked to see recognized the attitude of perceptive absorption which is neither strongly emotional nor reflectively self-conscious.

Within the framework of this theory the book contains some exceptionally interesting analyses of the methods of musical communication, in the course of which the writer reveals not only a competent knowledge of Western music down to the most modern of contemporary styles but an even more unusual familiarity with musical styles of primitive peoples and with Chinese and Japanese music. This is a book which will interest both those who agree with the writer and those whose point of view is different from his.

H. OSBORNE

Reflections on Art. A Source Book of Writings by Artists, Critics and Philosophers. Edited by SUSANNE K. LANGER. Oxford University Press. Galaxy Book. 1962. pp. xviii + 364. 12s. 6d.

THOSE WHO have known this 'heterogeneous collection' since its publication by The John Hopkins Press in 1958, will whole-heartedly commend the good judgement of the publishers who have made it available in a paper-back edition. The twenty-six papers it comprises have been chosen for a combination of intrinsic interest and inaccessibility. Having seen it done, one is tempted to demand that this should be the method of more anthologies. There are few of us who have not known the irritation of finding the most recondite source material omitted from collection after collection while that which is already on our shelves is reduplicated in every new one that appears.

In her Introduction Miss Langer confesses with engaging ingenuousness to a fundamental accord between the authors of her choice and her own philosophical views, since otherwise she would 'have no reason to judge their work as generally sound and important.' They are, she tells us, people from whom she has drawn some of her own ideas and they all either expound or assume either the concept of expressiveness as she herself treated it in *Feeling and Form*, or the concept of 'semblance' as defining the Art Symbol. Yet there is no lack of variety. Contributions on the problem of feeling include not only Otto Baensch's article 'Art and Feeling' from *Logos* (1923–4) and Louis Arnaud Reid's Aristotelian Society paper 'Beauty and Significance' (1928–9), but the more recent essay by Lucius Garvin in *The Journal of Phenomenology* (1947) 'The Paradox of Aesthetic Meaning'. We find Raymond Bayer's stimulating study on 'The Essence of Rhythm', Malreaux's 'Sketch for a Psychology of the Moving Pictures', and Étienne Souriau's 'Time in the Plastic Arts'. Gabriel Marcel and Micheline Sauvage also deal with the relation of actual time to musical time and we welcome the important essay by Helmut Reinold 'On the Problem of Musical Hearing' from *Archiv fur Musikwissenschaft* (1954).

This is a compilation which no one with a serious interest in theories of art can afford to be without.

H. OSBORNE

BOOKS RECEIVED

(The inclusion of a title in this list does not preclude subsequent review)

ALLEN, DON CAMERON (Ed.). *The Moment of Poetry*. The John Hopkins Press. London: Oxford University Press. 1962. pp. 135. 28s.

AYRTON, MICHAEL. *The Testament of Daedalus*. Methuen. 1962. pp. 70 and 16 Plates. 21s.

BAKER, HERSCHEL. *William Hazlitt*. Harvard University Press. London: Oxford University Press. 1962. pp. xiv + 530. 60s.

BAZIN, GERMAIN. *The Loom of Art*. Thames & Hudson. 1962. pp. 328. 6 gns.

BLUNT, ANTHONY. *Artistic Theory in Italy 1450–1600*. Oxford Paperback. 1962. 5s.

DUFFIN, H. C. *Arnold the Poet*. Bowes & Bowes. 1962. pp. 158. 21s.

FOGLE, RICHARD HARTER. *The Idea of Coleridge's Criticism*. University of California Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1962. pp. xiv + 185. 34s.

GABO, NAUM. *Of Divers Arts*. Faber and Faber. 1962. pp. 205. 52s. 6d.

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THE BRITISH SOCIETY OF AESTHETICS

THE THIRD Annual General Meeting of the Society was held on 3rd October 1962 at 6 p.m. at the Holborn Central Library, with the President, Sir Herbert Read, in the chair.

The Secretaries presented a report (which had been previously circulated to all members) on the Society's activities during the year. These included nine lecture-meetings at the Holborn Central Library, the organization of a course of five lectures on *The Philosophy and Psychology of Art* for The Friends of the York Art Gallery, and the continued publication of *The British Journal of Aesthetics*. An arrangement had also been made with the American Society for Aesthetics to collaborate in the production and distribution of the valuable bibliography which appears annually in the July number of the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*. This will enable interested members of the British Society to receive copies of the bibliography free of charge.

The treasurer's report indicated that the Society's financial position remained satisfactory, the year's accounts showing a comfortable surplus of income over expenditure; but the need for an expanding society to conserve its resources was emphasized. The Meeting passed a resolution amending the Regulations so as to extend the category 'Friends of the Society' (originally open to institutions only) to individual members donating a minimum of one hundred guineas or its equivalent under a Seven Year Covenant for the promotion of the objects of the Society and it is pleasant now to be able to record that one member, Lady Meyer, generously came forward at the conclusion of the Meeting to enrol herself as the Society's first 'Friend' under the terms of the new Regulation. The Meeting recorded its thanks to the auditor, Mr. A. Y. Green, for his voluntary services.

Sir Herbert Read was re-elected President and Professor E. F. Carritt Vice-President of the Society, and the Meeting confirmed the appointment of Miss R. Meager and Mrs. Vida Carver as Joint Honorary Secretaries, of Mr. Francis B. Cooke as Honorary Treasurer and reappointed Mr. Green (Hon. Auditor) and Mr. Ambrose Appelbe (Hon. Solicitor). Professor Stuart Hampshire, Mr. F. J. W. Harding, Dr. J. P. Hodin, Professor C. A. Mace, Mr. H. Osborne, Professor L. Arnaud Reid and Professor R. L. Saw were also reappointed to the Executive Committee. The co-option of Mr. Eric Capon and Professor H. O. Corfiato to the Editorial Consultative Committee and the reappointment of Mr. Peter Stockham as Assistant to the Editor of the Journal were reported.

The Executive Committee's appointment of Miss Sylvia Schweppe as an Honorary Life Member, in recognition of her services as Honorary Secretary and Treasurer throughout the first three years of the Society's existence, was warmly endorsed by the Meeting.

FUTURE MEETINGS

Meetings are held at the Holborn Central Library, 32/38 Theobalds Road, W.C.1 (buses 5, 19, 38, 170, 172) at 7.30 p.m. Non-members: 5/- payable at the door. Students are admitted free on the production of a College membership card.

Feb. 6 THE AESTHETICS OF INDIAN MUSIC

ARNOLD A. BAKE (Reader in Sanskrit at the University of London School of Oriental and African Studies and author of the chapter on Indian music in the *New Oxford History of Music*, Vol. 1)

March 6 JANE AUSTEN AND OTHERS

LAURENCE LERNER (Lecturer in English at the University of Sussex; has published a novel, *The Englishmen*, a book of poems, *Domestic Interior*, and a critical work, *The Truest Poetry*)

April 3 THE JAZZ ARTIST

ERIC HOBSBAWM (Reader in History at Birkbeck College and, as 'Francis Newton', jazz critic for the *New Statesman* and author of *Jazz Scene*)

May 1 WHAT IS THE POEM ABOUT? FORM AND CONTENT IN THE AESTHETICS OF GOETHE AND SCHILLER

ELIZABETH M. WILKINSON, (Professor of German, University College, London)

June 5 VULGARITY

JOHN BAYLEY (Fellow of New College, Oxford, and author of *The Characters of Love: a Study in the Literature of Personality*)

THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS

J. W. R. PURSER
THE ARTISTIC APPROACH TO TRUTH

LORD BRAIN
DIAGNOSIS OF GENIUS

PETER McKELLAR
ORIGINALITY IN HUMAN THINKING

MOSHE BARASCH
GANTNER'S THEORY OF PREFIGURATION

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THE ARTISTIC APPROACH TO TRUTH

J. W. R. Purser

1. *THE PHILOSOPHER AND ARTIST AS GUIDES TO CONDUCT*

NOT ALL literary men believe their work to be immediately concerned with truth, and few sculptors, painters, architects or musicians would probably make any such claim for theirs. Nevertheless, in their criticisms of one another's works they are all inclined to praise or blame a thing for its truth or lack of truth, leaving the word undefined as a sort of synonym for the 'classic' or the 'correct' or the 'lastingly valuable'—as an indication, in fact, of sterling quality in their own particular spheres. They feel, as everyone feels, that whatever is permanently of worth must in the long run depend for that worth on truth; and the aesthetician is pretty certain to have the same feeling and either to deny art any permanent worth at all or to attempt to link it up with his perhaps not very much more clearly defined conception of what is true.

In trying to establish a link between the work of art and truth in its most obvious definition we are met straightaway by a formidable obstacle, the apparently unmeaning and fabulous elements that are in all art. Architecture may be linked with one kind of truth through its usefulness, but it does not confine itself to the useful but insists on ornament too, and will sometimes sacrifice use to design. Musicians would be hard put to it to describe the truth of a good piece of music or the lack of truth which they too sometimes tell us characterizes a bad one. As for literature and painting, the fabulous element is almost what strikes us first about them, and the poet or painter who copies real life closely and makes a claim to truth on that account is certain to be regarded as inferior by the majority of admirers of either art.

If, then, there is any truth in a work of art it is not generally found to be in its correspondence with or imitation of actual fact. Plato's strictures

on the poet and the artist on account of their bad imitations of reality leave their withers unwrung: they believe him to be speaking so harmlessly beside the point that they feel no resentment against him, and even claim him as one of themselves, a poet in his own despite. His notion of the philosopher, concerned with the ideas of things rather than with the things themselves, would seem to them to describe more nearly the interests of the true artist.

Here, however, a new difficulty presents itself in the shape of a long-standing opposition and even animosity between the poet, and to a lesser degree other artists, and the philosopher—an animosity which Plato himself was among the first to describe (though who knows whether the poets, in their own way and from the opposite point of view, may not have got in a satirical dig or two beforehand?) when he made Socrates mock at the poets and rhapsodists with such cruel irony, and leave the sophists and enthusiasts grovelling at the bottom of such unenviable pitfalls. According to most philosophers we can only know truth by reason. If we rely on enthusiasm, or feeling, or intuition, or instinct, we expose ourselves to a thousand dangers, and are, moreover, relying on powers which can never prove their own validity. The philosophers who have defended intuition and instinct have used their reason in its defence, and so, as philosophers, have still been rationalists. The poet and artist, on the other hand, have little fear of feeling, intuition, instinct, often admit themselves to be guided by these, and even prefer them to reason. Sometimes the artist adduces the very same argument against reason that the philosopher adduces against feeling: reason has too often proved itself capricious and whimsical, the fanatic has committed unspeakable sins in the name of reason, and the only sure guide in life is our own profoundest, most inexplicable faith. There are deep and true feelings more trustworthy than any reasons: so the poets have often said. It is by feeling and faith alone that we know that it is right to be just or kind on principle; and still more when it comes to particular cases, only an appeal to deep instinct will tell us when we ought to be just rather than merciful or merciful rather than just. Thus poet and philosopher accuse one another equally of a whimsical and irresponsible attitude, and of relying on guides that are not to be trusted.

On the face of it the philosopher seems to be in the more secure position here. Few philosophers—at least few of the well-known ones—have been dangerous or irresponsible men, whereas many an artist has been notably wild in his views and irregular in his life. The advice of reason seems more reliable, in practice at any rate, than that of feeling or instinct. We may claim for the man who acts on feeling that he stirs the

world more and is more likely to lead it into new adventures, good or bad, than the man who consults calm reason on all occasions; but in matters of practice most people prefer safety to adventure, and no doubt wisely. New paths need to be coolly examined on the map or in the mind before we commit ourselves to them. If the individual likes to risk himself well and good; but the philosopher and the artist both are apt to speak for the whole of mankind, and, whether followed or no, keep on directing and urging others to go along with them.

Perhaps this is just a human failing on both their parts: perhaps the philosopher no more than the artist deserves to be taken at his own valuation as an expert guide to behaviour. Certainly if the world at large had imitated Diogenes or followed the advice of Nietzsche (and he is said not to have been without his unfortunate influence) it would have been led as far off the straight road as if it had run *en bloc* after Lord Byron or d'Annunzio. The world, indeed, is apt to regard both philosophy and the arts as purely speculative, and perhaps that is how they are best to regard themselves—as the scouts and map-makers and charters of new territories for humankind, leaving it to the general decision how and when their doctrines should be put into effect.

2. *ART AND DOGMA*

Putting the practical question aside, then, and reverting to the fact that the philosopher generally likes to think of himself as being guided by reason but the artist by feeling, is it possible to claim any truth for the work of art? Obviously our feelings are not just purely private affairs without any reference to truth at all, since there are good and bad, useful and harmful feelings, etc., and in works of art there are ones which, for lack of clearer terms, one may call valid or invalid. What does this validity or invalidity consist in? Truth of imitation (or representation) has already been ruled out as not being relevant, and that being gone what other is there?

Perhaps the easiest way of approaching this question is by taking examples; and literature provides no doubt the readiest ones. The following poem of Wordsworth's must be almost universally agreed to be a 'valid' poem:

> A slumber did my spirit seal;
> I had no human fears:
> She seem'd a thing that could not feel
> The touch of earthly years.

No motion has she now, no force;
She neither hears nor sees;
Roll'd round in earth's diurnal course
With rocks, and stones, and trees.

The beauty of this poem is no doubt largely due to the simple human emotion which the two contrasting verses make explicit and touching to everyone—to the power with which it conveys the blank feeling left behind by the loss of someone who has been loved. But the communication of simple emotion is not enough to make a poem; poems which have that aim alone being felt to be sentimental. Even the shaping of such emotions through the metrical form and the balancing of images into a pattern would not rescue it from sentimentality if there were no more to it than that. Poetry when treating of simple human experience seems to need to place it in a wider context; and in this poem of Wordsworth's we have the picture of the dead person, Lucy, being carried round in her grave with the motion of the earth in company with 'rocks and stones and trees'. A sad or despairing view of death is not presented here, but rather comfort of a kind is derived from the bleak thought of a mortal creature surrendering in death its private life and motion to the universal life and motion. The poem, however, does not assert dogmatically that this is what death actually amounts to, a loss of our individuality and a reabsorption of the personality into the insensible life of nature. Wordsworth puts forward his idea merely as an intuition or feeling that may be reflected on, and partly for this reason the idea is one which everyone will accept. A materialist, a Christian believer in the immortality of the soul, or a believer, like Wordsworth himself, in the beneficent power of nature, all can both be moved by it, and find deep meaning in it, for it does not dogmatize against their dogmas.

It is a failing with Wordsworth that he is too inclined to assert his passing intuitions as general truths (not that a poet always expects to be taken quite literally when he does this); and here is surely to be found a most important distinction between the poet's, and in general the artist's, approach to truth and the philosopher's. A statement in philosophy that is merely put forward as a suggestion or intuition is a woolly and fatuous sort of thing. The philosopher must dogmatize. He need not pretend that he has discovered the final truth about a matter, but he must claim to be trying to do so, and he must support his statements with arguments, make them consistent with one another and be willing to defend them until someone has proved them to be wrong. The wise poet does not set up to be a philosopher in this sense, and will generally leave some loophole of escape from even his most commendable truisms, by allowing us to regard their statement as playful, or pro-

visional, or by suggesting that the particular form they have taken has been adopted purely conventionally.

This does not mean, however, that poetry is in no sense philosophical. Wordsworth (but he is not the only sinner) may often make the mistake of laying down the law too positively, and so antagonizing some of his readers against his 'system'; but there is some system there all the same. All his intuitions, though they may conflict with one another here and there, and be only acceptable in certain given circumstances, add together and make a body of thoughtful experience that may indeed be called philosophical—that in fact influences certain types of mind more powerfully than any amount of acceptable dogma is likely to do. Among the many truths of which Wordsworth's work is convincing is his own conviction that the external world is not an indifferent mechanical world, which we inhabit by chance, but that its laws are our laws too, springing from the same source from which our lives spring and leading to the same destiny.

Some writers are very dexterous at communicating truth without defining it too closely or committing themselves to it irrevocably. The dramatist is prevented by his medium from dogmatizing personally to any great extent, but Shakespeare especially is a past-master at avoiding personal pronouncements. A Marlowe or Ben Jonson, great dramatists though they are, tell us too often what to think, but Shakespeare makes us think without ever urging us to do so or openly directing us. He has been accused of lacking a point of view and of being indifferent towards truth, so expertly does he express the feelings and motives of different individuals, and so perfectly does he give voice to conflicting notions about the constitution of the universe, the nature of good and evil, etc., etc. The fact remains, however, that we are all conscious of having learnt a great deal from Shakespeare, skilled as he may be in not abiding our question—much more than from Marlowe and Jonson for instance—and even that we know more fully and sympathize more completely with his outlook, however difficult to define, than with theirs. Critics have tried to discover Shakespeare's ideal of humanity from his plays, and, he being so human a writer, one would think that if any ideal were derivable from his works that would be the one. It turns out, however, that he sympathized with too diverse types altogether—with the 'reasonable' Brutus and the 'unreasonable' Cassius, with the complex Hamlet and the simple Othello, with the pleasure-loving Antony and the austere Coriolanus—for us to be able to detect a preference very clearly, far less find laid down any rules of behaviour for the perfect human being. Vaguely we can say that he liked conscientiousness, generosity and kindness, and disliked unscrupulousness, meanness and cruelty, but some

people whom in general he seems to admire are not untainted with even these vices, while, when he attempts to portray an unmixed virtue, he seems to lose interest in it, so that the portrait falls flat. In the end we seem to learn from him tolerance of all types rather than a preference for any. Certainly the attempt to describe an ideal of humanity that lies hidden in his work has not met with much success.

Yet are Shakespeare's works unphilosophical? Surely they are philosophical in some sense, and we are not giving him undeserved praise when we say he is a great thinker and a great stimulator of thought in others. Once more we have a body of meaningful experience presented to us, only it is experience inseparable from its body, and no abstract general conclusions are drawn from it. It would seem that mankind yearns towards truth in two different forms, in the form of concrete image and in the form of abstract statement. The artist with his imagination gives us the one; the philosopher with his reasoning gives us the other.

3. *ART AND THE UNIVERSAL OR GENERAL; MEANING IN ART*

It has been said by many literary theorists that poetry is not concerned with the particular but with the universal. Poetry, it has been maintained, does not 'number the streaks of the tulip'; 'its object is truth, not individual and local, but general . . .'. To agree unreservedly with these statements would, however, bring us near to identifying poetry with philosophy. It is true that a descriptive poet does not detail minutely any particular piece of scenery, but rather presents us with a typical scene which will appeal to everyone because everyone will have seen one such himself, and will be able from his own experience to re-create it in imagination. But philosophy does not describe scenery, and to describe at all is already to particularize. Indeed, poetry may from one point of view be said to be very specially particular. Usually it is in order to generalize about tulips that we number their streaks, but a poet describing a tulip, though he may appeal to common experience and avoid some kinds of detail (perhaps not even telling us what colour it is), tries to create a feeling of the actual presence of one particular tulip in the reader's mind. It may be that he wishes to make us aware of the 'eternal truths of man and nature', but often it is by describing his own parish that he does so, and the 'local' quality of his description will be essential to his meaning: he will wish to make us see the eternal truths 'operative' here and now.

Particularity of this kind is indeed so important in art that we can

disregard a great deal of generalized statement in a poem with which we would disagree violently, and still find it a very fine poem. Not all appreciators of *The Divine Comedy* subscribe to Dante's scheme of salvation and damnation, and many a solid admirer of *Paradise Lost* takes offence at (or still more damagingly feels inclined to ridicule) the general pronouncements that Milton puts into the mouth of the Almighty. Both poems, however, have been realized imaginatively with such vividness that we are willing to overlook their offending statements and fabulous cosmogonies and cosmographies for the sake of their lively deception, the strong sense of actual presence which they produce. Nor will any true admirer of these poems admit that he reads them purely for the pleasure of losing himself in the strength of another man's conviction. On the contrary he will staunchly assert that he has been in the presence of—in actual contact with—an important and moving truth.

It is easy to enumerate some of the truths with which we may be in contact in poetry and literature in general, for moral situations, religious paradoxes, social problems and the dreams and aspirations of every man are some of the very stuff of literature. It is harder when we come to an art like music, whose meaning is even more completely embedded in its medium, while its medium is, to all appearances, quite unintellectual. But musicians are insistent on the meaning of their work, and if a paper covered by mathematical symbols has meaning, that covered by musical notation surely has too, though it does not end up by presenting us with its meaning in a formula. As with the poem, so with the sonata, its intellectual content cannot be isolated from its body and repeated in abstract form over and over again as often as required. The only way to communicate the 'truth' of a sonata is to repeat the whole intact, and even then it will not be quite the same truth repeated to a new audience or an audience which has heard it before. We may say the same, no doubt, of the mathematical problem, that it does not mean quite the same thing to everybody on every occasion; but this is a matter of indifference to the mathematician. He is not concerned with the feelings evoked by his proof, whereas to the musician the feelings evoked by his music are of prime importance, for like the poet he endeavours to create not a general truth, but this truth, the feeling of 'thisness' in his work making such an impact that many people suspect him to be merely talking high talk when he claims it to have any general import at all.

The musician is justified in his claim to meaning. His work is shown to have general import by its affinities with other things. One piece of music is suited to a mass, quite another to a dance. It is by virtue of its general content that it fits with this or that occasion, is or is not martial

or contemplative, human or angelic. Of course, a large and complicated piece of music cannot be adequately described by any such simple terms as these, but the musician would say that that was not because it had any less intellectual content than a mathematical demonstration, but because its individuality was too well filled out to be so described. The amount of human experience that is incorporated in a symphony of Beethoven's is as notable as the complexity of its organization and the skill with which it is all made harmonious with itself. Yet as with the Shakespearian play we are baffled when we try to put this meaning into words of our own, so with Beethoven's symphony: it would require to be played all over again for us to learn the truth that it contains or, rather, is.

Abstract painting and sculpture must appeal in very much the same way as music, and those whose sensitivity to the shapes and colours of things our daily traffic with them has not staled maintain that they are capable of arousing as intense and various feelings as the notes of music can, and that an unrepresentational picture can be as tightly organized and hold as much meaning as a symphony. Representational painting and sculpture are nearer to poetry in that some at any rate of their ideas can be fairly easily described in intellectual terms. Again, however, this will of necessity be a very inadequate description, the individuality of the truth conveyed by the work of art being beyond the grasp of intellect alone.

4. *NEITHER THE UNIVERSALITY NOR INDIVIDUALITY OF ART IS ABSOLUTE*

In stressing the general meaning of works of art we have been forced equally to stress their individuality and non-intellectual side, but to keep on insisting on either of these has the effect of overstatement: it soon arouses opposition and incredulity. A meaning that cannot be expressed in abstract terms but only experienced imaginatively is after all not a meaning in the common sense of the word; and again, although it may be approximately true to say that every work of art is unique, the truth is only approximate. There are pictures very similar to other pictures, and it is an exaggeration to say that altering one word in a poem will change the whole completely. Occasionally it may be so, and occasionally that may just make the important difference between success and near-success, but in general an artist may keep on altering and refining his conception without radically affecting its individuality: it is the same picture or poem that is being worked at, and it is still the same piece of music that is being played to different audiences or by different performers. To grasp the universality in individuality that a work of art

presents us with is important in trying to understand the function of art, but to insist too much on either element in its make-up would lead in the end to a denial of the other. If the work of art were absolutely unique, with the kind of uniqueness it has, it would be meaningless, and if it were all pure meaning, with the kind of meaning it has, it would not be unique. Body and spirit may be united in it as perfectly as they can be united by mortal man—more completely than when he puts his will into action, for instance—but absolute perfection in this as in other respects is beyond his grasp.

5. *DESIGN AND ART*

A very noticeable side to all works of art is their design, so noticeable that the theorist has often been tempted to identify art with design, music being described as a pattern of notes, painting of forms and colours, poetry of words, architecture and sculpture of masses. The inadequacy of these descriptions is felt, however, by most true lovers of the arts: the word 'design' brings to mind carpets and wallpapers, and the difference between these and real art they feel to be pretty considerable. A mere design may be made infinitely complex and intricate, and still remain a mere design. One of the functions of a work of art is no doubt the imposing of order on things, but this order in a design, properly so called, is just a symmetrical pattern of greater or less complexity.

All the same, the dividing line between design and art is not easily drawn; and design of some kind is always present in art. The pattern of carpets or wallpapers may be generally one of geometrical regularity, but the introduction of representative features such as flowers or the heads of men or beasts tends to lift their appeal above that of design, the craftsman embodying in his work something of his own character and outlook—his sense of the abundance, or, it may be, the comedy of life. A very little is required to turn a craft into an art—that is to say, to make us cease to regard its utility only or to think of it simply as pattern or ornament, and to see meaning in it; just as a philosopher, by bringing his own thought to bear on a popular proverb, may find in it a profound truth. What we get from works of art we to some extent bring to them, and an enthusiast may find in a panel of stained glass an emblem of all creation.

The importance of design in art is well exemplified in architecture, in which every species of design, from simple symmetrical pattern to recondite and mystical symbolism, may be put to use. Well exemplified in architecture too is the call made by a work of art on the imagination of the beholder. A cathedral appeals through its mere size, proportion

and symmetry, and at the same time it requires imagination to appreciate it. The whole building cannot be seen at a glance: from whatever corner one enters it parts will be hidden from view, and this makes one conscious of the share the mind has in creating the grandeur that seems to overawe it. In experiencing the building aesthetically one is both acting and being acted upon, both subject and object in an act of creation, which is, of course, deeply satisfying to our human instincts—to our desire for power, our yearning for balance and order, and our love of a mystery which yet is hoped not to lie too far beyond the grasp of thought. We would scarecely need to be told of a medieval cathedral that it was a religious building, even though we were strangers from some other country or century: the soaring proportions and especially the deliberately cultivated sense of mystery would make it self-evident. In this case it is obviously the mystery of eternity that the work of art seems to present us with. The detail we refer to the whole, seeing in it the multitudes of God's creation, shapes of good and evil, the graces, absurdities and monstrosities of nature; while the design and symmetry of the building is thought of as being characteristic of the design and order of the original creative spirit.

In a specifically religious work of art, such as a cathedral, an altarpiece or a religious oratorio or mass, design and order are thus immediately associable with our conception of the creative mind: we think of them as being a reflection of the divine order and harmony. We are not always conscious of such an association when we admire the pattern of other works of art, and yet our instinctive love of design is surely just due to this, that we believe truth ultimately to be something ordered and harmonious, and disorder and unresolved discord to be, so to speak, the works of falsehood, or, if we are of a religious frame of mind, of the devil. Discord and disorder enter into works of art but only in order to be overcome. In fact, the more of them a work of art can successfully overcome the greater we feel its triumph to be; and perhaps this again is satisfying to us because we feel it to be a triumph of the powers of light over those of darkness, a victory of hope over despair, or of the integrating spirit of life over the disintegration of death. Satirical and other works of art which deal largely in 'ugliness' and disorder are apparent exceptions to this; but there is order in their disorder, and their criticism implies a positive ideal. A real disorder, a dead or disharmonious member in a work of art—one which does not co-operate with or which works against the others in the life of the whole—is as obnoxious as a diseased or dying organ in the body.

6. *THE 'LIFE' OF ART*

In speaking of the 'life' of a work of art, as in speaking of its 'body', one is, no doubt, playing with metaphor and analogy, but the work of art has not become familiar enough territory to have evolved a settled terminology of its own; and speaking metaphorically does not necessarily mean speaking merely rhetorically. Indeed there seems a special appropriateness in the application of the word 'life' to the work of art when we wish to indicate the difference between it and design. A design, it has been said, may derive its attraction from our instinctive yearning towards the orderliness of truth, but it does not live in the way that we believe the truth must live. Art at its simplest borders on mere design without any very tight organization or any very specific meaning; at its more developed it may be described metaphorically as a living organism. The soul of this organism is the 'meaning' of this particular work of art, its body is the medium in which the meaning is incorporated, and the organism as a whole is a co-operation of the two to produce an individual life. The work of art is in touch with truth through its 'meaning', but it may also be linked with truth on account of its form. What is finally true should be capable of maintaining itself—should in fact be a living organism like the work of art (only more unassailably perfect): it must evolve its own soul out of its own matter and its own matter out of its own soul, just as in a work of art the medium creates the meaning and the meaning controls the medium, the one being inseparable from the other and having no real life as art apart from the other. The work of art comes as near to living with a self-contained, self-supporting existence as anything conceived by the mind of man.

7. *SOME CAUSES OF FAILURE IN WORKS OF ART*

So far the causes of failure in works of art have not been considered. One disharmonious word or even one word that is too obviously lacking in vital function may ruin a small poem. But may not a poem fail, not because of disharmony within itself, but because of disharmony with some vague feeling we have of the nature of truth in general? If the appeal of pattern and design in art is due to our instinctive belief that their orderliness is characteristic of truth, a disharmony with truth outside a poem will result in a kind of secondary disharmony within it, even though it may be perfectly organized and therefore apparently harmonious when regarded *in vacuo*. It will then be a living organism in itself but a misfit in the world of mind in general. Some such seems to be the defect we feel in those many works of art with which we can

find no fault internally, but which yet dissatisfy us because of their sentimentality or pompousness or the like; while, on the other hand, because of its rightness of adjustment with truth external to itself, even a very slight work of art may seem to have a profundity beyond itself, giving us an extreme pleasure as hard to account for as the pain caused by the externally ill-adjusted work. Such a small poem as Herrick's 'To Daffodils' is, to a casual judgement, a triviality, yet it charms us altogether, and gives us a feeling of completeness and perfection which can only be accounted for by its utter rightness in relation to all our instincts externally (part of its appeal being, of course, due to its reminder of the sweetness of spring, a pleasure imported into the poem—as in the long run must be nearly all the sensations we derive from words—from our experience outside, but not for that reason to be regarded as irrelevant to the *poetic* beauty of the poem). It would be hard to prove that in itself Herrick's poem was any better organized than, say, one like Patmore's 'Toys', or one of Austin Dobson's *vers de société*; yet these even displease many readers, who can admire their technical attainments and the sincerity of their sentiment within themselves but feel that they take themselves too seriously or luxuriate over a feeling which ought to be coped with and put aside in the day's work.

In so judging a work of art by criteria external to the work itself are we committing a blunder? Most present-day criticism would say so, for it maintains that the only way to judge art is by an examination of the structure of a work within itself. Nevertheless, however he may generalize in theory, in practice every critic applies external tests. In the majority of cases it is not by analysing a work internally that we are convinced that it is too long or too short, or that its feelings are inflated. Generally we feel that a piece of music is too long because it begins to bore us, or that a picture is too large because it looks empty; but the common judgement is often confident in these matters. Thus it seems to be the common judgement that in spite of their effective qualities the symphonies of Bruckner or Mahler are often too long and too inflated emotionally. Vaguely we suspect that such defects may occasionally be traceable to some cause inside the works themselves, but who will undertake to show in most cases where exactly the pompous note is sounded, or which passage particularly is superfluous? In theory we suppose an internal disharmony to exist, but in fact we may question whether there is one. Originality likewise is a quality which is invariably demanded of works of art, each new work being no doubt rightly required to bring a new vision with it. But we cannot say whether a picture is original or no except by comparing it with others, or whether such and such an incident in a novel has the piquancy of novelty unless we have done a

good deal of scouring through the world of the novel. The prized uniqueness of a work of art is not only a matter of internal organization. In the end a work of art, though an organism like the human body, is, like the human body, an organism living in a world of which it is only to a limited degree independent; and it may die or suffer because it is ill equipped to deal with the cold or heat outside it, or because it cannot find its proper nourishment or an outlet for its energies.

The reluctance of contemporary theory to admit the dependence of works of art on their surroundings and the applicability to them of terms of approval or disapproval that are simply 'humanly' valid, is probably mostly due to the critic's fear of slick popular judgements, pronounced with too little attention to the work itself, this dependence being granted. It is easy to turn from a picture or poem with a disapproving 'ugly' because it deals with some distasteful scene or character, or to praise its 'beauty' after a purely superficial view of it because of its attractiveness to feeling and instinct alone. But in fact the judgement that a novel or play is ugly because its situations are morally evil or disgusting or depressing need not necessarily be a false judgement: it is so only when it is too carelessly applied. The 'chameleon' poet may feel as much pleasure in depicting the wicked Iago as the virtuous Imogen, but a play (unless it were satirical or designed in some other way to put us in mind of qualities unexpressed in its main theme) could hardly be made about Iago alone, or even with Iago for its central figure, and the 'unsentimentality' that thinks it could is surely as perverted as the sentimentality that would exclude from art all characters that are not Imogens. Art must harmonize with, or at any rate not clash too seriously with, the mind's requirements in general, and the mind seems to require a preponderance of moral good to make moral beauty, as it requires a preponderance of sensuous attractiveness to make sensuous beauty. This preponderance need not be shown by a victory of the powers of good or even by the presence of more good characters than bad in a play, for example; but by one means or another, if a moral situation is being presented at all, the human preference for the good must be acknowledged at least by implication. This would apply too (and most radically) to the hopefulness or otherwise of works of art. One that is merely depressing will in the end be ugly, truthful to some aspect of real life though it may be. The praises lavished by critics on the bravery of such works for their facing up to facts not seldom itself smacks of sentimentality, throwing up the sponge being, against all true instinct, regarded as a virtue and a kind of heroism.

8. *CONCLUSION*

The philosophic approach to truth is a very much less doubtful and difficult matter than the artistic. We have no doubt that (to put it crudely) the philosopher must use his reason to generalize as correctly as he can. There may be very large differences between philosophers' conceptions of reason, and a philosopher may decide that instinct and feeling are to be trusted on this or that occasion, but it is by his reason that he decides on which occasion they are to be trusted in practice: *qua* philosopher he takes reason for his guide, and will only surrender it in face of a mystery not to be unravelled.

Generally speaking, then, the distinction between the approaches of art and philosophy seems to be the distinction between the reason and generalization of philosophy and the emotion and individualization of art. From the philosophical point of view emotion and individualization may seem at first sight to have little to do with truth, but the words are inadequate. To describe art as being merely emotional and its function as being merely the creation of a unique and pleasing object is to take a very superficial view of it. The work of art is thoughtful as well as emotional and generalizes as well as individualizes. Imagination (a more adequate word than 'emotion') in art sees truth embodied. The body or individuality of the truth is so important to it that a comparatively trivial idea, a one-sided aspect of reality, which is embodied or individualized as near as may be to perfection, will seem to it more interesting, more beautiful than a great idea that has failed to realize itself fully in sensuous and emotional form. Art, however, is not indifferent to profundity or otherwise of meaning, and a deep idea or meaning perfectly embodied will be more valuable to it than a trivial one, while the trivial one, really to charm us artistically, will have to be aware of its own limitations, thus to some extent transcending them.

The impulse towards philosophy and (however they may temporarily go out of fashion) metaphysics—the desire for rational proof and generalization—is no doubt unquenchable in man, but the artistic impulse is no less so; and I think there is no accounting for it philosophically without recourse to metaphysics. It supplies us with truth that seems to need no proving. A successful love-song is a perennial truth: not the whole truth, but, if perfectly successful, one which we feel must harmonize with all truth. So—to take a controversial case—a poem like FitzGerald's *Omar Khayyám* is a truth, whether we agree with its 'philosophy' or 'ethic' or not: it puts forward its philosophy good-humouredly as the view of a man who may be mistaken, and for that reason one can accept it and disagree with it at once; and we feel per-

haps also that, because of its realization as a full experience and not merely as an abstract generalization, it contributes as much to our understanding of truth as does many a philosophy with which we are more completely in agreement. It is less easily shown how, but I believe too that a fine building, a well-executed dance, and even a handsome carpet, are, in their own contexts, truths. They lay down no universal laws, their 'meaning' is indescribable except in their own terms, but even the very humblest of them is a reflection, at the least, of man's aspiration towards harmony and order, and so a revelation in its way. Advanced works of art reflect also the very *life* of truth, and are, I feel sure, an earthly imitation of perfection—an attempt to realize through our human resources and within our human limitations a self-contained and satisfying union of mind and matter in a unique act of creation.

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DIAGNOSIS OF GENIUS*

Lord Brain

A GOOD many years ago I read a book called *The Personal Heresy* which consisted of alternate essays by Professor C. S. Lewis and Dr. E. M. Tillyard. On the first page of the first essay Professor Lewis says: 'Few will deny that the role of biography in our literary studies is steadily increasing; and if we look into the most popular literary biographies of the last decade or so, we shall find that in them the poet's life is connected with his work after a fashion quite alien from the methods of Johnson. Poetry is widely believed to be the "expression of personality"; the end which we are supposed to pursue in reading it is a certain contact with the poet's soul; and "Life" and "Work" are simply two diverse expressions of this single quiddity.' It is this heresy which Professor Lewis is concerned to demolish. He says in a later essay: 'The excellence of Donne's pornographic elegies is a fact: so is the excellence of his devotional poetry. But the "personality" constructed to explain their co-existence (as if it needed any explanation!) may well be a mere projection on which modern adolescents can lavish any kind of familiarity they choose.' Professor Lewis has no difficulty in showing that we can at any rate attend to a particular poem without at the same time attending to the poet's personality, and indeed, as is often the case, without knowing anything about it, and the second passage I have quoted is a very necessary warning about the limitations of hypothesis in biographical interpretation. But it is this 'personal heresy' with which I shall be concerned. What, I propose to ask, is the role of a particular form of biography in aesthetic appreciation, and the form of biography with which I shall be dealing is the application of medical psychology, in the broadest sense, to the understanding of the lives of men of genius.

It may be said that this is not a form of biography at all, and to meet

* Delivered as a lecture to The British Society of Aesthetics. (Ed.)

that possible objection I have used the term diagnosis, but at the outset it seems desirable to consider the relationship between biography and diagnosis in the sense in which I have used it. Coleridge took opium; Boswell drank a great deal, and was often drunk. These are biographical facts, and the biographer and his readers may go on to ask why these great men behaved as they did and what effect, if any, their addictions had upon their work. Some answers to these questions may undoubtedly be based upon the known facts, and what the subjects of the biographies themselves said. But the medical psychologist will probably feel that there is much more than that to be said. If Coleridge was a drug addict, and Boswell an alcoholic, it is natural to ask whether our knowledge of the causes of these disorders throws any additional light upon their biographies. Medical diagnosis essentially involves the discovery of what the patient has in common with other sufferers from the same disorder. Though each patient is an individual, and his personal situation and reactions to his illness need to be taken into account, his individuality does not extend to his pathology; his disorder is recognized because it causes the same symptoms and signs as in others who suffer from it. Here, then, is the positive contribution which *diagnosis* can make to biography, and inherent in it also are its limitations: the unique must escape it. Here I must emphasize that I am neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist and that I am propounding no thesis. My object is to enquire whether psychological theory has anything to contribute to our understanding of genius, and what are its limitations.

I must begin by saying that I do not regard genius as a unitary quality. It is fundamentally an emotive term, which we apply loosely to people whose achievements are so exceptional that they compel us to a kind of admiring wonder, and, since such achievements extend over the whole range of human capability, it is not to be expected that they should be the product of some single characteristic common to all who manifest genius. Dr. Johnson once said: 'The true genius is a mind of large general powers, accidentally determined to some particular direction.'

If by 'accidentally' he meant that what determined the direction of a particular genius arose out of the chances of his environment, and that if that had been different he would have been a different kind of genius, Dr. Johnson was almost certainly wrong; but if by 'accidentally' he included the accidents of genetic endowment we may accept his statement, for this undoubtedly plays a large part in determining a man's temperament.

Modern psychology, in which for my present purpose I include psychiatry, has two main ways of dealing with the individual. Descriptive psychology seeks to classify him according to the psychological

features which he has in common with other people. Individual psychology, also known as dynamic or depth psychology, seeks to understand him biographically in terms of his reactions to his experiences from his earliest days. There are some psychologists, of course, who pursue one of these methods to the exclusion of the other, but they are complementary. Ever since men contemplated each other it must have been obvious that people differ inherently in temperament. The ancients had their own theories about this, and one thesis attributed these temperamental differences to physical causes, and our word 'melancholy', or 'melancholia', is derived from two Greek words meaning 'black bile' because the Greeks thought that an excess of black bile was the cause of the melancholy temperament. By abstracting particular temperamental features it is possible to construct a variety of such classifications. Jung, for example, recognizes eight psychological types, beginning with his basic distinction between extraverts and introverts, and then classifying each according to whether thinking, feeling, sensation, or intuition is the predominant function.

PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES

Eysenck in his book *The Structure of Human Personality* reviews the history of psychological typology and urges that this can have a scientific basis only if our concepts of psychological types are based upon measurements.

Kretschmer's typology has had a considerable influence on psychiatry, from which indeed it was derived. It is best summarized in his own words.[1]

> The principal groups of the constitutional endogenous psychoses can serve as guides through the entanglements of the constitutional psychology of the individual. Manic-depressive psychosis, or cyclophrenia, corresponds in psychopathology to the cyclothymic temperament in normal psychology; and we regard the schizophrenic psychoses or dementia praecox as a psychopathological caricature of the normal varieties of schizothymic temperaments. The psychopathic border-zone states between abnormal and normal are termed cycloid and schizoid respectively.

Thus Kretschmer finds no sharp division between normal and abnormal. There is a normal type of temperament corresponding to each of the major mental diseases and, whereas Jung classifies great men in accordance with his eightfold typology, Kretschmer does the same with his. Moreover he finds a correlation between psychological type and physical type.

Amongst the more highly gifted cyclothymes, says Kretschmer, we find artists who are 'free and easy, broadminded, descriptive realists, and kindly genial humorists', scientists who observe, describe, and experi-

ment, and popularizers of science who can understand the mentality of 'the man in the street'. And in practical affairs 'benevolent, sympathetic conciliators, daring organizers on the grand scale, sturdy adventurers', such as Luther, Goethe's mother, von Humboldt and Mirabeau.

Schizothymes, according to Kretschmer, contribute to art 'the purists in form and style, classicists, romanticists . . . expounding the pathetic and tragic, crass expressionism and tendentious naturalism, and finally witty satirists. In science they lean towards scholastic formalism, philosophic reflection, metaphysics and exact classification'. In public affairs they are uncompromising, dogmatic and consistent types, 'dominating natures, heroic moralists, pure idealists, chilly fanatics and despots, cold and diplomatic calculators'. And among the schizothymes he places Schiller, Hölderlin, Strindberg, Spinoza, Kant, Calvin, Robespierre, and Frederick the Great.

Most practising psychiatrists recognize types which they describe as cycloid and schizoid, and within the cycloid type of temperament distinguish the constitutional depressive, the constitutional hypomanic, and the constitutional cyclothymic. These, be it noted, are temperaments not diseases. I take the following descriptions from a standard textbook of psychiatry, by Mayer-Gross, Slater and Roth. The constitutional depressive is quiet and reserved, and likes to remain in the background. He takes everything as a heavy burden and is always inclined to see the sad side of any event. While most of these persons lack somewhat in energy and drive, yet they are efficient within restricted fields. The constitutional hypomanic temperament is the counterpart of the depressive. An abundant flow of energy, liveliness, sociability, enthusiasm and resistance to fatigue are the main characteristics. Hypomanics are realistic, quick to grasp opportunities, versatile and often rather superficial. They are full of ideas, have a natural skill in dealing with people and in mastering situations. The constitutional cyclothymic is characterized by alternations of mood from the depressive to the hypomanic, each lasting a period of months or longer, but neither producing an excessive change. In cyclothymic artists, musicians and other creative workers the rhythm of the cycles can be read from the dates of the beginning and cessation of productive work.

NEWTON, DICKENS AND CLARE

We can all recognize these psychological types among people we know, and, of course, the vast majority of them never suffer from any mental illness. But it has been established that when people with these temperaments do suffer from psychological breakdowns they are liable to develop illnesses which can be regarded as exaggerations of their

normal temperaments, with the qualification that while most people with depressive temperaments develop a depressive psychosis, some become manic or manic-depressive; and, similarly, while most hypomanic individuals become manic or manic-depressive some of them become depressive, showing the close correlation between these moods and mood swings.

Now let us see how far descriptive psychiatry can illuminate the life of a great scientist. Isaac Newton was perhaps the greatest scientist the world has ever known. When he was fifty he had a serious mental illness and his letters show that he suffered from paranoid delusions. It seems to have lasted about two years and then he made a complete recovery and went on to become a distinguished figure. Just ten years after the onset of his illness he was elected President of the Royal Society, an office which he held until his death twenty-four years later.

Newton well illustrates the difficulties of typological classification, especially when the subject is no longer here to 'abide our question'. His secluded early life, and his philosophic approach to science and theology recall Kretschmer's schizothyme. Yet there is much also to point to a cycloid personality which, during at any rate the first part of his life, was predominantly depressive in type. His brief bursts of creative activity perhaps coincided with a swing in the other direction. The change from the secluded Cambridge don, which he was before his mental illness, to the successful man of affairs in London, which he became afterwards, suggests the possibility that his breakdown marked a change from the depressive to the hypomanic phase of a cycloid temperament. Perhaps his physique provides a clue to the puzzle, for he had the type of face which Kretschmer associates with a schizothymic temperament, but experience shows that the distinction between cyclothyme and schizothyme is not absolute, and that cyclothymic swings may occur in persons of a schizothymic temperament, which may have been the case with Newton. In any case it must be stressed that his intellectual genius was the result of other factors, however its manifestations may have been influenced by his emotional balance, and, apart from the two years when he was ill, we have to think of him in terms of his psychological constitution and not of mental disorder.

I have suggested before that Charles Dickens was a cyclothyme. His prevailing mood was one of elation which gave him his enormous gusto and energy which, apart from his prolific inventiveness, was always overflowing into long walks, parties, and amateur theatricals. The depressive side of his character was less obvious to the public, but equally characteristic. His son, Sir Henry Dickens, speaks of his father's 'heavy moods of deep depression, of intense nervous irritability, when he was

silent and oppressed'. Dickens himself more than once describes his feelings in his letters. 'I am sick, giddy and capriciously despondent,' he wrote to Forster; 'I have bad nights, am full of disquietude and anxiety.' Six months later he told Georgina Hogarth 'my wretchedness just now is inconceivable'. While staying at Bonchurch in 1849, writing of himself as 'the Patient', he said: 'If he has anything to do requiring thought and attention this overpowers him to such a degree he can only do it in snatches.' He speaks of 'extreme depression of mind and a disposition to shed tears from morning to night . . . a dull stupid languor. He has no purpose, power or object in existence whatever.'

Another cyclothyme was the poet John Clare, who for years suffered from bouts of depression. Just before he was forty-four he became so ill that he had to go into an asylum, as it was then called, at High Beech, Epping. Four years later he escaped, but after a few months of liberty was certified insane and admitted to the General Lunatic Asylum at Northampton, where he remained until his death twenty-three years later. I mention Clare partly in order to quote one of his poems, which so well describes the depressive state. This might well find a place in a textbook of psychiatry.

I am: yet what I am none cares or knows.
My friends forsake me like a memory lost:
I am the self-consumer of my woes,
They rise and vanish in oblivious host,
Like shades in love and death's oblivion lost;
And yet I am, and live with shadows tost.

Into the nothingness of scorn and noise,
Into the living sea of waking dreams,
Where there is neither sense of life nor joys,
But the vast shipwreck of my life's esteems;
And e'en the dearest—that I loved the best—
Are strange—nay, rather stranger than the rest.

I long for scenes where man has never trod;
A place where woman never smiled or wept;
There to abide with my Creator, God,
And sleep as I in childhood sweetly slept:
Untroubling and untroubled where I lie;
The grass below—above the vaulted sky.

THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH

The essence of dynamic psychology is that we explain an individual's present emotional reactions in terms of his or her past experiences. This very broad general principle allows great variations in detailed inter-

pretation. The past experiences may be, as Freud originally suggested, traumatic; that is some environmental factor, which might not have occurred, accidentally determined the subject's future orientation. But the general principle would apply equally well if different individuals were by nature predisposed to react differently to similar situations. When we are dealing with the living, the detailed interpretation of their present emotional reactions in terms of their past experiences is often, as we know, a matter of dispute. When we are dealing with the dead, even the data necessary to form a judgement are often lacking or inadequate.

In the field of dynamic psychology psychoanalysis has been most widely applied to the interpretation of art in all forms; so much so that it seems almost necessary to distinguish between psychoanalysis as a therapeutic technique and as a socio-psychological ideology which has effected a revolution in thought as profound and far-reaching as Darwin's. It would take much too long to discuss all the implications of this.

Psychoanalysis, whether as a therapeutic method or a system of thought about the human mind, is still young as human history goes, and still evolving and entering into fruitful relationships with other fields of biological thought. Its fundamental importance is undeniable, and its wide acceptance outside the strictly medical field suggests that mankind was ripe for some such advent of self-knowledge and that Freud should be looked upon as a discoverer rather than an inventor. Nevertheless in a more general sense psychoanalysis has directed fresh attention to the emotional life of the artist, whether described in his biography or deduced from his work, and particularly to the relation between the child and its parents as in some cases determining the feelings and actions of the adult.

Consider Dickens again: *David Copperfield* alone, even without laying undue stress upon its admittedly autobiographical element, provides rich study for the psychologist. It begins like *Hamlet* with the hero's father dead, and his mother married again. The mother was a dream mother: 'Can I say of her innocent and girlish beauty, that it faded, and was no more, when its breath falls on my cheek now, as it fell that night?' And when the second child came, and both mother and brother lay dead, there is this strange statement: 'The mother who lay in the grave', says the hero, 'was the mother of my infancy; the little creature in her arms was myself, as I had once been, hushed for ever on her bosom.' Besides his mother, David Copperfield had three loves. The first was little Em'ly: 'I am sure I loved that baby quite as truly, quite as tenderly, with greater purity and more disinterestedness, than can enter into the best love of a later time of life, high and ennobling as it is.' But

little Em'ly, the object of this pure and disinterested love, was to become later in the story a 'fallen woman', the object of an impure love. Then there was Dora, the 'child wife', and finally Agnes: 'A sister to whom I have confided so much . . . ever leading me to something better; ever directing me to higher things . . . let me be your friend, your brother.' Here is an author who in his writings—and *David Copperfield* is no exception—signally failed to achieve that fusion of elements from which mature human love between the sexes depends. And a similar failure seems a likely explanation of what Mr. Du Cann in his recent book *The Love Lives of Charles Dickens* calls 'his failure in love'.

Professor Lewis chooses as another illustration of his thesis this verse by Walter de la Mare:

> Very old are we men;
> Our dreams are tales
> Told in dim Eden
> By Eve's nightingales.

He goes on: 'Here it is very much harder to indicate by prose pointers the nature of the object presented to me. But at least we may be quite certain what it is not. It is not a picture of the poet. . . . If I try to imagine Mr. de la Mare, I can imagine him only as an individual living in a particular time and place, with other times and places forming a sort of context that stretches away indefinitely on all sides of him. But what I look towards in reading the poem is that context itself—the ages of human history. How could the object be the idea of a man who himself is inside that context?'

What Professor Lewis says is perhaps true at the most superficial level of factual interpretation, but even at that level one might surely be tempted to dig a little deeper, for though the verse may be an account of 'the ages of human history', it does not treat all those ages as equally valuable. 'Our dreams', and for de la Mare dream was one of the highest and truest values, are said to have their origin in a long-lost paradise, which is one of his recurrent themes. To find an illustration of this, I opened a book of his poems at random and read the first verse on which my eye fell. Here it is.

> Lost in myself I hide
> From the cold unknown:
> Lost, like a world cast forth
> Into space star-sown:
> And the songs of the morning are stilled,
> And delight in them flown.

This was perhaps a coincidence, but here is someone lost—and the

word is repeated—and cast forth into space from a morning whose songs are stilled, 'and delight in them flown'. This is clearly the same theme again, and Professor Lewis might say that it is still not a picture of de la Mare. But is this true? One major theme in de la Mare's work is a nostalgia for childhood. It appears again and again in his poems and short stories, many of which are about the experiences of a child. He wrote one novel, *Memoirs of a Midget*, about an adult who was no bigger than a child. He wrote poems for children and made anthologies for them, and he collected an anthology about children. Preoccupation with childhood recurred again and again in his conversation, and one of his treasures was a cabinet containing dozens of minute objects, including many miniature books, which had been sent to him as presents for Miss M, the heroine of *Memoirs of a Midget*.

I once mentioned this to a psychiatrist, who said: 'Ah yes, a fantasy.' Let us for the moment assume, without being able to explain why, that de la Mare continued throughout a long life either to feel in some respects as a child does, or to imagine that that was how he felt. Is that really irrelevant to an understanding of his poetry? And does it not even illuminate the very verse which Professor Lewis has chosen as evidence to the contrary?

Now let me try to bring together some of the questions upon which I have touched. I must re-emphasize how little still is known about the factors which make up human personality. Nevertheless there is general agreement that psychological types can be recognized, and many people believe that the major psychological illnesses lie at the extreme end of a spectrum which merges by imperceptible degrees into normality, so that there are many individuals who show in milder degree some of the mental characteristics of the mentally ill. When we say therefore that a man is of a certain psychological type, we mean that we can recognize in him traits which are common to all individuals of the same type, and when we interpret his behaviour in, let us say, analytical terms, we are again recognizing in it a pattern with which we are familiar in others who have reacted in a similar way to their experiences. We may best see the value, and the limitations, of such interpretations by comparing Dickens, about whom I have spoken already, with Swift.

If we regard Dickens as a cycloid individual, about which I think there can be little doubt, and one moreover who was usually on the hypomanic side of normality for that type, we can understand better not only the gusto which he brought to life in general, but also the prodigious energy of his creative powers. Such people moreover are generally extroverted, warm-hearted and rich in their emotional life, or at any rate rich in their expression of feelings. It is not unlikely also

that this temperament did something to enhance Dickens's acute perceptual sensibility, especially his visionary powers. Then, as we have seen, the unsatisfactory development of his emotional life reflected in his dealings with women could not fail to find expression in his portrayal of women, love, marriage and motherhood in his novels.

Swift's complex personality has been the subject of a vast amount of discussion. As Desmond McCarthy once said: 'He attracts psychologists who have only a textbook knowledge of human nature, and romancing sentimentalists who are apt to be almost as bad judges of men. His relations with women excite curiosity, and prompt conjecture for which there is room. In this he resembles Dickens, and has had a much longer run.' Swift's fascinated disgust at the basic physical functions of humanity has also tended to excite comment. As Dr. Johnson said: 'The greatest difficulty that occurs in analysing his character is to discover by what depravity of intellect he took delight in revolting ideas, from which almost any other mind shrinks with disgust. The ideas of pleasure, even when criminal, may solicit the imagination, but what has disease, deformity, and filth, upon which the thoughts can be allured to dwell?' This surely cries out for a Freudian interpretation, for Freud maintains that the child passes normally through a phase of psychological development in which its interest and emotions are centred upon those functions which aroused such horror in Swift, but ordinarily passes through this phase to reach normal psychosexuality. I have suggested that this preoccupation shows that Swift was emotionally arrested at an immature stage of development, and that it was this emotional immaturity that made normal married life impossible for him. There has been much discussion about his relations with Stella, but it is surely unnecessary to imagine the existence of any but a psychological barrier to their union, and whether Swift married her or not, as Sir Harold Williams has said, 'nothing was changed, for nobody has suggested that it was more than an empty ceremony'.

Mr. Terence Cawthorne, an otolaryngologist, has recently drawn attention to the possible influence of two physical disabilities, deafness and giddiness, upon Swift's character. His deafness began when he was about twenty, and at about the same time he began to suffer from disabling attacks of giddiness, which afflicted him for the rest of his life. Deafness, as Mr. Cawthorne points out, often has far more profound psychological effects than blindness, and this is well known to doctors. The reason may be that deafness seriously interferes with a man's relations with his fellow-men, whereas blindness chiefly disturbs his relations with the external physical world. Deafness may well have increased in Swift a sense of isolation from the rest of humanity. Still it must be

emphasized that although he might perhaps have been categorized by Kretschmer as the type of schizothyme who makes a successful satirist, he suffered from no serious mental disorder until old age, when his deterioration was certainly due to organic brain disease.

ABNORMALITY AND GENIUS

One or two general questions remain to be considered. As I have pointed out before, a series of surveys by different investigators have all reached the conclusion that the incidence of mental disorder in men of genius is no higher than in the rest of the population. Naturally, since they and their work are usually well known, when they do suffer from mental disorder it is likely to attract particular attention. When it does occur, mental disorder may affect the work of genius in several ways. As we have seen, a cycloid tendency may profoundly influence the rhythm of creativity, but no amount or kind of mental disorder can create genius. We are still very far from being able to analyse and identify the particular mental traits which in an artist, poet or scientist constitute the basis of its exceptional powers.

How may a mental disorder influence the content or quality of the work of a creative artist? This question has recently been reviewed by Sir Aubrey Lewis,[8] who writes: 'A clear difference can be discerned between the creative activity of great poets and artists and that of great scientists, mathematicians, or historians. In the artists, composers, and poets a psychotic illness may remove inhibitions, especially at the beginning of a manic attack; or a schizophrenic change of experience, in its early phases, may provide rich material for poetic expression and plastic representation. An attack of depression may provide deeper understanding of suffering, disclosing the Dark Night of the Soul. None of these, however, can result in a work of genius unless the illness occurred in a person of exceptional capacity: the illness may facilitate, or provide, some of the mood and content of a great work, but cannot beget such a work and alone bring it to birth. When the illness is schizophrenia, its effects are anything but uniform and predictable. In Swedenborg, a schizophrenic illness gave rise to new content for his mystical fantasy, but did no detriment to his eventual productivity: in Hölderlin, on the other hand, it conspired to bring about a new creative burst, different in essential style from what he had hitherto produced, but this was the prelude to decay and creative incapacity.' Much the same is true of neurotic illness.

These statements raise two further questions: what in this context is the meaning of 'normal' and 'abnormal', and what are the implications

of Lewis's statement that in certain circumstances even mental abnormality can enrich the content of an artist's work? Lewis comments on the first point: 'I have several times referred to men of outstanding gifts and achievements as abnormal. By this I meant literally or statistically abnormal, without implying a value judgement about health or other desirable abstractions.' Medical pathology grew up under the influence of morbid anatomy, which makes an absolute distinction based upon what can be seen with the naked eye or the microscope between normal and abnormal appearances, the abnormal always being pathological. The recognition of a functional pathology based on disordered physiology has done something to blur this distinction, but it still exercises a considerable influence upon medicine. The complexity and variability of the mind, however, is such that there must be many characteristics which are abnormal in the statistical sense, but not in the least pathological, just as in the physical sphere there are some exceptionally tall and some exceptionally short people, who are thus statistically abnormal but perfectly healthy.

Analytical psychology, however, has introduced a further complication. It teaches that the emotional reactions of the adult are moulded by his emotional reactions from birth onwards. These in part no doubt depend upon inherited predisposition, but they are also influenced by the behaviour of his parents towards him, and his reactions to them. There may be an average or norm which could describe the emotional development of the majority of the individuals in a particular culture; but there must be wide variations from this, and whether these cause trouble in later life would depend not only on the extent of their variation from the norm, but also upon the challenge to adaptation presented by the personal and social environment. It seems to follow that we cannot directly equate mental illness with statistical abnormality. Illness is a medical term and should perhaps be confined to those whose abnormality so seriously interferes with their adjustment to life that they need the help of a doctor, either at their own request or in the interests of society.

To sum up, a number of general topics emerge from the ideas we have been considering.

(1) Is there any positive correlation between genius and mental disorder? The answer to this is certainly 'No'. A number of surveys of men of genius have been made, all with this negative result. One of the most recent is that by Dr. Adele Juda whose conclusion, quoted by Sir Aubrey Lewis, is that 'there is no definite relationship between highest mental capacity and mental health or illness, and no evidence to support the assumption that the genesis of highest intellectual ability depends on

psychological abnormalities. . . . Psychoses, especially schizophrenia, proved to be detrimental to creative ability'.

(2) Can psychology or psychiatry throw any light upon the qualities that make for genius? The answer to this is also at present 'No'. Though, as we have seen, psychological disorders may interact in the genius with other factors so as to influence the rhythm of its creativity or the character of its creations, genius itself depends upon those other factors, probably a happy conjunction of varied traits. This is surely obvious, for if mental disorder were positively correlated with genius, genius would be much commoner than it is. As to the positive qualities of genius, a little reflection will reveal their complexity and the task which would confront any psychologist who sought to measure them. What factors are involved, for example, in the verbal felicity of a Shakespeare, in terms of world-learning, retention, availability, associations, integration with the emotional life (and what an emotional life!) and all under the guidance of those unconscious processes in which the roots of true poetry lie? And what are the factors which underlie the exceptional visual perceptions and executive skill of a Velasquez or a Rembrandt, or the musical imagination of a Beethoven which could survive a severe degree of deafness? And how are either linked to the emotional life? We cannot at present answer these questions.

(3) How much does all this matter? One answer, of course, is not at all! A work of art, whether it be poem, a picture, a sculpture or a symphony, exists in its own right to be appreciated in one sense out of relationship to its creator's biography. In another sense the biography can illuminate the work of art quite independently of its artistic value: a psychiatrist for example might detect and describe schizophrenic features in one of Van Gogh's pictures without having anything more than a psychiatric interest in it. Such an attitude may well seem to the aesthetic critic mere 'peeping and botanizing'. I suggest that there is a third alternative, that psychological understanding may enrich aesthetic appreciation, but only when the same psychology enriches the critic's self-knowledge. Is it not at least arguable that the better I understand myself, the better I shall respond to a work of art in so far as the artist's creation springs from experiences in some degree common to him and myself? This raises the question how far the response to a work of art depends upon unconscious factors, and whether there is any conflict between conscious understanding and such an 'unconscious' response, or whether indeed that distinction may not be artificial. If much past conscious experience must have gone to make possible my present conscious enjoyment of a work of art, why should that past conscious experience not include psychological knowledge?

(4) This finally brings us to the most fundamental question of all—what is implied in Sir Aubrey Lewis's statements that 'an attack of depression may provide a deeper understanding of suffering' or 'a schizophrenic change of experience, in its early phases . . . rich material for poetic expression and plastic representation'. How can the abnormal in the pathological sense enrich the experience of normal people? Part of the answer to this lies in the fact that, as we have seen, no sharp line divides the normal from the pathological. For example, most people experience depression and elation from time to time, and some are habitually pre-disposed to one or the other as a lasting mood. A genius who experiences and describes his own depression may therefore 'speak to the condition' of normal people.

But psychiatrists commonly distinguish between the cause and the content of a mental illness. A patient with melancholia may think that he has committed an unforgivable sin, and explain his depression as the result: the psychiatrist, on the other hand, will say that he is suffering from a mental illness, as a result of which he feels depressed, and entertains the delusion that he has committed the sin. It is not always possible, however, to draw such a sharp distinction, because a psychological illness characterized by depression may be the result of very genuine worries. The distinction is an important one, none the less, because it at least suggests that a principle of multiple causation is necessary for our understanding of mental states, and that two types of explanation are therefore not mutually exclusive. Thus a recent study *The Dark Night of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*[3] is an analysis of his poem *Dejection*. The book is an investigation of the view that Coleridge's failure to produce more good poetry was due to his preoccupation with metaphysics. The suggestion is made that he was looking to love and poetry for a mystical expression of the absolute, and failed to find it because it was not there to find. This leads to a discussion of the Kantian and realist views of poetry in relation to Coleridge. All this is interesting and certainly important, but the psychiatrist may still ask whether the psychiatric idea of depression may not also illuminate a state which Coleridge expressed in words not unlike those of Clare which I have already quoted:

> A grief without a pang, void, dark and drear,
> A stifled, drowsy, unimpassion'd grief
> Which finds no natural outlet, no relief
> In word, or sigh, or tear.

Or take as another example Christopher Smart, who has recently been the subject of an illuminating biography by Fr. Christopher Devlin. I have suggested that Smart almost certainly suffered from cyclothymia.

Fr. Devlin argues that 'recent research leaves the extent of Smart's cyclothymia in doubt. . . . Moreover though cyclothymia may be a correct medical label for Smart, it does not throw any light on his character nor on the particular obsession that was his real trouble'. With the last sentence I heartily agree, but I would deprecate the view, perhaps implied, that to describe a poet as a cyclothyme is in some way to 'explain' either his genius of the content of his work, even when he is insane. It is adding to and not detracting from our understanding of him as a man and artist.

In schizothymic and schizophrenic artists we encounter questions at a different level, as it were. Mr. Adrian Stokes in *Three Essays on the Painting of our Time* quotes Dr. Elliott Jacques as saying about schizophrenic thinking that 'non-differentiation between the thing symbolized and the symbol is part of a disturbance between the ego and the object . . . the differentiation between the self and the object is obscured'. This raises fundamental questions concerning both perception and knowledge. Mr. Stokes suggests that it throws light on some features of modern art. So, too, Mr. Aldous Huxley says, may the hallucinogenic drugs such as mescaline and lysergic acid. We know at present all too little about the effects of these disorders on the mind, or how in this sphere normal conscious life, dreams and mental abnormality are related to one another. These questions, which are of fundamental importance for our understanding of the creative artist, are too large and complex to be considered at the end of a lecture.

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THREE ASPECTS OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ORIGINALITY IN HUMAN THINKING*

Peter McKellar

THE WORD 'thinking' is ambiguous. It comes from everyday speech, and refers to a number of *different* activities. Problems arise from this and also from other key words in the field to be examined. It is my aim in this article to examine certain processes and phenomena—observed or reported—that might be categorized by words like 'thinking' and 'imagining' or as 'creative' or 'original'. Detailed analysis of such words, which belongs to linguistic philosophy rather than to psychology, will not be attempted. Other, and more specific, terms will be used where it becomes necessary to indicate which types of 'thinking' and 'imagining' are, and which are not, being considered. For example considerable attention will be given to the subject of *mental imagery*. 'Imagery' is used here in the psychological rather than the literary sense, to refer to 'an experience which reproduces or copies in part, and with some degree of sensory realism, a previous perceptual experience in the absence of the original sensory stimulation'. Again, I shall speak of *thought products* as a conveniently brief way of referring to such end products of human thinking as poems, novels, paintings, theories, inventions and the like. It is thought products and the processes responsible for them that will be our central concern. Three aspects will be discussed, and three propositions will comprise the thesis of this article:

> (1) what we are likely to assess as 'originality' depends upon the interplay of processes of different kinds rather than upon one single, specific kind of thinking; (2) the form and content of thought products have their origins in perceptual experience and

* Mr. McKellar addressed The British Society of Aesthetics on a similar theme on 2nd January, 1963. (Ed.)

reorganization of associations deriving from this; (3) there are important 'hidden differences' between individuals, and an examination of some of the phenomena of subjective experience—familiar to some people but known to others—may help in the understanding of certain thought products which impress us by their 'originality'.

One by-product of the ambiguity of the word 'thinking' has been a tendency for distinctions to be made between different kinds of thinking. Several of these distinctions will now be examined.

THE INTERPLAY OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF THINKING

It has been argued elsewhere,[1] and will be argued here, that socially useful products of thought depend upon the interplay of different kinds of thinking. In his recent textbook C. S. Hall[2] provides a convenient restatement of a distinction between *creative thinking* and *critical thinking*. Creative thinking is concerned with the emergence of new ideas and the discovery of new or improved solutions to problems, while critical thinking involves evaluation of these ideas and scrutinizes them for faults and defects. Such a distinction helps to alert us to some aspects of the complex interaction of mental processes out of which socially useful thought products emerge. Elsewhere[3] I have drawn an analogy between this kind of interaction and the respective functions of an author and an editor. Some individuals find 'authorship'—the production of relevant, fresh ideas—by no means easy; others find 'editorship'—the revision, criticism, and evaluation of ideas—the more difficult part of their work. Editorship can assume too prominent a part and impede authorship: Schiller's advice to the young man who complained that he was lacking in originality has often been quoted. Schiller declared that the difficulty 'seems to me to lie in the constraint imposed by your reason upon your imagination . . . you complain of your unfruitfulness because you reject too soon, and discriminate too severely'.[4] In giving this advice Schiller seems to have been making a distinction very similar to the one we are examining and to have been pointing to the dangers which may result from interference of editorship with authorship. Others appear to experience an opposite kind of difficulty: their weakness lies not in authorship but in editorship. Consider the advice of Brahms to a young composer: 'let it rest, let it rest, and keep going back to it and working on it again and again . . . until there is not a note too much or too little, not a bar you could improve upon'.[5] In these two contrasting pieces of advice we can see the importance of individual differences as regards the interplay of authorship and editorship. And these are not the only individual differences of note. Awareness of such

variations between person and person leads to the question whether it is possible to make measurements of the human qualities upon which original thinking depends.

Since the turn of the century a great deal of attention has been paid to the measurement of differences between '*more intelligent*' and '*less intelligent*' forms of thinking. Highly sophisticated techniques now exist for this kind of mental measurement. Yet both dissatisfaction with these, and some vigorous contemporary developments of another kind, are summarized in a recent comment by Torrance: 'the traditional measure of the I.Q. taps only a few of man's thinking abilities'.[6] Among important investigators in this field has been Guilford who has done much to stimulate attempts to measure this important 'other' aspect of thinking, which he calls 'creativity'.[7] He has developed a distinction between what he calls '*divergent thinking*' and '*convergent thinking*'. Divergent thinking is concerned with innovation, revision of the known and imaginative construction of the possible. This may be contrasted with convergent thinking—which orthodox intelligence tests measure—concerned with ascertaining usual and accepted solutions to problems. Thus Guilford argues in a recent paper that giftedness has too often been identified with the attributes of children 'who please their teachers because they learn more rapidly under conditions that call for uniformity of thinking and conformity within the group'.[8] Some recent findings by Getzels and Jackson* show how both a community and those actively concerned with teaching in it may do a great deal to discourage rather than reinforce tendencies towards constructive, divergent and more original forms of thinking.[9] There seems, however, to be no good reason to identify 'creativity' as a single unitary trait, and several investigators including Guilford himself are quite explicit in stating that they do not regard it as such.

A great deal of work is now going on in vigorous attempts to measure 'creativity' or its component parts.[10] Perhaps a note of caution is appropriate, since there are several difficulties about regarding creativity as a measurable trait. The judgement that a given thought product is 'original' or 'creative' depends very much on the values and attitudes of people who make the judgement, upon the standards of their community or sub-group, and upon the period of history in which they live. We may assess them differently now, but Henri Rousseau's paintings were once used in a court of law as evidence not of his originality but of his intellectual incapacity. Again an individual may exhibit high originality on one occasion and remarkably little on others: it may often be more fruitful to regard a term like 'originality' as descriptive of

* See review by Professor R. S. Peters. (Ed.)

instances of behaviour rather than underlying personality traits. Yet again in getting excessively enthusiastic about measuring 'creativity' we may well overlook certain of its necessary components. As Thurstone[11] has argued, high intelligence may not in itself be any guarantee that original thinking will occur and our school and university systems may encourage the development of critical rather than creative thinking. Yet Thurstone's own valuable analysis of 'creative talent' embraces *both* receptivity to new ideas *and* capacity to draw inferences from them. Thus he seems to emphasize not only what others would call 'divergent thinking' but also the attributes necessary to reasoning and comprehension: these latter come very close indeed to what orthodox intelligence tests measure. A rather similar standpoint is developed by Burt in a recent important paper: 'creativity without intelligence produces nothing of interest or value'.[12]

Words like 'creativity' and 'originality' can create endless confusion if we fall into the habit of thinking about them as traits rather than as words: they are simple names for highly complex interactions of processes. Many different things give rise to the production of thought products which a given audience, in a given place, at a given time, may be prepared to assess as 'original'. Luck on the one hand and social skill on the other may contribute to the achievement of this favourable judgement from others: over long periods of time some very great artists—Rembrandt is an obvious example—suffered from their lack of both. Capacity for both convergent and divergent thinking also seems to play its part, and we should not overlook such qualities as capacity for sustained effort and hard work. Books, plays and paintings, like other thought products, are not merely results of the higher flights of human thinking but also rather remarkable achievements of human endurance. Without a complex combination of these other qualities, to paraphrase Sir Cyril Burt, 'creativity' produces nothing of interest or value.

I shall now turn from the realm of hard thinking to that of fantasy, dreamlife and imagery. From the work of the psychiatrist Eugene Bleuler has stemmed the concept of 'autism' or fantasy-dominated thinking. Some years ago I attempted to develop the idea that it is from the interaction of two kinds of process, *A-thinking* and *R-thinking*, that useful thought products emerge.[13] By A-thinking (essentially Bleuler's autism) is meant 'thinking dominated by processes of the fantasy kind rather than geared to reality', typical instances being dreams, hallucinations and the imagery of the falling asleep or hypnagogic state. By contrast R-thinking has been defined (following Crawshay-Williams)[14] as thinking which is adapted to reality, to the specific purpose of dealing

successfully with the objective world and forming correct opinions about it. R-thinking is exemplified not only in the finished thought products of science and invention but also in the skill and craftsmanship which an artist brings to his work.[15] This dichotomy between A-thinking and R-thinking, as developed by myself, is an over-simplification as regards the complexities of the interactions upon which original thought products depend. Oldfield[16] has criticized this dichotomy and the emphasis upon such an interaction on the ground that I have gratuitously identified the logical character of R-thinking with being in correspondence with objective fact. Certainly it is necessary to remind ourselves that logically valid inferences have often been drawn from false premises. Moreover there have been some illuminating cases in which correct ideas or useful thought products have been derived from inferences which would have stood little scrutiny by the logician. Yet it was my original purpose in developing this dichotomy between A-thinking and R-thinking to place emphasis on the fact that it is the interplay of processes of different kinds upon which the thought products of art and science depend. That processes other than those I originally considered merit fuller analysis, and that the A-thinking/R-thinking dichotomy simplifies the complexity of this interaction, I would certainly agree.

Goethe wrote: 'Lernen wir träumen, meine Herren, dann finden wir wierleicht die Wahrheit'.[17] Commenting on this statement the chemist Kékulé adds: 'but let us beware of publishing our dreams before they have been tested by our waking intelligence'. Kékulé's comment is of more than ordinary interest since he himself was responsible for a major advance of theory in organic chemistry and the important notion of the benzene ring. This illumination came to him from a visual hypnagogic image while he dozed on top of a bus. He reports of his hypnagogic image: 'Suddenly the atoms danced before my eyes . . . and all whirled round in a ring. I noticed that the larger ones would form a chain dragging smaller ones along at both ends'. Kékulé was awakened by the bus conductor calling 'Clapham Road', and he reports on subsequent events: 'I spent part of the night in making sketches of the dream structures. That was how the structure theory arose'. The same investigator reports a second incident in which A-thinking again contributed to his work on the benzene ring theory: this occurred while he was dozing in his study. Again, in accord with his comment on Goethe's statement about the dream, Kékulé stresses the subsequent contributions of R-thinking processes: 'This time also I spent the rest of the night working out the consequences of the hypothesis'.

It will be evident that the original thinking of Kékulé did not arise

from a vacuum but from his past training.[18] The illumination occurred in his hypnagogic mental life *because* his mind was stored with the relevant facts from past perceptual experience. Another highly original thinker, Sir Francis Galton,[19] has employed the metaphor of a 'presence chamber' in which full consciousness 'holds court', and an adjoining 'antechamber full of more or less allied ideas, which are situated just beyond the ken of full consciousness'. Galton is careful to add that effective thinking depends upon 'large attendance in the antechamber' of ideas germane to the problem under consideration. In this field, in which individual differences are important, others who have provided introspective data on their creative thinking have emphasized similar things. These range from scientists like Helmholtz and mathematicians like Poincaré to painters like Picasso and novelists like R. L. Stevenson: all have stressed this dependence of their original thought upon past perceptual experience.

PERCEPTION AND ORIGINALITY

New ideas may emerge suddenly by a sort of 'eureka' process, but their origins take us back into the life-history of their author. The principle that 'nothing comes out of nothing', which so impressed Shakespeare's King Lear, also applies to original thought. It was Graham Wallas[20] who gave the now accepted names for the four stages of the creative process: 'preparation', 'incubation', 'illumination' and 'verification'. We shall now consider this first stage of preparation: the dependence of thinking upon an input of information through some channel of sense perception.

Some painters like Paul Klee,[21] or sculptors like Henry Moore, have deliberately collected natural objects which they used as stimuli to their creative work. Thus Paul Klee collected algae from the Baltic, coral from the Mediterranean, together with butterfly wings and crystals: these he used in studying structure and colour combination. One instance of the influence of perception upon a thought product which has been studied in detail concerns *The Eve of St. Agnes* which Keats wrote following a visit to Stanstead House, near Chichester, and this has been analysed by Gittings.[22] Carvings, furniture and fabrics seen by the poet were—on his return to Chichester—incorporated into his poem. During a service in the chapel he gazed for two or three hours at the stained-glass windows which—in the poem—'threw warm gules on Madeline's fair breast'.

I have suggested a distinction between two types of perception, primary and secondary, as relevant to the understanding of imagining.[23]

Examples of *primary perception* would be visually perceiving a landscape or human face, hearing a voice, or feeling the cold of ice or the pain of toothache. Instances of *secondary perception* would be seeing a painting of a face or landscape, hearing a recorded sound, or reading a description by somebody of the coldness of ice or the pain of toothache. In secondary perception, where there is something intermediate through which the object or event is experienced, another person can wittingly or unwittingly express his own personality. Thus sound recordings can be edited, spoken or written accounts can gain a great deal in the telling, and of visual records Gombrich has remarked: 'all pictures owe more to other pictures than they do to nature'. Secondary perception greatly enlarges the possibilities of human experience into the realms of the fictitious, the historically and geographically remote, and the imaginings of others. This fact is important to human creativity. Thus in his work on imagination Livingstone Lowes shows that when he wrote *The Ancient Mariner* Coleridge had not even crossed the Channel. Yet in his poem we find 'the authentic splendours and terrors of the Polar ice'.[24] This was because, as Lowes was able to demonstrate, Coleridge had read widely about the voyages of early navigators which contained both fantasy and fact, and interesting blends of both. Through secondary perception the imaginings of others can become subject matter for further thought and imagination can become a cumulative process.

To show the combined influence of primary and secondary perception upon original thinking I shall take one of the best known characters of English fictional literature: Sherlock Holmes. Secondary perception, notably a reading of the three stories about Edgar Allan Poe's fictional detective Auguste Dupin, exerted considerable influence upon the Holmes stories. This is evident not only generally but also in detail, as when Holmes repeats Dupin's achievement by interrupting the unspoken thoughts of another character and making an appropriate remark, thus demonstrating his creator's insight into the associative processes which underlie thought. It is well known that Conan Doyle used the Edinburgh surgeon Joseph Bell as his model for Sherlock Holmes, and he records quite explicitly that he used and amplified Bell's methods of diagnosis 'when in later life I tried to build up a scientific detective'. Bell's own physical characteristics may be noted: 'he was thin, wiry, dark with a high nose, acute face, penetrating grey eyes, angular shoulders, and a jerky way of talking'.[25] Yet Sherlock Holmes was more than merely a product of Conan Doyle's primary perceptions of Bell and secondary perceptions of Dupin. As was the case with many of the characters of Dickens, something important was contributed by the illustrator. In the case of Sherlock Holmes this was Sidney Paget,

who had his model also, namely his younger brother Walter, from whom he made his drawing of Sherlock Holmes. In this instance we see how the sources of imagining can be composite in that their perceptual origins are drawn from a number of different sources.

Either because its subject matter is composite, or for other reasons some of which will be discussed below, original thought tends to be a rearrangement rather than a reflection of past perceptual experience. Perception itself may play its part in determining the form of such rearrangement as well as its content, as when Harvey was led to his discovery of the circulation of the blood by observation of the action of a pump. This ability to use analogies as ready-made systems of relations seems to play an important part in human originality. The analogies upon which contemporary scientific thinking depends have advanced a long way beyond the cogwheels of Victorian science and include complex 'models' derived from self-correcting electronic machines and the like. The available repertory of ready-made systems of relations that can be perceived—in a primary or secondary way—is a huge one, and opens up new ways of reorganizing subject matter in thought. Thus in psychology itself there is great interest in simulation of processes which it is wished to study. Of some interest is the argument of Miller and his colleagues[26] that this way of thinking may help to free us from the sterile, outworn dogmas which have impeded the legitimate use of introspective methods in this branch of science. Among others Spearman[27] has placed considerable emphasis on the influence of externally perceived systems of relations upon originality. He argues that all original thought depends on a process such as this: a person perceives a relation between A and B and applies this relation to a new subject matter, namely P and Q. Spearman contends that the ability to perform this act of abstraction is fundamental to the process of creative thinking.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN THINKING, REMEMBERING AND IMAGINING

The mental life of any given individual will have certain characteristics which may differ markedly from others whom he assumes to be like himself. Realization of this difference may be an occasion for considerable surprise. Thus one of my subjects in a recent investigation was reporting on her tendency to think and remember largely in visual ways. Of her visual imagery she added: 'I thought everyone had it and was astonished to discover that my husband did not. We were choosing furniture and he could not "see" what it would look like. My son does not have it either, but both my brothers do.'

Surprise is one reaction when people first discover these hidden differences. Impatience and irritation are others, as in the case of another subject when she first learned that her fiancé was incapable of forming a visual image of her!

In the realm of waking imagination all things seem possible. What is usual to the mental life of one person may seem incredible to others, so little appreciated is the fact of these individual variations. Many of them even lack names. One common form of subjective experience which has a name is *déjà vu*: this is the illusion of recognition that 'I have lived through this before' while knowing one hasn't. An investigation of my own revealed that 69 per cent of a group of 182 students reported having had at least one *déjà vu* experience. Zangwill[28] has analysed a case of the experience in Nathaniel Hawthorne. Although Hawthorne refers to the experience in his autobiographical writings rather than in his novels, in *déjà vu* we have a good illustration of the kind of oddity of subjective experience which some—but not other—individuals have available to them to draw on for their thought products.

Through his own imaginative experiences a person may 'live through' events and draw both form and content for his thought products. The mathematician Poincaré argued that 'to create consists of making new combinations of associative elements which are useful', and André Breton comments on an important part of originality as the ability 'to draw a spark from the juxtaposition' of two mutually distinct realities. This dependence of originality upon the process of forming associations from past experience into new combinations had recently been examined afresh by Mednick.[29] This investigator reports positive findings with a new technique—the Remote Associations Test (or 'RAT')—designed to measure the ability to form such associations. This emphasis upon juxtapositions of unusual associations has application not only to the construction of the thought product itself but also to the reactions of others to it. The idiosyncracies of a given thinker's mental life may be such as to incline his thinking quite naturally to juxtapositions which his audience may regard as strange or 'original'. We shall examine hidden differences between people with this idea in mind. When Charles Dickens wrote 'I don't invent, but see it and write it down', he was commenting on his use of primary perception and external observation. Though philosophers might dispute the use of the word 'see' in this context, many individuals do in fact use it when reporting their own mental imagery.[30] There is plenty of evidence to suggest that a similar remark to that of Dickens might well be made about subjective experience as opposed to external perception. Thus some writers and painters have been quite explicit in their claims to use the imagery of

wakefulness, of sleep, and of the hypnagogic state, in their thought products.

In considering these hidden differences between people it is necessary to make use of evidence obtained by introspective reports. Introspective methods have for a long time been unfashionable in psychology which has not fully outgrown the sterile doctrines of early Behaviourism. But there are signs that introspective methods are returning. A leading British psychologist has recently presented some formidable arguments against Behaviourism which, he argues, 'both in its original or "naïve" form, and its later or "sophisticated" forms . . . has proved untenable'.[31] In an important book Miller, Galanter and Pribram, in discussing the psychology of thinking have likewise argued that fruitful lines of investigation have been 'lost in the rituals and taboos of objectivity'.[32] Even more directly relevant to our subject is Mednick's recent reminder that the 'visualizer-verbalizer' dimension involving imagery differences 'may be partly responsible for differential aptitudes for creative work in differing fields'.[33] With these hopeful signs of the time in mind I shall make reference to several unashamedly introspective investigations of mental imagery conducted by my colleagues and myself during the last decade or so. The last of these involves the responses of 500 adults known to be of good intelligence and representing a wide variety of occupations.

IMAGERY DIFFERENCES

Despite certain of the observations of Empson in this *Journal*[34] a wide range of imagery seems to be relatively common, at least among my subjects in several investigations. Some individuals report a huge repertoire of kinds of imagery available to them: visual, auditory, motor, together with imagery for touch, pain, temperature and taste. In a recent investigation the commonest number of available types of imagery reported was eight. (This was reported by 24 per cent of the 400 individuals studied.) The commonest number of types of imagery reported by these subjects as 'reasonably strong' was, however, two (most often visual and auditory), this being reported by 30 per cent of subjects. Others seem to be confined largely to a single mode of mental imagery; though in the investigation mentioned this was uncommon, and involved only 1·7 per cent of subjects. Thinking in a predominantly visual way is extremely common; some persons think in an auditory way and with others again a different mode of imagery is predominant. Again there are persons who deny that they possess imagery at all, though my own investigations suggest that these are today less common than Galton's[35] pioneer investigations might lead us to suppose. The

majority of people seem to declare that they are capable of forming visual images and a study by Carey found no instances of London elementary schoolchildren who were totally bereft of such imagery.[36] The same trend is apparent in adults. The last investigation of 500 individuals revealed that 97·2 per cent reported themselves as capable of visual imagery (86 per cent reported reasonably strong visual imagery); and 92·8 per cent reported the capacity for auditory imagery (69 per cent reported that their auditory imagery was reasonably strong). Galton himself believed that mental imagery can, and should, be developed by training, and recently Slater has restated the case for systematic training within the educational system of the ability to form both visual and auditory images.[37]

A number of those in occupations which seem to require visual thinking contend that visual imagery is either necessary or of value to them. Thus one of my respondents, concerned with film making, comments on the advantages of being able 'to visualize the whole scene on the screen before shooting. . . . I can thus build the set I want, and get the shots as near to perfection as possible at the first go'. Rather similar comments come from respondents concerned with drama, film continuity work, and the like. Another subject, a film director, finds the poverty of his visual imagery 'a handicap in some aspects of my work . . . visual and auditory imagery are desirable in the creative aspects of film-making, but not, I think, essential'. Another of my subjects was led to give up a course in exhibition design and display because, although she could visualize, she was unable to visualize three dimensionally. The inability of some of their students to think in three dimensions is a source of trouble to several teachers of architecture known to me. One wonders if a person unable to visualize in this way could become a successful architect? Several other occupations involving constructive forms of thinking merit illustration from reports of their practitioners. Thus one person, a dental surgeon concerned with facial injuries, comments on the advantages of the 'ability to visualize the end result of operation before beginning'. An advertising agency director, responsible for the work of the creative and development departments, reports being able to 'visualize quite clearly possible ways of designing a package, advertisement or poster, before actually commencing to draw . . . I design layout, shape, dimension, and colour in my mind".

No generalizations will be offered about how those concerned with visual or verbal creation *must* think; some attention will, however, be drawn to how individuals of this kind report they *do* think. In the investigation mentioned those respondents who were writers tended to stress the value of their own visual or auditory imagery. Fairly repre-

sentative is the following: 'I see and hear action in some detail before writing . . . particularly in writing plays it is essential to see the movements of the characters'. Another writer of plays declared more briefly: 'visual and auditory imagery is essential'. Some interesting detailed introspections were provided by a former psychologist who now writes for television, who reported that the idea for a story would come to him verbally in the form 'wouldn't it be a good idea if . . .?'—this being followed by visual images, auditory imagery of the dialogue, and movement imagery of the characters. Elsewhere with her permission I have attempted a detailed account of the use made by Miss Enid Blyton of her unusually vivid cinematographic imagery in constructing her stories for children.[38] In her case, as in the instance of the television writer, auditory as well as visual imagery contributes to the stories which Miss Blyton 'sees', 'hears', and writes down.

HALLUCINATION

There is a great variety of idiosyncracies of subjective experience which some individuals have but others lack. Any such experiences are available to be drawn upon by those who have them and may seem strangely original to others. Hallucinations represent one such phenomenon, whose rarity can be exaggerated. The largest investigation which has been conducted into this field—the 'census of hallucinations'—involved responses of 17,000 people, just under 10 per cent of whom reported having experienced at least one hallucination. Experiments with hallucinogenic drugs like mescaline, with crystal-gazing, and more recently with sensory deprivation, have shown a variety of ways in which hallucinations can be evoked.[40] Examples of spontaneous hallucinations collected in a recent investigation of my own will serve to illustrate their variety of content, and of sense mode: seeing an aeroplane crash, hearing one's own name spoken, and feeling a tap on the shoulder. Among them were hallucinations of a religious or supernatural kind such as seeing angels or the devil, and experiencing the smell of incense, while one subject—a European woman married to an Indian—had a vision of the Hindu god Vishnu. Certain artists have been subject to hallucinations of this religious kind, and have used them in their thought products. The famous case is that of William Blake who 'really saw' such things as a tree full of angels on one occasion, and the face of God at the window on another. Galton records his finding that visual hallucinations 'are much more common among sane people than is generally imagined'. He draws attention to the fact that he knew no less than five editors of influential newspapers who had visionary experiences: 'two

of them have described the phenomena very forcibly in print, but anonymously'.

DREAMS

Another source is the dream. Dreamlife, like hallucination, appears to have made some substantial contributions to the literature of the supernatural, and at an early date Lucretius advanced the view that 'the gods first appeared to men in dreams'. The beliefs of an individual will determine the interpretation he places upon experiences which others may prefer to call 'dreams' and 'hallucinations'. Although I don't myself happen to believe in ghosts and apparitions, I have nevertheless collected some excellent material of the 'I saw it with my own eyes' kind, both from individuals who share my disbelief and from others who don't.

Some drugs like opium stimulate dreaming while others, for example mescaline, appear to diminish rather than increase dreaming, though they can produce some striking forms of hallucination and waking imagery. Apart from De Quincey's case the evidence suggests that the dream which provided subject matter for *Kubla Khan* occurred under the influence of laudanum.[41] Even if drug experiences are reported as such, in literature we must be cautious about assuming that they are necessarily based on personal experiences of the author. A rather interesting case concerns Charlotte Brontë's novel *Villette* where an opium vision is reported by the narrator. When questioned about this Charlotte Brontë denied ever having taken opium: she explained the vision as having resulted from numerous occasions when, before sleep, she had thought about what an opium vision would be like. The vision itself emerged on one occasion after waking up in the morning. Obviously secondary perception played its part; but of interest is her reference to the thought processes which precede sleep, since hypnagogic visions can closely resemble those of a drug-induced kind. This resemblance has been discussed in detail by Ardis and myself elsewhere.[42]

Whatever their contribution to the writings of the Brontë sisters—and Emily Brontë portrays an hypnagogic image as such in *Wuthering Heights*—these experiences merit examination in themselves. We shall consider the hypnagogic experiences of the falling asleep and the hypnopompic experiences of the waking up state in their relation to certain instances of original thinking.

HYPNAGOGIC AND HYPNOPOMPIC IMAGERY

In the transitional states between wakefulness and sleep the boundary

between imagery and hallucination becomes less clearly defined. Hypnagogic visions—which may occur with closed or open eyes—have been likened to a display of lantern slides which seem unconnected with other thought processes going on at the time. Reference has been made to the part which juxtaposition of subject matter from different fields plays in originality: hypnagogic imagery can certainly provide some strange juxtapositions. One subject reports that his own hypnagogic imagery is 'chiefly noticeable for its original or surrealist character . . . objects arranged in unusual ways, being most like paintings by Dali'.

The thinking of the hypnopompic state may show similar features, even when unaccompanied by imagery. A subject whom I interviewed awoke one morning to find herself murmuring 'put the red pyjamas on the salad!' Analysis of this curious piece of hypnopompic thinking revealed that the subject had a temporary post in a restaurant where she made up salads: everything went into these salads so why not red pyjamas! Imagery in these states can also involve odd juxtapositions as in the case of one hypnagogic image of my own involving a crab holding a lighted cigar in its claw. The clarity of detail of some of these images also invites analogy with the paintings of Salvador Dali. One subject reported a scene in which 'every blade of grass was sharply defined', and one of Leaning's subjects had an image of a road and trees with 'every detail—leaves, track, cart ruts, pebbles—microscopically clear'.[43] Also of interest is the unusual lighting and colour of certain of these images, and Lady Berkeley who painted a series of her hypnagogic images uses terms like 'liquid fire' and 'strange luminosity' about them. Amongst others who have painted from their hypnagogic imagery was the surrealist Max Ernst, who reported 'being present as a spectator' at the birth of his own works and adds 'I had only to reproduce obediently what made itself visible within me'. These words bring out another feature of the imagery, its autonomy, in that the author has virtually no control over its occurrence or content. Others who have used hypnagogic imagery in thought products have included Edgar Allen Poe and Lewis Carroll. To take a more recent example, in a personal communication (October 1954) the imaginative writer Mr. Ray Bradbury reports his own use of such imagery and says 'quite often I have forced myself completely awake to make notes on ideas thus come about'.

To some people hypnagogic imagery is unknown, though it may be an occasional or even nightly feature of the mental life of their acquaintances. One study revealed that the majority of a student group investigated had had at least one experience of hypnagogic imagery; in another investigation 52 per cent who reported the experience declared it to be frequent or regular.[44]

BODY SCHEMA EXPERIENCES

The impression of one's body as an object in space is called the 'body schema'. In a variety of circumstances a person may have a disturbance of this impression, a feeling of alteration of the size or shape of his own body or one of its parts. This may happen owing to fatigue, drugs or anaesthetics and during migraine, asthma or other illnesses. It may also occur hypnagogically as with the following subject who reported of her childhood: 'I used to diminish in size till I was nothing . . . it used to frighten me and I had to call my parents'. In connection with body schema distortions may be noted the part which changes in the size of the characters has played in imaginative literature, for example in *Alice in Wonderland.* While Lewis Carroll had, of course, plenty of opportunity for secondary perception of such size changes, one may speculate a little about whether he also had more first-hand experience, not only through the hypnagogic state but also through his migraine. Yet another interesting source of raw material, and of juxtapositions of subject matter, is synaesthesia.

SYNAESTHESIA

Synaesthesia is the tendency for imagery of one sense mode to be evoked by sensations from another mode. The commonest form (visual-auditory synaesthesia) involves having visual images of colour or shape while listening to music, and there is evidence for synaesthesia of this kind among composers like Berlioz, Wagner and Debussy. Typical examples of visual-auditory synaesthesia are provided by one of my subjects who reported 'violins are mauve, blue and lavender' and added 'my mother has a bright red voice, and my history teacher had a green one'. Other kinds of synaesthesia include tactile imagery sometimes combined with colour as in the case of another subject who reported that 'deep soft voices are brown velvet, while clear soprano voices are pale blue satin'. One of our subjects had synaesthesia involving images of patterns and reported using it, when making up embroidery designs, by thinking of pieces of music for inspiration.

We cannot safely assume that because a person uses the language of synaesthesia he is necessarily subject to the experience. For this reason a distinction has been proposed between 'synaesthesia proper' and 'synaesthetic description'. (See below.) Yet some examples from literature merit mention, and among poets we find Baudelaire resorting to auditory-visual and auditory-olfactory synaesthetic language:

Comme de longs échos qui de loin se confondent
Dans une ténébreuse et profonde unité,
Vaste comme la nuit et comme la clarté,
Les parfums, les couleurs et les sons se répondent.

Certain drugs—of which mescaline, lysergic acid diethylamide, and hashish are the best known examples—produce synaesthesia in people not ordinarily subject to it. Drug-induced synaesthesia plays an important part in a short story by Sax Rohmer called *Breath of Allah*. In this, while spying upon a perfume maker in attempts to discover a secret recipe, the central characters are overcome by the fumes of hashish. The synaesthesias they experience include 'hearing' the perfumes speak in a variety of voices and 'seeing' words issue forth from the mouth of the perfume blender. This story gives a remarkable description of some of the manifestations of synaesthesia whose spontaneous occurrence is rare, but which can occur in certain states of drug intoxication.

SYNAESTHETIC DESCRIPTIONS OR METAPHORS

By 'synaesthetic description' is meant description of experience in one sense mode by language appropriate to another. Thus—without necessarily being subject to synaesthesia proper—we may say of a bright colour that appears in the wrong place that it is 'loud', and perhaps add that the wearer of the tie in question would have been wiser to choose a more 'subdued' colour. Quite a number of people use synaesthetic language about pain, and the following subject is representative: 'I have brown pain (nagging toothache), black pain (continuous bad headache) and red pain (shooting toothache)'.

Synaesthetic descriptions can result in some odd juxtapositions which may appear witty or otherwise original. A nice example is the description of high tea as 'a concerto of a meal in which protein is often a somewhat solo instrument playing with an over-full orchestra of carbohydrates'. (*The Observer*, 23rd March, 1958.) They quite often occur in literary or art criticism, as in the description of the Velazquez painting of Innocent X as 'a magnificent symphony in crimson', or in the comment: 'Picasso's paintings often roar and stamp, or pound; Klee's whisper a soliloquy'.

OTHER PHENOMENA

I have tried to illustrate how some people can think about, and express their thoughts about, a subject matter in ways which others find extremely odd. Other subjective phenomena may be mentioned briefly.

Thus certain people have number forms, a tendency to think of numbers in some regular, spatially arranged image. As an example from literature it may be noted that the heroine of Aldous Huxley's *Two or Three Graces* possessed such a number form. Some people think of numbers as having specific colours, colour on occasion being combined with other qualities as in the subject who reported to me: 'seven is dark brown and masculine; eleven is green and feminine'. Days of the week frequently have colour associations, and one subject reports these also for times of the day: 'half past three is yellowish, and one o'clock is greenish'. We have already seen that for some individuals voices have colour, and thus statements like 'Dr. A has a blue voice, and I can't stand grey voices' presumably have meaning to the speaker, however baffling they may be to others. Interesting problems of communication can thus arise, and did on the occasion on which Dame Edith Sitwell chose to refer to 'Emily coloured primulas'. This provoked correspondence from a variety of people, one of whom thought 'Emily coloured' meant mauve, while another declared it meant yellow. By 'Emily coloured' Miss Sitwell had, herself, meant pink! Colour associations and synaesthetic ways of description are relatively common occurrences though, needless to say, there is strong disagreement about which colours go with what. Our concluding illustration may be taken from four of my subjects all of whom had colour associations for days of the week. For one Sunday was greyish blue, for another drab faun, for a third it was grey, while for a fourth it was dark green. Other days of the week showed similar variations. The possibilities of hidden differences of subjective experiences are rich and fascinating in their variety.

CONCLUSION

Three aspects of the psychology of 'original' thinking have been discussed. The idea that original thought products result from any single and specific kind of thinking has been questioned. Thought products are complex, and they are the end results of a complex interaction among processes of a variety of kinds. I have attempted to draw attention to some aspects of this interaction.

An explanation of human thinking and thought products has sometimes been found in terms of emergence from 'within' and the eruption of processes of an 'unconscious' kind. Certainly incubation and the passage of time play an important part in creative thought; moreover, what emerges may be autonomous in having little reference either to conscious volition or to past perceptual experience. But 'the unconscious' merely refers to material that has been forgotten, what one doesn't know

one knows, as opposed to what can be recalled and what one knows one knows. What emerges from it, seemingly from within, has its origins in perceptual experience.

There are some interesting but hidden differences between individuals in how they remember, think and imagine: these can, and do, reflect themselves in the thought products which individuals create. I have examined some of these phenomena of subjective experience in the hope that their further study will contribute to the understanding of certain forms of human originality.

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THE BRITISH SOCIETY OF AESTHETICS

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JOHN BAYLEY (Fellow of New College, Oxford, and author of *The Characters of Love: a Study in the Literature of Personality*)

GANTNER'S THEORY OF PREFIGURATION

Moshe Barasch

I

SEVERAL TRADITIONS, or schools of thought, prevail in that field of scientific inquiry which is called 'History of Art'. Each of these schools has a main theme, which continually reveals itself in new aspects through the work of successive generations and even centuries. Thanks to the wonderful vigour of these themes, their perpetuation does not lead to rigid repetition, but results in a series of original creations and novel points of view.

The so-called 'Iconographic' school, for instance, originated with the humanists of the Renaissance (if not earlier) and has undergone fundamental changes in the course of the centuries. Its latest form, 'Iconology', shows how that school of 'Content-meaning' was able to absorb the problems of modern aesthetics and psychology (Form and Expression) without losing its ancient heritage of 'Content-interpretation'. We find a similar creative continuity in another great school, often called the 'formal' one. The work of the Swiss art-historian Joseph Gantner is the latest link in the development of this tradition, and to him are dedicated these remarks.

The school from which Gantner stems is linked to the town of Basel, though its ramifications are world wide. It begins with Jacob Burckhardt, and was continued, perfected and enriched in the work of Heinrich Woelfflin. The problems left by Woelfflin form the starting point of his disciple Gantner, who now holds the chair of History of Art in Basel once occupied by Woelfflin and Burckhardt. This external connection corresponds to a continuity of spirit and theme in their work. But here again this spiritual continuity constitutes a creative remodelling and enlargement of the theme.

Gantner's scientific work extends over large areas, parts of which have been neglected by his 'school'. He has given us penetrating research on Romanesque sculpture, and on modern art, on Michelangelo and Rodin, on *Leonardo's Visionen vom Untergang der Welt* and on the *Fortunes of the Representation of Man in European art.*[1]

In the last two decades there has developed and crystallized in the historical work of Gantner a philosophical aesthetic motif, which he calls 'Prefiguration'. The following remarks deal with this concept. But in order to see it in the right context, we must return for a moment to Woelfflin.

II

The great contribution of Woelfflin, as is well known, was to lay down a 'basic set of concepts . . . for pictorial representation in its most general form'.[2] Of course, even before Woelfflin it was well known that the physiognomy of form and modes of artistic representation in the fifteenth century differed from those of the sixteenth. Woelfflin is recognized as having articulated these differences in definite categories (the five sets of concepts); he also attempted to explain on that basis the differences in style which characterize various periods. What this history of styles brings out is a history of 'Forms of Representation'. Even before the artist applies himself to the actual realization of his work it has a definite, though general form in his 'Sight' or 'Representation'. (He sees it, or represents it to himself, in quite definite, if general lines.) Each period has its 'Forms of Representation', and these give their underlying uniformity to the manifold creations of that epoch. Woelfflin himself realized that the concept of 'Forms of Representation' possibly overstepped the limits of competence of the historian of art, and therefore desired a collaboration with psychologists.[3]

As historian of art he regarded the forms of representation as void of content, mere forms into which, so to say, any meaning could be infused. Moreover he assumed that there exists a history of those forms.

A whole generation of historians of art has been engrossed with discussing the above theses, and the discussion is by no means concluded. It is unnecessary to go into the problem here, but we would like to mention one of the parties to it, Benedetto Croce, for the exposition he offers in his *Estetica* has acquired paramount significance for the elaboration of Gantner's ideas. Croce sees every work of art as springing from an original intuition which he calls *intuizione espressa* and which is *a priori* a synthesis of form and content. Every work of art is, for Croce, completely formed from the moment of its conception. It is unique, and leaves no room for comparison with other works of art, even of the

same period. 'The only realities in the history of poetry or art, are the individual spirits of the artists or their works.'[4] These assumptions of the Italian philosopher (with whom a 'nominalistic' way of thinking developed in the field of aesthetics) led him to a sharp criticism of Woelfflin's theses. He had to deny both the existence of mere 'sight' or 'forms of representation'—which by their very nature are not yet completely materialized—as well as the internal ripening process of the work of art itself, which coincides with the distance between those forms and the completed work. Whoever posits these two things, is driven to accept abstraction. But in the process of abstraction we lose the living, dialectical relationship between content and form. In the end we are left with nothing more than a piece of abstract material, says Croce.

Woelfflin's school had to take a stand against this attack. Woelfflin himself embarked upon this in 1933 in one of his most beautiful and penetrating essays.[5] Gantner's theory of Prefiguration has grown out of this conflict between the 'intuitive' conception (even if not attached to Croce's name) and Woelfflin's 'abstraction'. Thus this theory is linked to the Woelfflin tradition, but raises its teachings to a higher plane than was reached in the original exposition.

III

Gantner's theory of Prefiguration concentrates on a phenomenon to which Woelfflin himself paid but little attention, despite the fact that it is of central significance: the genesis of a work of art. In the Romantic period this question was much discussed, and the coming into being of a work of art was mostly regarded as the (often irrational) exaltation of the creative drive. Gantner wants to show that the genesis of a work of art can be objectively grasped, and can be analysed in the documents it leaves behind, as milestones on a highway. The analysis of this road shows that the creation of a work is not as immediate as the intuitive school believes, that the work is not fully 'realized' and unchangeable from the moment of its conception. The formation of a work is a process comprising manifold intervening steps of Prefiguration before it reaches its final 'figuration'.

Where lies, then, this land of Prefiguration? What are the exact limitations and significance of these concepts? We must separate Gantner's outlook from that of many others close to him in order to see its profile clearly. Gantner sets out from the point of view that in the course of the process which leads to the creation of a work of art there exists 'both a first creative step and also a final result which goes beyond it'. The gap between the two is the realm of Prefiguration. Even this general

delimitation of the field in which Prefigurations extend seems to be a worthy contribution of Gantner's.

It is a well-known fact in all branches of the history of culture that every new work of art is not immediate, starting from a 'first beginning'. Rather, every new formation is constructed from pre-existing forms and is realized in the frame of tradition. We know the decisive importance of tradition not only for the traditional but also for the revolutionary artist, and that each artist has a so-called vocabulary wherewith he expresses his new ideas and original motifs. The most revealing example is the poet, whose raw material, the word, is stamped with a meaning in the most direct sense. For the pictorial artist this may seem less evident at first glance, but it is nevertheless equally true. It cannot be doubted that the inexorable link with tradition leaves its imprint on his work. Are we justified to describing it as a Prefiguration in Gantner's sense?

Gantner gives a narrower and more definite interpretation to the concept of Prefiguration. He means by it not only the content of the imprint of tradition, but also the artist's attitude to the realization of his work; it is a preparation, conscious or unconscious, for the completed work. Thus in connection with the history of art it is not sufficient to point to a 'pre-existing form' as a manifestation of subjective fantasy, as was often done in the Romantic period, or a pre-formation *via* tradition, as in the history of culture. Prefiguration becomes a specific artistic problem when we also consider the goal towards which it is tending: the finished work of art. This clarifies the conflict between the two ways of thought. Prefiguration, whether a mental representation or a schema, can be studied and examined by the psychologist without taking into account the final goal. The historian of culture can be satisfied with finding the imprint of a certain tradition at each and every stage of formation, and he too can forego the final goal. But it is decisive for the historian or art, whose problem is the history of completed art works, to ask: How near is Prefiguration to the finished work? How does Prefiguration build it up and what transformations does it undergo in the process?

Gantner thus retains the criterion of the finished work. As is well known, completion or finish was regarded as a criterion in the classical conception of art. But there it was a criterion of value. The unfinished was appraised as valueless, failure. For Gantner, however, completion is not a criterion of value, but a category of description and analysis. If completion is considered as the objective and final goal of the formative process, then the various phases in that process take on a clear and definite physiognomy. From the intuitionist standpoint of Croce this

whole field cannot exist. Since the work of art is brought completely to existence from the moment of its conception, its coming into being can have no history. When Gantner describes the genesis of a work of art in his theory of Prefiguration, he is developing Woelfflin's theory on the new level of discussion with intuitionism. Gantner wants to show that the history of a work of art is linked in several phases, which are distinguishable.

IV

The genesis of the work of art manifests—according to Gantner—two basic phases, or rather there are two sorts of Prefiguration. The first is the stage of *invisible* Prefiguration. Reference is made to Woelfflin's 'Forms of Representation' and Gantner also names them 'immaterial Prefigurations'.[6] These invisible Prefigurations are not directly recognizable, they do not appear before the eye. Rather they are deducible from analysis of the completed work. These immaterial Prefigurations only appear as such in the interpretation of the art historian, and are founded in his ability to abstract and compare. It is to the credit of Woelfflin that he accepted (in bold generalization) this result of analysis, as revealing a primary structure of imagination itself, the activity of 'representation' or 'seeing'. He anchored the history of art in that maybe still unfathomable sphere of collective psychology when he spoke of a history of seeing.

It is unnecessary to go into the lively methodological discussion to which this concept has given rise. Are the forms of representation filled out from the very beginning with some content or other? What is the contribution of tradition, of a collective memory, to the forms of representation and to what extent do we have before us the history of a pure fantasy? How is such a history of pure fantasy to be fathomed? Under the influence of Croce's critique Woelfflin defined his position on these questions. In the above-mentioned essay of 1933 he writes: 'Any form of perception presupposes something perceived. . . . In every new style of perception, there crystallizes a new world content. . . . Not only does one see differently, but one sees different things.' Despite this declaration Woelfflin still discriminates the form of perception from the object perceived, and thinks of it as autonomous. Gantner too seems to me to have departed little from this viewpoint, at any rate as he expresses his ideas in his book about Romanesque Sculpture.

From Gantner's point of view it might be desirable to pursue our research in another direction. The question we have in mind is: To what extent is 'invisible Prefiguration' Prefiguration at all in the strict sense of the term? In other words: Does the 'Form of Representation' already

contain within itself its relationship to the finished work? Or does there exist a qualitative difference in the structure of the two types of Prefiguration, aside from the fact that the one is invisible, and only apprehensible through analysis, whereas the other is externalized in visible sketches? Though Gantner must come to grips with these questions, they are not decisive for his theory of Prefiguration; for that, it is only important that every work, even before it acquires concrete form, is influenced by certain general forms of imagination.

Much more important for the problems of Gantner, and for an evaluation of his contribution, is the other kind of 'Prefiguration' which he names 'Direct Prefiguration'. He refers here to the documents of the work-process, in which the work of art takes shape step by step. It does not encompass as much as the 'invisible' forms of Prefiguration, which are like empty containers capable of being filled with any content whatsoever. The area of visible Prefiguration is narrower, and it is therefore more precise and meaningful. The continuous narrowing down of the area of visible Prefiguration envisages its gradual concretion into a *definite* work of art. Visible Prefiguration embraces all the various phases of sketches, trials, corrections. But visible Prefiguration can begin even before the most fleeting stroke is made on the drawing-board. In non-abstract art, it begins with the choice of the section of nature to be represented, for this choice is already a paring down of the unlimited possibilities of invisible prefiguration. Gantner brilliantly demonstrated that the choice by Leonardo of a given section of nature (a rocky gorge) already points to a *concetto* (to use a term of the Renaissance) of his finished work.[7] But Gantner is no rigid determinist in the sense of believing that a given section of nature leads to a particular form of completed work. At this first stage of visible Prefiguration the area of possibilities is wide. Nature as nature has no style, therefore the choice of a section of nature could lead as easily to a geological survey as to an artistic shape. Leonardo, as we know, gives us both. As the 'shaping' process proceeds, Prefiguration takes on ever more definite form until it culminates in the completed work of art, that is until Prefiguration gives way to Figuration. Gantner rightly stresses that even in the finished work the process of shaping does not always stop, even the 'finished form' can still be a Prefiguration. Modern art, indeed, offers many examples of such struggle with final form which perhaps never achieves a decisive result. But Rembrandt's pictures also show, as is well known, this endless striving for the final form, that often leaves its traces even in the finished work. Examples would be the 'finished' Rembrandt pictures whose idea is continued, changed and enlarged in drawings and etchings. Giorgione's *Tempesta* with its superimposed layers of painting, could be

another example. This 'painting-over', which we discover by X-ray when studying pictures, calls for a psychological and artistic interpretation. Gantner's theory of Prefiguration can provide it.

V

So far, we have considered the genesis of the individual work of art in its clearly distinctive phases. Gantner now widens his field of vision and asks: Does the process of Prefiguration and form-taking remain identical in all periods? Or does this process itself also have a history?

The surprising result of Gantner's research shows that the distance between invisible Prefiguration and final figuration displays quite extreme variations. We know of periods in which the immediate, visible Prefiguration seems to be entirely lacking. The fact that we have no sketches from the Middle Ages is explainable not only by their physical destruction, but also by the character of the creative process in that period. In that tradition-bound art the collective 'form of representation' comes so close to the final form of the completed work that no opportunity is left for the subjective imagination of the artist, for his trials and changes.

The Renaissance is marked by a different type of creative process, wherein the distance between invisible Prefiguration and definitive form becomes ever larger. Gantner brings to our notice that Dante already talks of an *intenzion dell'arte*[8] which is not identical with the finished work. Leonardo works out a formal exposition of the distinction between the two. Painting was for him, as is well known, a science, '*sciencia*', maybe even simply *the* science; but he speaks also of a 'pre-science', *pre-scientia*. He defines the first as knowledge of things possible, present and past; 'pre-science' as knowledge of preliminary, emerging things. Faced with this differentiation, it becomes clear why Leonardo sees in the *trasmutazione di forme*, in the ability of forms constantly to change, one of the great assets of painting.[9] This faculty for metamorphosis should not end even with the completion of form. There is perhaps nothing more typical in this respect than the comparison to which Leonardo appeals with the activity of the poet, who apparently also erases what has been completed in order to write something new and far more perfect.[10] The main aim, then, is the creativity of the mind, not the frozen form. Gantner sees in this process the encroachment of subjectivity. Maybe one could state it as follows: the greater the value attributed to subjectivity in any period, the wider is the scope of visible Prefiguration in its artistic shaping process.

The philosophical basis for this conception resides in the school of

thought named Platonic in European history, which created in Renaissance Italy the concept of the *Idea*. This became the leading motif in Michelangelo's world. Here arises an unbridgeable opposition between the image in imagination and the completed work of art. The Work is unfinishable, because material cannot render the *immagine del cuore*. To this is linked the definitive emergence of a new artistic category, the *non finito*. This did not mean the work which has remained uncompleted, but the unfinishable. The high evaluation of the *non finito* continued and indeed increased up to the passion of Turner for 'unfinished paintings' and Delacroix's conception that the greatest masters owe their 'effets les plus sublimes' to the unfinished, whereas the less great stick to the finished. Gantner sees a rise in the value placed upon the subjective element in modern art. The elimination of a clear distinction between picture and sketch, which we often find in Klee, shows this encroachment of the prefigural on the figural.[11]

This theory of Prefiguration, which grew out of Woelfflin's problems of objective forms of representation, comes close to a theory of artistic production. So Woelfflin's wish that historian of art and the psychologist should come together and join forces seems to be coming closer to realization. Gantner founds the synthesis of these two realms of knowledge on a solid historical basis, on a description and analysis of the path from the *Idea* to the completed work. This original performance gives new evidence of the vitality of a big school and of an ability to discover and analyse new aspects of 'its' theme.

Gantner's Theory of Prefiguration is not yet sealed. There remain many problems on which he has still to define his position (for instance, the relation of content in the scheme of Prefiguration). But one can already confidently assert that this theory opens up new and fruitful perspectives in our endeavours to deal with old and weighty problems of the History of Art.

REFERENCES

[1] Gantner's main books, on this theme, are: *Romanische Plastik. Inhalt und Form in der Kunst des 11. und 12. Jahrhunderts*, Vienna 1941 (Dritte Auflage, Vienna, 1948); *Schoenheit und Grenzen der klassischen Form: Jacob Burckhardt, Benedetto Croce, Heinrich Woelfflin*, Vienna (1949); *Rodin und Michelangelo*, Vienna (1953); *Leonardos Visionen von der Sintflut und vom Untergang der Welt*, Bern (1958); *Schicksale des Menschenbildes, von der romanischen Stilisierung zur modernen Abstraktion*, Bern (1958). Gantner's great literary output includes, in addition, a multiple-volume Art History of Switzerland, as well as studies on Konrad Witz, basic forms of the European town, *Gallia romanica* (together with Marcel Aubert, Marcel Pobé and Jean Roubier). Important is the edition of the minor writings of Woelfflin, which he arranged, along with the correspondence between

Jacob Burckhardt and Woelfflin, and other documents about their meeting, Basel (1948).

[3] Heinrich Woelfflin, *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe* (1° Auflage) Basel (1948), p. 275.

[3] Heinrich Woelfflin, *Gedanken zur Kunstgeschichte*, Basel (1940), p. 3.

[4] Croce's summarization of his position appeared in an essay in his journal *Critica* of May 20, 1942. Compare Gantner, *Schoenheit und Grenzen*, pp. 43 ff., esp. p. 63.

[5] Appeared first in the German journal *Logos* (1933), reprinted in *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, pp. 274 ff. In the English translation, this essay is unfortunately not included.

[6] Comp. *Leonardos Visionen*, pp. 22 ff. and *Schicksale des Menschenbildes*, pp. 105 ff.

[7] Comp. *Leonardos Visionen*, p. 19.

[8] Very interesting is the short but fruitful summary of the history of the problem of Prefiguration in *Schicksale des Menschenbildes*, pp. 108 ff.

[9] Gantner studied very thoroughly Leonardo's theory of art, from the standpoint of Prefiguration. See *Leonardo's Visionen*, especially pp. 41 ff.

[10] *Leonardo da Vinci. Das Buch von der Malerei*, ed. H. Ludwig, *Quellenschriften fuer Kunstgeschichte*, XVI, Vienna (1888), 189.

[11] See *Schicksale des Menschenbildes*, pp. 137 ff.

THE BRITISH SOCIETY OF AESTHETICS

A Conference on Aesthetics in 1963

THE British Society of Aesthetics occupies a unique position among learned societies in this country. Its membership includes experts in many fields of study, philosophers, art historians and critics, psychologists, lecturers and teachers, as well as artists and others engaged professionally in the practice of the arts—people who in the ordinary course of events have little opportunity to meet together and discuss their common interests.

Knowledge progresses rapidly in all these fields and there would seem to be a very real need for the Society to extend the service which it is able through its monthly meetings to offer to London members for the benefit of a wider public. The Executive Committee is therefore considering the organization of a one- or two-day conference to be held in conjunction with the 1963 Annual General Meeting in September, provided of course that there is sufficient interest in the project. A leaflet enclosed with this Journal gives further particulars and it is hoped that both members and non-members will give this their immediate attention and respond to the request to let the organizers know whether or not they would be interested in such a Conference.

could be as important as Monet's, and that a 'history of taste' would have to refrain from artistic value judgements. But is this not to say, or at least to imply, two things: first, that the 'history of taste' does not discriminate between good and bad taste; and secondly that the 'history of art' is the history of *good* art? Both implications must be put in doubt; both are likely to vitiate the handling of 'history of art' and of 'history of taste', whether separately or in conjunction. Of course, the 'history of art' must make value judgements, and is in fact making them all the time. But it can only do so by comparison and grading within art, and not simply by postulating canons of excellence. As every historian knows and appreciates, it is the mediocre, the merely competent, the vast amount of secondary and derivative material, which supports the scale of evaluation of the good and the great. But in this respect a 'history of taste' would present no different a picture. 'Taste' is not simply noted. On the contrary, the distinction between good and bad taste is so implicitly assumed that 'taste' is often used to denote 'good taste'—and the same care is necessary here as with the loose usage of 'art' for 'good art'. Thus, to return to Frith and Monet, it would be as fallacious to attribute equal importance to the two railway impressions in a 'history of taste' as it would be in a 'history of art'. And yet considerations of the prevalent 'taste' which made *Paddington Station* symptomatic and *Gare St. Lazare* prophetic, have to be faced—in both histories. Facing them in one 'history' alone leads to absurd and absurdly uninformative conclusions. Taste, whether inborn or not, only develops or deteriorates in contact with the art of an epoch, the art of the past, or the art of an ideal or lost tradition. And there is no art which does not feed on, or rebel against, the unwritten demands of 'taste'. Ignoring this leads to the atrophy of interest in problems of style. This rarely happens in art *history*, which would be nowhere without the bewitching concept of style, but philosophical art *theory* is not always blameless in this respect, even when it admits that art, of course, has a history. Problems of style, however, only become exciting when questions such as those of a dying style nurturing a taste into orthodoxy, of a prevalent taste provoking violent artistic reactions, or of an established artistic convention resulting in new modes of vision, are admitted as shaping the patterns of our investigations. Of course, this may only mean that the 'history of art' and the 'history of taste' should not be kept in watertight compartments, but be allowed to influence and enrich each other. But I believe that some reflection on problems of style—without which neither 'history' of art nor of taste could proceed—will show that the notion of 'two histories' cannot be sustained.

Such reflections cannot here be given in full. Also, they have often

been put forward by more competent writers. But it bears repeating that if 'taste' be a social phenomenon, and not a mental faculty for the propagation of aesthetic judgement—along the lines of eighteenth-century, rather short-lived psychology—then this fact does not therefore make 'social history' a mere descriptive discipline. What makes art history 'history' is not merely the recognition of temporal succession, but the concentration on interconnections, which can only arise from evaluative selection. The same holds for social 'history'. Strictly speaking, there is no *history* of taste, for 'taste' is one of the elements which make —social or aesthetic—'history' of art *historical*. For every historical discipline requires a concept or cluster of concepts which need not be further analysed or reduced to better-known causal factors. The concept of purpose or of chance in general history, for instance, or the concept of evolution in the history of life, or even the concept of cyclical development in the history of civilization—all these notions fulfil this function, and it is not here my business to decide whether it is to the good of the respective disciplines or not. Such notions are as much what is to be explained as what makes an ordered exposition possible. 'History' could only begin to be written when Herodotus saw that there were Greeks and barbarians, and cosmology only became natural *history* when the various myths of creation were understood metaphorically and thus put a stop to further speculations about 'first causes'. The 'history' of art needs the concept of 'taste' to make a mere catalogue of artistic achievements 'historical'. As long as 'taste' itself was a psychological *analysandum*, it could not fulfil this function. The high time of the history of art began with the flourishing of historicism, which went to the extremes of historical irreducibility. If we have circumvented that impasse, it is mainly due to having dropped the notion of a 'history of taste', and tacitly having appropriated 'taste', under many different names, as a historical matrix seen under the perspective of art works and their assessment. Thus I would suggest that the history of art is *also* the history of taste, but that there is no 'history of taste' as such. If one does not wish to destroy the usefulness of a device which allows one to proceed where otherwise an infinite regress of causes and effects would hamper any discussion of influences and trends, then the notion of 'taste' must be admitted as something which has a 'history' only in the context of that which it, in its turn, makes historically amenable: art.

FOLK ARTISTS AND THEIR INSPIRATION

Ksawery Piwocki

THERE ARE countries whose folk art had died out completely by the nineteenth century, so that for them it has now become an anonymous work. In fact anonymity has come to be regarded as one of its specific features. In Poland, however, folk art is a branch of the nation's creative activity which is still alive and in spite of the changes in its social function it continues to develop and flourish. It is still based on its old traditions although it now serves not the rural communities but the towns, where it is received with enthusiasm.

It is not clear how long such a state of affairs is likely to last, but at least it is still possible to examine the vital creation of folk artists, by no means anonymous, who continue to draw upon traditional patterns in spite of the impressions and concepts with which the contemporary world would imbue them. Their work is particularly significant and instructive, not only for the ethnographer or the art historian but also for aesthetics and the theory of art. For in a primitive artist the connections between traditional usage, incentive and realization are more clearly discernible than in more sophisticated art. It would be an interesting and fruitful accomplishment if present-day aesthetics would turn from abstract concepts of beauty and other aesthetic categories to an examination of actual aesthetic structures. This would open the way to a direct insight into the process of artistic creation in the primitive workshop of a folk artist.

The present article attempts such an examination in one particular sector. It is concerned with the relations which exist between the structure of a work of folk art and the patterns on which it is based. Naturally this matter may also be approached from a psychological or sociological angle, but its very scale imposes a limitation to an analysis of the struc-

ture of a work. Even so, interesting light is also thrown on other issues beyond those of folk art.

Aesthetic judgement is always, in essence, a comparison in which two things are measured against each other. Anyone who moves among artists knows that in fact they are primarily interested in the work of their predecessors. Even in dealing with a landscape motif an artist struggles against the patterns of his forerunners which arise insistently in his consciousness and subconsciousness. The folk artist and the primitive artist behave in identical fashion, but more unaffectedly and candidly.

All the folk sculptors or painters I know are like the medieval guild painters in possessing a pattern guide which serves as a starting point for every work. The well-known Polish sculptor, Leon Kudła, pastes into his pattern book pictures cut from illustrated magazines, pages from textbooks on zoology for elementary schools and devotional picture-cards. Teofil Kożuchowski, who is concerned with the portrayal of religious and historical figures, also makes use of the small illustrations from school history books, while folk artists famous for their paper cut-outs own small collections of the works of their predecessors. It is highly characteristic that Kudła, who sculps birds, does not sketch a hoopoe or a stork from nature, but makes use of a schema from another artist's illustration or photograph. Observations retained in the memory almost certainly contribute something to his work but the artist's main stimulus is a folk pattern from a picture or illustration.

To some extent this confirms the observations of André Lhote[1] that a work of plastic art is so closely related to the crafts that the scheme of its structure, the plan or blueprint of its form, is just as important to it as in the construction of a table or a castle. This is not surprising in folk artists who have always been regarded, and who regard themselves, as craftsmen. It is not then from experienced sensation or from fanciful imagination that the folk artists derive their creativeness but from an understanding of the structural formula of the subject, from a recognition of its characteristic features and by extracting and grasping its 'essence'.

Nevertheless this 're-creative' character of folk art does not detract from its aesthetic value, for it entails some 'processing' of the model which bestows fresh values on the work. The folk artist usually starts out with a subject of little interest and yet creates a work charged with aesthetic emotion, according to a traditional scheme of perception and concept mingled with a choice of forms and simplifications. In addition he achieves a feeling for the illustrative values of composition, decoration and colour, also based on and proved by tradition. This arises from features which I shall try to illustrate by the following examples.

1a. The Holy Sepulchre (German eighteenth-century engraving)



1b. The Holy Sepulchre (Polish folk artist: oil on paper)

2a. Madonna at Gidle (nineteenth-century engraving)



2b. Madonna at Gidle (Polish folk painting: oil on paper)

The Holy Sepulchre is a topic which occurs frequently in Polish folk painting and graphic art. The artists often took their model from the German engravings of Silesia and Austria which traders poured on to the Polish market during the numerous religious festivals and at places of pilgrimage. The engraving in Fig. 1a almost certainly comes from this source. It represents the 'burial' of Christ before an altar with conventional, mannerized mawkishness, as it is frequently represented on Good Friday in Catholic churches. In comparison with this the Polish folk 'copies' are striking for their flat frontal setting with no apparent effort at perspective (Fig. 1b). Such lack of foreshortening is a characteristic feature of all folk art, not only that of Poland. 'The assimilation of a model always involves the combining of material of the artist's own times with that of former times.'[2] The elements of perspective, incompetently drawn in the original, are presented with no foreshortening, but arranged in the decorative bands to which the Polish folk artist is accustomed in his environment. Folds are transformed into rhythmically-arranged lines, while the faces of the figures, the body of Christ, the rococo lamps and the rocaille in the corners of the engravings are all depicted on a flat plane. An aquatint subjected to this change of dimension, with rhythm bestowed upon its decorative elements, takes on completely different artistic values. It becomes transparent in structure while its decorative effect is magnified enormously.

The engraving signed 'SK', portraying the appearance of the figure of the Madonna at Gidle, near Czestochowa, unearthed by a peasant, has a certain aerial perspective in the landscape background, while the figures of Mary and the saints floating against the heavens are moulded with great realistic fluency and with an attempt to show individuality of character. Even until recently Gidle was a considerable centre of artists' workshops turning out objects for pilgrims to Czestochowa, and one of its painters has again introduced simplifications, with rhythmic bands of space, negating individuality of form in favour of decoratively developed shapes in a schematic layout embracing the heads of figures, animals and trees. In conformity with the traditional concept of the subject the attempts made in the engraving to introduce naturalistic differentiation have been abandoned. The transformed layout departs in obvious fashion from the natural portrayal of the engraving and in the place of forms making their own inherent impression there appear the traditional signs of things, symbols of objects: faces, trees, folds, clouds and animals. Enriched by a colouristic harmony, in aberration from nature, the oil painting of the folk artist triumphs over its model, which in spite of its charm is insignificant in expression. (Fig. 2a and 2b)

The present comparison of works of folk art with their models, which

are usually lesser works of more eclectic art, throws interesting light on the mechanisms of their genesis; it is neither invention nor memory, nor, as Verworn claims,[3] the retained memory of an imagined subject which lies at the root of creative folk art. Their source is to be found in concrete models. The specific aesthetic values of this art arise during the 'processing' into the theme deriving from the chosen model. This, in any case, is true of any work of art. The discovery of a proper form depends upon traditional habits of viewing shape and space, from the decoration arising from their rhythmical assembly in conformity with the elaborated, traditional layouts of the construction of each object surrounding the folk artist. The expression of these works, often so striking, is a secondary feature, although it is sometimes obviously intended by the artist.

The adaptation of models to traditional pattern does not, nevertheless, exclude individual creativeness. There is no scope here to illustrate this assertion; I can only say that my observations of living folk artists have shown me that each of them—at least each of the more outstanding ones —searches for his own form, just as any other artist. Even so they do not depart from existing layouts, but transform them. Cesia Konopka, the foremost among living artists engaged in paper cutouts, spends whole days experimenting with shears in hand to see what will come of such or such a way of snipping the paper within the existing scheme for cut-outs. What effect can still be achieved? The disinterestedness of this quest is just as moving as the quest of the most distinguished contemporary artists. The narrow confines of the folk artist's world dictate his use of existing schemes, for if he abandons them he usually produces something with no artistic value. This, however, does not mean that he should not utilize the impulses of others, while transforming them in conformity with the tradition to which he is heir. It is the trend of these changes which the present article is designed to show.

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GREAT ART. A STUDY IN MEANING

J. M. Ellis

IN HIS article 'What is Great Art?' Professor Jessup[1] picks up the category where the positivists left it: unrespectable, but still widely used. This is certainly something that needed to be done. Jessup holds an amended version of the 'serious content' view of great art, and this amendment is designed to include instances of abstract art; thus there may be 'abstract serious content'. This makes the serious content view workable, in that it now does not apply solely to representational art.

Now this seems to me a regression to a pre-positivist position, instead of an advance with due regard to the force of the arguments of the positivists. Before elaborating my objections, and my own solution, it will help to give a brief sketch of how Jessup's starting point arises. Judgements of greatness have always been made, and some judgements of this kind have been fairly solidly agreed on. But the disagreements on borderline cases have made it necessary to look for standards involved in making these judgements, which could be invoked to veto or accept specific instances.

Objectivist theories attempt to find out what it is that 'greatness' refers to; to find a descriptive statement about the work of art which guarantees greatness. Since greatness is not observable as empirical properties are, criteria have to be set up to decide when it is present. This is based on other evaluative phrases used in contexts where there is an *agreed* criterion: *e.g.* a good runner is one who wins races, or who looks as if he might do so. But in practice the attempt to set up agreed criteria for good works of art has involved circularity. Clive Bell[2] cites 'significant form' as a criterion of artistic merit, but is only able to back this up by ruling out representational art by definition: if a work of art has not significant form, it is not art. Thus the arbitrary definition is supported by the value judgement, and the value judgement by the definition.[3] No criterion is agreed, and an arbitrary one will not do.

But it is an even more damaging objection to objectivist theories that no formal feature in a work of art guarantees any value whatsoever. Imagine a dispute between two critics of a painting. One maintains that the colours are garish, the other that they are gay. If the dispute is analysed, it will be found that what they are arguing about is not a descriptive matter at all, but an evaluation of a description. What is in fact being said is that the colours are bright and effective on the one hand, and bright and ineffective on the other. Effectiveness is a matter of judgement, but it is something to do with value; brightness as a formal feature tells us nothing about value whatsoever. So that when the criterion theory says 'this work has X' and concludes 'in so far as it has X it is good', there must always be a suppressed statement about effect to back this up. The issue is falsified by making X an evaluative term already. What is really being said is 'this work has X used effectively' or 'this work has X which is here good'. Thus it becomes obvious that the conclusion 'in so far as it has X it is good' is not needed, for it is tautologous. 'Gay colours are effective', if analysed becomes: 'bright colours which are good, are good'. There is therefore always a gap between formal description and evaluation. No purely descriptive phrase guarantees any value, and if it appears to do so, this is because the phrase used is already in part evaluative.[4] Subjectivists come in here with an attempt to reduce judgements of aesthetic value to statements of observers' preferences. But trouble comes when the observer has to be specified, for 'Bach is great' makes no mention of an observer. There may be a variety of ways in which 'Bach is great' will have to be reduced, depending on the context; *e.g.* (*a*) I like Bach; (*b*) Most people like Bach; (*c*) Certain specified groups of people like Bach. Clearly it cannot mean all these at once, since some may exclude others. So that the subjective theory would have to hold that the proposition had no precise meaning without a context which made clear which sense was intended. But in fact we are able to understand the proposition as it stands without any trouble; if I am asked what I mean when I say 'Bach is great', it is not absurd for me to reply, 'I mean what I said; no more, no less'.[5]

It is on this point that the logical positivist view[6] comes in: since aesthetic value judgements do not yield verifiable facts about either works of art or observers, then they must be emotive utterances, devoid of any factual content. This would make them analogous to a scream of delight; more civilized, but no more meaningful. This position is not at all satisfactory, as Jessup notes; we do constantly use phrases like 'this is great art', and do manage to communicate with other speakers of English. But it seems to me that to resurrect a criterion theory is not the way out. The original 'serious content' theory was of course circular;

it had to rule out by definition those instances which would not fit. Jessup attempts to make it workable by including those instances with an amended formulation, but does so only by making it incredibly vague. The original theory was based on a distinction between form and content, and was thus intelligible. But Jessup's amended serious content allows that formal elements can be identified with serious content. What has now become of the distinction between form and content? Why use the term 'content' at all now? For 'serious impact' would seem to be what Jessup means. And we would all agree that great art has a serious impact. Content, implying a distinction no longer acknowledged, seems a misleading word. Moreover, not all works of art with serious content (on the old view) are great; Jessup has tried to make this theory workable with regard to its ability to include all that needs inclusion, but certainly hasn't made it workable in its ability to exclude.

Where we need to go now, it seems to me, is not back to objectivist theories but forward to an analysis of the *function* of the utterance 'great art', for this is after all a *linguistic* category. Definition is a matter of words, verbal usage, not of things. I propose therefore to consider the position from which Jessup begins by asking the question: if these words communicate, then *what* do they communicate? The problem thus becomes one of descriptive linguistics.

The structure of evaluative propositions is the first concern in this investigation. Strictly speaking, nothing has intrinsic value, if by this is meant value divorced from any situation. For an object to have value a relation with something other than itself is needed. Value must include valuer as well as thing valued; it is interesting to note that both the objective and subjective theories deal with one of these, but neither deals with both. A simple proposition asserting a relation would be: 'a relation exists between A and B'. Two terms are necessary to make this intelligible. It seems therefore that assertions of value ought also to contain two terms: but in fact 'this work is great' has only *one*, and would appear in this respect logically incomplete, if grammatically well-formed. Once more we must not lose sight of the linguistic data, however; speakers of English do use this sentence meaningfully, and there are many others similar to it. For example 'boring' and 'interesting' are evaluative words, and nobody misunderstands us if we say 'this is a boring book' even though the second term in the relation is not specified.[7]

My conclusion is that 'this work is great' is not a simple evaluative proposition; and that its ability to communicate must be to a large extent due to contextual implication, which can be described by an examination of the contexts in which it occurs.

Before doing this one point needs to be cleared up. There has always

been a temptation with 'greatness' for people who use the word to be nervously aware of the fact that it is difficult to deal with, and to offer their own definitions to forestall argument. For example: 'when I call this work "great" I mean that it deals convincingly with central human experiences.' This is not a genuine statement; the speaker still wishes to use the public sense of 'great'—why otherwise should he retain the term at all? Some other shorthand could have been found. But this is a fairly typical attempt to avoid any of the problems of using this awkward word.

Taking a descriptive approach, then, we can by examining the usage of the proposition 'this work is great' generalize about the contexts in which it occurs; its possible contexts show the restrictions on its usage. Thus if the meaning of the proposition is how it is used, these contextual restrictions or implications, depending on which way we look at them, are the meaning: these are the facts stated by the proposition. Now no one dominant implication or restriction can be found. This is not uncommon. When for example we talk of 'a great king', this may imply: (*a*) the speaker approves of him; (*b*) he was loved by his people; (*c*) he was powerful; (*d*) his historical effect was great; (*e*) he was rich; (*f*) he was wise; (*g*) he was just. There are probably many other considerations which may increase the status of a king. Any of the individual considerations may be expressly withdrawn: *e.g.* 'he was a great king but unjust' or 'he was a great king though not a rich one'. In the absence of such contextual withdrawal, 'X was a great king' means in normal usage that an unspecified number of (*a*)–(*g*) are implied. Now any of these individual considerations is capable of verification; they are all quite plainly factual statements. So that to say 'X is a great king' is to make a factual claim, but an imprecise one. We are not entitled to infer *any* proposition definitely, but should begin to wonder what was going on if all of (*a*)–(*g*) were denied and greatness still claimed. The nearest synonym of this use of 'great' is 'important'.

This use of 'great' in 'a great king' is similar to that in a 'great work of art'. This phrase is contextually taken to imply some or all, but not necessarily any one, of the following:

(*a*) The speaker likes it.
(*b*) Many others have liked it, especially those with critical training.
(*c*) Its effect is considerable, if it makes any at all.
(*d*) Its effect is salutary and ennobling.
(*e*) Its effect will last for the same person.
(*f*) It will reward considerable efforts to understand it.

As before, contextual withdrawal of individual items on this list (not

necessarily a complete one) may occur, *e.g.* 'It's great, but no one else appreciates it yet' or 'It's great, but I don't like it'. In some respects, these two lists are different; in the second there are more indirect statements about the work, through the effect, than there are about the king. This certainly points to the greater degree of complexity involved in evaluating works of art. But the main point of the analogy is that both lists consist of verifiable statements, and that these statements are related to 'great work' and 'great king' in the same way. Of both phrases we can say that they are factual, but imprecise; and that this imprecision can be precisely described. Both phrases are meaningful, and therefore communicate, by a consistent usage in which no one fact is logically entailed, but many are implied. The logic of the use of 'great' is the same in aesthetic and non-aesthetic contexts; it is only the particular list of possible implications derived from it that is peculiar to its use in aesthetic contexts. The one common element in all of these propositions is that the status on the one hand, and appeal on the other, must be considerable; if this is not so then we only use the word 'good' and not 'great'. 'Good' does not always imply a reservation, but when there is an accepted superlative, as the word 'great' is here, then not to use it must imply a reservation. Jessup thinks that there is some stricter distinction in kind between good (or beautiful) art and great art. This does not tally with linguistic usage, which certainly does use them in a 'good/better' relation; moreover the meaning of the terms is here confused with the possible reasons for individual works being so described. This distinction is a very important one. It may well be a line of research worth pursuing, that the main difference between the works that are usually called great and those which are normally called good is that the former are more serious; and such research might establish the point. But this would not make any difference to the meaning of the words; we know what these mean already.

In general, it is probable that most of the classical theories of art will be good instruments of research into the linguistic category 'great works', if they are used as instruments and not as arbitrary criteria. It would be difficult for example to work empirically with something like the expressionist theory. But whatever the results the same point holds: the meaning of the category is not what is being investigated, for this is given already. And while it is possible that in this research we may find one element common to all members of the class, it is by no means certain or even probable that we shall do so, or that if we do, this will be a very significant element. This means that we can say that 'this work is great' always means the same thing or has the same implications, *without* having to say that all works of art so described have a formal

feature in common, or any element which guarantees excellence. It would certainly seem that some degree of classification could take place, *e.g.* what sorts of work would appeal to what sorts of people? There would be difficulties involved because of the uniqueness of the structure of the individual work of art. It would clearly be mistaken to classify works on the basis of an abstraction of single features common to a number of works without taking account of the structure of the work, and how the feature functions in this structure. But provided that abstraction takes place with due regard to the context of the individual work, some results may be expected.

For example, there is certainly one classification which would be legitimate, although it is only quantitative not qualitative or evaluative. Hume talks about delicacy of taste when dealing with appreciation of art.[8] At first sight this appears to assume an objective standard against which to measure any individual taste. The analogy he uses to make his idea clear is that of the palate. We can probably trust the taste of those who have more delicate, that is more exact taste. Some can distinguish very small shades of flavour, while others have much less sensitive palates. This of course says nothing about good or bad flavour, or preferences for them, but only describes the ability to distinguish more finely what they are. This is why this description of taste is not qualitative or evaluative, but merely indicative of something quantitative. Applying this to appreciation of art, it is probably true to say that certain classes of works, more or less complex, will appeal to certain classes of people, in so far as they have more or less 'delicate' taste in Hume's sense. This again is nothing to do with absolute value, for complexity can be no real criterion of merit unless the complexity is effective, which is once more a matter of judgement.

An examination of the meaning of an utterance must start by being descriptive, but can of course become prescriptive, if the utterance proves inadequate to a particular task. And so the question arises, Does the vagueness of 'this work is great' justify any recommendation of a change of usage? It seems to me that although it can be misleading, in practice it has only misled aestheticians, who have drawn the wrong conclusions from it; in our dealings with works of art there are many instances where we have to deal in quasi-absolutes, *e.g.* when a local council is deciding whether to buy a picture for public consumption; or even when any individual decides to buy a ticket for a concert.

At this stage it may help to characterize my findings in relation to other theories: The subjectivist rightly sees that relation is involved in a value sentence, but is wrong in trying to make 'this is great' a precise statement of value by introducing a second term into the proposition.

In so doing he neglects the function of the imprecision of the claims involved, and the element of permutation in them (one or more from many). The objectivist rightly treats the proposition as a factual one, but confuses the predicate 'great' with other descriptive predicates and so is also led to think that it is more precise than it is, though in a different way to the subjectivist. His criteria confuse the possible results of research into the linguistic category with the meaning of the category. The logical positivist sees that there is no precise meaning involved and so assumes that there is no meaning involved at all. In general these are all mistaken attitudes to language and all have one common element, the belief that language works much more simply and precisely than it in fact does; imprecision is not imperfection if it has a positive function.

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[2] Clive Bell, *Art.* London (1927).

[3] *cf.* Beryl Lake, 'A study of the irrefutability of two aesthetic theories' in *Aesthetics and Language*, ed. Elton (1954) and W. E. Kenninck, 'Does traditional aesthetics rest on a mistake?' *Mind* (1958), for fuller treatments of the attempt to derive evaluation from a definition.

[4] *cf.* G. M. Matthews, 'Evaluative and Descriptive', *Mind* (1958). Matthews makes the point that many apparently descriptive words are evaluative, and that for this reason criteria of what satisfies a criterion would have to be given. Thus an infinite regress of criteria for the satisfaction of criteria arises, which at no point ends in purely factual description. A good example of failure to see this is in Kenninck's 'We may praise a picture, say, for its subtle balance'. This merely replaces the evaluative 'good' by the equally evaluative 'balance', to say nothing of 'subtle'. But Kenninck calls this an 'objectively discriminable characteristic'.

[5] B. Harrison elaborates the differences between 'I like it' and 'it is great' in his article 'Some uses of "good" in criticism', *Mind* (1960).

[6] *e.g.* A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936), p. 170.

[7] *cf.* P. H. Nowell-Smith, *Ethics* (1954), Chapter 5, for the distinction between aptitude words and descriptive words. I am indebted to Nowell-Smith for many other points made in this work, especially the notion of 'contextual withdrawal' and his treatment of the confusion of background with meaning.

[8] David Hume, *Essays, Moral, Political and Literary*, ed. Greene and Grose (1875). Essay XXIII.

BOOK REVIEWS

Hogarth and his Place in European Art. By FREDERICK ANTAL. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1962. pp. xxi + 270. 84s.

BRITISH PAINTING is rarely surveyed in its European context. The reader's expectations are raised correspondingly when a scholar of wide knowledge, trained in art history at a number of Continental centres, devotes a large volume to the examination of Hogarth's art in this ampler relationship. It is therefore disappointing at the outset to find that Dr. Antal's work is written in a socio-political jargon which obscures his meaning and is heavily loaded with unproved assumptions. It needs considerable resolution to read a book in which the word 'middle-class' is rarely absent from a paragraph; in which such a phrase as 'a combination which is only comprehensible when related to the historical situation in England in the first half of the 18th century' is held to be an account of Hogarth's style; and in which such a statement as 'morality, that powerful middle-class ideal, became, in the hands of the aristocrats who recognised its strength, a pawn in the political game' is put forward as a serious view of eighteenth-century thought.

Faults of style and construction apart, however, the thesis which is given at such length in these pages might well have merited consideration for, if it were possible to account for any artist at all in terms of social history, Hogarth would be one of the most promising subjects for analysis. His work undeniably records the full range of the life of an enterprising mercantile age, of which Lecky says 'in very few periods . . . was the commercial element more conspicuous in administration. The prevailing spirit of the debates was of a kind we should rather have expected in a middle-class Parliament than in a Parliament consisting in a very large measure of the nominees of great families'.

Lecky's phrase, which Dr. Antal must have read since it is quoted in Namier's *England in the Age of the American Revolution*, to which he refers with approval, should have warned him of the difficulty of drawing neat class distinctions in the eighteenth century, and shows the absolute necessity of clear and precise definition if any comprehensible correlation between the 'rising middle class' and Hogarth's painting is to be established. But this precision is alien to Dr. Antal's method. He expressly, and accurately, describes Shaftesbury and Fielding as aristocrats, and then proceeds to cite them continually as the embodiments and exemplars of middle-class thought. He further complicates the issue for himself by laying down as an axiom that 'realistic classicism (was) the genuine style of the European middle class for centuries'. Since this is not self-evident it must be presumed to be deduced from a representative number of established cases; but it soon becomes apparent that almost every instance forms an exception to this

supposedly universal rule. The era of the pre-Raphaelites, for example, might have been thought to have been at least as 'middle class' as Hogarth's age. But Dr. Antal has to characterize their style as 'a hybrid mixture of late Romanticism and —by advanced continental, especially French standards—insufficient realism'. It seems that the law fails to work in this case because the English middle classes had no further need to fight for their rights after the Reform Bill and so a 'really advanced middle-class mentality and art were scarcely able to evolve'.

What then of Hogarth, 'the propagandist in art *par excellence* of bourgeois ideas', who expresses the outlook of the rising English middle class, but can certainly not be called an exponent of 'realistic classicism'? Once again Dr. Antal has to save the appearances by hypothesizing further special conditions which invalidate the rule. He thinks in this case that it is the absence of a long artistic tradition in England, and the necessity Hogarth was under to work for the aristocracy with their taste for the baroque. The assumption he makes to bolster up this thesis, that Hogarth changed his style of painting to conform with the social status of his sitter, is a wholly gratuitous one. Anyone who has had to examine a number of unidentified portraits knows that within any particular artist's work it is not possible to guess the sitter's rank from the manner of painting; the only likely clues are external insignia of rank, such as coronets and orders. It is merely being wise after the event to discern, as the author does, an aristocratic quality about Hogarth's *Cholmondeley Family* which is absent from the *Beckingham Wedding*. Nor can the theory be supported by the references to Hogarth's occasional excursions into painting portraits in Van Dyck dress, in which he implies that the artist had some sort of primacy, although the earliest example is a rather doubtful one of the 1740's. But as early as 1734 the Duchess of Marlborough was writing to her daughter about the current vogue for women to have their portraits painted in this sort of historical costume. So the supposed concession to Tory reaction which Hogarth was making by reverting to this mode in the 'rather "aristocratic" years which saw the ascendancy of Reynolds' is chimerical.

In his desire to relate the niceties of variation in Hogarth's style to the changes in the political climate Dr. Antal introduces some strangely hybrid terms, such as 'middle-class rococo' and 'middle-class baroque'. The relationship between these concepts is thus defined: 'rococo . . . was, like baroque, an art of the aristocracy' but 'it is easier to imagine a middle-class rococo than a middle-class baroque'. There is an evident confusion here: if the class imposes the style and if baroque is aristocratic, it cannot also be the middle-class style (a position already occupied, on the theory, by 'realistic classicism').

Defects in the application of the dogma apart, the whole attempt to explain an artist's work in terms of his political background is misconceived. The author's sympathy with Hogarth is submerged by the desire to present him as an accretion of influences and borrowings selected and worked upon by blind ineluctable forces. His vocabulary embodies his fundamental view that art must have a social purpose; and by social purpose he does not mean giving the highest form of pleasure, but promoting radical reform and revolution. Hence his programme for the future of painting, for which it is difficult to feel any enthusiasm: 'art will have concrete aims connected with everyday life. . . . Many new themes might then be created and painted on the highest pictorial level possible at their time.'

The truth is far simpler than this inordinately long analysis implies. There was one source for taste in England in the eighteenth century, and that was the leisured upper classes. Hogarth only becomes of interest to us in so far as he

deviates from, and improves upon, the general level of his time. It is the chief fault of all such undertakings as the one now under review that all sense of the artist's uniqueness, of his own personal individual creativity, is lost. If Hogarth had not existed we could not construct an *œuvre* for him on theoretical principles; we can only savour his quality by looking at his works with detachment, not by studying the nuances of political history.

GRAHAM REYNOLDS
Victoria and Albert Museum

Creativity and Intelligence. By JACOB W. GETZELS and PHILIP W. JACKSON. John Wiley & Sons. 1962. pp. xvii + 292. 49s.

WE STILL speak in a general way of the 'gifted' child just as we speak of the 'backward' child; and both descriptions cover many very different categories of children. Terman's early studies did something to dispel the stereotype of the bespectacled anaemic swot. But in order to do this he called children 'gifted' who were in the top one or two or three per cent in I.Q. 'Giftedness' and high I.Q. from then on came to be regarded as being almost synonymous.

The authors of *Creativity and Intelligence* maintain that such an equation has severe limitations. In the first place intelligence tests, they claim, give a measure only of some cognitive functions and indicate very little about others. In particular they require subjects to recall and recognize and perhaps to solve problems; they make little demands on a subject's inventiveness or capacity to innovate. In the second place, though there is a positive correlation between I.Q. and learning, I.Q. rarely accounts for more than one-quarter of the variance in crucial matters such as school achievement and academic performance. Thirdly, the fascination with I.Q. has done little to further the development of theories of thinking. The authors regard creativity as one such neglected cognitive function and hope that a detailed study of it may remedy some of these limitations which have restricted previous work on gifted children. (They also worked on the morality and psychological adjustment of children who were ranked as 'gifted'. But their findings on these matters are of less interest from the point of view of aesthetics.)

Getzels and Jackson follow Guilford in believing that there are two basic cognitive modes of functioning, the one tending towards retaining the known, learning the predetermined, and conserving what is, the other towards revising the known, exploring the undetermined and constructing what might be. The I.Q. tests, they claim, evaluate the former 'convergent' functions. To evaluate the latter 'divergent' functions the authors devised what they called 'creativity' tests, which involve the ability to deal inventively with verbal and numerical symbol systems and with object-space relations. For instance the subject is asked to give as many definitions as possible of 'bolt' and 'bark', to suggest as many uses as possible for a brick, to find figures in a complex pattern, to complete fables in which the last line was missing, to make up problems from given information. By use of these tests as well as I.Q. tests a High Creativity Group was formed composed of subjects in the top 20 per cent on creativity measures but below the top 20 per cent in I.Q., and a High Intelligence Group in a similar way. A long series of experiments was then done on these groups of children in a private school with predominantly professional, managerial, and 'white-collar' backgrounds.

A relatively low relationship was found between the I.Q. metric and measures of creativity and, more unexpectedly, the equal superiority of high I.Q. and high creativity groups in scholastic performance was demonstrated. (This finding was confirmed on other samples.) The educational implications of this are considerable; for it

is customary to class children as 'gifted' on the basis of I.Q. and to describe those who achieve good results in spite of a lower I.Q. by the pejorative term 'over-achievers', it being assumed that their success is to be explained by reference to motivation variables (e.g. parental pressure). Yet their success may well be due to hitherto disregarded cognitive excellences of a different sort. Indeed tests revealed that such students are less inclined towards 'greasy grinding' for good grades. Tests revealed no significant difference between the two groups in respect of motivation, but they did reveal that teachers regarded the high I.Q. group, but not the high creativity group, as being more desirable than the average student. The explanation of this was revealed by further tests on the values, attitudes, fantasies and aspirations of the two groups. For these revealed that both groups agree on what qualities make for adult success and on what qualities teachers approve of; but the high I.Q. students value these qualities for themselves whereas the high creativity students do not. The latter are oriented neither towards 'success' nor towards their teachers. It is not therefore surprising that high I.Q. students are regarded as more desirable by teachers than high creativity ones. Furthermore the prominence of a sense of humour in the self-ideal of the creative adolescents as compared with the high I.Q. adolescents was very striking. In their non-verbal imaginative productions, also, they showed themselves less stimulus-bound, more fanciful and humorous and more prone to express aggression and violence. It was found, too, that the high I.Q.'s tended to be children of more insecure and conventional parents with a greater specialization of training, with mothers who were more or less exclusively child-centred housewives, vigilant about their children's education and friends.

So much for the findings. The authors then proceed to explore their implications for psychological theory and for education. Their exposition of theories of thinking is rather vitiated by a lack of philosophical sophistication—especially about what is a logical or epistemological and what a psychological question. The syllogism, for instance, is seriously discussed as if it were a psychological account of an actual *process* of thinking. Associationism is dismissed without raising the issue whether much of their theory was a logical analysis of concepts or a search for epistemological credentials masquerading as a piece of genetic psychology. Wertheimer's Gestalt theory is found inadequate without raising the question of the extent to which he was enunciating conceptual truisms rather than empirical discoveries.

The authors are more favourably disposed towards later developments of Freudian theory in their search for an explanation of their findings. Freud's own theory is sympathetically discussed but found unacceptable because of its too great reliance on the wild primary processes of the id for the explanation of art, and other manifestations of creativity. The developments of Freud's theory that stress the importance of the ego and of the preconscious, as distinct from the unconscious, are the ones that appeal to the authors. These derive from Freud's explanation of wit as an occasion when a preconscious thought is 'entrusted for a moment to unconscious elaboration'. Kris, for instance, held that 'many types of productive processes, from wit to art, and many other phenomena of inventiveness can be fully explained only if we assume that the ego regulates its own capacity to regression . . .'. Kubie goes much further and attacks erroneous clichés such as the notion that to be creative a man must be mentally sick. Indeed, he thinks that the unconscious tends to warp creativity. The preconscious, which exhibits great freedom in gathering, assembling, comparing, and reshuffling ideas, is the fountainhead of creativity. Both the conscious and the unconscious tend to rigidify the preconscious process, the one by literal

conscious purpose checked and corrected by conscious restrospective critique, the other by unconscious drives which are remote from reality and bound by rigid compromise formations. In creative activity preconscious material is 'toyed' with—a development of Freud's hypothesis that creative behaviour 'is a continuation of and substitution for the play of childhood'. The authors emphasize the consonance between this account of creativity and their finding that one of the main characteristics of creative adolescents is their delight in playful intellectual activity for its own sake. The reliance of creatives on preconscious material was also confirmed by the TAT-type stories and by the analysis of their occupational choices. Their use of preconscious material was not blind but in the service of the ego.

Getzels and Jackson also think that their study provides some confirmation for Schachtel's approach to the explanation of creativity from the perceptual side, as stated in his recent work, *Metamorphosis*. Schachtel objects to any assimilation of creative thought to the early 'autocentric' mode of perception in which there is little objectification and in which the emphasis is on passive subjective feeling amounting to a fusion between sensory quality and pleasure or unpleasure. This is contrasted with the later 'allocentric' mode of perception in which the emphasis is on what the object is like and the individual turns actively towards it in an attempt to 'grasp' it—figuratively or literally—with the help of the boundless energy of the exploratory drive. In the process of this metamorphosis, however, a secondary autocentricity develops. The lack of objectification of primary autocentricity develops into the secondary form of seeing everything in terms of the needs and fears of the percipient—the use-value of the practical man of an acquisitive society. Similarly, passivity and embeddedness in what gives security develops into the secondary form of an avoidance of everything that constitutes a departure from the routines and conventions of a particular social group. Schachtel therefore defines creativity as the 'art of seeing the familiar fully in its inexhaustible being, without using it autocentrically for purposes of remaining embedded in it and reassured by it'. It is in effect the capacity to remain perceptually open to the world. For most people: 'Everything has its label, and if one does not know it the experts will tell him.' The cocoon of cultural conventions takes the place of the primary embeddedness in the womb. The world that opens up to the child's early curiosity, his joy in new things, his drive to explore the unknown has faded with age. The child has become 'socialized'.

Getzels and Jackson think that their general findings about the conventionality of the high I.Q. group together with their findings about parental attitudes towards 'success', support this general analysis of development. 'Vocationalism' and *The Organization Man* have seeped into the innermost recesses of the nursery.

Some will question the validity of the empirical findings in this book; others will pour scorn on the looseness of its theoretical speculations. But what makes it a fascinating study is just this attempt to link a detailed piece of empirical work with theoretical speculation about matters of immense educational and social importance. Both the findings and the theorizing about them should be of great interest to those students of aesthetics who are dissatisfied with any crude Freudian theory of art but nevertheless retain the conviction that Freud's speculations were not entirely fanciful but might well be included in a wider theory which takes account of his basic distinction between the primary and secondary processes of thought.

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Les Colloques de Wégimont II—1955: *L'Ars Nova. Recueil d'études sur la musique du XIV^e siècle.* Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège. Fascicule CXLIX. Paris. Société d'Édition 'Les Belles Lettres'. 1959.

THE MEANING of the term *ars* in Latin, especially in medieval Latin, says Professor Nino Pirotta in his paper on 'Cronologia e Denominazione dell' Ars Nova Italiana' in this volume, is very different from that of the term 'art' and its equivalents in modern languages. 'Per convincersene basta pensare alla lista delle sette arti liberali', he continues, 'fre le quali veniva annoverata anche la musica: le sua consorelle nel Quadrivium sono l'astronomia, l'aritmetica e la geometria. Sotto il nome di musica era compresa dunque la "scienza" della musica, sopratutto il lato matematico di essa con le sue implicazioni metafisiche. Ma anche le arti del Trivium, grammatica, retorica e dialettica, indicano l'attegiamento razionalistico degli antichi che attribuivano l'abilità in una attività practica al possesso di una sistema di nozioni e di regoli. E' evidente comunque che *ars* non aveva nessuno dei signaficati estetici che sono stati attribuiti a tale termine in tempi piu vicini e che sono divenuti essenziali ai nostri giorni.'

Since the word 'art' had no aesthetic significance in the Middle Ages, and music was counted among the mathematical sciences, must we conclude that the concept of beauty had no place in the thinking of a medieval composer? To the learned person of the Middle Ages, and not only to the university lecturer on the *Musica* of Boethius, *musica* was indeed the 'science' of proportions as discovered in the tuning of the musical scale. Its metaphysical implications lay in Boethius's Platonic hierarchy of *musica divina* (the harmony of the spheres), *musica humana* (the harmony of the human spirit), and *musica instrumentalis* (the harmonies sounded on earth). The expounder of the musical books of Boethius regarded himself as superior to both composer and performer, and did not necessarily have direct contact with either. Conversely, his kind of theorizing had nothing to do with the training of practical musicians. The theory textbook of those who directed the choir of a medieval church was the Tonale, a directory of chants arranged according to their melodic vocabulary. The techniques of melodic analysis and tabulation entailed in compiling a Tonale were in principle the same as those we should apply now to the thematic content of a symphony or concerto. The purpose of a Tonale, however, was to provide information essential to a professional activity, not to investigate a process of composition. The performance of plain-song was one of the elements in a cycle of ritual acts, the rehearsing of which had no overt aesthetic connotations in the modern sense. It was not aimed, as much church music since the Reformation has been aimed, at arousing devotional or mystical feelings in a congregation. The presence or absence of listeners was quite irrelevant to its function as part of a liturgical ceremony. At the same time, those who heard or took part in it might have what we should call aesthetic feelings towards it. The passage in the *Confessions* in which St. Augustine recognizes the danger of taking more pleasure in the singing than in what was sung is well known. In the fourteenth century there is an instance of the rejection of a chant for reasons of taste by Bishop Grandisson, in his Ordinal for Exeter Cathedral (1338): 'Et dimitatur penitus illud dissonans *Kyrie* quod habet unum longum nimis, et aliud curtum nimis, quia non valet, licet inter cetera soleat dici Sarum.'

The composition of polyphonic music for the church neither replaced plain-song completely, nor differed from it in ritual function. It merely exercised that function on another level of decorative craftsmanship, much as did the fine stone-

carving of a chantry chapel in relation to the building as a whole. Up to the fifteenth century polyphony, both sacred and secular, was a specialized craft practised by a very few composers and performed by small ensembles of singers and instrumentalists. As to its relation to the listener, Professor Pirotta rightly points out how restricted was the number of initiates who had any acquaintance with the special values and hidden structure of the French motet of the fourteenth century. This esoteric music, called *ars nova* from the title of Philippe de Vitry's treatise of 1318, was written, he believes, with no thought of producing an 'effect' and without seeking to give 'pleasure'. One of his most interesting suggestions is that Italian polyphony, which was virtually non-existent in the thirteenth century and flowered into a mature secular art in the fourteenth, represented a counter-tendency to appeal to the natural musical intuition of the listener, not to his intellect. 'Essa interruppe', he concludes his article, 'una tradizione di subordinazione dell' intuizione musicale alle facoltà intellettuali e introdusse la concezione della polifonia come linguaggio artistico.' It would be fascinating to have this thesis tested by a study of the Franco-Italian polyphony of the late fourteenth century, such as is found in the famous Chantilly manuscript. By that time the intellectual approach of French polyphony had reached a stage of hyper-sophistication unique in the history of Western music.

It is certain that the music of the fourteenth century, which is still one of the more obscure manifestations of Western artistic history, has things to tell us about the medieval mind and spirit which no other historical record can reveal. The Wégimont meetings, under the charming and profoundly scholarly guidance of Madame Clercx-Lejeune, Professor of Musicology at the University of Liège, are making a remarkable contribution to our knowledge of this era of an ebullient and self-conscious *ars nova*. Besides Professors Clercx-Lejeune and Pirotta, the participants in the 1955 *Colloque* were Willi Apel, Mlle Becherini, J. Chailley, P. Collaer, F. Ghisi, R. H. Hoppin, E. Perroy, G. Reaney, L. Schrade, C. Van den Borren and K. von Fischer. These *Colloques* are an outstanding example of specialized scholarship pursuing the ideal of co-operation in exploring one of the inadequately charted regions of our artistic consciousness.

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Music and Poetry in the Early Tudor Court. By JOHN STEVENS. Methuen. 1961. pp. ix + 483. 63s.

THIS IMPORTANT book springs from a study of the chief sources of early Tudor song, but its scope extends far beyond textual examination and analysis of contents. The understanding of this music and its verse involves, as the author shows, many-sided and fascinating problems which cannot even begin to be solved until both arts are seen in the context of the life and thought of their age. Dr. Stevens begins with an introductory chapter devoted to detailed descriptions of the MSS.: BM. Add. MS. 31922 (called *King Henry VIII's MS.* because it contains his songs, which Dr. Stevens has recently published complete in a modern transcription as Vol. XVIII of *Musica Britannica* under the title *Music at the Court of Henry VIII*); *The Fayrfax MS.*, which belonged to the composer Robert Fayrfax, one of the chief musicians of the time; and *Ritson's MS.*, 'a general-purpose song-book of a provincial establishment' in the West Country. He distinguishes the various types and styles of carol-verse and love-lyric, showing that the stylistic differences in their manner of musical setting are roughly analogous while warning of the dangers of over-simplification. 'No medieval composition had what might be called an "authentic shape"; a song was

what musicians could make of it when they needed it' (p. 21). Many songs exist in countless different versions; variations in performance of instruments used, ornaments added, extemporization of new parts or omission of existing ones, made for a highly flexible craft of presentation that has no parallel today.

In the first chapter of the section discussing the relationship between music and poetry the emphasis is almost entirely technical, being an historical sketch concerned 'with what can be learnt from looking at the way music and words come together in song' (p. 58). 'One of the persistent problems confronting the reader of an early English lyric is, simply, this: was this poem intended to be sung? and, if so, how did music affect the writing, and how should it affect the reading, of the poem?' (p. 27) All previous assumptions on this point involve inherent contradictions: 'verse-tests in relation to musical settings are at worst thoroughly misleading and at best inconclusive' (p. 29). Moreover previous generalizations have ignored the distinction between art-music and tunes, the former the work of trained musicians, but the latter easily memorized by anyone. Chapter 2 shows that ideas of a traditional union between music and poetry are generally inaccurate. 'The thirteenth century was the last in which music and poetry and the dance, because they had grown up together and were still useful to each other, were naturally one and the same art. . . . In the fourteenth century the natural and necessary union of music and poetry finally broke up' (p. 35). The influence of rhetoric, a new concern with style on the part of poets, and musical experiments in rhythmic and textural complexity, separated the art music of the professionals from the popular tunes and ballads of the (mainly) illiterate minstrels. Yet though the two arts developed highly specialized techniques, the popular songs (which were known to all ranks of society) and their continued use as sources of musical material by professional composers 'meant that a natural unsophisticated relationship between words and melody was never lost sight of' (p. 54). The word-setting of such songs is discussed in detail in the following chapter; several plainsong hymns with verse translations are quoted from *Ryman's MS.* to show how words were fitted to existing tunes and linked with the probable origin of the carol from the litanies.

Chapter 4, 'Ideas and theories, medieval and humanist', corrects longstanding opinions in a survey of musical writings which shows that 'emotional expressiveness' in song had no place in the attitude of theorists and composers to their art. 'The most noticeable fact . . . is the complete absence of the very thing we are looking for—an account of music as an expressive agent, as speaking the language of the heart' (p. 64); 'by importing back into this early period the mentality of a later age we have . . . misconceived the relationship between music and poetry' (p. 58). An examination of the changes brought about by the Reformation underlines this fundamental point, for the Reformers, being concerned more with words than with music, since they wanted the words to be felt and understood while singing them, were not interested in musical refinements. 'Metrical psalm is, so to speak, simply purified medieval song' (p. 87). The later Elizabethan interest in an intimate connection between words and music, and consequently in care for details of word-setting, came from imitating the new European music influenced by humanist study of classical authors.

Two chapters on 'Music and the early Tudor lyric' discuss the compositions in the light of these observations. 'To find a poem set to music tells us nothing in itself about *the poet's* intention' (p. 107); the selection of texts is arbitrary, which makes 'one wonder whether the demand of the musical establishment for texts to set could possibly have been a live factor in the

literary situation' (p. 108); moreover, many poems had been in circulation for years before being set. These composers 'were members of a complicated craft, and in the exercise of this craft, choice of words mattered very little. They could just as easily set a complex "rhetorical" poem of double meaning as they could set a balet in light popular style. Some lyrics could be set in several styles. It is nonsense, therefore, in this period, to speak of the needs of musicians. They could do what they liked with words, almost . . . with any words. Any early Tudor lyric could be set to music in a traditional style. The suitability of a particular musical style to a particular poem is not a matter of emotional fitness, but of convention. And the conventional alliance between music and poetry of a certain kind . . . is largely dependent on the wider social use of the song' (p. 107). The evidence that the poems were primarily intended by their authors for singing varies according to the type of poem. Lyrics written for pastime 'not uncommonly bring us in touch with music. But it is never the music of the court . . . it is popular melody' (p. 119). Many court songs were written for pre-existing popular tunes, especially the balet. Dr. Stevens ends this section with a discussion of Wyatt, showing that the poet was not greatly interested in music, his references to it 'being vague and conventional. . . . He blames his lute, or not, but never talks about it in the way of a man who really understands or cares for it' (p. 134). One song, *Blame not my lute*, quoted in both its (completely different) settings, as an example of the problems involved, shows insufficient evidence for any conclusions concerning Wyatt's intentions.

The second section of the book—'Courtly love and the courtly lyric'—deals with the social outlook, customs and manners of the period. Supported by numerous quotations the argument shows how 'courtly love provided the aristocracy not only with a philosophy and a psychology of love but also with a code of social behaviour' (p. 151). The code of pleasing was expressed in this 'game of love': men pretended love even when they did not feel it, because such pretence was the mainspring of civilized behaviour. 'Whatever else it may have been, the "balet" of love was one of the means adopted by the Courtly lover to display his personal qualities to social advantage. There was one quality above all which the "balet", whether "complaynt" or "praise", enabled him to develop and display—his articulateness, his mastery of words, the art of courteous speech. "Courtly making" is an extension of courtly discourse; the love-poem is ' "half-talkyng" raised, formalised and crystallised' (p. 211). The subtleties of this point are unravelled in detail with penetrating comment.

Last of all comes a section on 'Music at Court' in which every aspect of music-making (outside liturgical practice) is discussed and illustrated with copious quotations. This section has a value far beyond that of its immediate relevance to Dr. Stevens's main theme. It forms the most perspicacious, detailed and critical analysis of late medieval music's relation to society that has yet appeared in print. Dr. Stevens proves the great differences in ability, knowledge and execution of the professional musicians, the noble amateurs and the minstrels, and exemplifies the social functions of each. It is impossible even to summarize here, so rich are its implications and consequences; it is the climax of a great, illuminating and thought-provoking work of scholarship.

Printing and paper are worthy. Annotations are printed (in large print, a welcome change) at the end of chapters. Musical illustrations are attractively drawn. There are four appendices: one of the literary texts with notes; an index of selected songs; a list of sources; and a reference list of books and articles referred to by abbreviation in the notes.

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The Untuning of the Sky. Ideas of Music in English Poetry 1500–1700. By JOHN HOLLANDER. Princeton University Press. London: Oxford University Press. 1961. pp. xii + 467. 68s.

STUDIES OF the borderline territory where music and literature meet are uncommon; those as detailed, well-informed and well-documented as Mr. Hollander's are very rare indeed. The Preface states that the book 'concerns certain beliefs about music rather than music itself; moreover, it is less about those beliefs alone than about the English poetry of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which expressed and employed them'. This is a field where little has been done previously; it requires not only fine literary scholarship but also considerable acumen in estimating the value of musical sources. 'In the treatment of music by Renaissance English poets there is a constant interplay of ideology and fact, of beliefs accumulated through intellectual habit and those thrust upon the consciousness by experience of a more direct kind. The very notion of music is so broad and deep, fed by startling developments in the history of the art itself, and at the same time inundated by floods of authoritative doctrine on the subject of music, that it is fair to say that in these musical beliefs most others lay implicit.' Aesthetics mingled with ethics, politics, and cosmology. How past generations felt and thought about music *qua* music has to be distinguished from what writers, theorists and moralists considered to be the correct attitude to and treatment of music. The author's investigation proves the importance and attractiveness of his subject, opening many stimulating prospects for further inquiry.

An introductory chapter outlines the main issues to be discussed, examining the Greek concept of 'music as myth and poetic subject', its survival in subsequent centuries while a totally different music developed, the struggle of Renaissance thinkers to adapt classical principles to their own practice, and the final 'demythologizing' of musical ideas by the empirical outlook of the seventeenth century. The treatment is sometimes a little too condensed: for example, the Renaissance is seen rather too much (from the musical viewpoint) as springing from Italian and humanist sources, though the music of the first part of the sixteenth was far more influenced by 'Northern' Franco-Flemish styles and techniques. This confusion leads to the false assertion that 'the history of English music is a rather retarded one, compared with the music of France, Italy and, later, Germany'. Although the Italian Renaissance was late in influencing English music, England had a strong native tradition which went its own way until *c.* 1560 with remarkable achievements unequalled by Italians at this time.

Chapter II presents an excellent account of the Boethian division of music into *musica mundana* (the cosmological order or 'music of the spheres'), *musica humana* (the reflection of the macrocosm in man: 'the blending of the body's elements' in temperament) and *musica instrumentalis* or 'practical music', together with expositions of the meaning of *ethos* and *harmonia* and the consequent figurative and symbolic use of instruments in poetic imagery. These fundamental notions coloured all musical development till the eighteenth century and some survived even into the nineteenth (a point which Mr. Hollander neglects to mention).

The stage is now set for the examination of poetic images and ideas and from this point onwards the argument is copiously illustrated by quotations. Chapter III discusses 'the musical subject in humanist poetry', beginning with a sketch of earlier medieval development and continuing in greater detail from Chaucer to Shakespeare. Many of Mr. Hollander's observations are entirely new: the section on 'musical ethics and ethical music', for example, is full of subtle and important distinctions that throw much light on

musical attitudes of the sixteenth century. This long chapter concludes with an analysis of the use and meaning of music and musical imagery in *Twelfth Night* that is one of the most brilliant sections of the book.

With Chapter IV the 'doctrine of affections' appears: the seventeenth-century attempt to classify, pigeonhole, and standardize the musical images that represented the meaning of words (or their emotional implication) when used in vocal music. This represents a 'new phase in the history of musical thought. The older tradition of world harmony and its consequences for the effects of music upon individuals are here specifically repudiated, and the powers of music are accounted for in terms of a quasi-mechanistic model . . . a shift from an interpretation of music as an *imitative* art to that of music as an *expressive* one' (p. 173). Music comes to be thought of in rhetorical terms. One of the most important sections draws attention to Joachim Burmeister's *Musica Poetica* (1606) in which parallels between music and rhetoric are expounded in detail. Burmeister's theories, though based on later sixteenth-century practice, seem to have been the source of practically all later German speculation on *Affektenlehre*. There is a valuable exposition of the new meanings given to mode and key in the seventeenth-century French lutenist Denis Gaultier, showing their relation to Poussin's speculations on mode in painting, and illustrated by three emblem pictures from Gaultier's *La rhétorique des Dieux*. Though it would perhaps have widened the scope of Mr. Hollander's inquiry too much to include all the ramifications of these ideas and to have traced more fully the remoter sources of baroque practice in the sixteenth-century *musica reservata*, what he has given us here makes one wish for a little more detail on the later influence of the theory of affections on composers such as Mozart and Beethoven whose choice of keys is fairly often determined by 'affective' associations. Another brilliant poetic analysis concludes the chapter: Crashaw's *Musick's Duell* shows not only 'a current view of music as passion', but imitates 'its production and effects' (p. 237).

The introduction to Chapter V is a little disappointing. Opinions of musical conservatives like Wyclif are grouped with genuine attacks on elaborate church music by Protestants (it is doubtful if the sixteenth-century knew much, if anything, about medieval abuses) and thus the chief reason for these attacks is not stressed—namely that the Protestants identified elaborate music with the Catholic liturgy they detested. Luther's position as the *only* Reformer who encouraged musical development is insufficiently emphasized. It is sad to read of 'vicious attacks on polyphony . . . issuing from the Council of Trent' (p. 257) at this time of day, when the old Palestrina-Trent myth has been exploded for many years. The main part of the chapter concerns imagery in seventeenth-century religious and meditative poetry, especially that of Herbert, Marvell and Milton.

'The Trivialization of Universal Harmony' aptly summarizes the theme of the final chapter. Previous musical images become stock clichés; the angels and Orpheus are outdone in contests with human performers; *musica speculativa* 'largely gives way to legitimate acoustical studies based on the joint development of classical physics and mathematical analysis, and to more or less professional discussions of stylistic elements' (p. 381). 'The inherited rag-bag of musical lore' becomes 'little more than a white elephant'. An examination of the various Odes for St. Cecilia's Day concludes with a detailed analysis of Dryden's *St. Cecilia Ode* and *Alexander's Feast* to show how 'the sky is untuned'; music 'is henceforth to be *made* rather than to be expounded like doctrine' (p. 421). Living music is now extolled and cosmological archetypes discredited.

Mr. Hollander's inquiry, as I hope the

above comments have shown, is of fundamental importance for the history of music as well as of English literature. It offers many opportunities for gaining an understanding of how our ancestors thought of music and therefore of what they experienced in it.

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Poetry and the Physical Voice. By FRANCIS BERRY. Routledge. 1962. pp. 205. 28s.
The Language Poets Use. By WINIFRED NOWOTTNY. The Athlone Press. 1962. pp. 225. 25s.

> 'You can draw water out of a water-well,' said the Hatter, 'so I should think you could draw treacle out of a treacle-well; eh, stupid?'
> 'But they were *in* the well,' said Alice to the Dormouse.
> 'Of course they were,' said the Dormouse, 'well in!'

THE PREDICAMENT of the little girls who lived in a treacle-well can be applied to writers on language; especially if they do not keep to one of the recognized ways of dealing with it, such as those of linguistic philosophy, or of philology. Mr. Berry is a poet, and therefore particularly 'well in'; Mrs. Nowottny writes a close study of her texts. She speaks of the 'web of topics' in her work—'until more is known of the nature of linguistic meaning generally, it seems better to feel one's way along the filaments of the web, than to cut bits out of it.' Avoiding easy preconceptions, and laying aside theory, both writers have presented works which are stimulating but inclined to be sticky. Readers should take a little at a time.

Mr. Berry relates the language of poets to their own voices—the shrillness of Shelley, the wail of Tennyson, the deep slow voice of Milton, which he reconstructs from their verse and what accounts have survived. He also writes on Shakespeare, Marlowe and some modern poets. My inner ear records the voice of G. E. Moore saying: '*Well* . . .' The number of social factors involved is immense, besides the fact that poets' voices, with age, may acquire new qualities. For example, I do not feel Mr. Berry is taking into account, in his comparison of Marlowe and Shakespeare, that Marlowe had to be shouted because the earlier Elizabethan audience had not learnt attentiveness; Alleyn reciting Marlowe had to sound more like the town crier than Burbage reciting Shakespeare. I don't know whether to agree that Mr. Auden should not rewrite his early poems, because a poet should not tamper with his own 'voice' as it was at an earlier stage; what about Yeats? Mr. Berry stirs me to enjoyment and to very considerable disagreement; his book is lively, provocative, and highly personal.

Mrs. Nowottny is crisply aware of the social complexities of language. She comments on the passage where Byron follows up a passionate lyric, *The Isles of Greece*, by

> Thus sung, or would, or could, or
> should have sung
> The modern Greek, in tolerable
> verse . . .

'The sardonic Byron . . . re-enters the poem not with a bang but a stutter, a deliberate grinding of the gears of language' (p. 47). In 'The elements of poetic language' she gives a condensed summary of the relation of modern linguistics to poetry. The end of this chapter is tough; the next, on the linguistic configuration of metaphor, is even tougher, though enlivened by wit and sharpened by precision of phrase. Mrs. Nowottny goes on to consider 'Language in "artificial" forms,' from Sidney to Mallarmé, schematization and abstraction, ambiguity, symbolism and obscurity, the last including a thirty-page analysis of Dylan Thomas's 'There was a Saviour'. The examples, close packed, and ranging from Shakespeare to Wallace Stevens, are handled with insight and a certain severity

of technique. It is clear, although nowhere put forward, that Mrs. Nowottny is not in sympathy with those who would connect poetry and ontology, with Northrop Frye or Kathleen Raine. It is rather surprising that she talks of 'explication de texte' with only one passing reference to William Empson, a critic who, though without her technical equipment, has done more than anyone to introduce the kind of approach she develops.

Her book would be a godsend to teachers in search of examples for discussion or topics for a seminar; some poets may like it, but others, I fear, will blink under the searchlight. As Edwin Muir has said: 'Imagination gives us . . . knowledge of people and nature, but never exact knowledge, since it cannot and does not wish to study them under the fixed conditions which make possible the exact knowledge of the scientist.' Mrs. Nowottny has the courage not to theorize; but she cannot disguise that she is dealing with 'specimens'—and most effectively, too.

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El Greco Revisited. By PÁL KELEMEN. Macmillan. 1961. pp. xii + 176 + 112 plates. 94s.

MR. PÁL Kelemen began to collect material for a study of El Greco in the 1920's, and over the years he has made the project of writing this book a part of his life. He has, with the instinct of an historian, determined to place El Greco as exactly as possible in his setting, and he has travelled widely, read widely, and personally consulted many of the proper authorities so that he may be sure that his information is completely accurate. It is therefore a hard thing to say that his book is disappointing. For all the work that has gone into it is much too obvious. It is so crammed with fact that there is no room for connecting comment. The reader tires while he longs to go on. He is never caught up and carried along. Just as this seems about to happen the paragraph comes to an end and he must start again. '. . . At Til' Keuy, thirty miles southwest of the city of Kayseri, which was once the capital of Cappadocia, in Central Turkey,' and so on and so on. This is the greater pity because much of the information Mr. Kelemen has accumulated is of interest and has never been assembled quite in this way before. Fortunately his publishers have been generous with the illustrations, and—although again this is a hard thing to say—it is here that the book is of most value. It is not that the works are unfamiliar, but that Mr. Kelemen has arranged and juxtaposed them with some perspicacity. In this way he makes his points more effectively than he does in the text, and as far as I know none of the existing books on El Greco provide so many comparative illustrations when it comes to the discussion of El Greco's debt to Byzantine painting. To be able to compare on the same page the Frick *St. Jerome* with a mosaic from the Cappella Palatina, or some of the heads from Greco paintings with Egyptian mummy panels, or *The Burial of Count Orgaz* with a traditional *Dormition of the Virgin*, is useful. But, of course, the basis of all this is Robert Byron's article in *The Burlington Magazine* in October 1929 (which Mr. Kelemen quotes in his bibliography). And what about El Greco's direct borrowings from Michelangelo? Mr. Kelemen says almost nothing of these.

In the Preface, where he ranges over experiences in his life as far back as 1914, Mr. Kelemen writes with a certain freedom and relaxation, and he makes one hope that his book will evoke El Greco with a Proustian sensuousness and understanding. A glance at the first few pages of the illustrations encourages this hope—the ruins of the fortifications at Istanbul, Santa Sophia, ruined churches near Aswan, at Cappadocia, at Damascus and at Acthamar—but

his whole approach to the writing of the book is so painstaking that he never gives it a chance to become a work of literature. Nor is it a work of art-historical scholarship. It falls very heavily between two stools. Perhaps it is best described as a compilation.

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The Traditional Theory of Literature. By RAY LIVINGSTON. University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis. 1962. pp. 188.

THE TITLE proclaimed by this book, *The Traditional Theory of Literature*, is apt to irritate the reader who is suspicious of monolithic assurance, and arouse curiosity in the reader who hopes to be enlightened on such a seemingly vast subject. The latter reader will be disappointed, the former will be exasperated by the time he has finished reading.

We have here an expository study of the works of the Indian scholar, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, whose writings are claimed to contain all the elements constituting 'the traditional theory of literature', that is to say, a theory of literature implied in the thought of every exponent of the 'Great Tradition' or 'Philosophia Perennis'. The Tradition (always with a capital T) appears to be that body of thought which is in agreement on fundamental principles of Being and Reality, Godhead and Human Destiny, Society and the Purpose of Life. The Bible, Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Dante, Master Eckhart, Milton and Blake are frequently referred to as witnesses to the 'eternal wisdom of the ages'. This seems to consist mainly in a belief in the dual nature of man (mortal and immortal), in a conviction that 'there is one truth that shines through them all in many shapes' (p. 9), and the assumption that metaphysics is the rational approach to the Ineffable. 'So far as human existence, in whatever form, is conducted in accord with this essential wisdom it is Traditional' (p. 15), the author states summarily, and that is about as far as the reader eager to learn about 'the traditional theory' will ever get.

Coomaraswamy is introduced to a Western audience which, in the author's opinion, is insufficiently aware of the Indian's importance, as the perfect exponent of the Tradition. 'His works seem to be the quintessential distillate of thousands of writers who on one occasion or another reveal the elements of Traditional thought' (p. 12). One may wonder whether Coomaraswamy is well served by Professor Livingston's description of his scholarly procedure: 'Coomaraswamy is much like the Schoolmen; he cites whatever expresses well the truth as he understands it' (p. 13). The book, however, does convey something more than the impression of a great eclectic's work; Coomaraswamy's integrity, passionate devotion to truth and enlightenment, and his immense learning are obvious. His 'metaphysics' cannot here be assessed.

'Traditional' thought as defined by the book is clearly absolutistic in character. Thus a theory of art, and of literature in particular, can only be gained from the total doctrine 'concerning the nature and final end of man' and 'the nature and purpose of the social order', in which 'the nature and function of art' are completely integrated. The 'archetypal theory of art and literature' is based upon a consideration of 'Man, Society, and Art' (Chapter II), which discusses art on the assumption of 'the fundamental identity of all the arts in principle and practice' (p. 28). This is followed by a chapter on 'The Creative Process', drawing mainly on Plato, Plotinus and Eckhart as Coomaraswamy's spiritual ancestors, and a chapter on 'The Work of Art', postulating art as imitative of the eternal forms of things, which must be expressed beautifully and in 'adequate symbolism' (with a distinc-

tion between 'signs' as referring to the known and 'symbols' as referring to the unknown or even unknowable). The next chapter, 'The Function of Works of Art', with its assertion that the supreme end of the work of art is the 'support of contemplation', says little that is not already obvious from the general approach. The final chapter, 'Judgement and Criticism', with its distinction between technical and moral judgement, claims that Coomaraswamy's theory helps to settle almost all hitherto confusing problems of literary criticism.

This brief summary must suffice to give an indication of the scope and philosophical temper of the book. The reader who wishes to read 'English literature as a road to wisdom' may conceivably find help and guidance here.

EVA SCHAPER

Glasgow University

Greek Aesthetic Theory. By J. G. WARRY. Methuen. 1962. pp. 168. 18s.

MR. WARRY'S book begins with an interesting inquiry into the question whether the use of the same term in Plato and Aristotle for 'intellectual functional beauty', and 'passionate, romantic and often sublime beauty' signifies a casual or profound association. 'If', he says, 'it is profound we shall know that we have discovered the ingredient or power which exists no less in detached intellectual delight than in ardent personal passion. This ingredient or power will then deserve the name of Beauty.'

In the intermediate chapters, the analysis of Plato's *Dialogues* and Aristotle's *Poetics* serve little to establish whether this ingredient will deserve the name of Beauty, but are valuable as an introduction to the philosophers' views on art.

In the last chapter the conclusion seems to be that the power of hypnosis is that which is signified by the term 'beauty', when it is applied either to things of functional beauty or to passionate romantic beauty. The identification depends on supposing that in so far as things which are formally beautiful 'focus intellectual concentration' they are in some sense 'hypnotic'. But this is not defensible, for a concentration of intelligence normally means heightened awareness, but Mr. Warry, on page 150, has defined 'hypnotic' as 'half-sleeping or comatose'. He seems to be confused by the senses of 'hypnotize', the one which may be used of a snake when it produces an intense concentration, the other which means reducing a person to an unconscious or semi-conscious state of mind—states which are antithetical to each other. What the two states have in common is a loss of *voluntary* control. It should be observed that the author uses the term 'beauty' indifferently of things or the experiences of them. Altogether his interesting thesis needs to have been rigorously thought about, and vague notions avoided, such as 'the approach to beauty may be subjective or objective'. Approach to beauty presumably means a personal attitude, which by definition must be only subjective. What he seems to want to say is that we may have one sort of experience in which we are aware of a beautiful thing, another in which we are so moved by passion, or so overcome by half-sleep that we are not aware of the thing at all.

One cannot help but feel the author's interest throughout the book, which together with his fluent style make it pleasant reading. It is evident from the citations in the text and from the bibliography that he has read widely on his subject.

EDWARD MORGAN

Symbolon. Jahrbuch für Symbolforschung Vol. 2. Edited by JULIUS SCHWABE. Benno Schwabe Verlag. Basel/Stuttgart. 1961. pp. 196. Sw. Fr. 20.

Eranos Jahrbuch 1961 (Vol. XXX) Der Mensch in Spannungsfeld der Ordnungen.

OLGA FROBE-KAPTEYN (Ed.). Rhein-Verlag. Zurich. 1962. pp. 376. Sw. Fr. 34.

THE SECOND Yearbook for Research in Symbolism, published under the auspices of the *Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftliche Symbolforschung*, comprises seven out of nine papers read at the third meeting of the Society in Basel, 3rd to 5th April 1959. In addition two papers from 1955 have been included for which a space could not be found in the first volume. The only contribution with an art theme in this collection of papers is by Professor Herbert Kühn of Cologne and Mainz, who is internationally known as an authority on prehistoric art in Europe. His paper is entitled *Das Symbol in der Vorzeit Europas* —The Symbol in European Prehistory. There is a dithyrambic statement on the significance and meaning of the symbol in the spiritual development of man, there is an investigation of the symbolic quality of the caves in which the prehistoric paintings were found—the cave as a symbol of the womb, of fertility, of redemption. Symbols of birth (Eve), of death and of the magic staff are discussed, the symbol of the spiral which signifies the eternal return, unfolding and vanishing, rise and fall. The representational art of the Ice Age and its magic quality is analysed as well as the mythical quality of the Stone Age when abstraction took over from figuration, and the sign and ornament replaced realism. The concentrated and involved trains of thought in this paper are illustrated with well chosen examples.

The XXXth Eranos Yearbook 'Man in the field of Tensions among Values' presents nine papers read at the Eranos Meeting at Ascona 16th to 23rd August 1961, of which three are concerned with art. The paper of Professor Dr. Emil Pretorius from Munich: *Vom Ordnungsgefüge der Kunst* (*On the Structure of Order in Art*) deals with the problem of the modern trend in art; Cézanne—Cubism—Abstraction—and with art as a direct visual experience. Sir Herbert Read's paper is entitled *Beauty and the Beast*. Dubuffet's *l'art brut* is discussed in it, the problem of ugliness in relationship to the varying concepts of beauty and the relationship of modern art to primitive art. A depth-psychological section follows based on the interpretation of Madame Leprince de Beaumont's story *La Belle et la Bête*, with an application of some ideas by Jung, Freud, Melanie Klein, Adrian Stokes, Lipps, Riegl, Worringer and Ruskin.

The third paper is devoted to music. Professor Victor Zuckerkandl of Annapolis spoke on *Der Singende und der sprechende Mensch* (*Singing and Speaking Man*), a study of speech and music and of space in its two complementary functions, geometric and musical space, leading further to the investigation of the musical component in the human psyche and to the apotheosis of music itself.

J. P. HODIN

Provincialism. By KENNETH CLARK. Presidential Address to The English Association. 1962. Oxford University Press. pp. 12. 5s.

ALONG WITH other polite arts, the art of public speaking is today in decline. Not that the demand for it dwindles; it is the results that usually depress. In recent years few people have managed to express well-chosen and lively thoughts within the iron framework of an 'Address'—which requires at once more than a speech and less than a lecture. The address given (performed, perhaps) by Cocteau at Oxford in 1956 was an expected exception. It was too good to be true—indeed, large parts of it were (probably) not true.

Now the English Association, daringly electing a president who is neither an Eng. Lit. pundit nor a clergyman, has been rewarded by an address of elegance, urbanity, and sheer civilized tenor, from Sir Kenneth Clark. As *the* English writer on art who is always a pleasure to read, Sir

Kenneth was certainly a happy choice, and the topic on which he addressed the Association was itself so unparochial—so unprovincial, in fact—that it must have been as refreshing to hear as it is to read. One's admiration only increases on learning that the address was given in that least witching period of the day for a speaker, the morning.

Naturally, it was concerned with provincialism in the visual arts, though the relevance for literature and music was noted. A stimulating topic, it might almost seem a dangerous one, likely to pain and astonish the gallant band for whom British art is always the best. English painting nowadays has more admirers than is quite decent. It is not so much a matter for aesthetics as for ethics that we have shamelessly stolen from their national schools Holbein and Van Dyck (both happening to die prematurely in England by the chances of plague and bad climate). No doubt if Rubens and Watteau had happened to die here we should have bagged them too in our sporting way. Sir Kenneth early set before his audience the unpalatable fact 'that English painting is provincial'. He sketches the position with a practised hand, noting that we have had 'one or two men of genius, one or two charmers, and one or two curiosities'.

From among them, he illustrates the theme of provincialism and draws some distinctions between metropolitan and provincial art. Apt and striking as these distinctions are, they come down to the question of the degree of pleasure that the work of art gives. Do we call it provincial when it gives us only limited enjoyment? Or is the limited emotion it gives the sign of its being a provincial work? And, most basically, of course, is 'provincialism' the term by which to define these limited works? Even historically, it is hard to come to any very clear conclusions. Certainly we can call Hogarth a provincial artist; Sir Kenneth implies as much, and points out how when he wished to be at his most serious Hogarth had to work in the international late Baroque style and became commonplace. (Actually, *Captain Coram*, for example, could be claimed as a successful adaptation of Baroque portrait style to a bluff ungrand sitter.) Hogarth never visited Italy. But no more did Rembrandt, some of whose early pictures are equally in an international though early Baroque style; they may not be very pleasing or successful but they are not commonplace —thanks, surely, to nothing except the man's genius. Leyden was provincial enough; but the pictures aren't.

Sir Kenneth states that the recurrent catchwords of provincial art are 'Truth to nature and individual judgement'. Might one not say that only provincial art has catchwords of any kind? The second half of the phrase is anyway, I feel, no catchword but simply the *correct* response of every great artist from Giotto onwards. If Giotto had exercised no individual judgement he could hardly have obscured Cimabue's fame; he broke the current style, as the great artist must do. It is the followers of every great artist who are provincial, in the sense of minor, whether born in Rome or Bradford, as inevitably as satellites are subordinate to the sun they revolve round. Anyway, should we judge the artist's stature by the extent of his influence on his period? Botticelli would then be a very poor fellow compared with Maratta. That he virtually *is* a poor fellow so compared in academic art history circles today shows the decline of vision and the growth of pseudo-historicism; and it is one of the most frightening facts for those with any interest in aesthetics to witness. Today's art history students are all-knowing and non-seeing.

It is certainly true that in provincial isolation the artist must trust to his individual judgement. It seems less certain that he will always turn to 'truth to nature' for the basis of his art. Gauguin and Van Gogh, if not provincial, at least sought the provinces. Crivelli became strange and

in-bred in provincial isolation but hardly more realistic (or whatever term one applies). Indeed, Sir Kenneth himself introduces a new category of the provincial when he says: 'Provincial painting is at its best when it is poetical painting, or perhaps I should say, for the great epics of Michelangelo are also poetic, lyrical painting.' Here we do seem to fit in Crivelli, Gauguin and Van Gogh, all masters of expressive line in terms of song not speech. The only trouble is: we seem also to be losing sight of 'provincialism' and merely defining two types of art quite unrelated to geography and having to do with temperament. Piero della Francesca's greatest works were executed deep in his native province, in places that remain provincial. No artist, of course, was ever less provincial.

However, what is particularly remarkable in the visual arts is the extraordinary dependence of the artist on a 'centre'. Like Cicero, he will sigh from the provinces to be in the metropolis: he needs the stimulation of others' achievement in a way that is much less necessary, it seems, for the writer. A fascinating field, barely explored, would be to study the visual dependency of the great artist on often unworthy material. The whole subject of 'borrowings', both conscious and unconscious, is of interest, making one feel at times that the artist is almost the victim of his marvellous eye. Yet he needs this exposure to other men's work and one cannot think of many great artists who have not passed at least briefly through the centre, even if they later returned to the provinces. But the experience can itself be as mixed a one as it was for Van Gogh in Paris.

In the later part of his address Sir Kenneth touches a raw nerve when he speaks of 'provincial' art criticism, chiefly as it has been practised in England. He wittily exposes a vein of chauvinism which is certainly ridiculous but which could also be exposed in the work of Italian, French and German critics. The whole vocabulary of today's criticism could be dismissed as provincial, for it is highly doubtful if we have yet evolved a satisfactory way of writing about the art of our own period. Sir Kenneth concludes with a summary of the provincial artist's dilemma, but at least the artist—whether on the perimeter or at the centre—is a creator. If the critic or writer about art has any role it is necessarily humbler; all the more reason for him to be at the centre of things, to respond to what is most significant and, hardest of all, to convey this in worthy language. The majority of writing about art and aesthetics today is not so much provincial as simply barbarous. This address is itself an exception which proves very little except how fortunate The English Association was in its 1962 President.

MICHAEL LEVEY
The National Gallery

Die Ornament-Grotteske in der Italienischen Renaissance. By FRIEDRICH PIEL. Walter de Gruyter. Berlin. 1962. pp. 198 + 12 plates. D.M. 38.

A VERY interesting and largely neglected subject is here presented with overemphatic ponderousness and in the killing straitjacket of the thesis-form. The Raphael Loggie are rightly taken as the starting-off point for discussion of the whole theme, and the aesthetic aspects and aims of this type of decoration are very fully discussed. This is primarily the author's interest and he specifically disclaims writing a complete history of the evolution of 'grotesque' and arabesque decorations; but there are some perceptive and useful comments on the functions and effect of such ornament. From any point of view, the illustrations are absurdly inadequate in number and rather poor in quality. It is equally to be deplored that there is no index—an omission which casts an odd light on the practices of the Art History Faculty of Munich University, under whose auspices the book is published.

MICHAEL LEVEY
The National Gallery

The Works of Arnold Schoenberg. A catalogue of his compositions, writings and paintings. By JOSEF RUFER. Faber & Faber. 1962. pp. 214. 63s.

THOUGH KÖCHEL catalogued only Mozart's music, Rufer's book is justifiably commended by its publishers as emulating Köchel's. In a full review this acknowledgement would outweigh further comment, and even in a brief notice its extent should be indicated. Schoenberg was known to have been versatile and industrious, but his most ardent thumfers are surely surprised both at the size of this inventory of unpublished compositions and *obiter scripta* and also at the amount that, for its sheer wisdom and insight, ought to be published. (The best lies in notes or incomplete lectures.) Some letters, not intended for a third reader, reveal Schoenberg's courage and dignity in dealing with time-serving Nazi officialdom, and it may be regretted that Rufer has not catalogued correspondence that has already been published. Ten superbly reproduced essays in unmistakably teutonic expressionist portraiture will provide the connoisseur with a more interesting task than their reconciliation with music which, whether still indebted to tradition or aggressively radical, was never emotionally problematic or psychotic. Indeed the sanity and assurance of the great teacher may be regarded as limitations in the artist. An essay on Schoenberg's place in the history of aesthetics might already have appeared in this journal, and one can hardly pay greater tribute to Rufer than by expressing relief that its contribution was postponed. Rufer is the author of the only English book on his master's technical adventures to prove of practical value to students, yet instead of indulging in the musical judgements which he is so well qualified to make he has given us by documentation the fullest picture of Schoenberg that we are ever likely to contemplate.

ARTHUR HUTCHINGS
Durham University

Chinoiserie. The Vision of Cathay. By HUGH HONOUR. John Murray. 1961. pp. vii + 294. 55s.

AS WAS the case with the author of *Chinoiserie*, many of us acquired our first knowledge and love of the exotic through 'willow-pattern' tea-sets, but it is not until one sees brought together and documented this vast conglomerate of 'Chinoiserie', from wig-stands to pagodas, that one realizes the profusion of this parasitic growth. For it remained at best parasitic, never supplanting the strength of native art but hanging its delicate tracery over the more solid, common-sense structure of indigenous production or taking over minor domains as its proper territory—tea-caddies, pleasure palaces, writing-desks, occasional tables. The importance of the present work is that its author presents convincingly his thesis that, given the impetus to 'go Chinese' as a result originally of the voyages of Marco Polo and others, it was natural for imagination to outstrip literal fact—as indeed it did in the lesser travel books themselves. The land of Cathay was not discovered; it was created by the vivid imaginations of artists and philosophers—a place of serenity, of dazzling birds in beautiful gardens—'a happy land where kings were true philosophers'. (The emphasis on the 'philosopher-king' concept shows how closely this fiction clings to the ideals of Western thought.) Perhaps the most interesting revelations in the book are of the disappointed travellers to Peking who searched in vain for the Cathay they had been led, through art, to expect there; and of the 'Chinese' designs devised in England to suit English taste, exported to India and finally to China for copying on to merchandise. No wonder Goldsmith's *Citizen of the World* comments on being shown a pagoda in an English garden: 'Where I stand, I see nothing, madam, at the end of the garden, that may not as well be called an Egyptian pyramid as a Chinese temple; for that

little building in view is as like one as t'other.'

In a book which defines with particular care and excellent illustrations the passage of Chinoiserie through Renaissance, Baroque and Rococo art to its decline, the only regret is that, like Dylan Thomas's Christmas-present book, it tells us 'everything about the bee but why?' Mr. Honour takes for granted the fact that Chinoiserie obviously satisfied a certain taste. Some speculation for the student of aesthetics would be welcome.

First, why has the exotic such an appeal, often beyond it merit as a work of art? As often as not the exotic may simply provide 'escapist' satisfaction, as in the vogue for pleasure palaces, *le petit* Trianon, etc. But beneath such apparent escapism may often lie a special form of distancing—a means of criticizing contemporary society in terms of a 'model' as dissimilar as possible from the established order being criticized.

Secondly, to what extent may two cultures be fused? Generally speaking (and this takes point from the previous consideration), when the exotic or imported element supplies the pattern and colour for decoration rather than the structural design of the art-object a successful marriage of the two cultures is more likely to occur than when the *form* is the borrowed element. The pagodas erected in English gardens in alleged Chinese style were to remain oddities but the use of Chinese motifs in rococo palaces remains appropriate and assimilated.

Perhaps the use of the term 'exotic' is misleading to describe Chinoiserie at all, which is a series of attempts to use certain aspects of the exotic within a Western pattern. The Chinoiserie of the visual arts tellingly displayed here is only one manifestation of its power. Shakespeare knew that the exotic was enough to turn the head of his Desdemona; Mozart's Prince Tamino was originally Japanese. In all the arts practically every European country found the remoteness of a Cathay just the right instrument for criticism of contemporary society or, more often, as a magic carpet to make escape from it.

Nor has the final pulse-beat of this strange power been felt. Not Chinese, but post-war Japanese design is affecting the pattern of architecture, furniture, fabrics, ornaments; and once again European designers are taking just as much as they require from the East to give fresh impetus to the creative imagination.

A note in passing. Mr. Honour seems a little doubtful about the 'singerie' in Chinoiserie. Perhaps it is French in origin as he suggests, but the Chinese themselves have a long tradition in their theatre of using the monkey-motif to make suitably distanced comment on their own civilization. It is unlikely that amongst the baggage and tales that the early travellers brought back some reference to this tradition would not have been made.

The book is beautifully produced, the illustrations remarkably clear and always integrated to the text. Its implications for aesthetics, though indirect, are real.

VAL VALLIS

University of Queensland

The Outline of Art. Edited by SIR WILLIAM ORPEN. Revised by HORACE SHIPP. Newnes. 1961. pp. xiv + 854. 45s.

ORIGINALLY *The Outline of Art* appeared in fortnightly instalments, together with its companion volume in Literature, in 1923–4, and it would be difficult to recall two works which have had more effect in their fields on their public. Although by the thirties the book had already taken on an old-fashioned appearance, it remained for thousands the accredited and authoritative version of what really happened in the World of Art. Now a new edition, enlarged and revised, has appeared. In format more attractive, and with some freshening up of the original illustrations, it preserves as a memorial most of the

Orpen–Rutter text and supplements this with new material to cover prehistoric, Egyptian, Chinese and other periods of art. But even in its new dress I feel that the grand old work will no longer be readily accepted. Particularly in relation to the Victorian Age and his own times, Orpen's emphasis seems hopelessly wrong. All the allegories and captions that accompany the paintings of G. F. Watts, the Lord Leightons, Alma Tademas do not make good pictures of them—Clive Bell has killed such thinking for all time—and Orpen's own work, so often prosaic and industrious, affords a clue to the pedestrian choice of his contemporaries. Modern Art as we know it was in the making all around him, but there is little evidence that he was aware of it.

It is an ironical reflection that partly because of the interest originally stimulated by the *Outline* its reappearance after thirty-odd years is in a world more 'art-wise' and less tolerant of its sentimentality.

VAL VALLIS

University of Queensland

Documents of Gestalt Psychology. Edited by MARY HENLE. University of California Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1961. pp. xi + 352. 64s.

THIS COLLECTION is intended to supplement the fundamental texts of Gestalt psychology and is in a certain sense complementary to *A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology*, edited by Willis D. Ellis (1939). With the exception of four essays by Max Wertheimer, most of the papers in the collection have been published since 1950. Part V, entitled Psychology of Expression and Art, comprises three papers: 'The Metaphor: A Psychological Inquiry' by Solomon E. Asch, reprinted from *Person Perception and Interpersonal Behavior* edited by Renato Tagiuri and Luigi Petrullo (1958), and two papers by Rudolf Arnheim: 'The Gestalt Theory of Expression', reprinted from the *Psychological Review*, May 1949, and 'Emotion and Feeling in Psychology and Art', reprinted from *Confinia Psychiatrica*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1958. The section on 'Cognitive Processes' contains papers on 'Brightness Constancy and the Nature of Achromatic Colours' by Hans Wallach, 'The Kinetic Depth Effect' by Hans Wallach and D. N. O'Connell, and 'Perception and Attention' by Wolfgang Köhler and Pauline Austin Adams, which may have a somewhat more indirect bearing upon problems of appreciation in the visual arts.

H. OSBORNE

A Croce Review

We are informed by the Instituto Italiano di Cultura that Professor Alfredo Parente, Professor of Philosophy at the Instituto Italiano di Studi Storici and Librarian of the Societa Napoletana di Storia Patria plans to publish a quarterly review, *Rivista di Studi Crociani*, bearing on every aspect of Croce's work, commenting on his ideas and relating them to modern thought.

Professor Parente is anxious to secure the collaboration of British scholars who would contribute articles on Croce's influence in this country. He offers a fee of Lire 3,000 per printed page.

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AESTHETIC APPRECIATION OF NATURE*

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I

CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS on aesthetics attend almost exclusively to the arts and very rarely to natural beauty.[1] Aesthetics is even defined by some mid-century writers as 'the philosophy of art', 'the philosophy of criticism'. Two much-quoted anthologies of aesthetics (Elton's in this country, Vivas and Krieger's in America) contain no study of natural beauty.[2] Why is this so?

For part of the answer we have to look not to philosophers' theories but to some general shifts in aesthetic taste itself. Despite appearances to the contrary (the cult of the open air, caravans, camps, excursions in the family car) serious aesthetic concern with nature is today rather an unusual phenomenon. If we regard the Wordsworthian vision as the great peak in the recent history of the subject, then we have to say that the ground declined very sharply indeed from that extraordinary summit, and that today we survey it from far below. The Wordsworthian nature was man's aesthetic and moral educator: whereas the characteristic image of twentieth-century man, as we all know, is that of a 'stranger' encompassed by a nature which is indifferent, unmeaning and 'absurd'.

The work of the sciences too has tended to produce some bewilderment and loss of nerve over the aesthetic interpretation of nature. Microscope and telescope have added vastly to our perceptual data; the forms of the ordinary landscape, ordinarily interpreted, are shown up as only a selection from countless different scales. 'What is nature?' The question can no longer be answered in terms of macroscopic, readily-discriminable, 'labelled' objects.

* A substantially longer version of this study is to appear in a volume to be published in Italian (publisher Lerici) introducing current trends in English-speaking philosophy.

On the theoretical level there are other and distinctive reasons for the neglect of natural beauty in aesthetics itself, especially in an aesthetics that seeks to make itself increasingly rigorous. Certain important features of aesthetic experience are quite unobtainable in nature—a landscape does not minutely control the spectator's response to it as does a successful work of art: it is an unframed ordinary object, in contrast to the framed, 'esoteric', 'illusory' or 'virtual' character of the art-object. And so the artefact tends to be taken as the aesthetic object *par excellence*, and the proper focus of study.

Linguistic or conceptual analysts have been understandably tempted to apply their techniques first and foremost to the arguments and manifestoes lying to hand in the writings of art critics. In the case of natural beauty, however, such a critical literature scarcely exists. The philosopher must first work out his own systematic account of the aesthetic enjoyment of nature. And this he has so far been slow—or reluctant—to do.

Having drawn attention to a neglected topic, I now want to argue that the neglect is a very bad thing: bad because aesthetics is thereby steered off from examining an important and richly complex set of relevant data; and bad because when a set of experiences is ignored in a theory relevant to them, they tend to be made less readily available as experiences. If we cannot find sensible-sounding language in which to describe them, the experiences are felt, in an embarrassed way, as off-the-map—and since off the map, seldom visited. This is specially unfortunate if for other reasons the experiences are already hard to achieve.

What, then, can contemporary aesthetics do about the topic of natural beauty?

II

If I am right that systematic description is one main lack here, I ought to supply some account of the varieties of aesthetic experience of nature. But their variety is immense, and mere cataloguing would be tedious. I shall select a few samples both interesting in themselves and useful for subsequent arguments.

We have already remarked that art-objects have a number of general characteristics not shared by objects in nature. It would be useful if we could show (and I think we can) that the absence of certain of these features is not merely privative in its effect, but can contribute valuably to the aesthetic experience of nature.

A good specimen is the degree to which the spectator can be involved in the natural aesthetic situation itself. *On occasion* he may confront natural objects as a static, disengaged observer; but far more typically

the objects envelop him on all sides. In a forest, trees surround him; he is ringed by hills, or he stands in the midst of a plain. If there is movement in the scene, the spectator may himself be in motion and his motion may be an important element in his aesthetic experience. Think, for instance, of a glider-pilot, delighting in a sense of buoyancy, in the balancing of the air-currents that hold him aloft. This sort of involvement is well expressed by Barbara Hepworth: 'What a different shape and "being" one becomes lying on the sand with the sea almost above from when standing against the wind on a sheer high cliff with seabirds circling patterns below one.'[3] We have here not only a mutual involvement of spectator and object, but also a reflexive effect by which the spectator experiences *himself* in an unusual and vivid way: and this difference is not merely noted but dwelt upon aesthetically.

If this study were on a larger scale, we should have to analyse in detail the various senses of 'aesthetic detachment' and 'involvement' that are relevant here. This could prove a more slippery investigation than in the case of art-appreciation; but a rewarding one. The spectator is, of course, aesthetically detached in the sense that he is not *using* nature, manipulating it or calculating how to manipulate it. He is both actor and spectator, ingredient in the landscape and lingering upon the sensations of being thus ingredient, playing actively with nature and letting nature as it were play with him and his awareness of himself.

Secondly: though by no means all art-objects have frames or pedestals, a great many of them share a common character in being set apart from their environment in a distinctive way. We might use the word 'frame' in an extended sense to cover not only the physical boundaries of pictures but all the various devices employed in different arts to prevent the art-object being mistaken for a natural object or for an artefact without aesthetic interest. Such devices are best thought of as aids to the recognition of the formal completeness of the art-objects themselves, their ability to sustain aesthetic interest.

In contrast natural objects are 'frameless'. This is in some ways a disadvantage aesthetically: but there are some compensations. Whatever lies beyond the frame of an art-object cannot normally become part of the aesthetic experience relevant to it. A chance train-whistle cannot be integrated into the music of a string quartet; it merely interferes with its appreciation. But where there is no frame, and where nature is our aesthetic object, a sound or a visible intrusion from beyond the original boundaries of our attention can challenge us to integrate it in our overall experience, to modify that experience so as to make room for it. This, of course, *need* not occur: we may shut it out by effort of will if it seems quite unassimilable. At any rate our creativity is set a task: and

when things go well with us we experience a sudden expansion of imagination that can be memorable in its own right.

> And, when there came a pause
> Of silence such as baffled his best skill:
> Then sometimes, in that silence, while he hung
> Listening, a gentle shock of mild surprise
> Has carried far into his heart the voice
> Of mountain-torrents . . .

If the absence of 'frame' precludes full determinateness and stability in the natural aesthetic object, it at least offers in return such unpredictable perceptual surprises; and their mere possibility imparts to the contemplation of nature a sense of adventurous openness. In a painting the frame ensures that each element of the work is determined in its perceived qualities (including emotional qualities) by a limited context. Obviously this is one kind of determinateness that cannot be achieved with natural objects. The aesthetic impact made upon us by, say, a tree is part-determined by the context we include in our view of it. A tree growing on a steep hill-slope, bent far over by the winds, may strike us as tenacious, grim, strained. But from a greater distance, when the view includes numerous similar trees on the hillside, the striking thing may be a delightful stippled patterned slope, with quite different emotional quality—quixotic or cheery. Any aesthetic quality in nature is always provisional, correctible by reference to a different, perhaps wider context or to a narrower one realized in greater detail. In positive terms this provisional character of aesthetic qualities in nature creates a restlessness, an alertness, a search for ever new standpoints and more comprehensive unities.

Lastly: we can distinguish between the particular aesthetic impact of an object, whether natural or artefact, and certain general 'background' experiences common to a great many aesthetic situations and of aesthetic value in themselves. With an art-object there is the exhilarating activity of coming to grasp its intelligibility as a perceptual whole. We find built-in guides to interpretation and contextual controls for our response. We are aware of these features as having been expressly put there by its creator. Now I think that we can locate a nearly parallel but interestingly different background experience when our object is not an artefact but a natural one. Again it is a kind of exhilaration, a delight in the fact that the forms of the natural world *offer scope* for the exercise of imagination, that leaf pattern chimes with vein pattern, cloud form with mountain form and mountain form with human form. Indeed, when nature is pronounced to be 'beautiful'—not in the narrower sense of that word, which contrasts 'beautiful' with 'picturesque' or 'comic',

but in the wide sense equivalent to 'aesthetically interesting' and 'aesthetically excellent'—an important part of our meaning is just this, that nature's forms do provide this scope for imaginative play. For that is surely not analytically true: it might have been otherwise.

I have been arguing that certain important differences between natural objects and art-objects furnish grounds for distinctive and valuable types of aesthetic experience of nature. These are types of experience that art cannot provide to the same extent as nature, or cannot provide at all. Supposing that a person's aesthetic education fails to reckon with these differences, supposing it instils in him the attitudes, the tactics of approach, the expectations proper to the appreciation of art-works only, such a person will either pay very little aesthetic heed to natural objects or else will heed them in the wrong way. He will look—and of course look in vain—for what can be found and enjoyed only in art. Furthermore, one cannot be at all certain that he will seriously ask himself whether there might be other tactics more proper and more fruitful for the aesthetic appreciation of nature.

III

Accounts of the aesthetic appreciation of nature have sometimes focused upon the contemplating of single natural objects in their individuality and uniqueness. They have centred upon the formal organization of such objects or their colours and textures. Other writers, with greater metaphysical daring, or rashness, have spoken of the aesthetic enjoyment of nature as leading to the disclosure of 'unity' in nature, or as tending towards an ideal of 'oneness with nature'. The formulations vary greatly and substantially among themselves: but the vocabulary of unity, oneness as the key aesthetic principle, is the recurrent theme.[4]

There are strong influences in contemporary British philosophy that prompt one to have the fullest sympathy with a particularist approach to natural beauty—as the contemplating of individual objects with their aesthetically interesting perceptual qualities; and to have very little sympathy for the more grandiose language of 'oneness with' or 'in' nature. None the less, it seems to me that we do not have here one good and one bad aesthetic approach, the first sane and the second absurd. Rather we have two well-separated landmarks between which lies a range of aesthetic possibilities: and in the mapping of this range those landmarks will play a valuable role.

We must begin by frankly denying the universal aesthetic need for unity, unity of form, quality, structure, or of anything else. We can take pleasure in sheer plurality, in the stars of the night sky, in a birdsong

without beginning, middle or end. And yet to make 'unity' in some sense one's key concept need not be simply wrong-headed or obscurantist. I want to argue that there are certain incompletenesses in the experience of the isolated particular that produce a *nisus* towards the other pole, the pole of unity. But there is not a single type of unification or union: *several* notions are to be distinguished within the ideal.

We have already noted the nisus towards more and more comprehensive or adequate survey of the context that determines the perceived qualities of a natural object or scene. Our motives are, in part, the desire for a certain integrity or 'truth' in our aesthetic experience of nature: and of this more shortly. We know also that in all aesthetic experience it is contextual complexity that, more than any other single factor, makes possible the minute discrimination of emotional qualities; and such discrimination is accorded high aesthetic value. It is largely the pursuit of such value that moves us to accept what I called 'the challenge to integrate'—to take notice of and to accept as aesthetically relevant some shape or sound that initially lies outside the limit of our attention.

The expansion of context does not have to be a spatial expansion. What else can it be? Supposing I am walking over a wide expanse of sand and mud. The quality of the scene is perhaps that of wild, glad emptiness. But suppose that I bring to bear upon the scene my knowledge that this is a tidal basin, the tide being out. I see myself now as virtually walking on what is for half the day sea-bed. The wild glad emptiness may be tempered by a disturbing weirdness. Thus, in addition to spatial extension (or sometimes instead of it), we may aim at enriching the interpretative element of our experience, taking this not as theoretical 'knowledge-about' the object or scene, but as helping to determine the aesthetic impact it makes upon us. 'Unity' here plays a purely 'regulative' role. Nature is not a 'given whole', nor indeed is knowledge about it. And in any case there are psychological limits to the expansion process; a degree of complexity is reached beyond which there will be no increase in discrimination of perceptual or emotional qualities.

A second movement away from contemplation of uninterpreted particulars is sometimes known as the 'humanizing' or the 'spiritualizing' of nature. I shall merely note its existence and relevance here, for there have been a good many accounts of it in the history of aesthetics. Coleridge said that: 'Art is . . . the power of humanizing nature, of infusing the thoughts and passions of man into every thing which is the object of his contemplation.'[5] And Hegel, that the aim of art is 'to strip the outer world of its stubborn foreignness'.[6] What is here said about art is no less true of aesthetic experience of nature itself. Imaginative activity is working for a *rapprochement* between the spectator and his aesthetic

object: unity is again a regulative notion, a symbol of the unattainable complete transmutation of brute external nature into a mirror of the mind.

By developing and qualifying the 'humanization' ideal we can come to see yet a third aspect of the nisus towards unity. A person who contemplates natural objects aesthetically may sometimes find their emotional quality is describable in the vocabulary of ordinary human moods and feeling—melancholy, exuberance, placidity. But not always. A particular emotional quality can be roughly *analogous* to a nameable human emotion—let us say, desolation: but the precise quality of desolation revealed in some waste or desert in nature may be quite distinctive in timbre and intensity. Aesthetic experience of nature may be experience of a range of emotion that the human scene by itself, untutored and unsupplemented, could not evoke. In Barbara Hepworth's remark, once more, to be one with nature in her sense was to realize vividly one's place in the landscape, as a form among its forms. And this is not to have nature's 'foreignness' or otherness overcome, but rather to allow that otherness free play in modifying one's everyday sense of one's own being. In this domain, again, we need not confine ourselves to the contemplating of uninterpreted particulars. In a leaf-pattern I may 'see' also blood-vessel patterns, or the patterns of branching, forked lightning: or all of these. In a spiral nebula pattern I may see the pattern of swirling waters or whirling dust. I may be aware of a network of affinities, analogous forms, spanning the inorganic or the organic world or both. My experience has a quality of *multum in parvo*. If, with Mr. Eliot, one sees 'The dance along the artery/The circulation of the lymph' as 'figured in the drift of stars', something of the aesthetic qualities of the latter (as we perceive them) may come to be transferred to the former. This is not necessarily a humanizing of nature; it may be more like a 'naturizing' of the human observer.

A fourth class of approaches to ideals of 'unity' is concerned with what we have called the 'background' quality of emotions and attitudes, common to a great many individual experiences. Here the background is a sense of reconciliation, suspension of conflict, and of being in that sense at one with the aesthetic object. This particular sort of 'at-one-ness' could hardly be present in art-experience, since it requires that the aesthetic object should be at the same time some part of the natural environment. This is the same environment from which we wrest our food, from which we have to protect ourselves in order to live, and which refuses to sustain our individual lives beyond a limited term. To attain, and sustain, the relevant detachment from such an environment in order to savour it aesthetically is in itself a fair achievement, an achievement

which suffuses the aesthetic experiences themselves with that sense of reconciliation. The objects of nature may look to us as if their *raison d'être* were precisely that we should celebrate their beauty. As Rilke put it: 'Everything beckons to us to perceive it.'[7] Or the dominant stance may be that of benediction: the Ancient Mariner 'blesses' the water-snakes at his moment of reconciliation.

This fourth type of unity-ideal could arise in the contemplation of what is itself quite *un*-unified in the other senses, the night sky again, or a mass of hills with no detectable pattern to unite them. It is more strictly a concomitant, or a by-product, of an aesthetic experience that we are already enjoying, an experience in which there may have been no synoptic grasping of patterns, relating of forms or any other sort of unifying.

I suspect that someone who tried to construct a comprehensive aesthetic theory with 'unity' as its sole key concept would obtain his comprehensiveness only by equivocating or punning over the meaning of the key expression, only by sliding and slithering from one of its many senses to another. When one sense is not applicable, another may well be. The fourth sense in particular can be relevant to vivid aesthetic experience of any natural objects whatever.

So much the worse, we may conclude, for such a theory *qua* monolithic. But to say that is not to imply that our study has yielded only negative results. This is one of several areas in aesthetics where we have to resist the temptation to work with a single supreme concept and must replace it by a *cluster* of related key concepts. In searching out the relevant key concepts, the displaced pseudo-concept may yet be a useful guide—as it is in the present case. It is not, however, adequate for all explanatory purposes.

We began our study by referring to the contemplation of uninterpreted individual natural objects in their particularity. This was not a mere starting-point to be left behind in our pursuit of the 'unities'. On the contrary, aesthetic experience remains tethered to that concern with the particular even if on a long rope. The rope is there, although the development and vitality of that experience demand that it be stretched to the full. The pull of the rope is felt when the expanding and complicating of our synopses reaches the point beyond which we shall have not more but less fine discrimination of perceptual quality. It is felt again when we risk the blurring and negating of natural forms as we really perceive them in an anxious attempt to limit our experience of nature to the savouring of stereotyped and well-domesticated emotional qualities. It is even relevant to our fourth type of unity-ideal: for the sense of reconciliation is not an independent and autonomous aesthetic ex-

perience, but hangs entirely upon the occurrence of particular experiences of particular aesthetically interesting natural objects.

IV

Although recent aesthetics has been little concerned with natural beauty as such, yet at crucial points in its analyses of *art*-experience it has frequently made comparisons between our aesthetic approach to art-objects and to objects in nature. In the light of our reflections so far we may wish to ask at this point whether the comparing has been fairly done. We have room to examine one example only.

An important part of current controversy is the assessment of the Expression Theory. The Expression Theory saw the artefact as the middle link in a communication from artist to spectator. Its critics see the artefact first and foremost as an object with certain properties, properties which are, or should be, aesthetically interesting and which in their totality control the spectator's response. This is an aesthetic approach that reduces the gulf between art-object and natural object. Both are to be approached primarily as individual, self-contained entities, exciting to contemplate by virtue of their perceived qualities. But how far can we accept this comparison? Critics of the critics have pointed out some deficiencies. They have insisted upon the irreducible relevance of linguistic and cultural context to the interpretation of a poem. Identical words might constitute *two* poems, not one, if we read them in two different historical contexts.[8]

We could extend this criticism as follows. Suppose we have two perceptually identical objects, one an artefact and the other natural. They might be a 'carved stone' of Arp and a naturally smoothed stone; a carving in wood and a piece of fallen timber. Or they might be identical in pattern, though not in material; for example, a rock face with a particular texture and marking and an abstract expressionist painting with the same texture and the same markings. If we made the most of the *rapprochement*, we should have to say that we had in each of these cases essentially *one* aesthetic object. Yet this would be a misleading conclusion. If we knew them for what they are—as artefact or natural object —we should certainly attend and respond differently to them. As we look at the rock face we may realize imaginatively the geological turmoils that produced its pattern. The realizing of these need not be a piece of extra-aesthetic reflection; it may determine for us how we see and respond to the object itself. If we interpreted and responded to the abstract painting in the same way, our interpretation would this time be merely whimsical. If we arbitrarily restricted aesthetic experience of

both nature and art to the contemplating of uninterpreted shapes and patterns, we could, of course, have the *rapprochement*. But we have seen good reason for refusing so to restrict it in the case of nature-experience, whatever be the case with art.

Take another instance. Through the eyepiece of a telescope I see the spiral nebula in Andromeda. I look next at an abstract painting in a circular frame that contains the identical visual pattern. My responses are not alike, even if each is indisputably aesthetic. My awareness that the first shapes are of enormous and remote masses of matter in motion imparts to my response a strangeness and solemnity that are not generated by the pattern alone. The abstract pattern may indeed impress by reminding me of various wheeling and swirling patterns in nature. But there is a difference between taking the pattern as that sort of reminder and on the other hand brooding on this impressive instantiation of it in the nebula.

A more lighthearted but helpful way of bringing out these points is to suppose ourselves confronted by a small object which, for all we know, may be natural or may be an artefact. We are set the task of regarding it aesthetically. I suppose that we might cast upon it an uneasy and embarrassed eye. How shall we approach it? Shall we, for instance, see in its smoothness the slow mindless grinding of centuries of tides, or the swifter and mindful operations of the sculptor's tools? Certainly, we can enjoy something of its purely formal qualities on either reckoning; but even the savouring of these is affected by non-formal factors that diverge according to the judgement we make about its origin. To sum up: the swing, in some recent aesthetics, from 'intention' to 'object' has been healthful on the whole, delivering aesthetics and criticism from a great deal of misdirected labour. But it has countered the paradoxes of expressionism with paradoxes of its own. Differences between object and object need to be reaffirmed: indiscernibly different poems or carvings become discernibly different when we reckon with their aesthetically different cultural contexts; and the contextual controls that determine how we contemplate an object in nature are different from those that shape our experience of art. In other words, we have here a central current issue in aesthetics that cannot be properly tackled without a full-scale discussion of natural beauty.

V

That, however, is not the only current issue about which the same can be said. It can be said also (and this introduces our final topic) about the analysis of such expressions as 'true', 'false', 'profound', 'shallow',

'superficial', as terms of aesthetic appraisal. These have been studied in their application to art-objects but scarcely at all in connection with nature. It might indeed be contested whether they have *any* meaningful use in the latter connection.

I think it can be shown that they have. We can best approach the topic by way of some analysis of an expression which we have used already but not explained. It is a sense of the word 'realize'. Here are some examples of the use. 'I had long known that the earth was not flat, but I never before *realized* its curvature till I watched that ship disappear on the horizon.' Here 'realize' involves making, or becoming, vivid to perception or to the imagination. Auxiliary imagings may attend my realizing of the earth's curvature, the image of my arms stretched out, fingers reaching round the sphere; and the realization of loneliness may involve imagining myself shouting but being unheard, needing help but getting none.

In some cases to realize something is simply to know or understand, where 'know' and 'understand' are analysable in dispositional terms. But our present sense of 'realize' has an essential episodic component: it is a coming-to-be-aware. In the aesthetic setting it is an experience accompanying and arising out of perceptions—perceptions upon which we dwell and linger. I am gazing, say, at a cumulus cloud when I realize its height. I do not discard, or pass beyond, the experience, as if I were judging the height of the cloud in flight-navigation (or the loneliness of the moor in planning a murder). This sort of realizing is obviously one of our chief activities in the aesthetic experiencing of nature. It has been central in earlier illustrations, the contemplation of the rock face, the spiral nebula, the ocean-smoothed stone.

But my suggestion that realizing is 'episodic', occurrent, may properly be challenged. Suppose that I am busy realizing the utter loneliness of the moor, when suddenly I discover that behind sundry bits of cover are a great many soldiers taking part in a field-exercise. Could I, without illogic, maintain that I had been realizing what is not in fact the case? Hardly. 'Realize' contains a built-in reference to truth. It has episodic components, but it cannot be exhaustively analysed in that way. I cannot be said to have realize thed strength and hardness of a tall tree-trunk if, when I then approach it, it crumbles rotten at a touch. But surely I was doing *something*: my experience did occur; and nothing that subsequently occurs can alter it.

Now this experience was, of course, the aesthetic contemplation of apparent properties. That they turn out not to be also real properties may disturb the spectator, or it may not. For some people aesthetic experience is interested not at all in reality—only in looks, seemings: indifference to truth may be part of their definition of the aesthetic. If

the soldiers appear or the tree crumbles, the aesthetic value of the prior experiences is (to those people) not in the least affected. Others take a different view. One could agree that a large range of aesthetic experience is not concerned about truth but yet attach a peculiar importance to the range that is. I am not sure that the gulf between this and the contrasted view is wholly bridgeable by argument: but some reflections can be offered along the following lines.

If we want our aesthetic experiences to be repeatable and to have stability, we shall try to ensure that new information or subsequent experimentation will not reveal the 'seemings' as illusions. If I know that the tree is rotten, I shall not be able again to savour its seeming-strength. I could, no doubt, savour its 'deceptively strong appearance'; but that would be a quite different experience from the first.

Suppose the outline of our cumulus cloud resembles that of a basket of washing, and we amuse ourselves in dwelling upon this resemblance. Suppose that on another occasion we do not dwell on such freakish aspects, but try instead to realize the inner turbulence of the cloud, the winds sweeping up within and around it, determining its structure and visible form. Should we not be ready to say that this latter experience was less superficial than the other, that it was truer to nature, and for that reason more worth having? If there can be a passage, in art, from easy beauty to difficult and more serious beauty, there can also be such passages in aesthetic contemplation of nature.

Were there not a strong nisus in that direction, how could we account for the sense of bewilderment people express over how to bring their aesthetic view of nature into accord with the discoveries of recent science? Because of these discoveries (as Sir Kenneth Clark puts it): 'the snug, sensible nature which we can see with our own eyes has ceased to satisfy our imaginations'.[9] If the aesthetic enjoyment of nature were no more than the contemplation of particular shapes and colours and movements, these discoveries could not possibly disturb it. But they do: they set the imagination a task in 'realizing'.

An objector may still insist that reference to truth is aesthetically irrelevant. To him the only relevant factors are the savouring of perceptual qualities and formal organization. But a formalist might at least be reminded that a major element in his own enjoyment is the synoptic grasping of complexities. A particular colour-patch may be seen as part of an object, as modifying the colour of adjacent patches, and as contributing to the total perceived pattern—all simultaneously. One could argue that the striving to 'realize' should be taken as adding to our powers of synopsis and that for the *exclusion* of it no good reason could be given.

But a more searching anxiety might be expressed. Sometimes indeed such realizings may enhance an aesthetic experience, but may they not sometimes destroy it? When I see the full moon rising behind the silhouetted branches of winter trees I may judge that the scene is more beautiful if I think of the moon simply as a silvery flat disc at no great distance from the trees on the skyline. Ought I to be realizing the moon's actual shape, size and distance? Why spoil my enjoyment? There may be cases where I have to choose between an aesthetic experience available only if I inhibit my realizing and on the other hand a different aesthetic experience available if I do some realizing. In our example, the first experience is of beauty (in the narrow sense); and we could not count on the alternative experience being also one of beauty, in the same sense. It might, of course, be still aesthetically exciting: that is, of beauty in the widest sense. But, the objector might press, even that cannot be guaranteed in all cases. And this is exactly the difficulty we feel about the bearing of present-day science on our vision of the natural world. Sometimes our attempts at realizing are aesthetically bleak and unrewarding; or they may fail altogether, as perhaps with some cosmologies and cosmogonies. Compromises, the balancing of one aesthetic requirement against another, may well be inevitable. One may say in a particular case: 'this is the nearest I can come to making imaginatively vivid what I know about that object. My realizing is still not quite adequate to my knowledge; but if I were to go any further in that direction, I should lose touch altogether with the sights, sounds and movements of the visible world seen from the human point of view. And that would impoverish, not enrich, my total aesthetic experience.' What we should be feeling again is the tug of the rope that tethers aesthetic experience to the perception of the particular object and its perceived individuality.

To be able to say anything more confident about this problem one would need to hold a metaphysical and religious view of nature and science which denied that the imaginative assimilating of scientific knowledge could ultimately lead to aesthetic impoverishment. That possibility we can only take note of in this essay without being able to explore it.

We may recall at the same time, and in conclusion, that some important accounts of natural beauty have, historically, been closely allied with various sorts of nature-mysticism. I have argued that there are in fact not one but several unity-ideals; that it is most unlikely that any single aesthetic experience can fully and simultaneously realize them all; and I believe that with certain of them the notion of full attainment makes dubious sense. Yet the idea of their ever more intense and com-

prehensive attainment is not without value, and the link with nature-mystical experiences need not be severed.[10]

Very tentatively, I suspect that no more materials are required than those with which we are already furnished in order to render available certain limited varieties of mystical experience, and logically to map them. Those materials provide us, not with affirmations about a transcendent being or realm, but with a *focus imaginarius* that can play a regulative and practical role in the aesthetic contemplation of nature. It sees that contemplation as grounded, first and last, in particular perceptions, but as reaching out so as to relate the forms of the objects perceived to the pervasive and basic forms of nature; relating it also to the observer's own stance and setting, as himself one item in nature—a nature with whose forces he feels in harmony through the very success of this contemplative activity itself.

But even if something of the intensity and momentousness of mystical experience can be reached along such lines, this would be a mysticism without the God of theism. And surely the absence of belief in transcendence would make this quite different from a mysticism that centres upon it. Different, indeed, in the quality of available experience and in expectations aroused both for the here-and-now and the hereafter: but not so radically different as to make 'mysticism' a misnomer. Belief in a transcendent being means that, for the believer, the 'focus' is not imaginary but actual—in God; and it is doubtless psychologically easier to work towards a goal one believes to be fully realizable than towards a focus one suspects to be imaginary. Rather similarly, in ethics a student may experience a check to his practical moral confidence when he discovers that 'oughts' cannot be grounded in 'is's'. Yet it is seldom that he indulges for this reason in a permanent moral sulk. Perhaps, if I am right, it is no more reasonable to indulge in a nature-mystical sulk. But I begin to moralize: a sign that this paper has come to its proper end.

REFERENCES

[1] By 'nature' I shall simply mean all objects that are not human artefacts. I am ignoring the many possible disputes over natural objects that have received a marked, though limited, transformation at man's hands.

[2] W. Elton (ed.), *Aesthetics and Language* (1954): Vivas and Krieger (eds.), *The Problems of Aesthetics* (1953). Compare also H. Osborne's *Theory of Beauty* (1952), which likewise confines its investigation to art-experience. M. C. Beardsley's *Aesthetics* (1958) is subtitled *Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*.

Mr. Osborne defines beauty as the 'characteristic and peculiar excellence of works of art'. Professor Bearsley's opening sentence reads: 'There would

be no problems of aesthetics, in the sense in which I propose to mark out this field of study, if no one ever talked about works of art.'

[3] *Barbara Hepworth: Carvings and Drawings* (1952), chap. 4.

[4] (*a*) Graham Hough's *Image and Experience* (1960) contains some suggestive reflections stemming from his discussion of Ruskin and Roger Fry. 'By intense contemplation of . . . experiences of form and space we become conscious of the unity between ourselves and the natural world' (p. 175). 'It is Ruskin's special distinction to show . . . how the experience of the senses can lead directly to that unified apprehension of nature, and of ourselves as a part of nature, which can fairly constantly be recognized, under various mythological disguises, not only as that which gives value to aesthetic experience, but also as one of the major consolations of philosophy' (p. 176).

(*b*) The nature-mystical interpretation of unity-with-nature is briefly stated by Evelyn Underhill in her *Mysticism*. In moments of intense love for the natural world 'hints of a marvellous truth, a unity whose note is ineffable peace, shine in created things' (4th ed., 1912, p. 87).

W. T. Stace, listing the common characteristics of 'extrovertive mysticism' (to which nature-mysticism belongs), includes the following: 'The One is . . . perceived through the physical senses, in or through the multiplicity of objects.' 'The One [is apprehended more concretely] as being an inner subjectivity in all things, described variously as life, or consciousness, or a living Presence.' He adds: 'There are underground connections between the mystical and the aesthetic . . . which are at present obscure and unexplained.' (*Mysticism and Philosophy*, 1960, pp. 79, 81.)

(*c*) Coleridge wrote: 'The groundwork . . . of all true philosophy is the full apprehension of the difference between the contemplation of reason, namely that intuition of things which arises when we possess ourselves as one with the whole . . . and that which presents itself when . . . we think of ourselves as separated beings, and place nature in antithesis to the mind, as object to subject, thing to thought, death to life.' (*The Friend*, Bohn Ed., p. 366.)

These brief quotations, culled in near-random fashion from very diverse historical contexts, may suffice to show at least the existence of some of the tendencies with which we shall be concerned.

[5] *Biographia Literaria*, vol. II, 'On Poesy or Art'.

[6] *Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art* (trans. Bosanquet, 1886), p. 59.

[7] *Later Poems* (ed. Leishman), p. 128.

[8] See H. S. Eveling, 'Composition and Criticism', *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1958–9.

[9] *Landscape into Art* (1949), Pelican Books, 1956, p. 150. Sir Kenneth Clark is writing of art and artists, but his points are no less relevant to a contemplation of nature that never passes into the constructing of art objects.

[10] Compare, once again, Graham Hough, *Image and Experience* (1960), pp. 174 f.

NOTES ON ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND AESTHETICS*

Jerome Stolnitz

WE HAVE been told often enough of the 'barrenness' and 'woolliness'[1] of aesthetics, that, relative to the other philosophical disciplines, 'aesthetics is a retarded child'.[2] Not that it has done much good. Those whose interest in the arts has been chiefly historical or technical, or who conceived of aesthetics as *belllelettristic* or as an exercise in speculative psychology, were not and could not have been expected to be greatly moved by the charge. Those professional philosophers, by far the lion's share, who disdained aesthetics, found themselves confirmed by it. Something more than a jeremiad was required, if the jeremiad was to have any positive effect. The recent analytic movement had its origins in a keen, even agonized awareness of the fatuities and inconclusiveness of traditional philosophy. But its leaders articulated their discouragement by an elaborate conceptual machinery for locating error, tracing it to its source, and thereby eliminating it. Aestheticians are probably the most parochial of philosophers, but only those who are just devoid of historical self-awareness will want to deny the appositeness of such a challenge to their own field.

Aesthetics, characteristically, felt the impact of the analytic movement relatively late. This is partly because, as has been noted, aesthetics has been a somewhat peripheral study. More significant is the fact—a paradoxical one—that, if I may put it so, aestheticians have not earned the right to the kind of despair that animated the early analysts. The justification of induction, the nature of perception, the denotation of 'good' —each of these had been the subject, throughout the twentieth century, of an intense, highly technical, and acute dialectic. Most of the viable

* This is a revised version of a paper read at the symposium 'Analytic Philosophy and Aesthetics' held at the annual meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics, October 1962.

alternatives in each area had been expounded powerfully and their contradictories canvassed. Still no accord or any clear way of knowing how, if at all, it could be achieved. There was no comparable dialectic in aesthetics. For one thing the philosophical quality of thought and writing in this field was markedly inferior. More important, dialectic demands that its terms of reference be clearly defined, else there can be no genuinely common issue about which the contenders are arrayed. This condition was not met in large measure, both because of the vagueness of the chief concepts and also because theorists, who thought themselves opposed on 'the nature of art' were actually concerned with very different things, *e.g.* the provenance of the art-object as distinct from its internal structure. Finally, even when the alternatives were pointed to the same issue in aesthetics they were not so much exclusive, as their proponents thought, as complementary of each other. Given the impasse between phenomenalism and realism, a way out was to consider them alternative languages for the same facts. It was, by contrast, quite possible to think that the theories of form, representation, and expression called attention to different but not incompatible aspects of art and could therefore be reconciled in electicism.[3] If the aestheticians felt little despair, this was not because their field was more highly developed than the others, but for the opposite reason.

If this is a fair account, then we can begin to specify the ways in which the influence of the analytic movement can be expected to be salutary. I have mentioned its keen sense of the past. Unless it leads to the intemperate conclusion that the whole history of philosophy is a history of gratuitous puzzlements, this sense can liberate and cleanse the mind. It tempers with wariness our natural esteem for the sacred literature; it compels a re-assessment of history; and it puts a premium on the clarity and rigour which can alone effect an improvement over the past. Who can doubt the value of the workings of these impulses if they were brought over into aesthetics, a field so often marked by bland disregard of the follies of the past or else an incapacity to recognize them as such?

So too if—as it necessarily must—the analytic movement brings with it the reflexive concern of philosophy with its own nature. In the recent analysts, as in their forebears, this question is in the forefront of consciousness, and it surrounds and plays upon inquiry even when it is not being explicitly raised. The kind of dialectic in aesthetics just described, in which the talk is at cross-purposes and the issue goes unjoined, was the result, in large part, of failure to consider just what the field of inquiry is, what its problems are, and its boundary-relations to other fields. There is evidence closer to hand. Every single issue of this *Journal*

and of its American opposite number is a category-mistake on a large scale. It is nothing to do with the merits of the individual papers to point out that fully half of them, in each issue, could perfectly well appear in artistic, historical or other non-philosophical periodicals without the slightest incongruity. Can the same be said of the papers which are published in any other philosophical journal?

In one obvious respect it is clearly question-begging to liken either this *Journal* or its American counterpart to other philosophical journals. Both the British and American Societies make explicit provision for psychological, historical and other non-philosophical approaches to the arts and aesthetic experience. And I certainly do not wish to argue that the philosopher should pay no attention to what can be learned from these approaches. That would be fatuous and costly arrogance. But these considerations only defer the question; they do not settle it. How is it that aesthetics, apparently alone among philosophical disciplines, can so unprotestingly mingle with studies which are, on any showing, non-philosophical? The other disciplines seem to have achieved professional self-identity precisely when they separated off from the empirical studies—'natural philosophy', *science des moeurs*—with which they had been historically associated. Is it anything more than an historical accident, a symptom or effect of the 'retardation' of aesthetics, that this has not yet occurred in our field?

My point is not that we must accept the conceptions of aesthetic theory advanced by such analytic philosophers as Gallie or Passmore (Chaps. II–III). It is, rather, that the discussion of the reflexive questions which they have stimulated is long overdue. It is time for us to pursue it seriously—which is not to deny that the answers will vary, and that they will themselves be theoretical decisions at one level of aesthetic thought. Yet the ensuing debate would, in itself, help to clarify and fix the identity of philosophical aesthetics.

These opening remarks have had to do with the impulse and tone of analytic philosophy, not its method and doctrines. And indeed, as we have now had time to recognize, it is very difficult to classify together those generally considered 'analytic philosophers' in these latter terms. There are, of course, intramural divergences among the several philosophers, but the cause lies deeper. Analytic philosophy was, at its inception, diagnostic and deflationary. The techniques which it had employed for these purposes, novel, exciting, and powerful, were then turned to constructive ends. But whereas there had been a vigorous and overt account of the nature of deflationary philosophy, there was no corresponding statement for this new mode of philosophical activity.

What are the purposes of philosophy and the criteria of its validity, when it is more than a technique of pathology?

The answer(s) will be worked out, if at all, *ambulando*—it is not unlikely that the similarity to traditional philosophy, professed or actual, will turn out to be not inconsiderable. Short of this, however, we must probably all agree that the achievement of the analytic movement, on its critical side alone, has been very great. It has brought home to a generation of philosophers as, probably, never before that language is not a docile and plastic instrument of thought, that it can warp and vitiate thought and betray the unwitting user. Surely the literature of aesthetics exhibits more than its share of the linguistic innocence which breeds counterfeit understanding. Thus the editor, in summing up the papers in the Elton anthology, *Aesthetics and Language*, cites the following errors in traditional aesthetics which have been exposed as such by his contributors: that 'art' stands for an essence, the facile and uncritical transposition of such terms as 'balance' from one context to another, the assumption that the traditional theories of art are genuinely empirical (pp. 3–4). The arguments used to show that these are errors are worth taking seriously, and they help to justify the analysts' scepticism of the past.

Yet there is this to be noted about the errors cited by Elton—all of them either were or might well have been spotted and shown to be errors before ever the analytic movement was heard of. Thus nominalism or positivism or simply serious intelligence could have done the job. One can see how the contributors to the Elton volume, sensitized to the duplicities of language, would be especially well-equipped for it. But there is nothing in the conclusions which mark them as the private property of analysis. What of the methods by which they are arrived at? Characteristic Wittgensteinian biases, *e.g.* the aversion to generality, the insistence on linguistic context, are clearly at work. And yet the approach which is most generally said to be the hallmark of the analytic movement, *viz.* eliciting from ordinary usage the rules governing appropriate use, which thereby serve to specify and legislate over the philosopher's mistakes[4]—this approach is not taken in diagnosing the above errors. Why not? Is there something about ordinary aesthetic language which sets limits to the fruitfulness of this approach? This is a large question, but I want to offer some observations that bear on it.

Whose usage? Take first the man who has no professional concern with the arts and whose personal commerce with them is fairly slight and perfunctory. Yet, at one time or another, he uses many of the aesthetic predicates. I would expect that a survey of his usage would reveal conspicuous grossness and looseness. (I base this on hearing such

people talk.) There will be, predictably, a certain amount of vagueness and ambiguity, but this in itself is neither fatal nor peculiar to the aesthetic. Rather the conditions of significance will be loose in the extreme, sometimes to the point of little less than irresponsibility. If this be the case, the hope of working out a 'logic' for this language will have to be severely qualified.

Aestheticians have commented on the fluidity of 'art' in ordinary discourse, but in fact, I think, the two other major terms, 'aesthetic' and 'beautiful', are much worse off. 'Aesthetic' is of some interest in its own right because it was originally a philosopher's word which has now filtered down. But it is no good attempting to dismiss the technical neologism or to refine it by appeal to non-technical use. 'Aesthetic' seems often to be used interchangeably with 'beautiful' or with 'artistic', which is of no help. When the term is not used in either of these ways it apparently has a more inclusive reference, but it is not at all clear what this is or that it remains recognizably the same in different utterances. Prof. Weitz has drawn upon Wittgenstein in order to show that no definition of 'art' is to be found or should be sought, but he claims that certain applications of the term are paradigm cases.[5] One could grant this or even go further, to argue not implausibly that, say, skilled human workmanship is a necessary condition in the case of 'art'. But with how much confidence could a comparable argument be advanced for 'aesthetic'? Aestheticians are constrained to use this term which, in the recent history of their subject, has become at least as important as 'art' and 'beauty', and they must therefore specify its significance-conditions. To do so, however, will take the form of a decision which owes little or nothing to ordinary usage. In this not unimportant case it is difficult to see the point of a detailed examination of such usage, even as a preliminary. The uses of 'beautiful' are somewhat easier to make out, but the problem of its 'logic' is knotty. It makes good sense and it is instructive to say that a 'contextual implication' of 'right' or 'probable' in ordinary discourse is that the speaker is prepared to adduce reasons. What of 'beautiful'? When it is used to ascribe instrumental value, the same implication can reasonably be said to exist. The more important use is the attribution of intrinsic value, but here I do not see that the contextual presence of reasons can be inferred. But no more can its opposite. Or perhaps we want to say sometimes the one, sometimes the other. But how will this help?

It may be urged, with some justice, that the usage of the ordinary man settles nothing. Still there arises the unhappy possibility that the analytic philosopher will find much the same sort of thing in the language of the critic and of others instructed in the arts, with whom he is more pro-

perly concerned. The ordinary man would, save for particular and identifiable instances of carelessness or ignorance, follow the rules if they had been defined within the discourse of the critics and connoisseurs. There is an area of such discourse which is not subject to the above strictures. It includes such terms as 'cadmium orange', 'triad', 'allegory'. But however extensive and intricate such technical vocabulary may be, it makes up only a relatively small and, in respect of the motives of criticism, a relatively unimportant part of the language of criticism. The language which is used to interpret and elucidate the work of art, to hit off its expressive quality and to evaluate it, is not of this order. A fair degree of familiarity with the literature of art criticism and, particularly, many would-be 'disputes' among critics will give one a sense of linguistic waywardness and indeterminacy which differs from that of the man in his shirt-sleeves only in its pretentiousness.

If this is too harsh, then it must, I think, be qualified in this way: We feel sure, on many occasions, that the critique has been genuinely communicative, that we learn from and share with the critic some insight into the structure or tone of the work which makes us more responsive to it. Even then it is a possibility seriously to be considered that our assurance is less well-founded than we think. The endemic fluidity of affective terms, the uncertainty in determining which of several possible attributions is being put forth in metaphorical discourse, the application of language to an object which is significantly unique—these are omnipresent dangers in trying to read art criticism. Our experience may, in fact, be altered by the critique, but only as by a random cause, not as the result of shared meanings. Our 'reading' of the work may be grossly unlike the critic's, but no one the wiser. The way to decide is not, usually or primarily, by reference to the 'rules' of critical discourse. It is, rather, by seeing how the operative words—which these are has to be decided too, and in the same way—function within the specific critique or, perhaps, the critic's writings generally. A familiar characterization of the art-object itself, *viz.* that its significances are intrinsic, contextual, mutually interactive, is appropriate to the criticism of the art-object. If 'the language of criticism' is taken to involve some putatively stable and commonly shared set of rules which are contextually invariant and binding upon its uses, then the attempt to work out the 'logic' of such a language is forlorn from the outset. In the literature of art criticism, I suggest, we come within hailing distance of Prof. Wisdom's 'Idiosyncrasy Platitude'—but it isn't, here, a platitude.

I have claimed that the distinction between the ordinary man and the critic is not, in the salient respect, as sharp as one might think or hope. This conclusion is re-enforced if we consider the term 'expression',

which is widely used by both, and in very much the same ways. Let me put our problem in this fashion: Austin says that 'it seems that we shall in the end always be compelled to straighten out [the ordinary uses of words] to some extent'.[6] Is it possible to set any limits *a priori* to the nature and extent of the 'straightening-out'?

In recent years a number of aestheticians have done very excellent and valuable work on 'expression'.[7] They describe themselves as criticizing the philosophical theories which take this concept to be central. It seems clear, however, that the various senses of 'expression' which they have distinguished, *e.g.* 'expressing the emotions of the artist', or 'evoking feeling in the percipient', are also to be found in non-philosophical discourse. The task of working out the conditions of use is considerably easier here than for 'aesthetic' and 'beautiful'. The intended reference of 'expression', in each of its senses, is relatively obvious, as is its function of adducing a reason in support of the value-judgement ('How expressive!'). But the recent work has brought out what is presupposed or entailed by these uses. The upshot is that most or even all of them run into serious trouble. They rest on dubious or false assumptions and/or they generate 'unnecessary or unanswerable questions'.[8] Do we want to say that the man using ordinary language is 'communicating' with us when he says: 'The music was so expressive—I have felt what the composer felt'? We know (in some sense) what he means, we understand why he is saying it, and the sentence is a staple in aesthetic discourse. But he does not and cannot know that he has 'felt what the composer felt'. Indeed, the assertion may suffer from defects more serious than just being false or unfounded. And there are comparable objections to the other uses of 'express'. Thus, given that the 'ordinary uses' have been established, the demands of reason have not been met. The latter are, without argument, binding upon us; the corresponding claim on behalf of the former, which in any event has to be made out by the analytic philosopher, is least plausible here. The 'straightening-out', if that is still the appropriate phrase, will be very drastic indeed. Will it still be 'straightening-out' if, as a result of these arguments, we decide to abandon 'expression' in aesthetics altogether?

Yet 'expression' has, to a considerable extent, dominated the non-philosopher's talk about art for something like a century, and does so still. There is no question that the word had a job to do, calling attention to features of the aesthetic object or its experience which were, for many of those who used it, the most important of all. All the while, however, it was enmeshed in opacities and confusions which have been exposed only in recent years, and only by the philosopher. 'Expression' is therefore worth the consideration of those analytic philosophers who take

linguistic survival to be a favourable sign. I have been arguing that aesthetic discourse will, more quickly and pointedly than some other modes of discourse, challenge the analyst to an examination of his assumptions. This may well be true of what is, for some, the most basic conviction of all—that the received language is a summing-up of robust and astute good sense.

It might be conjectured that the language of the aesthetic life has survived, wayward and unstable as it is, because there is no exigency in the aesthetic life itself which would inspire reform. The contrast drawn earlier between 'right' and 'probable', on the one hand, and 'beautiful', might be a clue. The aesthetic life is at once less important and less urgent than the moral or the cognitive life. It is largely devoid of the institutional prohibitions and sanctions which enforce the scruples of language as of other modes of behaviour. Perhaps, then, the aesthetic life has tolerated discourse which is, like itself, casual and irresponsible. But perhaps not, and the trouble lies deeper than social accident. Whatever the cause, the effect is tolerably clear and the approach and aspirations of analytic philosophy must be trimmed accordingly.

Analytic philosophy will perforce turn to what is *said* about aesthetic objects and therefore to criticism. It should be no surprise, therefore, that over half the papers in *Aesthetics and Language* are devoted to criticism, though sometimes the authors mean by a 'critic' someone professional and systematic, like Johnson or Ransom, sometimes anyone who passes a judgement on a work of art, and sometimes it is not clear which. Prof. Gallie, who pretty clearly means the first, says that it is 'the vocabulary and presuppositions of . . . criticism . . . from which any philosophical aesthetics must draw its raw material' (p. 13). Macdonald, who probably means the first, writes: 'The aesthetic problem is to elucidate what [the critic] does and how he does it' (p. 115)—though it is not clear whether she means by this '*the* problem of aesthetics'.

Any method whatever will single out and fasten upon the data with which it is best equipped to deal. This is neither surprising nor invidious, but it reminds us that something is being left out and that there are alternatives. Within the range of phenomena which extends from the social and psychological ambience of the artist, through his creative activity, its product, and the aesthetic experience, to criticism, the aesthetician of whatever persuasion must get a purchase at some point. He will usually organize the whole of aesthetic theory round this point. Thus in the last century or so this has often been the creative activity. So the analytic philosopher is no exception. The wisdom of his enforced selection of the terminal point can only be decided by seeing what it

leads to. The stimulating and profitable discussion of critical reasoning, which the analysts have recently triggered, counts in this decision. But what of the conception of aesthetic theory as the study of 'the vocabulary and presuppositions of criticism'?

The critic's judgement supervenes upon the aesthetic experience. If not for that experience there would be nothing for art criticism, as opposed to art history, etc., to be about. Indeed, unless the critic's judgement reflects an authentically aesthetic encounter with the work, he forfeits his authority over us. If his ostensibly aesthetic judgement is in fact an evaluation in other terms—economic, moral, snob appeal—then he is guilty of what Santayana calls 'aesthetic vulgarity'. So we must know what distinguishes the aesthetic experience before we can know even whether to entertain some judgement as properly critical. Now we can say, if we choose, that this is a question about 'the presuppositions of criticism', in Prof. Gallie's phrase, and therefore that it comes under aesthetic theory as the analysts conceive of it. But this would be purely formal and trivial. Inquiry into the nature of the aesthetic experience—perhaps it should be called 'phenomenological'—must distinguish the attitude or 'set' which governs such experience and the psychological processes aroused in the course of it. The crucial issue is whether the analysts do in fact, or, consistent with their metaphilosophical commitments, can, or, less rigorously, given their metaphilosophical propensities, are disposed to pursue this kind of inquiry.

The first alternative can be handled quickly. The contributors to the Elton volume do, in fact, say next to nothing on this question. Their treatments of the question vary widely, but none of them is very felicitous. There is, on the one hand, rather cavalier dismissal of the problem on the ground that it would involve us in introspection (p. 48). The usual description of the aesthetic experience—the product of introspection—is, on the other hand, taken for granted and drawn upon: 'Nothing but holding an object still in attention, by itself and for its own sake, would count as having an aesthetic interest in it' (pp. 166–7). Indeed all of Prof. Hampshire's essay, from which this is quoted, turns, if I understand it, on just this concept. What is objectionable in this account is just that it is not enough. There are too many questions which remain unanswered, but which have to be settled if the concept is to be viable. Is 'disinterested curiosity' aesthetic? Play? Does 'aesthetic interest' refer to one's purposes—that now we have no ulterior concern ('for its own sake')—or to one's perception—that we dwell upon the individuality of the object? Is either one of these a sufficient condition of the aesthetic? If not, how are the two related?[9]

Such questions are treated by those philosophers who address them-

selves systematically to the nature of aesthetic experience. Many of them consider the problem in its own right, without regard to criticism or other phases of the aesthetic life. There is little dialectical force in observing that analytic philosophers are not another kind of philosopher. My contention is that the analysts cannot adequately do the job they set for themselves, of 'elucidating what the critic does and how he does it', unless they expand their terms of reference to include the phenomenology of the experience without which he would do nothing and for the sake of which, as many of them hold, his criticism exists.

Among the latter are those authors in the Elton volume who hold, in one form or another, that it is the critic's function to 'convey' the work of art to his reader, so that he can become more nearly responsive to it and, perhaps, share the critic's experience (pp. 129, 137–8, 165). In itself this is, I think, one of the insights for which we are indebted to the analysts. It hits off the character of a great deal of art criticism, which had been ignored when the function was taken to be marks-giving. Beyond itself, however, it raises questions which it is imperative to answer if this view is to lay any claim to coherence. To put the chief question neatly: Can what the critic 'conveys' be inaccurate or misleading or false to the work of art? Can he get us to appreciate the work of art in the wrong way or for the wrong reasons? One alternative is to go the way of the *fin-de-siècle* 'impressionists' and answer in the negative or even deny that 'wrong' makes any sense here. Macdonald, for one, does not. She is explicit that 'some interpretations may be rejected' (p. 126), and by reference, apparently, to the qualities of the critic—whether he is 'skilful', 'sympathetic', etc. (p. 130). These criteria might turn out to be question-begging, but Macdonald hardly says enough on the matter to enable us to decide.

Yet more must be said. But how? Part of the answer, which is all that can be considered here, is to be found in those passages in which the analysts rule out certain aspects of the art-object as inappropriate to critical discourse. Having been touched, very likely, by winds of doctrine that have blown in from America in recent years, they exclude talk about origins or other contextual facts in the name of 'the work itself'. Macdonald would bar reference to the intentions and feelings of the artist or, it would seem, the creative process generally (pp. 117–18). Passmore, similarly, excludes such data from 'the aesthetic approach', and also questions of technical construction, social and historical influence, etc. (pp. 52, 54). Hampshire, again, holds that to consider the artist's purposes is to give up considering what he has created 'as a work of art' (p. 162).

Each of these proscriptions would have to be treated on its own merits.

I would, however, urge the summary objection that they are all, to a considerable extent, counter-intuitive, i.e. they run counter and fail to do justice to what we know of our experience of art-objects and the elements that make it up. The original motive of these wholesale exclusions was to protest against the kind of critical talk which degenerates into biographical maunderings or sterile technical analysis or 'social history'. We can, however, mark such criticism and know it for what it is, and yet refuse to rule out of court *all* talk about the ambience and history of the work of art. This because we know that, sometimes at least, talk about the artist's intentions lights up a work which had previously resisted our attention and brings out its tone, and that technical analysis can disclose intricacies of structure which we had earlier ignored. '(The) more we put a poem into the past [and] establish it in its historical context . . . the more its uniqueness and individuality appear. . . .'[10] We know these things because we see the difference which is made in the immediacies of our confrontation with the work by reading such criticism. Our perception is more subtle and shrewd, our response has greater amplitude. These deliverances of aesthetic experience are more coercive than any philosopher's proscriptions. The latter, wholesale and unqualified as they are, come to seem crude and dogmatic.

Criticism takes its rise out of and, so the above analysts hold, exists to subserve aesthetic appreciation. Analysis of the language of criticism must therefore always proceed in the light of its relation to appreciation. Specifically, stipulations of the legitimacy of certain critical inquiries, historical, psychological, etc., will be reasonable only when the influence of such inquiries upon aesthetic perception has been assessed. But this, once again, demands systematic attention to the phenomenology of aesthetic experience. I probably ought to add that I do not think or wish to imply that the problem of deciding which critical statements are to be legitimated and which are to be excluded becomes easy if it is set into the larger problem of what is to count as authentically aesthetic experience. Quite the contrary. The blanket exclusion of contextual criticism is, so far as that goes, a much simpler disposition of the problem. I am, however, persuaded that such locutions as 'the work of art itself' and 'what is *in* the work of art' must be approached frontally and treated systematically. They must not be used, as so often in the recent past, as though they solved the very problems which they create. I am also persuaded that their analysis proceeds most fruitfully by marking the distinction between what can enter into and sustain aesthetic attention, and what diverts or disrupts such attention.[11]

Why is it that the authors in the Elton volume say so little—either nothing or not enough—about these phenomenological issues? One can

only speculate. It may be because they are following the lead of the widely-known work done in ethics, where the emphasis has been on the judgement and where the felt experience of the agent is a much less important consideration. But the sober and fruitful insistence of the analytic movement on the peculiarity of each mode of discourse is sufficient corrective for this. It may be that they consider defining the aesthetic by reference to a distinctive attitude needlessly difficult or unprofitable. But since it was in just this way that the concept of the aesthetic was introduced and elaborated in modern theory, and since, indeed, it was out of this movement of thought that the notion of 'the work of art itself' evolved,[12] their objections ought to be argued and at length. It may be because what I have called 'phenomenological' inquiry is taken to be wholly empirical and therefore non-philosophical. But it would be distressing to think that doctrinaire programmes, designed for polemical uses, should become self-denying ordinances in the second generation of the 'revolution'. And indeed, there is less reason to think this as analytic philosophers come increasingly to argue in theory and exemplify in their practice that only by large-scale investigation of the non-linguistic context of language can logical grammar be construed.

If this approach is taken, analytic philosophy, as originally understood, will tend to assume a lesser role—ancillary, tactical, heuristic (which will show, other reasons aside, what a misnomer the phrase 'analytic philosophy' is). Aesthetics, like other disciplines, will be seen as a mélange of the empirical, the conceptual, the logical, the linguistic, or, which is to say, what philosophy in great measure has always been. Philosophy is not to be understood, let alone defined, by reference to any one of these modes of inquiry alone, but rather by reference to the dialectical purpose on behalf of which they are all marshalled. I do not venture to say what the purpose is, but only that to speak of it in the singular is misleading.

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ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY AND AESTHETICS

Bertram Jessup

AFTER I accepted the invitation to participate in this symposium* on Analytical Philosophy and Aesthetics and had written for some intelligence as to planned procedure, I was informed that there would be two sides and that I would be 'con'. I felt a bit uncomfortable in finding myself thus firmly cast in a role, and even suspected that maybe what was wanted was a sitting duck, and that I had been picked to be it. However, I settled my misgivings by taking the assignment of role as, at the worst, predictive rather than prescriptive. And in that case, I reasoned, should there be disappointment in what I turned out to be or in thinking what I would think, the failure would lie in the prediction, and not in me and my thoughts as the facts.

Actually, I think I am not, in this context, a pure-bred 'con', but rather a hybrid of some sort. For one thing, though I am not at all sure what it is, I have great respect for analytic philosophy and for its practitioners, among whom I count Socrates when he speaks as he is reported to have spoken in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* in the following pertinent passage:

> Aristippus again asking him if he knew anything beautiful, he replied, 'Many things.' 'Are they then,' inquired Aristippus, 'all alike each other?' 'Some of them,' answered Socrates, 'are as unlike one another as it is possible for them to be.' 'How then,' said he, 'can what is beautiful be unlike what is beautiful?' 'Because, assuredly,' replied Socrates, 'one man who is beautifully formed for wrestling, is unlike another who is beautifully formed for running; and a shield, which is beautifully formed for defence, is as unlike as possible to a dart, which is beautifully formed for being forcibly and swiftly hurled.'

It is not necessary to subscribe to the substantive Socratic theory of

* This paper was read in a symposium, 'Analytical Philosophy and Aesthetics' at the annual meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics at Harvard University in October 1962.

functional beauty to accept this as a piece of genuine analytic philosophizing and, as it happens, one which in its results squares quite closely with at least one major point of achievement in the current thinking of those neo-analysts who have lately turned to setting things right in aesthetics, the point, namely, that the word 'beauty' or the word 'art' has a plurality of uses.

But I am getting ahead of myself. What I really want to be saying to start with is that I find it uncommonly difficult to know what I am to talk about. In talking about analytic philosophy I ought first to know in some workable sense and measure what analytic philosophy is and what aesthetics is. I have indeed set myself to trying to find out.

I have gone to analytic philosophers, both in their writings and in their writings about their writings. From the latter I have received very little help, and, indeed, very little encouragement in asking the question which, it seems to me, I ought to ask. What they say mostly in their talk about what they are doing and who they are is that there is no such thing as analytic philosophy—no school, no movement, no common tenets or doctrines. There is, rather, an 'activity' practised by various and often disagreeing thinkers and having no more common characteristics in method or in subject interest than a respect, in Professor Max Black's phrase, for 'good craftsmanship'. If we read in the 'parade of instances' in which the activity is exhibited we will be, or at least everyone has so far been, hard put to find an 'underlying unity of purpose and method in these varied undertakings'. There are indeed family resemblances, perhaps a pervasive atmosphere or climate, and certainly strong influences commonly felt from the 'work of Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein'. But out of these there come no common properties and no common directions. There is no 'analyticism'. And when this activity is turned upon 'aesthetics' altogether, the one agreed conclusion is that there very probably is no such thing or no such field as aesthetics, and that the consequent dullness of aesthetic writing 'arises', as Passmore opines, 'from the attempt to construct a subject where there isn't one'. (*Aesthetics and Language*, p. 50.)

The consequence of this is that the present symposium is set the task of discovering the relation of analytic philosophy, when there is no such thing, to aesthetics, which according to analytic philosophy, is a subject which does not exist. If then one wants to get on with the matter, one cannot, of course, take this too seriously. When oddly disabling pronouncements are made one takes them as verbal barriers to be hurdled but not as signs to stop the whole business. At least that's what I did when I found, for instance, Professor Urmson saying on page 163 of his *Philosophical Analysis* that 'these philosophers' (analysts) 'do not constitute

a school or movement', and then concluding on page 186 that 'we have traced the history of the analytic movement and in particular the theoretical justifications of it. . . .'

Judging by what lies in between such verbal reversals, it is clear, I think, that what is to be acceptably understood is that we cannot talk generally or inclusively about either analytic philosophy or aesthetics, but only particularly and selectively about some things said by some analytic philosophers about some questions which have sometimes been called 'aesthetic'. And there is no warrant for supposing that any questions chosen for examination are either more or less basic or important than any others that might have been chosen instead. I shall proceed on this understanding. I shall not assume that I cover either field or that I raise the central issues in them.

What I shall do is to speak of certain things which have struck me in analytic aesthetic writings, either because of their frequent recurrence there, or because I have felt particular dissatisfaction with the treatment given them, or because I sometimes seem to find that analytic inquiry when pushed far enough does not differ significantly from some allegedly non-analytic method which the analytic sets itself to expose as faulty.

One of the regularly recognized functions which philosophical activity as analysis is said to perform is that of uncovering conceptual and linguistic confusions. Strawson, for instance, in the essay 'Construction and Analysis' (*The Revolution in Philosophy*), discoursing on 'the philosopher's tasks' speaks of the new philosophy as 'diagnosing philosophical disorders' in the old, and characterizes the aim generally as 'therapeutic'. This is one widely prevailing self-view among analytic philosophers, and it is a point of considerable and common emphasis among those who have turned to aesthetics. In the volume of collected essays *Aesthetics and Language* pursuit of this task is constantly evident both in statement of aim and in practice. The first and largest division of essays in this volume is directed upon what the editor calls the whole 'field of aesthetics itself' (p. 3). Traditional confusions in conceiving the field or the subject are here the objects of the linguistic therapeutic treatment. Diagnosis reveals that one of the prime sources of such confusion is the very bad philosophical habit of generalizing.

Plunging into the pitfall of generalization is the first and fatal misstep which leads to the welter of confusions and misdirections which characterizes the main body of traditional, non-analytic aesthetics. 'When in aesthetics,' says Stuart Hampshire, 'one moves from the particular to the general, one is travelling in the wrong direction.' (*Ibid.*,

p. 169.) There is then no possible righting of the course; the way forward is the way back to a new start. Diagnosis reveals the predicament and constructive analysis sets the new direction.

What is discovered right off if one does get back to solid ground for a re-starting place is that there is no such thing as 'art' in general, no such thing as 'aesthetic object', and no such things as universally applicable aesthetic standards and judgements. Also, there is no such field as 'aesthetics'. 'The "craving for generality", of which Wittgenstein speaks' (*Ibid.*, Introduction, p. 3), is morbid and needs the drastic treatment of excision. Once whole again, we will understand that: ' "Art" no more than "aesthetics", necessarily stands for one thing; [that] the presence of a verbal substantive is no guarantee that a single substance exists to correspond with it' (*Ibid.*).

To such observations I take no exception, and of such warnings, I agree, it behooves one to be mindful. Aesthetic concepts should not be closed before aesthetic investigation begins. I think so now when they are reiterated in chorus by the new analysts, and I have often thought so in the past when I met the same observations and the same advice in earlier writers—in the passage, for instance, which I quoted before from Socrates and in Worringer who, in *Abstraction and Empathy* (1908), deprecates 'the attempt to link together things of such diverse kinds with the great, nebulous word "art",' and observes that 'a great deal of mischief is wrought with the group of letters that spell "art" '. And I assent to the doctrine of pluralism in the arts in contemporary analytic writings as I did when in the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* I read James Sully saying that 'the attempt to force a thing fitted for poetry on sculpture and architecture would rob these of their distinctive value'.

These observations of anticipations and agreement may be taken as an aside which admittedly has no bearing on the question whether and how far the critical and positive analytic views are valid. But still they do help to make a point of at least historical interest. The 'revolution in philosophy', or in aesthetics, at least, is not so totally new as it is made to appear. And though, I admit, the thought occurs to me merely by free association and not through seeing an intrinsic connection, it may be that pre-revolutionary thinking in aesthetics may not all be as wrong, or as altogether wrong, as it is being made to appear. And it may be too that the new way, when it is new, is not quite as all right as it may seem to be.

In passing, again, I should like to observe that what I think *is* notably new in the 'new' way is, beyond a regrasping of earlier insights, a certain sustained resolution in sticking to them—of keeping them in sight. Per-

haps this is all that is claimed, though there are many declarations that suggest something much more radical.

I turn to my thought that perhaps the new analytic way is not all right, and, correspondingly, that possibly the old way is not all wrong. I should like to test these supposals in examining some specific analytic points of criticism against aesthetic generalization and at the same time to see what in practice is offered in its stead.

The method under attack, the method of generalizing in aesthetics, is called 'essentialism', and I see no reason to deny that the term fits. The method which is offered in its place is called 'analysis', but I think that to bring out the opposition more sharply, it may be fairly called 'particularism'. The two are then seen not only as opposing methods but also as opposing initial views as to the nature of art or aesthetic fact, in the sense that art or aesthetic fact, whatever it be, is, directly or through linguistic detour, what aesthetics is about.

Now the analytic position holds that what we have to start with is (i) a single word 'art', and (ii) a vastly loose conjunctive class of particular things, such as, paintings, poems, novels, pieces of music, sculpture, etc. The single word 'art' applies to this miscellany in no significant sense, that is it names no common property. It has multiple denotation, but no connotation at all.

The essentialist's failure is the failure to see that that is indeed all there is. He attempts to *make* the word 'art' not only cover the class nominally, for some good reason, perhaps, of practical convenience, but to name by it something in the class which isn't there—an essence, a binding common nature which holds the miscellany together, and which enables him, he supposes, to move in understanding and judgement from one to all or from all to one. He is in the depths of the pitfall of generality—in which no things, and from which no light. Sounds, perhaps, yes, but they are no other than signals or symptoms of unwitting confusion and distress.

The critical and negative task of analytic aesthetics is, of course, to tell this dismal story. I assume it told—at least synoptically. If this were all, the rest would be silence—long and eloquent perhaps, but silence all the same. But there is more: (i) to justify its conclusions, and (ii) to show alternatively how things should be rightly done. To these I now turn. As the initial wrong step in essentialism is to suppose that 'Art' stands for one thing, so the initial right step is to see that 'rather than works of art sharing common "aesthetic properties", they share a certain mode of consideration or approach. . . .' (*Aesthetics and Language*, p. 3). In this way we can say something about the experience of the many particulars

without attempting to reduce them to a spurious unity of substance. Passmore argues the mistake and the correction by an analogical appeal to an assertedly similar state of affairs in science. Writing specifically of the 'aesthetic use of "good" ' without falling into the error of 'ascribing aesthetic characters' to the work so judged, he says:

> The solution, I think, is that although there are not 'aesthetic properties' common to all good works of art, there is what we may call an aesthetic approach to works of art, just as there is a scientific way of considering a thing, without it being the case that things have scientific characters. . . . (*Ibid.*, p. 52.)

Since it is a major finding in analytical diagnosis of non-analytical aesthetics that misleading analogies are a frequent 'source of confusion in the field' (*Ibid.*, p. 4), it may not be amiss to point out that this one from the side of 'analysis' limps very badly. At least four ideas are involved in the analogy: works of art, science, aesthetic objects, and scientific objects. The analogy suggests that works of art stand to aesthetic objects as science stands to scientific objects, and that both of the second terms in each set are spurious. There are no scientific objects, and we all understand *that* in knowing that anything whatsoever may be approached or studied scientifically; but some of us, namely, the essentialists, do not see the same obvious and equally true fact respecting works of art. They suppose that works of art do indeed have common characteristics. But where *is* the analogy? I cannot find it. Properly, it seems to me, there is an analogy between works of art and science, but not between works of art and falsely supposed 'scientific objects'. It is true, I agree, that there are no 'scientific objects', in the sense of things in the world, so that some facts are there scientific and some are not—there are no common characteristics marking off scientific facts from others. So also is it true, I agree, that there are no objective aesthetic facts, so that some things in the world are aesthetic and others not. Rather, every fact is potentially aesthetic and becomes actually so when an aesthetic approach or attitude is taken towards it. But neither the scientific observation nor the aesthetic implies the non-existence of the respective *works* resulting from and characterized collectively as embodying the defining approach in each case. Most of us, I should suppose, believe that there are works of science, and that it is meaningful to speak of them collectively or in general as 'science' and not poetry or religion. And I should be inclined to think that a correctly drawn analogy between art and science would rather support us in thinking that there are works of art than to require us to dismiss the notion as absurd. If we believe that there is a class 'science' consisting of scientific works, we can also believe, on the basis of good analogy, that there is a class 'art' consisting of aesthetic works. And to

venture a step farther, generalizing aestheticians may reasonably hold that their activity and their assumption that there is a field of 'aesthetics' have about as much respectable ground as do those of the philosopher of science, working, as he thinks, in the meaningful field of philosophy of science. At least the analogy put forward against the aesthetician shows nothing to the contrary.

Mistakes in aesthetic generalization may, of course, be made. And even if generalizations are carefully guarded and correct, it may well be too that other considerations may take most of the substance out of them and prove them, with respect to certain further interests, to be trivial or barren, in the sense that they (the generalizations) will provide no principles for close aesthetic understanding and guidance for aesthetic experience. But this is quite another matter and requires independent investigation. And such investigation, one may suspect further, will prove fruitful only if it be directed upon specific generalizations and not be itself content with a blanket generalization about all generalizations.

Wide generalizations of any sort, aesthetic or other—generalizations, for example, about 'thing', 'man', or 'art',—are always and necessarily uninformative about characteristics which are not stated in the generalization in question. When definitional generalizations get rather high up in the tree of Porphyry they do tend to be useless with reference to what stands below them, but still that fact does not invalidate them in what they are. Positively, for instance, there may be no use or only a negligibly small use in defining 'art', or in saying what is good in art generally, but this does not prove that 'art' can't be defined, nor that it is of *no* use to define it. For, negatively or correctively, it may be a precisely sound and safely thin generalization which will enable us to recognize and reject extravagant or spuriously rich generalizations. Thus it is on the basis of a generalization which includes insistence that works of art are physical that there is a corrective point to Paul Ziff's analytic argument ('Art and the "Object of Art" ', *Aesthetics and Language*) against what he describes as the 'myth' 'that when we discuss a work of art we are not talking about a painting', but about some ' "imaginary" thing sometimes called the "object of art" or the "aesthetic object" '. Ziff's generalization is that works of art, whatever else, are immediate physical objects and not something independent of them (as in Croce) or perceptually built out of them (as in Pepper).

The view attacked in this example is certainly a generalization, but so is the view from which the attack is made. The point of the attack is not that the rejected view is a generalization but that it is a faulty and contrary to usage generalization. And basically, it seems to me, this is

the only point that can be made in the name of analysis or any other method—short of giving it all up and resting in silence or mysticism, sheer nominalism or gross existentialism. To take a non-aesthetic example, when we are told by Margaret MacDonald ('Natural Rights', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series, Vol. XLVII, p. 237), writing in the therapeutic analytic vein, that:

> There is no definition of Man. There is a more or less vague set of properties which characterize in varying degrees and proportions those creatures which are called 'human'.

we will I believe be persuaded not that no factually and logically acceptable definition of man is possible, but only that such a definition will not inform us about anything concerning men in the contexts in which virtually all our interests lie. But it may still be of a limited and not for that reason unimportant interest sometimes to insist by appeal to generalization and definition that man is not, say, a rodent or a crustacean. For instance, there might be reasonable caution or hesitation in incorporating the results obtained in a certain virus experiment with rats in a new serum for human beings. The reasonable hesitation would surely rest on the supposition that after all there is such a thing as man or human being and that we could, if required, say in the context how we define 'human being' or 'man' in general—meaning, of course, in this case 'biological man in general' and not something as absurd as 'general man in general'.

The conclusion which I draw from these observations is that the metaphor 'falling into the pitfalls of generality', upon which the analysts attempt to hang all the faulty generalizations which traditional aesthetics has offered is misleading and that the criticism which it conveys is strained and out of focus. Furthermore, if I may ride the metaphor for a moment, it seems to me that they, the analysts, in this particular have fallen into a pitfall of their own, namely the metaphor.

But to explain what I mean non-metaphorically, I think the case is this: The analysts are critically right in challenging and exposing as spurious or extravagant many of the generalizations which abound in major aesthetic thinking of the past. They are wrong in generalizing that these generalizations are wrong in the mere fact that they are generalizations; or, more simply, they are wrong in rejecting generalization as a method of inquiry into aesthetic matters. As a matter of fact, they don't make it work when they turn from diagnostics and therapeutics to positive analyses on their own—that is, when they show how aesthetics should be done. Thus Stuart Hampshire, in his contribution

'Logic and Appreciation', to the 'parade of instances' stands pretty firm against the method of generality and inclines with Passmore to the probability that 'Perhaps there is no subject matter' of 'aesthetics'. (*Aesthetics and Language*, p. 161). But in a later and more layish article 'Realism is not Enough' (*Saturday Review*, 24 December 1960) he does write positive aesthetics, and he does there seem to assume that there is such a field and that its matter is art. Thus he speaks of 'the place of the arts in our lives and in the life of society as a whole', and he deplores the fact that 'though we speak of art in solemn tones . . . , we seem to have no clear theory of what it is and why it is essential'. In what follows he does not dispute, but insists, rather, that Art altogether is clearly and essentially something and not something else. 'Serious art' (his phrase), for instance, is not commercial entertainment art. The latter is 'non-art' (his phrase again), or as the essentialist Collingwood would say, not 'art proper'. This is surely generalizing, and of a very inclusive range.

Passmore, though he does not venture into that range, does none the less generalize too when, for example, he writes 'poetry is a particular kind of thing, with its own properties'. (*Aesthetics and Language*, p. 42.) Thus though he is insistent that 'there are not "aesthetic properties" common to all good works of art', he does clearly seem to think that there are properties common to all poetry. Again, there is surely generalization here, and, although restrained, it is still of a fairly high degree. And the 'dullness of aesthetics' which he suspects may possibly arise 'from the attempt to construct a subject where there isn't one' may, as another possibility, arise (when it does) simply and contingently because someone is not interested in general aesthetics. And no supposition that general aesthetics is empty is needed to explain that innocent dullness.

As an example of analysis turned upon the area of art criticism or evaluation we may take an article by Helen Knight, 'The Use of "Good" in Aesthetic Judgements'. (*Ibid.*, Ch. IX.) After arguing convincingly that there is no general meaning of 'good' in aesthetic judgements, that different pictures, for example, 'are good by different criteria', she does not feel quite comfortable in resting without qualification in that conclusion. As Hume did before her, in saying that: 'It is impossible to continue in the practice of contemplating any order of beauty, without being frequently obliged to form *comparisons* between the several species and degrees of excellence. . . .' (*Essays*, 'Of the Standard of Taste'), so Dr. Knight faces the fact of meaningful and needed comparative judgements, that is, of finding general criteria for a plurality of works of art. In some cases, she allows, 'we *do* make comparative judgements where the criteria are different. Raphael's "School of Athens" is better than a water-colour by Crome or a cartoon by Max Beerbohm'. This in

spite of the fact that 'Crome and Beerbohm were aiming at completely different ends from Raphael'. And they should, we might have supposed on the basis of the main argument of the essay, be judged by completely different criteria. But here we are told that the specific or limited criteria can themselves be judged by more general criteria. Dr. Knight puts it simply and without any further analysis in saying 'that some criteria are higher than others . . . [so that] when pictures excel by some criteria we say that they are better than if they excel by others'. To this conclusion I do not object, but it does seem clear to me that in reaching it an initial short-range particularism has given way to a rather long-range generalization. That some criteria are 'higher' than others seems to mean that they are more general than others, and it is then not simply or wholly true that different pictures are good by different criteria.

Is this then merely a regrettable instance of a good philosopher nodding and slipping into the 'pitfall of generality' and not to be counted as a slip in the method itself? I think not. I believe rather that it is a good case to show that when a good philosopher gets on with the business of aesthetic inquiry he cannot do without generalization. He may start, as Dr. Knight does, by insisting against those who too often in theory or practice ignore it that 'criteria are diverse', but then find in his own further thought or practice that this does not mean that they are endlessly diverse.

The main conclusion, it seems to me, is that the analytic philosophers, taking their own aesthetic practice together with their criticism of traditional aesthetics, have missed the simple but all-important distinction between generalization and over-generalization. The distinction is certainly muffled in the rather question-begging metaphor 'pitfalls of generality'. It is basic error to generalize from one or some to all, and the analysts have in multiple instances shown that in classic aesthetics this error vitiates a good deal of the collective corpus of aesthetic literature. It is over-generalization, as almost everyone has long agreed, to generalize, as Tolstoy did, the character and purpose of Christian art into the character and purpose of all 'genuine' art; and it is over-generalization to attempt to force representational art into non-representational, as the pure formalists tried to do. But such over-generalizations do not show generalization itself to be error. When a particular over-generalization is found out the corrective is to pull back, not to give up. Actual practice of neo-analytic aesthetics so far, as I have tried to show in several examples, gives support to this conclusion. The 'new' method is not as revolutionarily new as it appears to be when regarded in its purely diagnostic role. When it is turned to getting on with positive aesthetic work, it proves new only though importantly in its insistence that prin-

ciples and limitations of sound generalization be observed. It shows not that we should not generalize, but that before we generalize we should 'look and see'. It is mindful that the test that proves a generalization good is its applicability to the facts of the experiences concerned. Professor Ryle states it when he says that: 'In saying what we think, we do not just signal what is going on in our heads; we describe, or we misdescribe reality.' (*Revolution in Philosophy*, p. 7.) Following these insistences, the analysts are doing admirably good work where often before bad work was done. But, to repeat, they are doing it not by a radically new method, but by practising, to return to Professor Black's phrase, at a high level of 'good craftsmanship'. Why should anything more be asked or claimed?

THE HISTORY OF ART AND THE HISTORY OF TASTE

Frank P. Chambers

MISS SCHAPER in her article of this title[1] is asking in effect What is a History of Art, and what is a History of Taste, and what is the relation between them? Somewhat inadvertently she is stirring up a whole hive of further questions.

So, what after all *is* a History of Art?[2] Is it a history of *things* or a history of *ideas*, or both? If it is a history of ideas, then a history of taste can hardly be excluded from it. But *whose* ideas and *whose* tastes?—presumably the ideas and tastes contemporary with the particular work of art under discussion. But then again how can the art historian translate himself into ideas and tastes not his own?

Often enough the art historian represents his own ideas and tastes and is naïvely unaware that he is doing so. He makes the tacit assumption that what he knows as 'art' has always existed and that it is for him to recount and interpret the phases through which it has passed. No doubt he can load into his text a mass of social, political and anthropological material —and most art historians today do just this—but even then how far can he hope to break out of the vicious circle of self-exposition? As is said especially of biography, it is not so much the subject's character which the biographer reveals as his own!

Miss Schaper mentions in her article Frith's *Paddington Station* and Monet's *Gare St. Lazare* and it might be possible, indeed relatively easy, to find out what were the ideas and tastes contemporary with these two paintings. There might even be persons alive today who remember the thoughts and feelings of 1877 and 1881 when the paintings were executed. Or, with a little research, some of the critical records of the time could be tracked down. In this case sufficient source material could be brought together for a history of art *and* a history of taste, and the

author thereof would be wholly absolved from falling back on interpretations of his own devising. But in many another case he might not be so fortunate.

Miss Schaper has suggested that such reflections as these have often been put forward. But this is just where *this* writer would disagree. Such reflections have very seldom been put forward. In fact there is abundant room for a new kind of History of Art, which would also be a History of Taste and in which the author would draw his interpretations—his 'assessments and implied assessments'[3]—from contemporary documents. 'Art' and what people say of it—especially what peoples of other periods have said of the art of their respective periods—could be a sensitive and infallible index of entire culture-patterns.

Miss Schaper's reflections, however, were once put forward by the late Edward Bullough, that pioneer of aesthetic studies. He used to speak in his lectures of 'Genetic Aesthetics', a clumsy term perhaps, though self-explanatory. 'It is not *our* ideas that we want to know,' he would say, 'but *theirs*.'

> . . . Only our own experiences are directly and to some extent introspectively accessible to us. What the Renaissance, the Middle Ages, the Greeks, the Egyptians, the Chinese or the primitive peoples meant when they spoke (many never spoke) of Art is ascertainable only indirectly, in their own critical and theoretic statements. Their works are no unambiguous testimony, doubly obscured as their evidence is by the confusing interpretations in our own analogies through which we have been accustomed to see them. That 'Art' has not, in its history, retained the same significance is beyond doubt. How far was the art-experience of the Greeks, Egyptians or Chinese the same as ours? How has art-experience in general come to be what it is? That is the problem of Genetic Aesthetics. . . .[4]

We should therefore answer Miss Schaper's initial question in the words of her own conclusion: 'The history of art is *also* the history of taste,' and we should add that the History of Taste as such is an inviting, still largely unexplored territory wide open to any adventurer who feels the lure of it. But whoever goes into that territory must go prepared for its difficulties. He must resolve to study the art of past periods, in Bullough's words, 'in their own critical and theoretical statements', and he must realize that those statements may sometimes be easy to come by—as in the case of Frith's and Monet's railway stations—but more often may be extremely hard, if not impossible. Sometimes the statements have been lost; sometimes they never existed. There were many long centuries, centuries often highly productive of 'art', which, again in Bullough's words, 'never spoke' and whose very silence suggests a sort of inverted significance of its own.

For there have been great works of art now vanished, but which have

left surviving 'contemporary' descriptions—such as Solomon's Temple[5] or the Mausoleum of Halicarnassus.[6] There have been great works of art which have themselves survived, but whose contemporary descriptions have vanished—such as the Parthenon.[7] There have also been those rare and happy cases where both the works of art and the contemporary descriptions have survived—such as the choir of Canterbury[8] or the Abbey of St. Denis[9]. Finally there have been the puzzling silences for which it is incumbent to find some plausible explanation. What, for example, is to be made of the following?

> . . . . It is astonishing that the (mediaeval) scholastics, all of them clerics or monks, themselves witnesses of the growth of the cathedrals, who celebrated mass in them, heard confession, preached, who had a voice in the plans, superintended the building activity, managed the finances, who philosophized on the 'beautiful' and wrote treatises, never refer to Gothic by a single word and do not mention a single cathedral. . . . Besides them there are numberless mediaeval historians to whose statements we owe our ability to date particular edifices in whole or in part, but they, too, never think of wasting a word on the Gothic element of Gothic architecture or its 'beauty'. . . .[10]

It is out of this sort of testimony that somebody some day must work out a History of Art which is also a History of Taste.[11]

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[2] Heather Martienssen, *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, vol. II, no. 3, July 1962, p. 203.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 202.

[4] Edward Bullough, *Aesthetics: Lectures and Essays*, edited by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson (1957), p. 152.

[5] 1 Kings, VI.

[6] Pliny, *Natural History*, XXXVI, 5, 4. Perhaps not a 'contemporary' description, but the nearest available.

[7] Ictinus, the architect of the Parthenon, is said to have written a treatise on it. —Vitruvius, VII, Pref.

[8] *Gervasius on the Burning and Repair of the Church of Canterbury in the Year 1174*, edited by Charles Cotton, Canterbury, 1932.

[9] *Abbot Suger on the Abbey Church of St. Denis*, edited by Erwin Panofsky (1946).

[10] Paul Frankl, *The Gothic: Literary Sources and Interpretations* (1959), p. 107.

[11] But see Frank P. Chambers, *The History of Taste: An Account of the Revolutions of Art Criticism and Theory in Europe* (1932).

A PREHISTORIC ART CYCLE IN MALTA[1]

D. H. Trump

PREHISTORIC ART to most people means the paintings and engravings of the Old Stone Age in the caves of France and Spain, but this is far from being its only manifestation. Man has always given to his artefacts something more than their functional requirements demand, and one hopes he always will. This in its humble way is surely art, even if it is no longer as meaningful to us as it was to its original makers. Higher up the scale there comes a point where suddenly this non-utilitarian aspect of man's handicrafts does retain the power to move us today, and here the artistic content is unarguable. Whether we are moved to admiration or abhorrence does not affect the issue: the object has 'got something'; it is certainly art.

Study of prehistoric material from this point of view is greatly hampered by the fragmentary nature of the evidence, which makes objective treatment correspondingly difficult. Even more, we can only guess at the ideas behind it since ideas from times before writing are extraordinarily ephemeral. As art on textiles, wood, the human skin or other perishable material only exceptionally survives, one has to rely on pottery, architecture and sculpture in stone, bone, metal or terracotta for information on the artistic sensibility of long-since-disappeared cultures and peoples. Misleading though this can be, it is the best we can do.

Malta is fortunate in that a great wealth of ceramics, sculpture and architecture has survived from the Copper Age, which there covers roughly the period 2800 to 1500 B.C. In architecture, despite some very unusual contemporary models and drawings, probably architects' drafts, the surviving remains are inadequate for aesthetic assessment. It requires a highly trained appreciation to be moved by a building reduced to little more than its ground plan. Though a new analysis of

Maltese temple architecture is desirable[3] it would be out of place here.

Sculpture is in slightly better case in that the finished works have survived in fair numbers, though with an unfortunate shortage of heads. Most, however, come from early excavations and therefore cannot be related to particular levels and so to particular phases in the sequence. Any discussion of how some come to have this element of meaningfulness whilst others lack it is doomed from the start by this lack of time scale, though its presence or absence here is more noticeable than in any other prehistoric material from Malta. The figurines were dealt with fully many years ago[3] and few new ones have come to light since. But again a re-appraisal from the artistic viewpoint would be of considerable interest. Some surviving pieces, such as the 'Sleeping Lady' of Hal Saflieni and the 'Venus of Malta' from Ħaġar Qim are by any standards magnificent. Even the numerous figures seated with the knees to one side from Ħaġar Qim and Tarxien can be excused both their excessive corpulence and their monotony when their curves form so pleasing a design.

The only way in which the historical development of the sculpture can be examined is by following the much better documented if lowlier art form of the pottery and relating the sculpture back to it where possible. Since the whole sequence of the prehistoric development of Malta has been worked out primarily from the pottery[4] and, in its revised form, is now fully supported by stratigraphy, the difficulty of the time scale does not appear. However, at the time of writing this scale is relative only. Though we know which phase and which pottery style precedes and succeeds which, we shall not know until radiocarbon analyses now in progress are completed how many years each stage of the development took, nor how distant they are in time from the present. The over-all dates quoted above, 2800 to 1500 B.C., are merely guesses from the archaeological evidence. By study of the pottery, then, we get a story something like this.

The first human settlers of the islands of Malta arrived about the middle of the fourth millennium B.C. from Sicily, only sixty miles to the north. They brought with them the Neolithic crafts of agriculture, animal husbandry, the flaking and grinding of stone tools, pottery manufacture, etc. This first period of Malta's prehistory has nothing outstanding to be noted here.

The second period begins with another immigration from Sicily. This culture, named after tombs found near the village of Zebbuġ in 1947, is related to that of San Cono which opens the Sicilian Copper Age.[5] Though no metal has been found on Maltese sites as early as this, it is best considered Copper Age too, to emphasize on the one hand the

cultural break since the preceding phases and on the other the close link with Sicily at this time. The pottery in this phase was made in three main wares. The commonest is of black fabric with a polished grey surface, and is nearly always, especially on the finer vessels, decorated with scratched lines holding a white paste made from gypsum. The second main ware is a yellow-buff colour all through, scratch-decorated and white-filled on the smaller and finer vessels, scratched and red-ochred or undecorated on the coarser ones. Thirdly comes a black-cored ware with a cream-coloured slip painted with bright red.

The designs produced in the different techniques differ little and are of the simplest: groups of concentric arcs on the neck, one or two horizontal straight or wavy lines inside the lip, a group of converging pendant lines from the rim, a sort of network of double lines linking bosses with the neck, this especially on the painted ware. A commonly recurring feature is a motif of crossed hooks, in the clearest examples easily recognizable as a stylized human figure but usually the stylization has gone too far for this to be immediately evident. Another trick on the scratched ware, derived from the Sicilian custom of bordering groups of parallel lines with rows of dots, was to edge lines with a fringe of pits or, much more frequently, chipped triangles. Yet another was to indent the lip with a row of oval dimples. The effect of all this is pleasing in a blunt, primitive way. Though it can be traced back to its antecedents in Sicily, in Malta it can be regarded as a pioneer style transplanted from origins elsewhere. There is no continuity with the local Neolithic wares.

From the commonness of the surviving remains and the hints of development within this phase it seems to have been a long one. Mġarr, which succeeded it, appears on the contrary to have been short, little more than a transitional interlude to Ġgantija. It is named after the temples at that village, whence came a great quantity of characteristic pottery. It has since been shown that this derived from an older settlement on the site, not from the temples themselves, but this of course does not affect any analysis of the pottery style.

The burnished ware of the Mġarr phase is darker, usually brownish-black, and the scratched decoration is now better called gouged or scraped since the individual lines are much wider. They are always inlaid with white, now often given a wash of red ochre subsequently. A variant of the Żebbuġ buff ware develops into a coarse domestic pottery, but its lack of decoration excludes it from further consideration here. The painted cream-slipped ware and the little men, painted or scratched, disappear completely.

Two changes in general effect are apparent. The wide filled lines against the dark burnished surface are much bolder in their conception,



1. Jar from tomb. Żebbuġ-style decoration.



2. Bowl from tomb 2, Xemxija. Ġgantija style decoration.



3. Offering bowl with volute decoration, Tarxien temples.



4. 'Sleeping Lady.' Terra-cotta figurine from the Hypogeum.

while at the same time greater care and feeling has gone into the planning of the simple designs. These are now nearly all curvilinear, but one gets the impression that although the potters were trying hard they were still not really sure what they wanted of their designs. It is essentially a formative stage. The two subsidiary decorative tricks continue in a lighter and less obtrusive form. Parallel lines, instead of being pegged to the vase with chipped triangles are delicately stitched on with a lightly scratched fringe. The rims now bear scratched cross-lines instead of the impressed dimples.

There is an evolution in vessel shape too, but this need not be followed in detail as it is clear all along that this people's strong point was two-dimensional pattern rather than three-dimensional form,[6] at least as shown by their pottery. Their vases, though differing slightly from phase to phase, are remarkably uniform at any one time. With the scratched designs it was as a rule far otherwise.

From the formative Mġarr phase sprang the flowering of Ġgantija. It is a long phase and saw not only the origin but also most of the development of the temples for which prehistoric Malta is justly famous. It is after one of the finest of these, in the sister-island of Gozo, that the style is named. The earliest dateable carved and modelled fiġurines[7] are of this phase too. But this survey is concerned primarily with the pottery, where the richness and achievement are as obvious as anywhere.

It is difficult to do justice to this style in words. One can describe easily the distinctive features which make even small potsherds recognizable—the thin scratched and red-ochred lines, the single lines following closely below the rim and circling the base of the neck, the converging curves with hatching between them, and most characteristic of all the curve ending in a small circle, a 'cherry' or 'comet'. These are only details. What is really important about this style is that the motifs are every time worked out differently. No two vessels are identical and though each is different, each has a satisfying, balanced design of smooth-flowing curves. Cups, bowls, saucers, jars are each treated in an appropriate style built up from the same basic elements but treated differently as the shape dictates or the artist's imagination suggested to him (or more likely her). A fine collection of vessels illustrating this admirably was excavated from rock-cut tombs at Xemxija by Professor Evans in 1955. At the beginning of the phase another painted style appeared briefly but did not catch on—its broader lines had not the appeal of the finely drawn ones of the scratched ware.

The next phase, Saflieni, is another transitional one and has only recently been clearly separated from the last to be dealt with here, Tarxien. It is, however, a very important one for a survey of the pottery

from an aesthetic point of view. The main line of development, the decoration of the cup necks, seems suddenly to have run short of ideas. Where diversity was the keynote of Ġgantija, uniformity suddenly becomes the rule. A second line continues little changed from Ġgantija—the dividing of bowl necks into chequer panels, alternately void and hatched or flecked in some form. Only an occasional vessel, the bull-and-goat plate from the Hypogeum being the most outstanding example, breaks new ground. The under side of that plate shows the commonest way it may do this, a sort of puddingstone effect, oval voids against a flecked ground. The upper side, with fifteen bulls and goats scattered haphazardly across the surface, is unique.

The Saflieni phase is unlikely to have lasted long. Although the Hypogeum of Hal Saflieni itself, probably the most remarkable structure to survive from prehistoric Malta, was largely filled with this material, the carving of this underground temple must date at least in part from Ġgantija. No other temple building can be securely tied into this phase and the quantity of pottery outside the Hypogeum is small.

Up to ten years ago nine-tenths of the illustrated material from 'Neolithic Malta' came from the single phase of Tarxien, the last of the temples. That many of the temples, most of the sculpture and an overall majority of the pottery belong here has tended to obscure the fact that the civilization which produced them was already in decline. The very quantity of temple buildings and of offerings within them hints at religious obsession and economic instability. The temples now, instead of being open throughout, have closed off inner parts for a jealous and so probably disliked priesthood. These interpretations are frankly subjective and open to criticism, but they are supported by a study of the pottery.

From the Saflieni cups are derived two designs, each almost invariable, a 'boat'-shaped curve with forking ends and a running volute, both appearing in many hundreds of examples. Restoring Tarxien offering bowls from excavated sherds is like doing jigsaw puzzles with differently cut pieces but identical pictures. Even odder, the tendency for the lines of the design to become thinner has been taken to extraordinary lengths. On many vessels they are so lightly grooved that they can only be seen when light is reflected off the surface or it is dipped in water. No attempt is now made to inlay with ochre. Tradition decreed that the design should be there and the gods were still apparently satisfied even if it was no longer visible to the human eye. But such a development is doomed to speedy extinction. Although technically the fabric is better than ever before, the life has gone out of it.

That this state of affairs did not satisfy the potters is shown by the

sudden spate of new decorative techniques, all revolting against the over-sophistication and standardization of the designs so far described. Popular early in the phase was a diagonal lattice-scratching, a complete break with the curvilinear tradition but not flexible enough to satisfy for long. Sometimes the volutes were not scratched on the fired vessel but incised and dot-filled on its soft clay. This looks like an indigenous development from the fleck-filled designs occurring in Saflieni.

Some of the new techniques seem to have been imported from outside the island. An even greater break with tradition is shown by vases covered with applied round or oval studs, with parallels in the heel of Italy. The same effect is often produced by prising up pellets of clay from the soft surface. When the background was filled in with white paste the two would be indistinguishable. Another idea was to striate the whole surface, some examples of which recall a decoration common at this time in the south of France. But these are still invariable designs, and are still not nearly as common as the mass-produced volutes. One technique only suggests imagination, and that a soon-fading flicker. On coarser ware jars the surface was sometimes heavily fluted in rosette form between four vertical cordons, a vigorous design but never further exploited.

Returning to the subject of the sculpture for a moment, one could draw a parallel with the development in the pottery. The following suggestion is not capable of proof until new pieces are found in dateable contexts but does tally with the known facts and likelihoods of the case.

The real masterpieces, the sleeping lady and the Haġar Qim Venus for example, come from sites known to have been in existence by the Ġgantija phase, when the pottery was at its finest. The Tarxien temples, which were not built until the phase named after them, have produced nothing as fine as these. Apart from an inch-high face carved from a piece of stalagmite, and a seductive figure of the same height modelled from clay, the many pieces found there were either repeats of the seated figure, good but copied endlessly, or undistinguished attempts to find something new. Unfortunately the great statue of the goddess there is broken at the waist so its artistic merits cannot be easily judged. If the skirt and legs are anything to go on, this is less of a loss artistically than archaeologically. Reliance on size alone—she probably stood about nine feet high when complete—is a common device of a failing art in the vain attempt to escape from mediocrity. It is not too difficult here to see the same evidence for decline from the peak of Ġgantija that has been shown so clearly in the pottery.

Great surprise has always been expressed at the sudden complete collapse of the Maltese temple civilization. The culture of the Early Bronze

Age was another immigrant one and at a much less advanced level. Various explanations of this have been suggested—war, plague, drought. Whatever the immediate cause of the depopulation, leaving the islands empty for the newcomers, the signs of decay were already there, in the temples and in the pots. The cycle was complete and the searching for new inspiration by the Tarxien potters could not revive it. The new invaders swept it away, to make a completely new start on quite different lines.

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[1] This paper was suggested to me by the editor who, much impressed by the art of Copper Age Malta, considered that an article on it would be of interest in this journal.

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[4] J. D. Evans, *Malta*, Ancient Peoples and Places series, no. 11, 1959; D. H. Trump, 'Skorba, Malta and the Mediterranean', *Antiquity*, December 1961, p. 300.

[5] L. Bernabo Brea, *Sicily before the Greeks*, Ancient Peoples and Places, no. 3, 1957.

[6] In contrast for example to the Apennine Culture of Bronze-Age Italy or some of the pre-Inca cultures of Peru.

[7] With the exception of two Middle Neolithic figurines of very simple type discovered at Skorba in 1962 and an even simpler carved figure from one of the Żebbuġ tombs.

MILTON AND CRITICAL METHOD

David Pole

THE MOST interpreted book in the world is, I dare say, still the Bible; but its lead is no longer as sure as it used to be. Since English got a place in the universities and the new race of academic critics, not long after, mastered the ancient art of interpretation, the picture has changed; the classics of modern literature, Shakespeare first and Milton gaining, must challenge it before long. Professor Summers's book is called *The Muse's Method*; for students of the critic's method it is at least equally rewarding —and Mr. Cope's work presents us the same sort of method only carried rather further: about to the limit, I should say. Against both we may set the work of Mr. Swardson, whose critical approach is relatively conservative, and whose findings stand directly opposed to theirs.* He gives us, that is to say, a very different impression of *Paradise Lost* itself, as well as of the right way of studying it. It would doubtless be easier if we could separate the two issues; it is hard to discuss 'meta-criticism' coolly where the critical points themselves are already so controversial. But, of course, they are really inseparable. Milton, in some quarters, has been pretty freely denigrated in recent years, and his champions, understandably, feel strongly; moreover there may always be religious as well as literary issues involved. But we should gain nothing by shirking these difficulties or glossing them over. For Cope and Summers offer a defence, or rather an apotheosis, of a poet in whose vision of God, sin, justice and unfallen humanity flaws have been noted, discrepancies brought into view (Swardson spotlights some of them); and they defend him by critical methods that, roughly speaking, can accommodate anything. The poet, it would seem, can do no wrong;

* *The Muse's Method. An Introduction to Paradise Lost.* By Joseph H. Summers. Chatto & Windus. 1962. pp. x + 227. 21s. *The Metaphoric Structure of Paradise Lost.* By Jackson I. Cope. John Hopkins Press. London: Oxford University Press. 1962. pp. 182. 40s. *Poetry and the Fountain of Light.* By H. R. Swardson. Allen & Unwin. 1962. pp. 168. 25s.

worse, he can write nothing insignificant; every word bears its triple metaphorical and metaphysical load. Equipped by modern criticism with the tools—this for us is the issue—they read the works of Milton, where faults have been found in them, in the spirit in which Pope read the works of God:

> All nature is but art, unknown to thee;
> All chance, direction, which thou canst not see;
> All discord, harmony not understood;
> All partial evil, universal good.

Since Milton, even the flawed original Milton, is a very great poet, there is some call for protest; quite apart from any question of critical method.

To begin with Summers—whose work, incidentally, is much the better of the two: his lucid English is a pleasure to read (Cope's is a kind of quagmire); more, he brings real sensibility to the poetry, and cares for it as poetry, not simply as suitable material for interpretation to work on. He writes excellently of the qualities of Milton's verse, of its variety of pace and movement, of direction and tone—all pivoting on his miraculous syntax—which make it inexhaustibly surprising, permanently readable: so that Pope in *The Dunciad* quotes it as Bentley's grand achievement that his unwearied pains 'made Milton *dull*'—as though that were to do the impossible. 'Miltonic' ought not to mean 'sublime' —or not that only: it ought to mean sublime, lyrical, tender, colloquial, terse—above all, various. But to satisfy the twentieth century it is perhaps best to stress the colloquialism, a quality which has been said to be wholly foreign to him—which we find, however, above all where it properly belongs, for instance in the mutual recriminations, after the intoxication has worn off, of the fallen Adam and Eve. Summers has a fine analysis of the evening hymn in Book III, with its woven themes of rising and falling (here the method brings real rewards) and he writes well of the psychology of Adam's temptation and fall.

With his treatment of the allegory of Sin and Death his distinctive method—or the new method in general, for it was earlier used by Arnold Stein—appears more clearly. Milton has been censured for mixing substantial figures with allegorical ones, Satan with Sin and Death. Satan encounters this pair, his child and grandchild as he shortly learns, early on his journey, at the gate of Hell. Death stops his path and everything is set for a heroic conflict, when Sin intervenes—rushes between them clamouring, according to Summers, with all the sentiments of an operatic heroine. And the ludicrous effect is intentional: 'the sudden reduction of the action from the civil, military and mythological to the

domestic is essentially comic' (p. 46). (Incidentally, why on earth? The involvement of public with private themes, one would rather have thought, is eminently typical of the heroic style.) The story Sin tells is grotesque too: she refers in delicate circumlocutions to her incestuous relations with Satan and her subsequent rape at the hands (or other indistinguishable members) of Death, her own unnatural progeny. She is, unlike Adam and Milton himself, prudish and nice; she professes fine filial sentiments to her father-lover. Lastly, she anticipates, with the success of his voyage, the glorious time when Satan shall reign—Milton is certainly working out his hellish parody of Heaven—with her at his side: 'At thy right hand voluptuous, as beseems/Thy darling and thy daughter, without end' (ii, 869–70). With which lines (we are told) 'the high point of comedy' is reached (p. 53)—the high point, I suppose, like Falstaff's famous: 'Why, hear you, my masters, was it for me to kill the heir-apparent?'—though the comedy is a shade more elusive, perhaps. Her final grotesque appearance (in this episode) 'towards the Gate rouling her bestial train' (ii, 873) is claimed as endorsing this reading.

Milton is not heroic here but mock-heroic: it did not need Pope to deflate him; he had already, subtly and consciously, done the work of deflation for himself. The heroism of Hell, the grand debate, and the splendour of Satan's defiance to which we responded in Book I, all this, with a sudden change of perspective, is dwarfed and made ludicrous. So it is from a true transcendental viewpoint; Satan is an impotent and unreal goblin, breathing empty defiance. God has him 'in derision', we shall learn, and securely 'laughs at his vain designes' (v, 734–5). This is the moral, then: the Christian view transcends the heroic. Arnold Stein, as I mentioned, defended the war in heaven, the self-healing spirituous bodies which tickled Pope ('Fate urged the shears, and cut the sylph in twain,/But airy substance soon unites again') by similar manœuvres. It is all a heroic mock-battle, a battle fought—though the rebels blindly refuse to see it—against an omnipotent opponent. As to the mixing of allegory with history, Summers has a still more ingenious reply: Satan himself is half unreal, '*all* the inhabitants of Hell' (not only Sin and Death, that is to say) 'approach non-entity: they represent a denial of proper being, perversion as well as unfulfilment' (p. 54–5). I think it is in support of this metaphysical reading—though his comment is somewhat obscure—that Summers quotes a passage from Book II (which we may well be grateful for having recalled): the description of the infernal exploration, 'o're many a frozen, many a Fierie Alpe', which penetrates a region

A Universe of death, which God by curse
Created evil, for evil only good;
Where all life dies, death lives, and Nature breeds,
Perverse, all monstrous, all prodigious things,
Abominable, inutterable, and worse
Than Fables yet have feign'd, or fear conceiv'd,
Gorgons and *Hydras*, and *Chimeras* dire. (ii, 620–8)

I am not sure that I really understand the suggestion that Satan 'approaches non-entity'. Indeed there is a metaphysical doctrine that error and evil are unreal—ultimately unreal, being only the fragmentation in finite minds, or constituting finite minds, of a vision that is unified in the Absolute, in a Spinozistic *Deus sive Natura*. How the eminently personal deity of *Paradise Lost* can inflict unreal (though eternal) torture for unreal sin, is harder to see. Milton, of course, may have meant it, but if so he was a pretty bad metaphysician; and I challenge anyone to read *Paradise Lost*, keeping hold on the vision actually shown us, and think of Satan as a fragment of God's mind. Besides, we have seen those tortures and we know better; inhabitants of Hell are rightly unimpressed when you tell them that evil is unreal. And not being unreal, it is not ludicrous.

We had best honestly add that Empson is plainly right; that torturing your helpless enemies and laughing at them—even unrepentant sinners—is not a sort of behaviour usually thought of as human, far less divine. Milton himself calls it 'justice', but which theory of justice will support him? Not a utilitarian theory, obviously; nor a deontological one either. Even if, with Sir David Ross, you claim to know intuitively (an intuition that some of us lack) that wrong-doers ought to suffer proportionately, yet no sin is proportionate to endless suffering. The difficulty is flagrant enough; and one sometimes wonders how far those critics who find a perfect moral vision, a perfect harmony orchestrated in *Paradise Lost*, yet never mention it, can be in earnest about the problems that they seem to treat as most serious.

I have selected the episode at Hell Gate as typical of Summers's work. The scene as he depicts it is made so lively, the detail chosen and pointed with such skill, as to send the reader—one reader at least—back to the text, wondering how he could have missed anything so obvious. Where, alas, the impression dissolves: it just won't read mock-heroically. The tone is continuous with what went before; the passages Summers re-sets with apt epithets—with vivid glosses such as 'Sin is incapable of being low; she modulates immediately into injured innocence' (p. 49)—fall back into place. I have played the same trick back on Summers, somewhat unfairly; but the only alternative would have been to quote both Milton's passage and his commentary in full.

Of Cope's work I shall have to confine myself to a few samples of approach and method. I have read somewhere the complaint that Waldock insists on reading *Paradise Lost* as if it were a modern novel. Cope insists in reading it as if it were *Finnegans Wake*. This is not just a jibe, an irony of mine: he virtually says so himself. At least he appeals to the analogy to rebut Tillyard's 'linear', 'progressive' and Aristotelian reading. (Tillyard has the fine remark that Milton 'domesticated' the heroic poem, making the climax the reconciliation of Adam and Eve. Cope will hear nothing of a *climax*. Whatever you are, don't be linear and Aristotelian.) By an odd trick of imagination, it must be, I keep finding myself thinking of Thomas Gradgrind; I can hardly resist adapting the first sentence of *Hard Times*. 'Now, what I want are Images. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Images. Images alone are wanted in literary criticism. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. . . .' What is really wanted, I fear, is less throwing about of critical machinery; less talk of the modern mythic consciousness and metaphoric what-have-you and the realizing of time in spatial terms; more ordinary all-round literary sensibility, and a sane right-way-up approach to the poem as a whole. Some of the *impedimenta* might also have been left behind—I mean the baggage-train of learning—or only brought up when something really relevant was to be got from it. It is sad to see so much learning with so little light.

I proceed to examples. At the unfolding of the gates of Hell Sin and Satan first look out upon Chaos, described by Milton as 'a dark/Illimitable Ocean without bound' (ii, 891–2). An image, one might feel, in itself unremarkable: of course no other poet could have written the whole passage as Milton did, but whoever wrote it the comparison of Chaos to an ocean must surely have suggested itself. Cope's view is different. 'The old metaphor of the raging sea should alert us,' he writes (p. 55); (Cope being easily alerted where images are concerned, trigger-happy, one might say. Milton, incidentally, never says a *raging* sea; he only calls it 'dark' and 'illimitable'.) The moral we should draw, it would seem, is that Chaos resembles Heaven in one respect: that space and time are concepts we cannot apply to it. 'Having validated icons by looking with self-idolatry into the mirror provided by Sin, Satan has validated also the medium in which icons must exist, the medium in which his spiritual distance from the "Most High" must be perceived in the image of the fall: space' (p. 56). All this so that 'the structure of the divine irony can finally be realized': to wit, that God said—but could not really have meant—that He created Man to replace the fallen angels. Man was set upon the earth; earth is spacial; and space, apparently, is the proper element of Satan. But God will turn it all to His glory.

We were speaking just now of unnatural births, chimeras and prodigies. If this writing were merely exceptional, an isolated freak in modern criticism, I should not quote it; but it is representative of what students are given who come to universities to study literature—of one large class of criticism at least. A good course, perhaps, will be to contrast it at once with the legitimate pursuit of similar interests; and happily there are better things in Cope's book as well. What we need, to treat imagery as symbolic—to justify such treatment and, more particularly, to test given readings—is some extrinsic evidence to appeal to. Now *Paradise Lost* is certainly a poem about the Fall; and hence the recurrent imagery of rising and falling is the most promising strand. It seems further that the paradox of the 'fortunate fall', so popular at the time, was never far from Milton's mind: it is hinted at early and towards the end, through Adam's mouth, made all but explicit. So far we are on fairly firm ground. Yet criticism does not end here: it does not suffice to gather images, though images be as plentiful as blackberries, nor even to interpret them; we are studying a poem, the whole imaginative projection of a vision, and we shall want to know how they contribute to it. To see that we must look beyond imagery. The paradox is of rising through descent, of spiritual gain through humiliation. We know, also, what humility sounds like; we think, for example, of *Lear*. Only at rare moments, it seems to me, notably in Eve's great speech in Book IX and her final words in Book XII, does Milton convincingly catch that accent; he commands every other human tone, but rarely this. (It may be that speaking through a woman's mouth, whose lower status he so firmly insists on, he was able to draw on a part of himself, a layer of his own personality, not otherwise open to him.) Imagery has significance in a work such as *Paradise Lost*—poetic significance—so far as it takes up and echoes what is embodied in the main action and the characters.

I have not space to deal properly with Cope's refacing—plaster for brick—of Milton's God. Like Summers he welcomes Stein's interpretation of the war in Heaven, and seizes on the method—which is indeed a godsend for critics of this sort. But he rather surprises us by rejecting, though he finds it 'impressive', the view that God speaks non-rhetorically, tonelessly, to symbolize His unique status, His omniscience and godhead. Here Cope's scholarship serves him well; for the passage, he shows, is thick with rhetorical figures. Still, it is worth noticing as a warning of where interpretation can lead; and our interest is more in a critical style than in individual critics. (The staginess of Edith Dombey, which critics complain of, has its place, for all I know, in the mythic structure of *Dombey and Son*; it symbolizes her essentially unreal, unidimensional or theatrical role.) Cope's own view is that God by a

'decorous synecdoche' becomes a metaphorical—all-seeing, all-generative—eye: which, so far, may be true; but how it helps us with that all-too-recognizably human voice, sometimes jeering and sometimes grand, but bent mostly of self-vindication, is not clear to me.

We turn finally, perhaps not without relief, to the work of Swardson; as one might descend from a switchback to stand again on the familiar steady earth. His treatment of Milton is only a single chapter in a book devoted to a wider theme: the divided heritage, the Christian tradition and the classical, which seventeenth-century poets strove to reconcile. Milton among them—in this like his great opponents in the public sphere, the English Catholics—inherited the problems of a dual allegiance: Milton more than anyone, who made it his task to write a Christian epic, a Homeric or Virgilian poem on the Fall of Man. He surely knew the nature of his undertaking, 'above heroic' he calls it; complaining too—though here doubts suggest themselves—of the traditional battles, races and games and other epic subject-matter: 'the better fortitude/Of Patience and Heroic Martyrdom/Unsung' (ix, 31–3)—doubts, I say, because this description squares so imperfectly with the actual content of *Paradise Lost*. He constantly invokes, with careful qualification, the 'fabl'd' or 'feign'd' gods and goddess, so that their ideal glamour may invest the sacred, historical action. In spite of everything the two traditions fall apart; such is Swardson's contention. For God, the invisible author and omniscient mind of the universe, put into a heroic poem can only appear as a generalissimo, the chief of one great party—whose side we are on, so to speak. A heroic poem must be filled with 'martial bustle' (Swardson's phrase). Even before the revolt in Heaven it is much in evidence; we hear, for instance, of 'Ten thousand, thousand Ensignes high advanc'd' (v, 588); and later we find the 'unarmed Youth of Heav'n' seeking recreation (despite Milton's sneer in Book IX) in 'Heroic Games' while 'Celestial Armourie, Shields, Helmes, and Speares' hang nearby (iv, 551 and 3)—all which, surely, makes little or no sense in Christian terms.

Incongruities such as these, of course, are just what the new art of interpretation—or new application of an old art—is used by Stein and Summers to remove. Meanings are everywhere, and allegorical meanings where literal ones fail. Milton has deliberately 'placed' the heroic tradition: hence the war in heaven, which is calculatedly absurd. Now we have found Milton not always very accurate in his own programmatic statements; but for the rest Swardson has no difficulty in showing that if military activity is absurd in a Christian Heaven, God is no less implicated than Satan. There is military show in abundance before Satan's revolt. And later we hear, for instance, how Raphael was sent

'Squar'd in full Legion (such command we had)' during the creation of the earth to watch the gate of Hell and ensure that no evil spirit broke out. This was God's order 'Least hee incenst at such eruption bold/ Destruction with Creation might have mixt' (viii, 234–5). God, it would seem, being interrupted, might spoil His own work in a fit of temper (you always have to be careful with the Boss); which is no more meaningful in Christian terms than that Omnipotence should need Raphael to prevent it—which latter point Milton recollects; but hardly mends matters by turning the expedition into a military exercise designed to test discipline. Yet another mock-battle in the cosmos. Or take Gabriel defying Satan (who has been discovered in Eden):

> who more than thou
> Once fawn'd, and cring'd, and servilly ador'd
> Heav'ns awful Monarch?
>
> (iv, 957–60)

Now granting that this is a lively description, that epic encounters which wholly eschewed such writing would be hard to manage, we may still ask how far—*Paradise Lost* being a Christian poem—we are to take it seriously. If we do, we must try to give meaning to servile adoration of God—adoration which can hardly be pleasing to Him. Perhaps we can. But Satan is to be thought of as fawning and cringing—watched contemptuously, perhaps jealously too, by Gabriel and others—before the Throne. How, then, did the Monarch respond? But it only gets worse the farther we go; Milton has slipped into the notion of an earthly potentate.

Milton's interpreters, it appears, have matter to keep them occupied for a long while yet. I wish rather to ask, not how to manufacture interpretations—that no longer presents difficulties, the greater danger is overproduction—but how to test them. It is a curious thing, surely, that in a period in which methodologists elsewhere have been occupied —almost obsessed—with problems of tests and controls, falsification and so forth, so many critics seem never to have heard of them. The first general point to be noticed is only this, that the human mind is an interpretative instrument; this is its instinct and bent, it looks everywhere for pattern and meaning—and, generally speaking, it finds them. It finds them in prophecies and biblical texts; in flights of birds or leaves left in tea-cups; in imagery from dreams or from Milton; briefly, in whatever material you offer it. In fact we can generally find not only one pattern but half a dozen; which, of course, is precisely the snag, for we so far have no way of choosing between them. And this is the end of the story, the farthest we can get, unless we can find other tests to appeal to.

So with the intrepretation of poetic imagery: there is no problem in combing texts for images, and no great problem in 'interpreting' them —that is, assigning symbolic values. Our tolerance here is pretty wide; we have no rigorous criteria so there is generally a fair range of things with an equally reasonable claim to be counted as the meaning of any image. Last, manipulating these counters we must work them into some pattern that can be read as tantamount to a 'statement' or theme; and this, given the elastic rules of the game, presents no great difficulty either—at least, not once you have learnt the general trick. What you have, then, is an interpretation that fits—fitting being defined as above —the original data: and this, so far, constitutes no achievement in criticism whatever. We might, rather roughly, compare it to an untested scientific hypothesis.

I have already indicated one place at least in which we can look for further tests. We should start with what is not in dispute: *Paradise Lost* is certainly about the Fall of Man, and at least two passages refer, pretty explicitly, to the paradox of the 'fortunate fall'. In a sense the best we can do with imagery is to tie it to the main action; if we find recurrent imagery of rising and falling in a poem of this sort, it is no great stretch to give it a special significance. But of course it can acquire it in other ways too. Images may have a symbolic significance, ready for use, outside the poem; a symbol may be the common property of a culture. Or, failing that, a writer may pause or work on it to give it significance; he may establish his symbols within the poem. (Or again we find both: the river, symbolizing time, in the *Dry Salvages*, is in effect a public symbol; and Eliot also fixes it, as well as deepening it, within the poem.) This is not to say that poets never write in what we may call a private symbolism, without working in this way to establish their symbols; on the contrary, in our time especially, it has been rather common. But if so, what they write is bad poetry; for poetry must exist as a public object or not at all.

One further distinction. Imagery undoubtedly makes up a large part of the substance of poetry: it works on the reader's sensibility along with rhythm, tone, structure, for instance, or the interplay of mere sound and meaning, contributing imperceptibly to the whole effect. And this is the normal use of imagery in poetry: a thing radically different from the use of explicit symbols or symbolic images, which have to be interpreted to be understood. These latter can only exist—that is, exist objectively, in the poem as distinct from the poet's intention— where their meaning is fixed, where they are more or less pointedly focused or underlined.

The problems raised by Summers's reading of the episode at Hell Gate

are more elusive; and, of course, there is no ultimate test other than the text itself, carefully re-examined, and sensitive reading. 'Ultimate', however, needs to be stressed; we need not yet abandon hope of further guiding principles anywhere. We can, for one thing, make explicit the principles which any particular reading presupposes, and test them by looking at the consequences of applying them elsewhere. And, naturally, we can look within the poem for other passages bearing on this; we can try out our reading there too. In the present case we have, in effect, tried and got the results of that test already: Summers finds a special account to remove one anomaly; Swardson points out half a dozen others. What is still more convincing, his explanation is general; they all flow from one cause, namely the tension between Milton's Christian material and classical form. Summers's account, then, cannot be generalized; Swardson's can.

In Summers, however, there are two distinct positions to be distinguished which have an air of lending each other support and conversely, perhaps, lean on each other too. The fall of either might bring the other down with it. He finds first, in this episode, a shift of tone—from the heroic it moves abruptly to the mock-heroic—and secondly a metaphysical parable. At least the former, surely, it may be said, calls for no special comment: a poet can move from one key to another, or a critic point out such transitions, without being asked to cite special methodological principles. And examples could easily be added, though examples (our opponent will go on) seem somewhat superfluous. It is just part of imaginative writing; Shakespeare's plays abound in such changes. *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, for instance, moves between three worlds, those of the courtiers, of the fairies and of the 'rude mechanicals' of Athens. Or Plato's Socratic Dialogues, with their play of tone, their shifting level of seriousness, might serve to provide examples of similar differences less explicitly drawn.

Even so the case before us seems to me to deserve a little more scrutiny. The transition Summers finds is pretty radical—from black to white, in effect; the heroic style is turned inside out; and further, it comes wholly without warning. The verse is continuous, and so is the action. We simply follow Satan on his voyage. The different worlds of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* are each well established, with their own characters and even their own style of language, verse or prose, before they are allowed to overflow. And as to Plato, though particular shifts come without warning yet we are repeatedly warned to beware of Socrates; we know of his irony; and in difficult cases, as in the *Gorgias*, another character may serve as a sort of chorus to help us out. The myths are always clearly marked off; and in the *Republic* we are ex-

plicitly warned when the goddess speaks 'mysteriously and in jest'. In the *Ion*, I suppose, we need no warning: Socrates explains that during his own oratorical performance he was literally inspired—that is, mad—and hence cannot remember what he said. Plato may have been half in earnest, half in jest, in his theory of inspiration; but if Summers could point to anything as clear or nearly as clear as this, I might acquiesce in his reading. But the lines 'Retire, or taste thy folly, and learn by proof,/Hell-born, not to contend with Spirits of Heav'n' (686–7) do not seem to me very plainly to 'verge on the comic' (p. 47).

Summers, however, goes much further: his reading not only requires a sudden and absolute reversal of tone; Milton, with the introduction of the allegory, is supposed to break through the very form of his own poem, using the form, and the break in the form, to make a substantial metaphysical point. Now the objection here is first the old and obvious one to any critic who imports, from his own intellectual stock, material which is not actually in the poem at all. Recondite metaphysical theses are to be touched off by obscure hints—as Cope was 'alerted' by the word 'ocean'. Milton's weakness was, if anything, an overfondness for pointing morals; and he is at pains to let us know his metaphysical views, where they are relevant, through the mouth of Raphael or of God. His standards, in other words, of what constitutes poetry—publicly or objectively constitutes poetry—seem to have been rather different from Summers's. And rightly. The great passage describing the 'Universe of death' does not say that evil is unreal or only half real; it says that in this region 'nature breeds/Perverse, all monstrous, all prodigious things'.

But, after all, the thing is possible: an artist may break the illusions—like Groucho Marx with 'This is a bright red dress, only technicolor is *so* expensive'—which his own art presupposes. But there, of course, the effect is comic and meant to be comic; and we know what is happening. In general the trick is easiest to play on the stage, where the wall between actors and audience, between make-believe and reality—an invisible wall—is so evident and, as it were, clear-cut. Elsewhere to play such a trick, to play it without warning, with a serious not a ludicrous intent—this seems to presuppose a wonderful understanding between artist and audience, a perfect *rapport*. After the action in Hell we follow Satan on his flight, and first meet allegorical figures—described vividly enough to be real. Now it seems that we are meant to feel the jolt; to guess that since Sin is unreal (allegorical) Satan after all, who encounters her, cannot be wholly real either; finally, recollecting our metaphysics, to see the deep propriety in the anomaly. The point is not that all this, as a matter of historical fact, is extremely unlikely: it is that poetry as a public thing—and otherwise it is nothing—presupposes certain elastic,

but not wholly elastic, conventions or rules. This sort of interpretation, consistently applied, would take from us the conditions that make poetry possible.

Monroe Beardsley, examining criteria of critical interpretation, makes the suggestion that we should accept whatever reading of a passage makes the best poetry out of it. Now whether Summers's reading really improves the episode at the gates of Hell may be doubted; but at least it removes the anomaly of mixing allegorical figures with 'real' ones. This, then, might be claimed for it; but the proposed criterion, it seems to me, is unworkable anyway. Take any passage of crude rodomontade such as the Restoration heroic drama abounds in; to make the best of it we might treat it as pastiche. It would not make it good, but it would make it better. But on this showing anything can be anything; and, once again, poetry as a recognizable entity disappears.

But to examine this device, a work of art that breaks through its own conventions, the best place to look is in Milton himself; he uses it in *Lycidas*. The voice of St. Peter foretelling 'the ruin of our corrupted clergy then in their height' breaks through the pastoral convention, which Milton afterwards re-invokes, closing the interruption with the words,

> Return *Alpheus*, the dread voice is past,
> That shrunk thy streams; Return *Sicilian* Muse.

No doubt he was sailing near the wind, and knew it too. He takes care to let *us* know that he knew it: the change of tone is abrupt and unmistakable, and the poem leaps out of Arcady into contemporary England. Not satisfied with that, Milton gives us explicit notice of the end of the break (in later editions he added a note to the title as well). If any of these features were paralleled in the passage from *Paradise Lost*, the interpretation could claim some basis; the notable thing is their absence.

Criticism is, or should be, a serious discipline, a different thing from advocacy. The high point of the advocate's art is so to present his case as not even to draw attention to its weaknesses by defending them; to state the issue so as to bypass them from the start. The whole poem for Summers, I have said, is a great moral parable: a thousand visions, shifting perspectives, contained and harmonized within a single vision. His ear, moreover, is so finely attuned that not even inaudible harmonies pass him by. Now most readers have been shocked by certain painful discords; and here, all of a sudden, he is wonderfully deaf. He only keeps hold (he might perhaps answer) of the plain moral structure. Which is, as far as I can find, that God is God, because Milton says so, and good, presumably, because he is God. Further, he is omnipotent and laughs at

his enemies, being 'secure'; so what Satan does, and what Sin says, is mostly laughable. The question to ask here, I would suggest, is how the poetry sounds. Gabriel defying Satan sounds exactly like Satan defying Gabriel—or defying Death. They are just on different sides. Sin complains that God calls his vengeance 'justice'—which must be absurd, since God is just. Yet oddly enough she has the poet's own authority; for God allowed Satan to rise from the burning lake so that he might first seduce Man, only to see Man forgiven,

> but on himself
> Treble confusion, wrath and vengeance pour'd.
> (i, 219–20)

So it is vengeance after all; moreover it sounds like it. The devils in Hell, we are told, hold firm concord and rejoice 'in their matchless Chief' (ii, 487 and 496). What is Summers's comment? 'Every emotion except pure love of God can be corrupted. . . . Parodies and distortions of most of the theological and cardinal virtues can be found in Hell' (p. 28). Parodies and distortions seem pretty much to the point: a miraculous balance that comes level whatever the weight of the goods, a bendable yardstick that adapts—this truly is a critical find. I do not mean that such a judgement could never be right; a detective might explain a crime where the explanation involved six separate coincidences and yet be right. I mean that explanations of this sort require—to put it mildly—special care, suspicion and scrutiny; they are not to be tossed around like a juggler's balls. Critics, it seems, require to be reminded that such a subject as methodology exists.

Let us finally glance back at the poem: must we conclude that it is a bad poem, that Milton after all simply failed? He certainly failed to project that flawless image which some admirers have hallucinated; but then, it may be, he never meant to. He failed elsewhere, too: in his presentation of God, in the war in Heaven, where the heroic fuss, as Empson observes, is mere fuss, because it is about nothing. Yet we do not say the same of the action on earth or in Hell, of Satan's defiance or his despair, of Eve in her physical presence or Eve penitent. What the action in Heaven chiefly lacks is any credible *mise-en-scène*; it is not subtle parable, but a morally and metaphysically avoidable lack of props. We are not allowed to imagine what any personage does between whiles; we have no detail to fill in the set. (Only compare the beginnings of conspiracy, angry words and smouldering discontent, in the first act *Henry IV, Part I.*) Milton cannot touch on such themes: Satan, after a single brief speech (whispered to Beelzebub), hurries his legions under cover of night 'to the quarters of the North'. 'The North' is not precisely a vividly realized locality. One more short speech, and that is all

we get; emptiness seems to gape all around. But Hell is quite different: it is a place that we learn about concurrently with Satan himself; and the material setting and martial style do no harm here. There is a further perspective too: a background, sufficiently suggested, of a heroic campaign undergone under Satan's leadership—his voice 'heard so oft/In worst extreams' (i, 276–7) cannot fail to rouse the legions—which gives us all we need. (It is only later that we learn that a single day made up all the real fighting; the second being a cannonade, and the third, when the rebels 'all resistance lost', merely a rout.)

Milton's greatness is to be looked for, it seems to me, not in any subtle play of suggested meanings, of moral perspectives; rather it is a gigantic straightforwardness. It is this, that his mind baulks at nothing; every vista of ordinary experience—ordinary, though on a huge scale, and this is his strength—is entered into with tremendous whole-heartedness. The passage quoted earlier is a fair sample, describing the region in Hell which 'God by curse/Created evil', populated by monsters and freaks. Summon Dali or Kafka: the twentieth century has nothing on this. But in a twentieth-century author it would have been all of a piece, his whole range; the rest of the material would have matched. The same poet who described this land of death also described an earthly paradise and celebrated the beauty and mystery of wedded love. All which is no doubt humdrum praise, and old-fashioned, compared to the great coherences recent critics have found: better to be humdrum, I think, and praise things that are really there.

Dryden makes Charles II pray

> From plagues and agues Heav'n defend my years,
> But save me most from my petitioners.

Change the word to 'interpreters' and you have a form of prayer suitable for poets expecting immortal fame.

A FRESH LOOK AT COLLINGWOOD

R. W. Hepburn

COLLINGWOOD'S VERSION of the Expression Theory of Art suffered some harsh criticism at the hands of analytical philosophers when first they turned their attentions to aesthetics. Like Croce's and other versions it was a tempting target; for it claimed to define all the arts in terms of a single activity and seemed thereby to violate their diversity. It seemed also, by the way its key terms were deployed, to resist any empirical confirming or refuting. By calling the art-object an 'imaginary' entity Expression theories appeared to be denying, monstrously, the hard materiality of many works of art: and by seeing aesthetic success or failure as matters of successful or unsuccessful expression of emotion they seemed to make criticism impossible. For how can one test effectively whether an emotion has been communicated intact from artist to appreciator?

Some of these criticisms were, I think, valid. Expression theories were certainly muddled on the 'imaginary' status of the work of art. But they could survive the lopping off of that branch. Although some criticisms were wide of the mark, others again were close enough to function as healthy challenges to the Expression theorist to clarify and strengthen his case.

On the problem of definition of art, for instance, one must certainly reckon with the Wittgensteinian warning that some expressions have no single core of meaning, but denote various things related by 'family resemblances' only. This warning should not, however, be taken as an embargo upon the attempt to define. Our definitions may have to be complex: open-textured notions will have to receive open-textured definitions. A proposed definition, like 'Art is expression of emotion', still requires consideration on its individual merits. Again, we may agree in rejecting a theory of art that commits the 'intentionalist fallacy' and yet not convict Collingwood of committing it. 'Intention' and 'expression' (in Collingwood's sense of 'expression') have by no means an identical logic. In that sense an artist may intend, but fail, to express his emotions, and he may express what he did not intend to express.

The writings of art-critics very often tend to support, not to confute, the theory. Works of art are indeed deplored when 'inexpressive', when they merely name or describe some emotion, when they rant or 'betray' feeling, or fake emotions not really experienced. Critics seem to succeed, somehow or other, in making such judgements.

Lastly: despite the concern of many writers to set aesthetic issues clearly apart from moral issues, Collingwood's account of their deep interconnections cannot be lightly dismissed. Art is seen as the overcoming of 'corruption of consciousness'—that evasive

refusal to contemplate and respond to the human situation as it really is. The artist's role has a prophetic and therapeutic element.

These comments are for the most part echoes from Alan Donagan's spirited and scholarly account of Collingwood's aesthetics in his book *The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood.** Although I am referring chiefly to those pages which will be of most interest to readers of this *Journal*, the book is a full-scale study of Collingwood's many-sided philosophical activity, sympathetic in approach without being uncritical where criticism is due. The student of aesthetics can profit not only from Donagan's discussion of *The Principles of Art* but also from his treatment of Collingwood's philosophy of mind as developed in *The New Leviathan*, which contains some valuable material for the correcting and amplifying of the earlier work.

With these in mind, and paying due attention to the special senses 'expression' and 'emotion' are given within the theory, one has to grant that Collingwood achieved an impressive conceptual map of the province of art, that he found a 'projection' which leaves no considerable area quite unmapped and ignored. Quarrels, if any, must be chiefly over the distribution of emphases and proportions. Yet these can be serious enough.

Collingwood's theory of art is at its best in explaining how art can bring to consciousness, clarify and articulate aspects of human situations and actions. But its concepts are less well adapted to describe cases where an artist gratuitously fashions some wholly new object and brings into being with it new emotional qualities. An artist does not always derive these from previously felt vague perturbations or half-evaded emotions about his extra-aesthetic situation. They may owe their existence wholly to the resources of the medium deployed in his distinctive and original manner. The paint (or the sounds) do not always serve as clarifiers or focusing-aids, but can be instruments of sheer creation. Collingwood's concepts most naturally interpret creating as a means, ultimately, of exploring, discovering, revealing. (*Cf. op. cit.*, p. 111.) In a near-trivial sense this is true: since once a new object-and-experience has been brought into being, a new potentiality of human creativeness has *ipso facto* been discovered. But creating is not always discovering in any stronger a sense than this.

Collingwood's philosophy of mind contains a hierarchical scheme of 'levels' of consciousness. Emotions are thought of as correlated with these various levels, from the most primitive to the most reflective, and thus as no less diversified and complex than the acts of consciousness upon which they are 'charges'. Emotion, therefore, in Collingwood covers a reassuringly broad range of experience—as it would have to do to give any plausibility to the formula that all art is expression of emotion. Yet I suspect that we pay rather highly for the neatness of the formula in a smothering of distinctions. Surely, when a work of art is in fact exploratory and revelatory it can sometimes owe its worth not to its expressing of emotion but of *attitude*, or to its power to redirect our *attention* to unnoticed aspects, analogies, similarities, differences, to deliver one from habit-formed stereotyped vision—but not necessarily for the sake of the emotion thereby expressed, if any. The human failure that art helps to overcome is not only emotional failure but also the intellectual failures of inflexibility and ossification. Collingwood himself was subtly aware of all these functions of art, but wrongly treated them as subordinate to the expressing of emotion. The theory of art needs an unashamedly large and rich vocabulary to elucidate these complexities, and it is of no consequence if this compels it to exchange its one key concept for a dozen or more.

A last point: Donagan has energetically defended the Collingwood theory against the Beardsley-Wimsatt strictures on the 'intentionalist fallacy'. (Pp. 119 ff.: also *Philosophy*,

* Oxford University Press. 1962. Pp. xii 332. 42*s*.

1958, 'The Croce-Collingwood Theory of Art'.) I cannot rehearse his arguments here. But if one considers the basic question, what reference should be made to the artist's mind in any philosophical account of works of art, it is easy to see great merits in Collingwood's *general* type of answer. It is an answer that avoids the artificiality (or perversity) of treating a known human artefact as if it were merely a natural object. And it avoids the dangers of the opposite extreme: of treating the art-work as no more than a set of clues to the artist's intentions. Any viable theory has to acknowledge both that works of art are vehicles of communication and that they have a certain 'objectivity', a measure of autonomy and self-containedness. Collingwood's amply acknowledged both aspects.

CONFERENCE ON AESTHETICS

The British Society of Aesthetics will be holding a week-end conference at International Hall, Brunswick Square, W.C.1. from 13th–16th September, 1963. Three symposia are planned:

Aesthetics and the Artist
Aesthetics and Criticism
Aesthetics and Psychology

and a number of individual papers have been submitted. Among those who are expected to contribute papers are:

C. Brighton
Lt.-Col. A. E. Clements
Mikel Dufrenne—of the Sorbonne
E. Eade
J. B. Hunsdhal—of Copenhagen
Professor Bertram Jessop—University of Oregon
M. E. Johnson
Oscar Kokoschka
D. I. Masson—Leeds University
H. Morris-Jones—University College, Bangor
Eva Schaper—University of Glasgow
E. L. Wright
M. Wykes-Joyce

Further applications should be sent to the Conference Secretary, Miss P. Whitehead, 100 Wendover Court, Chiltern Street, London, W.1., who will send further details. The Conference is open to both members and non-members of the Society. The Proceedings will be published in abstract form and will be available to all who attend.

BOOK REVIEWS

Cervantes's Theory of the Novel. By E. C. RILEY. Clarendon Press. 1962. pp. xiv + 244. 30s.

CERVANTES, WHO wrote the first modern novel, took a justifiable pride in his innovations. He not infrequently comments on what he is doing or what writers should not do, but his ideas are sometimes casual, ironical or contradictory, or put into the mouths of characters who may or may not be speaking on his behalf. There has therefore been much speculation about the depth of his reading, his place in relation to the thought of his day and, needless to say, about what he really meant. His own statement of intention, his *niyat*, is to amuse and edify. This, of course, has not deterred critics from attempting to prove that his aims were quite different—as the Introduction to Part II of *Don Quixote* shows, he regarded academics as good comic material.

Some thirty years ago Dr. Américo Castro collected Cervantes's observations on a variety of topics and made it possible to appreciate his range of interests and way of thinking. Since then much has been said about the evolution of literary criticism in sixteenth-century Italy and Spain, and Mr. Riley is able to set the author's reflections against the doctrine of his time and to estimate his influence on the rise of the novel as a genre. The book is a useful contribution to Cervantine studies, and many of Mr. Riley's observations are penetrating. He has read and drawn nutriment from a good deal that many might have found jejune, and he is able to show how Cervantes gave thought to such matters as unity and variety in the plot, the way of arousing *admiratio*, diction and the appropriateness of style, and the attitude of the author to his characters. Whether this amounts to a 'theory of the novel' is more than doubtful, and the reader may feel it a pity that Mr. Riley could not have read his own conclusions before he began to write.—'The theory of the novel that has been pieced together in the preceding pages from Cervantes's critical observations, and when necessary inferred from his practical application of current poetic principles, is ample though not exhaustive, coherent though not always self-consistent. It suffers from his failure to draw conclusions. His silence on many of the outstanding features of his art is also disappointing. . . . There is little in his direct statements of literary theory to account for (*Don Quixote*). . . . Nothing that he could have said about the sixteenth-century prose romance is nearly as eloquent a statement about its nature as the story of the man who attempted to translate it into life. This metamorphosis of criticism into imaginative invention represents the final triumph of Cervantes's creative over his critical instinct.' One cannot help feeling a touch of wistfulness when Mr. Riley adds that 'simply as a literary theorist, (Cervantes) does not rank with Tasso . . .'. The retort is obvious.

To me it appears that Mr. Riley is

perhaps too ready to assume that Cervantes was a natural critic: he uses as one of his headings Lessing's dictum that 'not every critic is a genius, but every genius is a born critic'. Cervantes wrote a *Journey to Parnassus* in which he attempted to classify his contemporaries for the benefit of posterity, and his judgements are neither profound nor very interesting. Mr. Riley concedes that the work contains a good deal of flattery, which is not criticism: one might go further and say that it contains very little that is criticism. Similarly in *Don Quixote* the central theme is literary criticism; yet a whole genre is condemned by definition, and the only judgement involved is whether a handful of sinners should be saved from a backyard *auto-da-fé*. This may be sound theology, but on the surface at least it is hardly what we now understand by literary criticism.

It is true that Cervantes seems to imply that the novel should have its rules when he makes his Priest object to the books of chivalry 'which Aristotle never thought of, of which St. Basil had nothing to say and of which Cicero never heard'. It is also true that Cervantes demonstrates that the old novel of chivalry did not stand up to examination either in the light of the rules of pagan antiquity, the precepts of Christian morality or of plain commonsense. But this did not mean that all works of chivalry were to be absolutely condemned, or that it was necessary to follow a fixed set of rules in order to write a good novel. Riley notes that Cervantes's Priest warmly praises *Tirant lo Blanch*, 'a treasure of contentment and a mine of recreation', yet declares that the author 'deserved to be sent to the galleys for the rest of his life, because he did not perpetrate all those absurdities in a calculated manner (*de industria*)'. He concludes that Cervantes emerges neither as a rigorous preceptist nor as an iconoclastic innovator.

Few would dispute this. But I am not sure that it is enough to define Cervantes's essential criterion as 'rational purpose or artistic awareness'. Nor is it sure that with Cervantes 'deference to authority meant in the first instance, deference to the authority of the ancients'. The condemnation of the author of *Tirant* is clearly on moral grounds, and while the ancients might have condemned the book they would hardly have done so on the charge brought by Cervantes's Priest.

Cervantes certainly knew that in *Don Quixote* he had found a great theme, and he no less certainly perceived that the spectacle of honour humiliated and virtue confounded does not belong to the rational and perceptive surface of existence, but to its intuitive and imaginative reverse. He also knew that the free rein of the imagination was suspect, and that the novel itself might be condemned as a mere emanation of the *folle du logis*, both mad and bad. It was a new genre, and the classical advocates could not therefore help it very much. The ancient precedent for the novel of adventure was Heliodorus's *Ethiopic History*, but the preceptists were silent. Cervantes decided that the novel was a form of epic, and the same conclusion was reached by his contemporary López Pinciano, who remarks in his *Ancient Poetic Philosophy* (1956): 'I have come to realize that the *Ethiopic History* is a poem in prose.' (Mr. Riley shows that there is still no proof that Cervantes knew Pinciano's work, though it remains highly probable that he did.) In fact, the substitution of prose for verse was not in itself a difficult obstacle: one form of novel, the pastoral, had long been affiliated to the eclogue. However, narrative in prose may be technically history and Cervantes was evidently preoccupied by the relationship between story and history, and this is one point of departure for his musing on the difference between poetic and historic truth.

Nevertheless, it does not seem that Cervantes's most personal and enduring concept of the novel is to be found in his considerations of method, style or art or

in his borrowings from classical preceptists. The true fault of the novels of chivalry was that they were the product of the unbridled imagination. This faculty, if unrestricted, would cause the author to fall into absurdity and make his work appeal only to the foolish. Cervantes possessed a meticulous conscience, and a no less meticulous artistic conscience. He desired to preserve its autonomy, but autonomy is meaningless without responsibility and the honest writer, who cherishes his freedom, is loyal to the society which has bestowed it on him. He will therefore declare his intention, and consult the teachings of antiquity and of the Church. Cervantes clearly did not regard the precepts as an end in themselves. He was not participating in some literary quarrel of ancients and moderns. The novels of chivalry that are spared owe their survival to something less like literary precept than grace. This mysterious influence in its popular form, *gracia*, flows through the whole of *Don Quixote*.

HAROLD LIVERMORE
The University of British Columbia

Cántico: el mundo y la poesía de Jorge Guillén. By JAIME GIL DE BIEDMA. Editorial Seix Barral, S.A. Barcelona. 1960. pp. 189.

THE MAIN argument of this study concerns the alleged breakdown of a poetic approach essentially subjective, lyrical and hedonistic, when (to his credit) the poet extends his range to encompass the world of social and historical reality. It is hinted that this breakdown, supposedly exemplified by Guillén, is one aspect of the decay of late romantic subjectivism in general.

Guillén first published *Cántico*, a collection of seventy-five lyrics, in 1928; in successive editions this nucleus was expanded to the 334 poems of the fourth and final edition (1950). *Cántico* deals exclusively with the world of immediate personal experience expressed in its most intellectualized form: the emphasis being less on the experience in its sensuous concreteness than on the poet's *awareness* of it, the musings and reflections of the ever-vigilant thinking subject. Guillén, like Jiménez, his immediate model, is very much a 'poet of consciousness'. His style, fastidious, abstract, superbly controlled, is admirably suited to the subtlety of his thought. Underlying this, however, is a sense, exultant or serene by turns, of the wonder and beauty of life, which saves Guillén from becoming merely cerebral and gives his poetry a vigorous optimism rare indeed in our angst-ridden twentieth century.

A feature of the last edition of *Cántico*, however, is that a polemical note has entered. Though not directly referred to, the horrors of modern life have clearly disturbed the serenity and self-contemplation. The hedonist is on the defensive, proclaims his right to stand fast by his own standards (which are at least civilized) in a world gone mad. While it is true that this new manner brings with it certain *longueurs*, it is certainly an exaggeration at this stage to speak, as Biedma does, of a breakdown.

Guillén, however, did not stop here (though his critic does). Already in 1957 he had published the first of two additional volumes of verse under the significant general title *Clamor—tiempo de historia*. Here the private person, at one with his luminous world, largely gives way to the man in his historical context. Everyday reality, even in its more sordid and violent aspects, now obtrudes itself on the poet's attention. The result naturally appals the devotee of 'pure poetry' and gladdens the heart of those who will feel that Guillén has done the right thing. Both reactions, however, are liable to obscure the essential continuity of his work. True, there now occur some not too effectual attempts at satire, and at times Guillén's stylized manner shows signs of strain and even becomes a parody of itself. But the basic mood of

Cántico—its affirmation of life—still persists; and even the less lyrical side of reality is still seen through the same medium, the same sensibility, the same consciousness. Guillén in short seeks to do his own kind of poetic justice to both his worlds. Of one, the world of man in nature, he once mused that it was 'well put together': *El mundo está bien hecho*. His view of the other, the world of man in history, was distinctly less sanguine. By dividing his work between both, Guillén becomes as it were his own Leibniz and Voltaire in one.

T. P. WALDRON

Cambridge University

W. B. Yeats: His Poetry and his Thought. By A. G. STOCK. Cambridge University Press. 1961. pp. 255. 27s. 6d.

PROFESSOR STOCK has written a reliable and perceptive guide for the student who wishes to read Yeats's poetry with informed care but who has not access to everything he wrote. Presumably she has particularly in mind the foreign student whose acquaintance with Yeats criticism is limited; the chapter on 'Background' seems especially aimed at such a reader. Her audience and her aim, then, to some degree inevitably make it necessary for her to cover some tracts of ground already traversed by earlier critics like Henn, Jeffares and Hone. Readers who are equipped with prior knowledge of such critics will find no new *information* here; they will, however, find Miss Stock's a rewarding book.

Her exploration of Yeats's poetry is directed by the principle that while 'a poet's ideas cannot be detached from his words, there is nothing wrong in taking his ideas seriously: to believe that great art does not grow out of flabby thinking is not the same thing as mistaking the "message" for the greatness of the art'. This quasi-Coleridgean principle—'No man was ever yet a great poet without being at the same time a profound philosopher'—necessitates a thorough and sympathetic exploration of Yeats's developing thought and its embodiment in his poetry. As she would by any other criteria, she finds the early poems less satisfying—though she is more responsive to the dream-beauty they contain than critics who are principally alert to 'visible traces of agony'—and the later poetry great because it is thoroughly rooted in mature conviction born of thought and experience. It is true that Yeats's poetic tone and manner frequently invite—the word is used advisedly—the reader to take the thought of the poem seriously; the *Vision* and numerous other pronouncements make serious attention almost imperative; and yet Miss Stock is in danger of elevating a critical principle which seems essential for a study of Yeats's poetry into a principle of general validity. 'A poem is not great because of the belief it expounds, but when it convinces us of its greatness we know that it cannot have been made from false or trivial thoughts.' The thought behind a great poem may surely be trivial in a certain sense; it was at any rate commonplace in the case of, say, Dryden's *Absalom and Achitophel* or Pope's *Essay on Man* and, unless we are to credit the poet with the profundity of the thought he inherits from his cultural tradition, there is no philosophical originality behind Johnson's *Vanity of Human Wishes*. Miss Stock is right, of course, that 'false thoughts' in the sense of their being imperfectly grasped or penetrated will fail to generate great poetry. But what matters regarding Yeats or any other poet is not so much his ability to think with philosophical originality or profundity as the intensity with which the thought is experienced. The evidence of that experience is in the poems themselves and this is where the critic should begin. For the most part Miss Stock does begin there though occasionally one feels that, for all her disclaimers, a certain poem has excited her because it illuminates some facet of

Yeats's thought rather than because it is poetically distinguished.

The characteristic of Yeats which every critic rightly acknowledges—his dedicated integrity as a poet—provides another of Miss Stock's themes. By supplying the relevant details about the poet's career and the stages of his growth as a thinker she makes the reader aware of the significance of J. B. Yeats's observation: 'All art is *reaction from life* but never, when it is vital and great, an escape.' The period during which Yeats grew up as a poet is littered with examples of writers reacting *away* from life; their borrowed rhythms, verbal reliance on earlier poets, or repetition of worn themes betray their reluctance to grapple with actuality purposefully and personally. The handful of poems (Wilde's *Reading Gaol*, Davidson's *Thirty bob a Week*, for example, though uncertainly even there) which respond squarely to the human situation throws into relief the mass of agreeable though emasculated versifying. Yeats himself went through this phase in his own distinctive way but not without self-awareness; though his memory may have later over-dramatized the past, he claimed that by 1890 or thereabouts he was seeking a 'unity of being' that would fuse his literary, philosophical and political interests which had hitherto seemed separate. Miss Stock ably traces the process by which he eventually succeeded in holding together that element in art of personal isolation and a kind of priestly dedication with the essential participation in human activity that feeds the creative impulse. He did not 'stoop to truth' like Pope, hovering over and then swooping down; he says (in *The Coming of Wisdom with Time*) that he allowed his leaves and flowers to 'wither into truth', in the sense of letting the inevitable decay of what had come to seem superficial beauty reveal the bare, rugged strength underneath. Nevertheless the results in both cases were not too dissimilar: both men 'moralized' their song and both felt that in poetry they were handling a 'sacred weapon left for truth's defence'.

A further topic which must occupy a critic of Yeats is the significance he attached to the values represented for him by the Anglo-Irish aristocracy. Miss Stock defends Yeats on this score against the attacks of L. C. Knights and Louis MacNeice and underlines the imaginative importance of the 'big house' culture in Yeats's poetry. She remarks, for example, on the richness with which he invests the word 'ceremony'; in various poems (such as *Michael Robartes and the Dancer*, *The Second Coming*, and *A Prayer for my Daughter*) the word accumulates meaning and comes to focus one valuable realization of transcendental truths in human actions and attitudes. She is justified in emphasizing the relationship between Yeats's view of the big house culture with its roots in an evocative past and his veneration for the wisdom of the race enshrined in myth, but some other features of this controversial topic could have been more fully explored. Not only did Yeats vary in his attachment to this culture as time went on and question the extent to which he had idealized it in his own mind, but also there is a distinct variation in his poetic realization of it. In *Coole Park 1929*, to take one example, there is a striking difference between the poise and achieved formality of the last stanza—'Here, traveller, scholar, poet, take your stand/When all those rooms and passages are gone . . .'—and the closing line of the second—'A scene well set and excellent company'—which, by comparison, is on the level of a wine-merchant's advertisement for 'gracious living'. And again, it might have been worth investigating whether the eighteenth century contributed something of value to Yeats's symbolic view of the country house. Pope had a clear idea of what it stood for (as had Ben Jonson—*To Penshurst*—and Marvell—*Upon Appleton House*—before him) and, most important when thinking about Yeats, Burke makes a peculiarly important

symbol of it in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. In that work it stands, together with the noble family, for stability, tradition, a cultural heritage, and a way of living that is generous and dignified. Speaking of the liberty which is 'a noble freedom' Burke continues: 'It carries an imposing and majestic aspect. It has a pedigree and illustrating ancestors. It has its bearings and its ensigns armorial. It has its gallery of portraits; its monumental inscriptions. . . .' And one remembers the 'buildings that a haughtier age designed,/ The pacing to and fro on polished floors/ Amid great chambers and long galleries, lined / With famous portraits of our ancestors', from Yeats's *Ancestral Houses*. The suggestion is not that there was any conscious borrowing but rather that Yeats's attachment to the big house and its culture may have a more complex background than is commonly imagined. He came to recognize, of course, that what Coole Park stood for was a thing of the past, but, by attaching himself to it imaginatively he was defying the world of his own day, seeing the deficiencies of his time, and yet drawing a stubborn energy from the awareness (as Miss Stock remarks) that 'he belonged to a defeated world'.

To indicate thoroughly the comprehensive survey Miss Stock provides would be to comment on almost every important facet of Yeats's poetry and thought. One final observation must suffice and this must direct attention to the way the book is written. Not only is Professor Stock a well-informed and discriminating scholar, she also writes with an attractive urbanity and seriousness of purpose that make her book both refreshing and stimulating.

JAMES T. BOULTON
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Drama in a World of Science. By GLYNNE WICKHAM. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1962. pp. xiii + 92. 18s.

TODAY THE nature and purpose of a university are subjects for general debate. What was hitherto reserved for minority discussion of mainly interested parties (*cf.* the *Scrutiny* articles in the thirties) has now reached the Sunday papers and Government reports. The arguments flourished by the opposing factions grow familiar. On the one hand, there are the fierce defenders of intellectual standards, led usually by the Oxbridge *élite*, and on the other the champions of the vast numbers who are denied educational opportunities which practically every other civilized nation would be prepared to grant them. In *Drama in a World of Science* Professor Glynne Wickham, who holds the newly established Chair in Drama at Bristol, makes his contribution. The book consists of four lectures, one of which given to an American university audience is a survey of trends in the English Theatre since the war, another called 'Poets and Playmakers' is a lecture given at Cambridge mainly on the clash between the literary and technical demands of the theatre, but the last two deal almost wholly with the place of drama as a subject fit for study in a university and are by far the most important.

His defence carries with it some well-aimed shafts at prevailing disorders in normal academic life, the sterile research with 'Masters' theses and Doctoral dissertations neatly sorted row upon row like cremation urns' and, more profoundly, the specialization leading to an almost schizophrenic cultural climate where the claims of the intellectual Sciences are hardly on nodding terms with the sensibilities nurtured in the Arts. Drama, he claims, is not only one of the few subjects embracing 'a single homogeneous tradition' but by calling on practical skills as well as intellectual and emotional faculties can do something to heal this split. Just as Music and Architecture have long been established, even in the older universities, so even the Fine Arts have been staking a claim and Drama should legitimately have its place.

These lectures touch on a great many other aspects of cultural life here as, for example, the cult of amateurism, which Professor Wickham rightly points out so invades the English theatre that it is quite normal practice for the professionally trained actor, often with little or no cultural background even in his own field, to be directed by the product (usually of Oxbridge) who for all his wide reading and good academic degree has had no professional training in production whatever. He observes that in those countries where State and Civic theatres receive proper support (as in Germany) the amateur theatre is paid far less attention and is not considered to merit regular support at the box-office.

What this implies is that sooner or later the universities have got to come to terms with the problem of vocational training. At the moment it is a well-known fact that candidates being interviewed for the very few places are advised to avoid all reference to any future profession in order to prove their academic enthusiasm and yet once they are there, if their assurances have been genuine, they will find themselves in a tiny minority. Consequently the charge of vocational training which a course in drama uniting practical as well as literary work inevitably evokes can be answered by referring to 90 per cent of those taking other courses. In any case, would any member of the Cambridge Senate see King's College Choir abolished? Of course music was the one art that survived the Puritan onslaught in the seventeenth century; one could still sing hymns whereas theatre is not only the most ancient but the least respectable of the arts. Even in its greatest period in this country Ben Jonson had to defend himself vigorously for the effrontery of publishing his collected plays in folio form as a serious contribution to literature. For the greater part of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the social standing of the stage was as low as its products. Men like Garrick and Sheridan were the great exceptions. By the end of the century it had become acceptable owing to a variety of reasons, not the least being Queen Victoria's passion for the theatre as a young woman. Intellectually, Shaw and Granville-Barker completed what Irving and Bancroft had achieved socially. But that is only half a century ago —a very recent time for an Oxbridge Senior Common Room. In the Redbrick faculties the difficulty is less academic than due to lack of interest and talent. Puritanism always had deeper roots in the provinces, despite its champions in the City of London, and it is no accident that those leading actors and producers who have been to a university almost invariably come from Oxford or Cambridge.

These are some of the topics discussed by Professor Wickham in his lectures and they are treated with a seriousness and intelligence that merit attention. There is obviously a great deal more to be said on all sides but to consider a Degree in Drama as equivalent to majoring in Business Management at an American university should be resisted by anyone seriously interested not only in the arts but in the cultural health of this country and the rather uncertain future of its increasingly leisured society. If the universities are not to set a lead in this matter it is hard to see from where else it can come.

ERIC CAPON
Guildhall School of Music and Drama

Primitive Song. By C. M. BOWRA. Weidenfeld & Nicholson. 1962. pp. xiv + 303. 36s.

SELDOM HAS such a wide range of scholarship and experience been brought to bear on an obscure musical problem. Sir Maurice Bowra brings to his study of Primitive Song a rich and authoritative store of knowledge, the result of studies and research in literature and poetry, with emphasis on analytical, inspirational, aesthetic and creative aspects of words and

the theory of poetry, which can assure musicians that here is a new and exciting approach to the origins of song.

The obscurity of the subject is obvious, for whereas a study of the earliest musical instruments can be made from sculpture, paintings and even cave drawings, and the method of tone-production, performance and sound can be estimated and the actual instruments reproduced (as seen in the works of Galpin and Schlesinger) the origin of song, the sounds produced, the words and movements seem to most musicians to be wrapped in the mists of antiquity. But with the reservations which all scholarly minds maintain when faced with the mysterious, Sir Maurice makes a convincing and reasoned reconstruction of the factors which contribute to the early use of vocal sound, first in 'emotive cries' leading to incantations using words and evolving from expressive movement and dance, with rhythmic repetitions all invested with the power of sympathetic magic.

The primitive belief, originating in superstitions connected with the sounds of nature (thunder, etc.), that sound was of magical origin, enhanced the potency of sound in expressing and exciting emotion, and as a means of self-preservation. As Tovey points out, 'the first musical attempts were invested with a mysterious power over listener and musicians by reawakening instincts that were more powerful, because more ancient and necessary, than any that could ever have been appealed to by so deliberate a process as that of drawing on a flat surface a series of lines to remind the eye of the appearance of a solid object in space'. Ten excellent pictures of cave drawings are inset in the book.

It is, however, a disappointment for musicians to find that musical illustrations of the many poetic quotations which have been collected presumably from the singing of primitive people have not been given, for surely these quotations depend on rhythmic and melodic features for their effectiveness. The issue of a 7-inch E.P. disc of samples with the book would have brought the words to life for a musician.

The 'primitive vision of existence', the insight into 'primitive imagery', and 'fears in the presence of the unknown', the idea that vocal utterance allied to meaningful words 'gave order and harmony to overmastering emotion and jostling thoughts', these, and innumerable other ideas, pregnant with meaning for the singer and the student of music, must inevitably deepen the significance of interpretation and heighten the 'enchantment' of song, which the author tells us is 'not merely a metaphor'.

Musicians should be grateful for the illumination given to this neglected and shadowy field of knowledge, and serious students of song may well find their approach to their studies not only enlivened but their historical understanding deepened and their insight and power of interpretation made more penetrating, greatly intensifying their *rapport* with their audiences.

W. GREENHOUSE ALLT
Trinity College of Music

Grundlagen der Antiken und Orientalischen Musikkultur. By HEINRICH HUSMANN. 1961. Walter de Gruyter & Co. Berlin. pp. 213. DM 38.

THROUGHOUT A long academic career Professor Husmann has been interested in the nature and the history of melody, harmony, consonance, and of the temperament of intervals. As one might expect from the title of the book his researches took him far afield, but none the less the vast amount of material involved in such a study is manageable under four chapter headings: 'Greek Antiquity', 'The Arabic-Persian Musical Culture', 'The Indian Musical Culture' and 'The Indonesian Tonal Systems'.

Professor Husmann also explores the physiology of hearing and the evolution of the ear. He asks whether the mind is capable of dividing and multiplying by equal parts the spatial distances at which nerves are stimulated in the basilar membrane, and he compares this process to that accomplished by the sense of touch which is capable of dividing distances on the surface of the skin (pp. 45–6). It is good to see a humanist cross the frontier which separates Snow's Two Cultures, especially since these fascinating data and their relevance to the tempered scales are usually outside the competence of musical scholars.

This leads to the heart of the author's thesis, which stands and falls with the existence in their own right, musically and physiologically, of equidistant tunings. In the *Ausblick*, the final paragraph, the threads are gathered together and the grand design takes shape. It is briefly as follows: Two musical cultures clashed in the course of history. There were the Indo-German and Mongolian invaders feeling about intervals in terms of consonance, and the invaded ancient Oriental civilizations including Greece using tempered scales. Acculturation took place, with repercussions that were felt as far away as the south of Africa and the north-west of Europe. Professor Husmann adds that harmonically Aryans, Mongols, Bushmen, and Pygmies 'have something in common' (I cannot do better for the German *Einheit* because it lacks a precise meaning in this context), and the book finishes with the statement that many of the implications of this hypothesis require clarification.

Since equidistant tunings are so important for this hypothesis, it is not surprising that Professor Husmann returned to Hornbostel's theory of the 'cycle of blown fifths'. This theory postulated an independent genesis of tunings (*i.e.* independent from partials and consonances), which were assumed to be of an entirely different order from those other scales which Husmann calls the *durch die Konsonanz erklärten reinen Skalen* (p. 184). On one point he disagrees with Hornbostel: he is satisfied with seven steps in the cycle where Hornbostel required twenty-three. In all this discussion one misses reference to L. B. Meyer's view on the psychology of equidistance which he set down six years ago in *Emotion and Meaning in Music*.

Musicians who have used electronic equipment will share Professor Husmann's admiration for the results which Horbostel achieved with his rather primitive pitch-pipes (p. 185). Methods of pitch measurement which at one stage or another use the ear as an arbiter of pitch are surely unreliable. Professor Husmann is aware of the difficulties when he writes, *à propos* of Kunst's monocord readings, that electrical devices are *wohl etwas genauer* (p. 166). Is there then a general rule as to the degree of accuracy in making measurements? Does the answer not depend upon the musical context in which an interval occurs? Hood, for instance, suspects that in Indonesian music certain small differences in pitch would become intelligible if they were understood in the appropriate musical setting.

The author casts his net extremely wide and the catch has something for everybody. Historians will note the hypothesis that the five-tone *slendro* tuning originated in India and that it travelled from there to Africa and to Indonesia (p. 191). Events in Africa itself are studied in some detail too. We read for instance that 'in West Africa, where the *slendro* culture on the Niger is said to be older than the seven-tone scales, the latter obviously spread from somewhere west of the Niger region towards the east and swamped parts of the *slendro* area in the course of their migration' (reviewer's translation). The argument for this view is set out very clearly, and however slender may be the threads by which it hangs it makes interesting reading.

The comparison of scales across the millennia and over vast distances leads to

strange associations. For example the twelve-tone equidistant tuning of the modern keyboard, invented presumably at the end of the seventeenth century, is seen to be identical with Aristoxenos's system, which also survived in a scale system of the Chinese Middle Ages (p. 41) and one suddenly becomes aware of the fact that the author does not suggest that Aristoxenos, Bach, and the medieval Chinese thought of temperament in identical musical terms. One wishes, however, that theoretical systems need not be compared with each other in isolation from the musical textures and sound effects which stimulated the growth of each system.

K. P. WACHSMANN

Of Divers Arts. By NAUM GABO. Faber and Faber. 1962. pp. xviii + 205. 72 illustrations. 52s. 6d.

THIS IS the eighth volume of the A. W. Mellon Lectures in Fine Art, which are given annually at the National Gallery of Art, Washington. The seven previous volumes include, among other good things, Sir Kenneth Clark's *The Nude*, Sir Herbert Read's *The Art of Sculpture* and Professor Gombrich's *Art and Illusion*—three of the most interesting art books of the last ten years. The Lectureship Committee deserves our gratitude for using its opportunities so well.

Gabo is the first artist to contribute to the series. He was chosen because, in his own words: 'the National Gallery of Art would like to introduce to its public an artist in the flesh, in order that you might be in more personal contract with him than by merely seeing his work, and in the hope that you might get an idea, from the sources where art is generated, of the mental mechanism of the artist'. The choice was a good one. Gabo represents much of what is best in modern art. He is serious, socially responsible, optimistic in the sense that he believes in the fundamental goodness of art, intelligent and uncompromisingly modern. For over forty years he has been making one of the bravest and most successful attempts to produce a genuinely modern form of sculpture.

As Gabo himself once said, an artist who tries to explain himself and his work is walking into a minefield. Artists are not professional 'word-men'. They are not as cool and careful as philosophers and scholars, they use terms loosely, they expect us to jump imaginatively from one idea to another without the aid of a logical bridge, they become emotionally involved and frequently speak in metaphors. Gabo has these faults, if they are faults, but he is still one of the most articulate of modern artists. He knows exactly what he is doing and has been explaining it since the first exciting days of the Realist Manifesto of 1920. An unsympathetic reader might be irritated occasionally by his manner of speaking, but a reader who values Gabo's contribution to modern sculpture will welcome this book for the additional insight it offers into the man and his work.

The lectures have two closely interwoven main themes: the story of the artist's own development, told as a kind of Pilgrim's Progress, and the relations between art and science. The themes are interwoven because Gabo was educated as a scientist before he took up art.

Gabo's development reflects some of the most profound changes in the intellectual climate of the last fifty years. He describes how in common with many artists, scientists and philosophers he came to abandon the view of himself as an 'outsider'—a detached observer or recorder of what is actually 'out there'. Consciousness, he realized, does not mirror nature passively, it grows by creating 'image-conceptions', in terms of which what is 'out there' is made knowable and manageable: 'There is in nature chaos and order, and all that we make of it is not itself; it is an image of our own making, a work of

art produced by our consciousness, a product of our talent, to make images not of nature but onto it.' Scientists and artists are both engaged in the creative task of building man's image of himself and the world.

Constable, living in an age when the scientists' world was solid and accessible, saw no reason why painting should not be thought of as a branch of science. Gabo, brought up on the abstractions of the modern mathematico-physical sciences, cannot see why science should not be regarded as a branch of art. For him the 'images' (conceptual models?) that the scientist constructs are 'just another stage setting with all the magnificence and ingenuity that the genius of any artist produces in a work of art'.

From his encounters with modern philosophical problems Gabo has framed for himself a working philosophy. His feeling of desolation and separateness from the 'void of nothing' revealed by modern science disappeared when he saw that 'there is a close unity between me and nature, and the closest distance of that unity to me is no further than my own consciousness'. Thus, although his vision is turned inwards and his work is strictly non-objective, he does not live in a personal private world of fantasy. His inner landscape is one in which the chilling and remote abstractions of the modern universe are given form and imbued with feeling. The images he creates help to humanize that universe, to make it knowable, acceptable and familiar. In a brilliant phrase of G. Kepes, Gabo is 'domesticating the invisible' for modern man. To do this has always been the main function of sculpture. But for Gabo the anthropomorphic images of the past no longer suffice: 'man's bodily features are not identical with the traits of his actuality'. He has had to create a new kind of image.

Reading this book and Gabo's other writings since 1920, we begin to realize that here is an artist who has not only anticipated some of the most recent ideas on the nature of the visual arts and their relation to science, but who has also been taking these ideas into account *in his work* for some forty years.

The influence of Gabo's Constructivism is spreading, and it seems likely that in an age of science and technology it will have a greater capacity for growth than the work of many of his contemporaries. This alone makes any statements of the artist that may elucidate his work worth reading.

L. R. ROGERS
Loughborough College of Art

Creative Development: Five Lectures to Art Students. By REG BUTLER. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1962. pp. v + 82. 10s.

THESE LECTURES, which were delivered at the Slade School in 1961, are addressed to students, but it is obvious that they are aimed also at art college teachers and administrators; and, although Reg Butler does not say so, they are probably intended to be a contribution to the widespread discussions that are accompanying the present reforms in art education. They make lively and entertaining reading and contain some sound advice on what and how art students should study. In certain fundamental respects, however, I think they are misguided.

Butler's two main topics are (i) a theory of the psychology of the creative artist, and (ii) a plan, based on that theory, for the education of painters and sculptors of exceptional promise. I shall discuss these in turn.

Butler presents an essentially romantic view of the artist and supports it with an oversimplified theory of motivation derived from psychoanalysis. One of his 'laws of creative development' states that 'development is proportional to motivation, which is inversely proportional to adjustment'. Artists, he suggests, are not 'normal'; they may have an 'overdeveloped

emotional cortex'. Their creative drive is due to their being 'out of balance with their environment'—their sexuality, of course, is particularly liable to wobble. Their work is a release of emotional tensions, a substitute for the breast, and a form of do-it-yourself psychotherapy which must never be allowed to succeed lest they become adjusted and lose their creative urge. All this is heavily seasoned with the jargon of psychoanalytical criticism: 'pre-orgasmic' and 'post-orgasmic imagery', 'placental mess', 'mother-directed' and 'girl-friend-directed sexuality', 'Oedipus complex controls', etc. As one writer puts it: 'There has been much unprofitable speculation, particularly about artists, based on over-simplified theories of motivation. This has usually been contributed by the less scholarly type of amateur for whose excesses the psychologist is often blamed.' This kind of Freuditis usually attacks critics; it is almost treason for an artist to get it.

A note on the back of the book states that the greater part of Butler's experience of art education has been acquired at the Slade and much of what he says is undoubtedly tailored to suit the needs of the Slade, which is devoted to the fine arts. But when he generalizes about art education and art colleges he makes the problems sound simpler than they are. He appears to equate students of painting and sculpture with art students generally and to speak of art colleges when he really means fine art departments. The majority of art students in this country are not, in fact, students of fine art but of the various branches of design, and their talents are not necessarily more 'pedestrian' than those of self-expressive painters. Butler's concern for the potential genius would lead him to cut down the number of students in art colleges by 90 per cent if it meant better opportunities for fostering exceptional talent. This attitude is based on a complete misunderstanding of the purposes of colleges of art. Certainly there are too many minor talents romantically attracted to the glamour of being an artist, but the answer to their problem is not cynicism, as Butler suggests, but more realism. They need not leave 'in order to make money in any of the thousand and one occupations dedicated to that objective'. There are many alternatives to the religions of Self Expression and Mammon —the various branches of design, the crafts, and teaching, for example. Gropius said of the old academy that 'its fundamental pedagogic mistake arose from its preoccupation with the idea of the individual genius and its discounting the value of commendable achievement on a less exalted level'. It would be foolish for modern colleges of art to repeat this mistake.

When he is recommending certain lines of study Butler is much more interesting. He proposes a three-part course arranged serially. The idea behind this arrangement is a good one. It would prevent students and teachers from talking at cross purposes; both would be clear at all times about whether a student was studying something teachable, *i.e.* acquiring skills or information, or trying to express himself in a work of art. If the latter then Butler, like Gropius, believes that he should be left alone. He suggests, therefore, that students should first study techniques and history of art. His remarks about the value of art history to an artist are wise and illuminating. They hint at a belief in the social responsibility of the artist which I find difficult to reconcile with some of his other views.

The second part of the course would be concerned with traditional skills. The focus of this would be the life-room, where work would be 'directed towards objectivity'. Butler's 'great revelation', that 'study is what being students you should do in the studio', is my favourite remark in the book. It should be written in letters of gold over every art college porch. 'Intending to study,' he says, 'is not intending to make art.'

In the final part of their course students would be supported on a 'creative island' 'to face the full and horrible(!) responsibility of working with no other purpose than to express themselves creatively'. Certainly the exceptionally gifted student should be given opportunities for advanced work at institutions devoted, like the Royal College, to that purpose. The Council for Art Education will shortly publish its recommendations on this subject. And it may be that at this level certain students of fine art would thrive on Butler's island. But there are signs that the prospect of endlessly and purposelessly expressing themselves in a social vacuum is beginning to make many intelligent students of painting and sculpture feel sick, and less 'adjusted' than ever. The more they learn of art history the more they envy the purposefulness and social integration of artists in other civilizations. These are the students that need help, but what kind of help our society can offer them God only knows. The romantic, anarchic individualists, with their all-the-world-owes-me-a-living arrogance, can take care of themselves.

L. R. ROGERS

Loughborough College of Art

Contemporary Sculpture—An Evolution in Volume and Space. By CAROLA GIEDION-WELCKER. Revised and enlarged edition. Faber & Faber. 1961. pp. xxxi + 397. 5 gns.

THE QUICKENING of interest in the visual arts that has occurred since the war has been particularly apparent in sculpture. This is partly because in the last half-century there has been a gradual release from the few traditions that controlled sculpture, and a broadening out to a very much greater diversity of subject, expression and method, and the much greater resulting variety has attracted a greater public; and partly an economic reason, because the greater distribution of wealth has meant that more people have been able to avail themselves of the means to enjoy the visual arts. Sculpture now touches life at a far greater number of points than it could ever have done when confined by a few traditions. First it was a broadening out from European traditions to find inspiration in Egyptian, Oriental and primitive sculpture, and then to the subjects prompted by modern science and technology, subjects which stem from geometric figures, and machines and the researches into biological forms. The movement towards more and more abstraction, and the use of an increasing variety of materials, some of which have been made available by modern chemical industry, have also added interest.

To obtain an impression of these various movements and manifestations of modern sculpture this book by Mrs. Carola Giedion-Welcker can be recommended for it is probably one of the fullest photographic presentations of its subject within a single volume so far published. The first edition appeared in 1937, a revised and expanded version appeared in 1956, and a third revised and enlarged edition in 1961, with a new section devoted to 'Totems and Stelae'. After two introductory essays, there are about four hundred photographs of the work of about eighty sculptors from Rodin to the younger sculptors in their thirties, with notes on their work and aims. This is followed by brief biographies of the sculptors, and a useful extensive bibliography compiled by Bernard Karpel.

Although a very large number of movements and manifestations are represented, including dadaism, cubism, constructivism, surrealism, the record cannot be regarded as comprehensive. Complete adherents of familiar European traditions are understandably excluded, and thus the English Academic sculptors find no place here. Yet to make it really comprehensive all influential innovators would have to be included, and for that reason it is difficult to understand the exclusion of so powerful

a sculptor as Jacob Epstein, who had something new to say and said it as effectively as most of the sculptors represented in this book. This and a few other omissions prevent this book being as comprehensive and representative of the new developments in twentieth-century sculpture as it might have been; yet it gives much, and is a valuable work of reference.

In the introductory essays Mrs. Carola Giedion-Welcker ventures on some contributions to aesthetic theory, but she is not always on sure ground. She seems to see in modern sculpture two very strong tendencies: a general abandonment of representational art for organic or abstract art, and a movement away from Greek and Renaissance humanism which regarded man as the measure of all things. In her 1937 essay she quotes Jean Arp with approval when he says: 'Art is a fruit which is born of man himself; as a fruit grows on a tree or an embryo in its mother's womb. But whereas all fruits have forms intrinsically their own . . . the human fruit we called "Art" nearly always embodies a ridiculous resemblance to something else,' and then: 'I love nature, but not its substitutes. Illusory art is simply a bad substitute for nature.' Mrs. Giedion-Welcker says later in the essay that 'once we discard imitation and illusion, and with them all literary encumbrances, a self-sufficient plastic reality is free to emerge, which is just as real as the reality of nature and human life, all necessarily different to both'. In the later essay of 1956 she confirms this point of view when referring to the tendencies in sculpture. The first one to be observed she says 'is the detachment from all illusion, hence from all imitation of nature, and the inclination towards elementary forms freely created and closely dependent on the inherent propensities of the materials used'.

It is possible to discount art that aims at illusion yet question how an art can evolve without some degree of imitation or representation. If, as Henry Moore has done, a material is given forms characteristic of itself, such as the forms that emerge in a block of stone on the seashore when it has been beaten by the waves for thousands of years, this does not go very far in expression. Even the study of numerous rock forms is limited, and thus a subject outside the rock is taken, as Henry Moore takes the human form, and something emerges that belongs intrinsically to both. But the element of imitation is there, indeed even in the most abstract works it seems impossible to eliminate it as a starting point. Thus the claim for sculpture that it is non-illusory, non-imitative or non-representational is difficult to substantiate.

Pythagoras said that 'Man is the measure of all things', but now Mrs. Giedion-Welcker says: 'Man is no longer the measure of all things; his microcosm has been absorbed into a much vaster macrocosm'. It is, of course, impossible to substantiate such a claim. It is true that man has evolved a mathematical system that works extraordinarily well so that the position of a star can be given before the star is seen, but it is still a human invention. Man cannot obviously get outside himself, the whole world as he knows it is a creation of his perception, and he cannot by his very nature know any other world.

The value of this book, however, is not in the philosophical essays that form the introduction, but in the photographic record and the informative notes.

ARNOLD WHITTICK

The Experimental Psychology of Beauty. By C. W. VALENTINE. Methuen. 1962. pp. xiii + 438. 45s.

THIS BOOK is a species of phoenix, for it has risen from the ashes of a little one with the same title by the same author and first published nearly fifty years ago. It says much for Professor Valentine's stamina, and tenacious interest in the experimental

approach to problems of aesthetics, that he has gone on now to produce a volume of fifteen chapters laden with detail and much of it new. Thirteen of these chapters survey, with cautiously critical comment, a large number of English and American studies, old and recent. They are grouped for their bearing on appreciation of the visual arts, including *objets d'art* (167 pages in all), on appreciation of music (122 pages) and on understanding poetry (95 pages). Professor Valentine devotes the first and last chapters to his own general approach (that of an unpretentious traditional experimentalist willing to consider introspective as well as other evidence) and to some broad conclusions. Among these, he lays most stress on the existence of individual differences in response to all the art forms considered, adding a few hints from experimental work on why some of these differences are found.

Only tough readers should attempt to go straight through a volume of this sort which does not offer much in the way of stimulating theory or guiding hypotheses. There is, however, plenty of incidental interest for those who approach the book crabwise, starting with the last chapter and the table of contents, and with questions in mind on which they seek to find data. While it is not, and makes no claim to be, a complete source of reference it is well worth consulting. Its intelligent use could prevent theorists and naïve investigators alike from making mistakes due to ignorance of much work patiently done in this field.

JOAN WYNN REEVES

Bedford College

The Sciences and the Arts: A New Alliance. By HAROLD GOMES CASSIDY. Harper & Bros. New York. 1962. pp. x + 182. $4.75.

PROFESSOR CASSIDY discusses ways and means whereby the deplorable present-day schism between the sciences and the arts (or the humanities, as he sometimes calls them) could be healed for the benefit of all concerned. Sciences and arts, he writes, are complementary parts of our modern civilization, and both are suffering injury by their persisting separation. For there is much that is scientific in the arts, and artistic in the sciences; the imaginative insights of the one are comparable with the imaginative insights of the other. Professor Cassidy refers constantly to their respective problems of communication; for both sciences and arts, 'in their own ways, pit themselves against those barriers that isolate persons'. In general Professor Cassidy's thesis is that sciences and arts 'differ in essentials at the levels of data and emphases but converge at the levels of the laws and great principles which give us pictures of the world'.

The book is to be commended as a review of recent thinking on a question of great importance. It is excellently written and always lucid. But it has one big weakness—its lack of historical sense. The present-day schism of the sciences and the arts is surely a historical schism, and it cannot be removed without understanding how it came about. The man of the Renaissance—say Leonardo da Vinci—was scientist or artist as occasion required. He practised in both fields and knew no difference between them. But today the mathematician who plays a musical instrument or the surgeon who paints pictures is a curiosity in his profession. What happened, what historical situation arose—perhaps sometime in the late eighteenth century—to make such a change not only possible, but necessary? And what could happen *now*—in this late twentieth century—to reverse the process? The great intellectual conflicts of our era, like this particular conflict of the sciences and arts, or the conflict of the sciences and religion—or, in the political world, the Cold War—all have a vast background, and they are not to be put to rights just by wishful protests.

It is significant that the citations in the Notes at the end of the book (except Francis Thompson and Keats) are from recent writers—practically all, in fact, from writers since 1900. The names of Bacon, Galileo, Descartes and Newton are scattered through the text, but there is no evidence that the author is at all familiar with their original writings. In a problem which cries out for historical treatment, the book is curiously limited.

F. P. CHAMBERS
London School of Economics

The Romantic Rebellion. By ERIC NEWTON. Longmans. 1962. pp. 224. 30s.

AT FIRST sight this book looks as if it was going to be a history of romanticism in painting as from the late eighteenth century—a book which, incidentally, very much needs to be written. On an early page appears a promising reference to Friedrich von Schlegel, and the reader accordingly settles down to enjoy Mr. Newton in a somewhat unexpected excursion into historical writing. But the author soon turns over to the kind of criticism which we more often associate with his name, and, as is soon clear, his thesis would not really be very much affected whether he argued it historically or not.

The thesis is that romanticism occurs in artists of many periods and is not the exclusive property of those of the romantic centuries usually so called. The author is dissatisfied with the ordinary distinction between classic and romantic, and he evolves three categories—classic, romantic, and extrovert—which, in his view, more adequately cover the possible alternatives. He then defines romanticism in general terms as a revolt against law, a revolt expressed in such qualities as mystery, nostalgia, conflict and abnormality. These are the qualities which, in different combinations and concentrations, are to be found in artists as diverse as Botticelli, Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, Giorgione, Tintoretto, Hieronymus Bosch, Patenier, El Greco, Salvator Rosa, Watteau and Piranesi. The author's special heroes seem to be Altdorfer and Grünewald in the fifteenth century and, in modern times, Picasso and Klee.

The book can best be described perhaps as a series of meditations, full of refreshing and often surprising insights, most vividly written, on a number of artists of no connection other than the fact that all of them, to a greater or lesser degree, have been participants in the timeless and ever irrepressible Romantic Rebellion.

F. P. CHAMBERS
London School of Economics

The Loom of Art. By GERMAIN BAZIN. Thames & Hudson. 1962. pp. 328. 6 gns.

THIS IS a gorgeous book. The lucky possessor will enjoy just turning over its pages of more than 400 illustrations (including 146 plates in colour), most of them specially reproduced. But the lucky possessor, it is to be hoped, will also read the accompanying text, which is easily written, perfectly translated—and commendably brief. Otherwise he will hardly appreciate the author's often unusual selections of the works of art, great and small, which he has presented to us. For this is no ordinary History of Art. The author already has one such history to his credit. This is rather a series of meditations, entirely personal, on the general theme of the reciprocity of art and civilization through the ages. The range is wide and stretches from prehistory through Greece, Rome, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Baroque and Rococo, up to the most recent '*impasse de l'impossible*'. But there is no underlying philosophy and no favouritism as between particular periods or schools. The author's taste throughout is catholic and faultless. He himself describes his

book as 'a game . . . a play of images'.

The author's insights are always suggestive, often startling. For example, he interprets Hellenistic art in terms of power politics: 'The town grew larger in proportion to the power to which it was subjected, and the archaic and classical *polis*, which consisted of a large village grouped around a temple and a few public monuments, was transformed into the royal city complete with town planning. The end of power is glory, and its instrument is war; out of fourteen Seleucid kings, ten died soldiering. . . . Power sought embodiment in excess of physical strength, and authority adopted that as its external form. . . .' And he drives home his point with a photograph of Dionysius I Soter, one of the grandest illustrations in the whole book.

Sometimes, it seems, the author's interpretations are overdone, and he is tempted into the error of putting our own century's catastrophic thought into the minds of earlier men who in their particular day and age could never have understood a word of it. Thus on Caravaggio he writes: 'At the beginning of the century (the sixteenth) in which the great controversy on Grace arose, Caravaggio brought out in all its starkness the loneliness of the human being cut off from God, and cut off from the world, which the night in which he is plunged annihilates . . .' and he continues in this vein with somewhat precious allusions to modern existentialism. We should like to quote the author's magnificent passage on Picasso. But it is more than a page in length, and, in all fairness, we could not attempt to compress it.

If we were to be sentimental about a book of this kind, we should surely comment on the sharp contradiction between the gaiety of its production and the grim seriousness of its text. There is both joy and grief here, and both are in good measure.

P. P. CHAMBERS

London School of Economics

A Concise History of Painting from Giotto to Cézanne. By MICHAEL LEVEY. 1962. Thames and Hudson. pp. 324. 549 plates in colour. 35s.

Art and the Spirit of Man. By RENÉ HUYGHE. 1962. Thames and Hudson. pp. 526. 5 gns.

MR. LEVEY has written a book which escapes greatness only by the limitations imposed by its conciseness. It is unusual in being genuinely a history of painting rather than an assemblage of anecdotes about painters and ancillary reportage about their pictures. Incidental information is kept to bare essentials. This is the work of one who knows how to look at pictures and will be read by those who want help in learning to see them and not merely to know everything that is to be known about them. Mr. Levey's judgements are personal, illuminating and surprisingly catholic over the range comprised in his study. Where brevity is forced upon him he has the knack of highlighting those features which are most significant and suggestive, and it is rarely that one does not wish he had explored his theme at greater length. If the purpose of an introduction is to stimulate the reader to venture further along the way, and to arouse his interest in many things, no more successful introduction than this could be wished for.

It is the greater pity that a work of such excellence, with the emphasis squarely upon visual response, should be blemished by the poor quality of the illustrations. When a large picture with bold colouring is reduced to the size of a cigarette card it may appear vulgar and garish even if the hues are reproduced with some exactness. In the illustrations to this book accuracy is seldom vouchsafed. The blurb on the dust-cover explains that the 549 full colour reproductions 'illustrate and complement the text page by page. In this way the author's points become self-explanatory with a vividness that is impossible to achieve by any other method'. Unfortunately, the

reverse of this is the case. The illustrations are so garbled that they make nonsense of the most pertinent of the author's points. A person who reads that Vermeer's 'interior settings mute the brightness and give a pearly quality in place of Fabritius's rather brash daylight', and then turns to the reproductions on the opposite page in order to *see* what the author is writing about, could only conclude that he is writing gibberish. Or he reads of Fra Angelico: 'His colour is almost heraldic in its intense blues and pinks; and the painter has all the candour of such colours.' And the three reproductions quite simply gave it the lie.

In his Mellon lectures, *Painting and Reality* (1958), Professor Étienne Gilson in the context of metaphysical speculation as to the impossibility of duplicating a work of art writes a great deal of good sense about the practical dangers latent in the modern taste for appreciating works of art through the medium of imperfect and distorting illustrations. Almost his every warning could be exemplified from a book of this sort. In December of last year I attended a press conference organized by Consumers' Association Ltd., who through their magazine *Which?* had organized an inquiry designed to show which publishers of colour reproductions give the best value for money. The walls of two rooms at the Royal Society of Arts were hung with examples of colour reproductions by twelve firms of forty-six well-known paintings. The juxtaposition brought home as never before how wide is the range of variation between different reproductions —and between each of them and the original. In many—indeed very many—cases it was not possible to know that the several reproductions of one picture were reproductions of the same original except by taking into consideration that they all represented the same subject. The exhibition also showed compellingly how few pictures lend themselves to even passable reproduction in colour, on paper and at a size unrelated to the size of the original. Ganymed, who were awarded the palm, certainly owed their superiority in part to the scrupulosity and understanding with which they selected what pictures to reproduce. All this carries us less far from our theme than might appear, for colour reproduction in books has its own additional problems—problems dictated by the restrictions of cost and size. Experience shows there is a real danger that crude and cheap colour reproductions will either quench a nascent visual interest or, if admiration is forced, may well extinguish the taste for pictures themselves. Why, we are impelled to ask, if colour is thought to be so unimportant a feature in pictures that the most inaccurate, garish and vulgar substitute will do, why not be content with illustration in black and white? This course has in fact been adopted in René Huyghe's *Art and the Spirit of Man*—a book which is as finely as the other is badly produced. The 308 illustrations in black and white give all that can be given in the medium, are excellently conceived and executed and can hardly fail to stimulate in the reader a desire to pursue further his acquaintance with the originals. The sixteen colour reproductions, all full page, are very carefully selected (seven of them giving detail only) and are executed as successfully as modern techniques allow. The production of this book is exemplary of what can be done at a popular price.

M. Huyghe, for the English edition of whose exciting book *The Discovery of Art* we are grateful to the same publishers, has now given us the book for which all those have been waiting who are exercised by the need to bring into relation the sometimes conflicting claims of the abstract and figurative functions of contemporary art. M. Huyghe does not repudiate either mode. 'Our purpose', he says, 'is not to disavow modern art, but we must not get bogged down in it.' He recognizes that any fine work of art must display those formal and plastic qualities which the exponents

of abstract art make it their endeavour to bring about in divorce from representation. But beyond this, and common to both styles, is the *expressive* function of art. In language which has affinities with the aesthetic writings of some psychologists of the gestalt school he explains: 'The elements that the artist borrows from reality must be compelled to render what was only within the artist himself. How can we make a tree express the mysterious sadness of the woods? How can familiar images be made to express something that only the artist feels when he sees them? Art can not only imitate things, as has been supposed for so long, but also suggest them. In music, the minor mode predisposes the listener to melancholy, the major mode to exaltation. Lines and colours have a similar effect. They can both describe emotional states and reflect them. If the artist succeeds in imprinting his own emotional states on them, they will inevitably awaken an echo in the viewer. Poussin's theory of the modes was based on this insight' (p. 435). The theme of the book is, therefore, to display the whole range of visual art as a language of the human spirit, a mode of emotional expression. 'The work must also be created by and for the human spirit —must express it, nourish it, enrich it' (p. 11).

In one place M. Huyghe writes: 'Art historians have, for too long, given greater importance to the combination of external circumstances and influences that account for an artist's work in historical terms than they have given to the secret of his personality. To situate an artist historically is merely to perform preliminaries to the real task, which is to understand the artist himself.' His own favoured method is therefore to describe the *œuvre* in terms of the artist's personality expressed in it. From the point of view of formal psychology this is unscientific because it is deduction from ultimately unverifiable impression. But if we transliterate and regard it as an exposition of the expressive qualities inherent in the work of art itself, then the method is criticism at its best. Verification derives from the reader's own response.

Each of these two works is supremely good of its kind and they have this in common that both may be regarded as applied aesthetics. Each is the outcome of a deliberate aesthetic attitude not worked out in theory and argument but presented in operation. One would be hard put to it to say whether their value is greater to the aesthetician—who must after all consider how his theories work out in practice—or to the more unassuming lover of pictorial art.

H. OSBORNE

Deutsche Kunst & Kultur von der Gründerzeit bis zum Expressionismus. By RICHARD HAMANN and JOST HERMAND. Akademie-Verlag. Berlin. Vol. I *Impressionismus* (1960). pp. 414. Vol. II *Naturalismus* (1959). pp. 336.

THESE BOOKS coming from behind the Iron Curtain, though confined to German art and literature, should for a number of reasons be of interest to students of aesthetics in the Western world.

The senior of the joint authors, Professor Hamann, is (or was) a collector and art historian of repute, with an impressive list of previous publications to his credit. After the last war he had settled in the university town of Marburg (West Germany) when in 1950 he was awarded the East German State Prize. In fact, the first of the two volumes represents an expanded reissue of his *Impressionismus in Leben und Kunst* (1907) with the main argument left intact. It has, however, now been embedded in Marxist doctrine concerning the social and economic conditioning of cultural activities, and is associated with a naïve realist view of perception. Even in his previous book Hamann had looked upon impressionism not primarily as a

movement in art but as a cultural phase of wide ramifications, reflecting a distinctive attitude and state of mind. As a consequence impressionist painting, though profusely illustrated in the new volume, is not the only target and is in fact hardly mentioned in the first two hundred pages. The authors are as much concerned with the music, literature and generally with the *Weltanschauung* of the period.

Whatever we may feel about the Marxist colouring, their analysis is penetrating and well argued. They establish an interesting link, for instance, between the impressionist quest for the pure sensuous appearance, on the one hand, and the phenomenalism of Mach and what has become known as the 'descriptive' view of science, on the other. In both strands we find the same concentration on what is immediately given in sensory experience and the tendency to consider substantive things and their interrelations as derivative. In this way the authors throw into relief parallels between different domains and activities, and this is most instructive. On the other hand questions of aesthetic value are not discussed and the autonomy, or even an autonomous aspect of, artistic creation is implicitly denied from the first page to the last. Similarly the historical roots of impressionism, which after all stems from France, are ignored. The authors willy-nilly have made up their minds that its German variety began as a reaction against the boisterous period of industrial expansion and militant patriotism in the newly founded Empire. It offered, they argue, an illusory escape into subjective inwardness and the pleasures of an uncommitted aestheticism. In a Platonic streak they censure the impressionist artist for his cult of an ever shifting iridescence of movement and light, of the fleeting nuance haphazardly caught at a glance. In his portraits he does not aim at representing a person with a distinctive human character—he paints them for their pictorial qualities and colour values. Impressionist art, we are told, exhausts itself in stimulating and charming the retina, but neither interprets nor explains —and this, it appears, is unforgivable.

One might, therefore, expect that the authors would show more sympathy towards the naturalistic phase which somewhat antedated the German impressionist period. This, however, is not the case, for though they recognize an awakening social conscience, with very few exceptions (*e.g.* Käthe Kollwitz), they see in naturalistic art and literature no more than a caricature of the false ideals that preceded, a marginal commentary which does not really come to grips with the social conditions against which it protests. In this connection the authors make two interesting points. Firstly, naturalism is not a unique phenomenon, but naturalistic reactions recur periodically both in the history of societies and in the life of individuals. There had been a naturalistic phase earlier in the nineteenth century—we may here think of Büchner's *Wozzeck* —and a similar stage can be discerned in the development of the young Goethe when he wrote his first versions of *Götz* and *Faust*. The second and more important feature to which the authors draw attention is an essential similarity between the work of the impressionist and the naturalistic artist. Both dwell on detail and neglect form: the one in the context of his own sense impressions, the other as a result of his obsession with photographic or phonographic fidelity. Thus extreme subjectivism and a slavish objectivity concur in cultivating the fortuitous and accidental, but do not face up to the 'essential problems of reality', their causes and solutions.

As a consequence one important element in German naturalistic literature, which found consummate expression in Gerhart Hauptmann's characters, is given short shrift by the authors—compassion: compassion with the uneducated and underprivileged, the poor in spirit who is imprisoned in his environment and help-

lessly falls victim to his physical desires. Obviously the two volumes evince little appreciation of human tragedy or poetic feeling, while there is an almost reactionary grudge against the pleasures of the senses. Yet in places a strange countercurrent against the authors' determined austerity becomes noticeable. I suppose that old connoisseur Richard Hamann just could not help describing some impressionist paintings in glowing and loving terms. On the other hand he should be forgiven when in his strictures on the sensuousness of Corinth and others, he falls into the opposite extreme and gloats in associations which look very much like the seamy side of the discarded aesthetic attitude. Singleness of purpose casts its shadow.

For the rest, the standard of scholarship is high and the literary achievement notable. The books have been conventionally produced and the plates are of indifferent quality. To sum up, these are historical studies of a kind that is rare in the Western world: studies in ideology. In spite of much repetition they are valuable for the wealth of their material and because they bring out connections between different spheres which had probably not been appreciated sufficiently. We are bound to feel less sympathy for their moralizing attitude towards artistic creation. It stands to reason, though, that books like those under review are written from a specific angle, and on that count no blame should attach to the authors. They fail, however, in that they will not admit that there may be still other aspects to the matter, and are unable to question their own assumptions. Phenomenalism, after all, may be the true, and naïve realism an illusory philosophy.

PAUL SELIGMAN

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Modern Sacred Art and the Church of Assy. By WILLIAM S. RUBIN. Columbia University Press. 1962. pp. xi + 185. 70s.

RELIGIOUS ART raises certain problems for the aesthetician: Is it a distinct category of art? Is a landscape painted by a devout believer a religious work? Is a Renaissance Madonna Christian or even religious in anything but name? And so on. Dogmatic or institutional religion raises still further problems: Can a work of art be heretical? Can an unbeliever produce a work suitable for sacred purposes? How far is it possible to exercise control over an artist and still leave him sufficient freedom to follow his inspiration? These problems were posed in an acute form by a celebrated controversy over the church of Notre-Dame-de-Toute-Grâce, at the sanatorium of Assy, in the French Alps, in 1950. The parish priest, on the advice of the Dominican Fathers of the *L'Art Sacré* movement, invited a number of prominent artists to contribute works for the decoration of the church. Only two, Georges Rouault and Jean Bazaine, were practising Catholics; two were Communists, Léger and Lurçat; two more were Jews, Chagall and Lipchitz; the rest were atheists or non-practising Catholics, Matisse, Bonnard, Braque and Germaine Richier.

Opposition was first aroused in ecclesiastical circles by Germaine Richier's crucifix, which Gabriel Marcel described as 'much like a rickety branch covered with a sort of mould'. 'This is not a religious art, but an infamous profanation,' declared a local tract. 'The production of a pathological art, manœuvred by a heretical propaganda,' was the comment of *Osservatore Romano*, which went on to call the crucifix 'a caricature image'. Malraux, coming to its defence, said that it was 'the only modern Christ before which one could pray', and the historian Dorival described it as 'strong, expressive, powerful, charged with humanity and palpitating with love'. The patients at the sanatorium also liked it.

The final decision on matters of worship rests with the ecclesiastical authorities, and the Bishop of Annecy, under pressure, finally had the crucifix removed. (It has since been restored to the mortuary chapel.)

So far the matter had been purely domestic. But the controversy did not end there, and in the ensuing debate matters of more general aesthetic interest were raised.

The questions at issue were: How far can an artist working for the Catholic Church be allowed freedom of expression? And is it proper to invite non-Christian and even atheistic and anti-Christian artists to produce works for sacred use? The answers to the first question were rather vague. 'The art belongs to the painter; the order and disposition to the Fathers,' was a much quoted prescription of the Council of Nicea. 'Any unusual image' or anything which did not observe 'the forms received from Christian tradition' was to be prohibited or discouraged. Much depended on the interpretation of these phrases. The answers to the second question were more precise: 'none but practising Catholics were to be permitted to work for the Church'; 'the artist who does not possess the truths of the faith . . . does not possess, in effect, that interior eye which permits him to discover that which the majesty of God and divine cult require.' 'The manner of action follows the disposition of the agent and as a man is, so are his works,' Maritain had once written, and this rather metaphysical argument greatly influenced Catholic thinking on art.

The defenders of Assy took the line, summed up by Rouault, when he said that to produce sacred art 'one must begin by loving painting'. They questioned the idea that the great religious art of the past was done by pious men. 'There were good and bad artists even then,' said Chagall. 'The difference did not lie in their piety, but in their painterly ability.' It was sufficient that they lived in a religious *milieu*. Since most of the artists who contributed to Assy had had a Catholic background, their art might touch some hidden well-spring of religious sentiment. Provided they did not produce anything contrary to the faith, 'it would be safer', the Dominican Fathers thought, 'to turn to geniuses without faith than to believers without talent'.

This is a question which cannot easily be settled, but at the moment it is one which Catholics might prefer not to discuss. Therefore it has been left to a non-Catholic to gather together the material of the debate and present it with a certain detachment. It is clear, however, where his sympathies lie and at times he has been led into making statements which might cause embarrassment to those he supports. But he writes without heat or irony, and with a remarkable understanding of the issues involved. Had he shown more sympathy towards what he calls the Vatican position he might have produced a more balanced picture, but would not have essentially altered its main outlines. Had he been more familiar with the workings of an institutional religion his concluding note might not have been so pessimistic; for time is on the side of revolutionary ideas. For anyone interested in these problems he has done a valuable service.

CYRIL BARRETT S. J.

Picasso as a Book Artist. By ABRAHAM HORODISCH. Faber. 1962. pp. 136. 42s.

PICASSO IS probably the greatest illustrator of our time. He is certainly one of the most prolific, as the detailed bibliography of works illustrated by him at the end of this book shows. Part of Picasso's greatness will always be assessed by the great variety of his styles, and the variety of his forms of expression in painting, sculpture, ceramics, theatrical designing, and print-making. As a book illustrator he has used etching, wood-engraving, aquatint, lithography, drypoint, and even in one book an edition of Paul Eluard's poems (1941), water-colour illustration in the way, but not in the manner, of Blake's *Songs of Innocence*. Although Picasso had provided illustrations to books as early as 1905, and there are a number with illustrations from his Cubist period, it was not until the 1930's that he

began to take a real interest in the illustration of books. In 1931 was produced the very fine edition of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* (Skira, Lausanne) with thirty etchings by Picasso in his classic style, and here we see a reasonable integration of text and illustration. This is not always so, and many of the books illustrated by Picasso show no connection between text and illustration but are attempts at deliberate bookmaking designed to appeal to rich buyers as decoration and investment. Horodisch in his bibliography has usefully separated these two types of illustration, and in addition lists separately books with a frontispiece by Picasso, books with one or more illustrations of the author by Picasso, and books with a wrapper design by Picasso. The book is a translation from the German of a book published in 1957, and for this edition the lists have been brought down to 1961. The most useful parts of the book are the lists and the reproductions of the plates. The text, which only admits to being an introduction, is disappointing as the author does not know the inside stories of the making of these books, although many of them are obviously the result of close collaboration between artist, printer and often author, even when there appears to be a lack of visual connection between text and illustration.

PETER STOCKHAM

Philosophy Looks at the Arts. Contemporary Readings in Aesthetics. Edited by JOSEPH MARGOLIS. Charles Scribner's Sons. New York. 1962. pp. 235. $3.25.

THIS IS another collection of writings on aesthetics of the sort already familiar from William Elton's *Aesthetics and Language* (1954), Susanne Langer's *Reflections on Art* (1958) and Morris Philipson's *Aesthetics Today* (1961). It is a measure of the wealth of material available to the anthologists that out of the twelve seminal papers comprised in the book only one overlaps with previous collections (Arnold Isenberg's essay on 'Critical Communication' is also contained in Elton's book). The book is arranged to deal with twelve basic questions in contemporary aesthetic thinking, each represented by one paper prefaced by a two-page introduction and followed by a short bibliography. The book includes such cardinal papers as J. O. Urmson's 'What Makes a Situation Aesthetic?', Morris Weitz on 'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics', Wimsatt and Beardsley's 'The Intentional Fallacy', Paul Ziff's 'Reasons in Art Criticism', Margaret Macdonald's 'The Language of Fiction' and Max Black's Aristotelian Society paper on Metaphor. The author tells us in his Introduction that the twelve sections were designed to combine 'the widest representation of the most influential and active aestheticians of the analytic sort, papers that have attracted the greatest interest in professional circles, the freshest and most recent and most characteristic work of the philosophers represented . . .'. He claims that the collection is 'at once an introduction to a number of the most active professionals and the most actively debated questions in aesthetics'.

In a remarkably clear and commendably brief exposé of the nature of philosophical interest in aesthetics Mr. Margolis describes the professional philosopher in the Anglo-American tradition as one who, when performing professionally, is not at all qualified or concerned to dispute or vindicate particular evaluations of works of art. 'He will not decide, say, which of two opposing opinions is justified but rather what we would mean by a justified opinion in the context given.' Though an 'impressive variety' of methods are exhibited, the sort of method most characteristic of the Anglo-American tradition is broadly described as 'analytic'. Of particular interest is his formulation of the new attitude to aesthetics which has spread among professional philosophers. Whereas,

he says, it was fashionable, only a few years ago, to speak of the 'dreariness' of aesthetics, today aesthetics 'is enjoying a certain vogue among professional philosophers'. Indeed it is now 'not at all uncommon that younger philosophers of promise apply their most recently acquired techniques to questions of aesthetics first'. Aesthetics now exhibits a repertory of important questions comparable in precision to the range of questions in perception theory, we find 'lively philosophical dispute of a high order' and strikingly new possibilities reveal themselves. It is encouraging that this new seriousness should find expression in the Introduction to a collection of such outstanding merit.

H. OSBORNE

From the Renaissance to Romanticism: Trends in Style in Art, Literature, and Music. 1300–1830. By FREDERICK B. ARTZ. The University of Chicago Press. 1962. pp. 311. $5.00.

WE MIGHT take exception at first to the author's use of the word 'style'. But, before many pages are passed, we are almost convinced that his choice is right and that no other word would so well convey his purpose, and we continue to read with increasing absorption a book which amounts to a general history of European culture as seen in successive styles of art (painting, sculpture and architecture), literature and music.

The more serious and persistent doubt, however, is whether such a book is possible at all. When John Addington Symonds wrote his *Renaissance in Italy*, he needed seven sizeable volumes for one country and one main period. Here we have a single volume, compressed into a handy 300 pages, covering not only Italy, but France, Spain, the Low Countries, Germany and England during the Early Renaissance, the High Renaissance, Mannerism, the Baroque, Neo-Classicism and Romanticism. In these hectic, busy days of ours we ought to render up heartfelt thanks for the short book, but this one this time has surely gone a bit too far. Over-simplification, incompleteness and uneven treatment are inevitable—and the author himself admits as much in his Preface. We also suspect that the author is not equally at home in all his arts—his literary passages usually read better, for example, than his architectural.

Nevertheless, this is a brave and brilliant effort. Non-specialist, 'inter-disciplinary' studies are too rare—and too valuable when we get them. The author specifically warns us against expecting precise synchronizations, but he shows us how a certain religious attitude or a touch of frivolity or a mathematical rule-making obsession or a striving after sheer novelty will often find expression in several arts at once and so form for a period a consistent cultural pattern. Any student of any art today should have his knowledge and interests immensely widened for seeing the stylistic 'cross-relationships' and 'correspondences' which are here discovered for him. Perhaps this reviewer would select in particular the chapter on Mannerism (1530–1600) as an admirable piece of exposition of a period which is still relatively obscure.

FRANK P. CHAMBERS

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BOOKS RECEIVED

(The inclusion of a title in this list does not preclude subsequent review)

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THE DISCRIMINATION OF AESTHETIC ENJOYMENT

Monroe C. Beardsley

EVERY BRANCH of philosophy cherishes its classic fallacies, partly as a dire warning to the neophyte, partly out of a repressed but lingering fear that the celebrated inference may be valid after all—as has sometimes turned out to be the case. One of the famous scandals of aesthetics concerns 'significant form'—the circular route by which Clive Bell first introduced this term into aesthetic discourse. As is well known, Bell began by saying that there is a unique 'aesthetic emotion', and set as the main task of aesthetics the isolation of 'some quality common and peculiar to all the objects that provoke it'.[1] This quality he then named 'significant form', which he defined thus: 'These relations and combinations of lines and colours, these aesthetically moving forms, I call Significant Form.'[2] It is easy enough to fit this pair of remarks into a logical circle, since he gives no other description of aesthetic emotion. What is it that we get from art? Aesthetic emotion. What is aesthetic emotion? It is what is produced by significant form. What is significant form? It consists of those combinations of lines and colours that produce aesthetic emotion. Bell has often been scolded for this logical lapse.[3] If we wish the statement, 'Aesthetic emotion is produced by significant form', to be synthetic, we must of course define each term independently of the other. If (like Bell) we wish to make the statement definitive of one of its terms, then the other must be defined independently of it. And if we start with aesthetic emotion, on the naturalistic premise that the value of aesthetic objects is a function of the psychological responses they evoke, then it seems we must (unlike Bell) explain how aesthetic emotion is to be discriminated from other emotion, without referring to significant form.

Bell's dilemma is helpful because he was too enthusiastic and philo-

sophically naïve to try to disguise it. But it is one that is confronted, in some form or other, by any naturalistic account of aesthetic value. For the distinction between aesthetic and other values seems to require the discrimination of a peculiarly aesthetic manner of affecting people acceptably. There is some difference of opinion about the proper choice of a genus. We can speak of 'aesthetic pleasure', but 'pleasure' strikes some people as too restricted, at least in its connotations. We can speak (like J. O. Urmson)[4] of 'aesthetic satisfaction', but 'satisfaction' perhaps suggests too strongly an antecedent interest or desire. I shall choose 'enjoyment', and hope that it makes reasonable sense to speak of 'aesthetic enjoyment', or of 'enjoying something aesthetically'. Some will reject this locution: after we have been deeply moved, have passed through the emotionally shattering experience of a great tragic drama, would we say that we had 'enjoyed' it? I agree that the term is inadequate, if that is all we have to say; but I do not think it is incorrect, for anyone who stays through the whole play without any ulterior aim such as winning a bet—who is kept in his seat by the play itself—is enjoying what he is experiencing (he is taking a kind of pleasure in it), however profound and stirring his enjoyment may be, compared to other sorts.

I

Let us begin with a brief look at some illuminating passages from Samuel Johnson, Aristotle, and Edmund Burke, in whose writings we can discern three distinct responses to the dilemma, which, like any such animal, may be seized by either horn or avoided by evasive action.

Johnson supposes that it is the function of poetry to produce pleasure, and relies upon this supposition at crucial points in his criticism. For example, there is his defence of the digressions at the beginning of the third, seventh, and ninth books of *Paradise Lost*:

> Perhaps no passages are more frequently or more attentively read than those extrinsick paragraphs; and, since the end of poetry is pleasure, that cannot be unpoetical with which all are pleased.[5]

What this says is that all pleasure is poetical pleasure; what is meant, no doubt, is that all pleasure derivable from poetry is poetical pleasure. A similar notion is implicit in Johnson's remark about *Henry IV*, Parts I and II, that 'Perhaps no author has ever in two plays afforded so much delight',[6] and in his General Observations on *King Lear*, where he dissents from the *Spectator*, which had censured Nahum Tate's revision of the play, giving it a happy ending:

> Since all reasonable beings naturally love justice, I cannot easily be persuaded that the

> observation of justice makes a play worse; or that, if other excellencies are equal, the audience will not always rise better pleased from the final triumph of persecuted virtue.[7]

In these remarks Johnson refuses to make any distinction between a specifically aesthetic pleasure and the kind of (moral?) pleasure we take in seeing justice done. Pleasure can readily be identified without any reference to poetry, and poetry (though not *good* poetry) without any reference to pleasure, so there is no dilemma for him. But these arguments strike us queerly, precisely because no distinction is admitted. When we ask whether Nahum Tate's *King Lear* is better or worse than Shakespeare's, it seems quite irrelevant to be told that his version gives us the added pleasure of seeing Lear back on the throne and all the good people suitably married. Tate's *King Lear* might, of course, be disparaged on Johnson's general hedonistic grounds by the argument that in providing this pleasure the play loses other and greater ones, so that it comes out short in the account ('other excellencies' are not equal). But that seems insufficient—we want to say that to be a better play Tate's *King Lear* would have to provide a greater quantity of specifically *aesthetic* pleasure, and that the satisfaction of our moral sensibilities cannot be weighed in the same scale.

I think we must reject Johnson's methodological procedure, because unless we can discriminate aesthetic enjoyment from other sorts, we cannot have a category of specifically critical evaluation at all.

The logic of Aristotle's method is less easy to discern, but some clues to a possible approach can be found in the *Poetics*. 'We should not require from tragedy every kind of pleasure,' he remarks forthrightly, 'but only its own peculiar kind.'[8] He says the same in Chapter XXVI, and in Chapter XXIII, where he is discussing epic poetry, which shares the same end as tragic drama. What is this kind of pleasure—the *oikeia hedone* of tragedy? Aristotle's answer is quite brief: 'the tragic poet must aim to produce by his imitation the kind of pleasure which results from fear and pity'.[9] Since it seems that fear and pity cannot be identified except as responses to certain kinds of situation, Aristotle has implicitly defined the 'proper pleasure' of tragedy—let us call it the tragic pleasure —as the sort of pleasure felt in seeing tragic events. If we take into account Aristotle's discussion (Chapter IV) of the origins of poetry (we enjoy, he says, imitation and also melody and rhythm), we can sharpen this definition: tragic pleasure is the sort of pleasure felt in seeing the harmonious imitation of tragic (pitiful and fearful) events.

Aristotle's procedure avoids circularity, so long as no concept of aesthetic value, or critical judgement, is introduced. But then it has awkward consequences. It seems a little odd to say that the function of

tragedy is to produce tragic pleasure. When we speak of the function of the spleen, or of a gear, we mean its unique or special ability to produce results that can be defined and detected independently of any knowledge of the spleen or gear itself. But apparently the function of tragedy is to produce, by being watched, a pleasure that can only be described as the pleasure of watching tragedy.

A highly instructive analytical method is employed by Edmund Burke in his *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (1757). Exactly like Bell, he is looking for those properties in sensible objects that are capable of producing certain desirable feelings, of which he distinguishes two main aesthetic ones, the feeling of the beautiful and the feeling of the sublime. He realizes that the inquiry runs into trouble unless the feelings can be described independently of their sensory correlatives. But consider first beauty, defined as

> that quality or those qualities in bodies by which they cause love, or some passion similar to it. . . . I likewise distinguish love, by which I mean that satisfaction which arises to the mind upon contemplating anything beautiful, of whatsoever nature it may be, from desire or lust; which is an energy of the mind, that hurries us on to the possession of certain objects, that do not affect us as they are beautiful, but by means altogether different.[10]

At first glance, here is Bell's scandal almost exactly. Beauty is what produces love: love is what beauty produces. But this is not quite the situation. The first definition (of beauty) Burke means to keep—so that he can then go on to inquire what qualities of objects beauty consists of—but notice how he phrases it. Beauty is what causes 'love, or some passion similar to it'. The reference to beauty in the sentence distinguishing love from desire is supposed to be non-essential, merely clarificatory; and the logic of the matter is this. Begin with the feeling of being attracted to a woman, as an individual (not as a member of a species); abstract from this the ingredient of sexual desire, and what you have left is a certain feeling ('love'). The beauty of a woman (as distinct from her desirability) is what enables her to arouse this feeling; her visible qualities and any qualities, wherever found, that arouse the same, or a similar, feeling are then (by definition) constituents of beauty.

This analysis is at least not circular, for it does not need to refer to the beauty-qualities in order to define the relevant feeling of (aesthetic) love. The serious question here is whether Burke has succeeded in isolating, identifying, and sufficiently characterizing a feeling that is in fact the feeling evoked by those objects that are widely agreed to be beautiful. And it seems doubtful that he has.

His treatment of the sublime is parallel in structure, but teaches a

different lesson. The passion to be discriminated in this case (whose cause will then be defined to be the sublime) is

> Astonishment; and astonishment is that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror. In this case the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on that object which employs it. Hence arises the great power of the sublime. . . .[11] Whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime.[12]

As before, the method is first to characterize 'astonishment' as the emotion we feel when faced by something fearful to a high degree, but are at the same time protected from it, so that we know we are safe. The consequent mixed feeling of being freed from pain, together with the feeling of being absorbed and filled with the sense of the terrible, is the delight of astonishment, and whatever qualities produce this feeling, or some feeling close to it, are (by definition) constituents of the sublime.

Burke is more successful in telling us what the sublime feels like than he was in discussing beauty, and it might seem at first as though here, at least, he has been successful in avoiding the circularity. Yet this success depends, just as it did in Aristotle, upon defining the feeling in terms of the quality perceived: astonishment is what we feel when we see an object that is terrible, or looks terrible, or is associated with what is terrible. But Burke introduces another procedure that is interesting and instructive. We are of course not surprised, after this account, to discover that more terrible objects are more sublime, but he goes on to argue that vastness, and power, and obscurity in the terrible increase the intensity of astonishment because they increase the terribleness. Thus the properties of visible objects seem to be connected in two very different ways with the feeling of the sublime, some of them by definition, and some of them contingently. Burke does not make this distinction very explicit or emphatic, but it contains an important truth.

II

How do we go about discriminating aesthetic enjoyment from other kinds? Presumably we must first identify a certain *source* of enjoyment, and isolate those properties of it that are productive of that enjoyment. That these features are, as such, enjoyable has, of course, to be shown; and then there may be some debate about the propriety of labelling this enjoyment 'aesthetic'. The procedure recommended by J. O. Urmson, in the paper referred to above, is interesting. He argues that 'aesthetic satisfaction' is distinguished from moral, economic, personal, and in-

tellectual satisfactions, by 'the explanation or grounds of the satisfaction' (p. 79). He rejects the proposed differentia of 'a special emotion or a special emotional tinge' (p. 81)—including the physiological responses (gooseflesh and tears) of A. E. Housman.

> To judge a thing aesthetically good or first-rate is not to call it good in a sense different from that in which we call a thing morally good, but to judge it in the light of a different sub-set of criteria. . . . We may recognize an aesthetic reaction by its being due to features of the thing contemplated that are relevant criteria of the aesthetic judgement, and the aesthetic judgement is one founded on a special sub-set of the criteria of value of a certain sort of thing (p. 83).

Thus Urmson discriminates the 'aesthetic reaction' (of which 'aesthetic satisfaction' must be the positive type) by appeal to 'aesthetic judgement' —it is a reaction to those properties that are relevant to judgement. And he distinguishes the properties relevant to judgement as those that are criteria of a certain kind of value (which may as well be called 'aesthetic value'). But these two proposals are in imminent peril of circularity, since there appears to be no way of characterizing the criteria of aesthetic value other than to say that they are the properties that supply aesthetic satisfaction. Surely the satisfaction is primary here; the value, and hence the judgement of value, depend upon it.

Actually, Urmson's procedure tacitly acknowledges this, for he looks about for the most general and elementary situations in which a satisfaction that can reasonably be called aesthetic is available. Here a certain arbitrariness appears. Urmson begins with enjoyable smells, and though this particular satisfaction is no doubt akin to that of art, the inclusion of smell-satisfaction among aesthetic satisfactions has been regarded with suspicion by some aestheticians. But there is no need to bog down in terminology; I recommend a narrower sense of 'aesthetic', but am willing to pick a narrower term instead, if need be. Suppose we characterize aesthetic enjoyment as 'the kind of enjoyment we obtain from the apprehension of a qualitatively diverse segment of the phenomenal field, in so far as the discriminable parts are unified into something of a whole that has a character (that is, regional qualities) of its own.' No doubt many questions can be raised about this proposal; at the moment, I am interested in exploring its logical consequences.

Suppose we set down the following definitory statements:

1. *Aesthetic enjoyment* is (by definition) the kind of enjoyment we obtain from the apprehension of a qualitatively diverse segment of the phenomenal field, in so far as the discriminable parts are unified into something of a whole that has a character (that is, regional qualities) of its own.

2. *Aesthetic value* is (by definition) the capacity to provide, under suitable conditions, aesthetic enjoyment.

3. *Positive critical criteria* are (by definition) properties that are grounds of aesthetic value.

From propositions 2 and 3 it follows that:

4. Positive critical criteria are (analytically) properties that help or enable an object to provide aesthetic enjoyment.

And from propositions 1 and 4 it follows that those features of an object that are mentioned in the very definition of aesthetic enjoyment—unity, complexity, and intensity—will necessarily be positive critical criteria. Thus when someone asserts that one work of art has greater aesthetic value than another, and gives as his reason that it is more unified, there is a certain lack of surprisingness in this little argument, since it amounts to saying that the work has a greater capacity to provide aesthetic enjoyment because it has more of a property the enjoyment of which is (by definition) aesthetic. Yet it is not utterly trivial, since the work might have been better in other ways—for example, because it unified a greater collection of elements or because it had a more intense regional quality.

There is no circularity, then, in defining aesthetic value in terms of aesthetic enjoyment, and defining aesthetic enjoyment in terms of the properties enjoyed. But this set of definitions does have an interesting consequence, for it divides positive critical criteria—those properties that can be cited as grounds of aesthetic value (or artistic goodness)—into two sets. When we cite those properties that are involved in the definition of 'aesthetic enjoyment', we are giving the sort of 'safe' answer that Socrates describes in the *Phaedo*: 'the safe course is to tell myself or anybody else that beautiful things are beautiful because of the beautiful itself'.[13] Naturally, if aesthetic enjoyment is (in part) the enjoyment of unity, unity is a ground of aesthetic value, and greater unity (other things being equal) of greater aesthetic value. But when the critic cites properties that are not involved in the definition of 'aesthetic enjoyment'—such as that a modulation is too abrupt, or not abrupt enough—he is giving a more interesting answer, because a synthetic connection has to be established to make the reason relevant (it must be argued that the too abrupt modulation mars the unity of the music, or that the insufficiently abrupt modulation weakens its dramatic intensity, or some other quality).

This distinction between the safe and the risky critical criteria may offer an explanation of an intuitive difference that has been felt by some recent writers. For example, Dorothy Walsh[14] has distinguished between 'reasons' and 'norms' in critical judgement. The norms she lists[15] are

unity, complexity, and 'generative powers' (the parts 'interact with one another to generate emergent regional qualities'). The norms, in her view, are not themselves reasons but 'regulative principles guiding choice in the selection of reasons' (p. 392); that is, the statement 'X is more unified' does not, for her, constitute an answer to the question, 'Why is X better than Y?' but it (or one of the other norms) will be operative, even if not mentioned, whenever answers *are* given to the question. Norms

> are, methodologically, ultimate. Accordingly, they must recommend themselves on their own merits; they must be and seem plausible simply as such. To have this plausibility, they must be general *to the point of obviousness* (p. 391).

Professor Walsh does not, so far as I can see, justify her claim that unity, complexity, and intensity of regional qualities are obviously the correct norms of the critic; evidently she thinks it is not seriously deniable. But in the light of my previous argument, a justification might be given. Since these three Primary Critical Criteria enter into the very definition of the enjoyment that is in view, we might say, they do have a sort of obviousness. So, one might say, to cite a Primary Criterion is not so much to give a reason as to indicate the area in which a reason can be given—to classify criteria as unifying, complexifying, intensifying. The distinction between the Primary and Secondary Criteria would then be somewhat like that between rules of inference and premises in critical argument.

Nevertheless, I don't think this analysis is quite correct. Critics quite often (and sensibly) cite unity as a reason—they may say: 'It hangs together better'; 'It is better-organized'; 'It seems to have more of a shape'. (Actual examples are not hard to find.) We can sometimes sense the unity, or the lack of it, in a work even before we discover by analysis which detailed features are responsible. Unity is itself a regional, or *gestalt*, quality, and it has its perceptual conditions. The question is: *why* does unity function as a guide to our selection of specific reasons for justifying a particular judgement? The answer, I think, is that it so functions because the specific criteria are properties which, in this particular work, tend to promote or inhibit unity. Professor Walsh says something close to this (p. 393). If there is anything strange about citing unity or lack of it as a critical reason, it is only that this remark would be quite general, and not very informative unless pursued further, and also perhaps not very surprising, since one work of art can be better than another only by surpassing it in at least one of the three primary respects.

More recently, Morris Weitz[16] has asserted that not all the reasons

that critics give to validate their judgements require to be vindicated in turn. After a survey of discussions by four Shakespearian critics, he says:

> It seems to me, as I read criticial evaluations of Shakespeare's dramas, that at least some of the reasons offered in support of the praise of the drama are good reasons, hence validate the praise, not because further reasons for them can be given, but simply because they employ certain criteria—certain 'P's—about which the question, 'But what have these to do with dramatic greatness?', cannot be intelligibly asked since no answer to it can be given (p. 436).

There are two remarkable omissions in Weitz's argument. In the first place, he gives no general characterization of those 'logically unchallengeable' (p. 437) reasons, by which they are to be distinguished from the challengeable ones. He just asserts there are some reasons (his examples are Johnson's 'Because they represent general nature' and Coleridge's 'Because they are true to nature') for which it is 'appropriate and legitimate' (p. 436) to ask a vindication, though he does not think that these reasons have actually been vindicated. On the other hand Pope's reason ('Because the characters are individuals, various and consistent') and Coleridge's reason ('Because the puns in *Hamlet* intensify the passions and move the action of the drama') 'can stand alone', and need not be further justified (p. 436).

In the second place, Weitz gives no argument, so far as I can make out, to show that some reasons are unchallengeable. He says that when a critic (such as Coleridge) employs unity as a criterion of evaluation, it makes no sense to ask why unity is a good thing in a drama rather than disunity, 'for what could be a further reason for the reason, "Because they are unified," offered in support of the praise of Shakespeare's dramas?' (p. 437). This is a bit surprising, when we recall that Aristotle did not hesitate to answer precisely this question (*mutatis mutandis*), when he remarked of the epic that 'it must have a beginning, middles, and an end, in order that the whole narrative may attain the unity of a living organism and provide its own peculiar kind of pleasure'.[17] That is, unity is a good thing because it enables the drama to produce its special enjoyment. I don't think Aristotle was giving an unintelligible or useless answer to the question, but, as I have said, it is in a way obvious. It always makes sense to ask of *any* critical reason why it is relevant—why that particular property counts for or against the aesthetic value of a work. Yet there is this much truth in Weitz's distinction, that some of the critic's criteria cannot sensibly be challenged by someone who knows the nature of the relevant kind of value. Anyone who understands that aesthetic enjoyment is (among other things) a relishing of highly organized wholes, does not need to ask why unity is a positive critical criterion,

though he might need to ask whether, and why, the puns in *Hamlet* are merits or defects.

In short, it is philosophically interesting (if true) that some critical criteria (the Primary Criteria) are established by the initial discrimination of aesthetic enjoyment and, consequently, of aesthetic value; but what makes criticism an interesting and adventurous business is that the Secondary Criteria are connected with aesthetic enjoyment in a synthetic and contingent way.

REFERENCES

[1] *Art* (1915), p. 6.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[3] See C. J. Ducasse, *The Philosophy of Art* (1929); Lincoln MacVeagh (1929), Appendix.

[4] See 'What Makes a Situation Aesthetic?' Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. XXXI (1957), 75–92.

[5] *Lives of the English Poets*, ed. G. B. Hill (1905), Clarendon Press, I, 175.

[6] See *Samuel Johnson on Shakespeare*, ed. W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. (1960), p. 88 (*cf.* Robert W. Daniel, 'Johnson on Literary Texture,' *Studies in Honor of John C. Hodges and Alwin Thaler*, University of Tennessee, 1961).

[7] *Op. cit.*, 97–98. The *Spectator* had said (No. 40; April 16, 1711): '*King Lear* is an admirable tragedy . . . as Shakespeare wrote it; but as it is reformed according to the chimerical notion of poetical justice, in my humble opinion it has lost half its beauty.' (I confess to some chagrin at finding the term 'beauty' applied to this work!)

[8] *Poetics*, ch. XIV, trans. G. M. A. Grube (1958), p. 27.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[10] *Enquiry*, ed. J. T. Boulton (1958), p. 91. I want to thank Professor Jerome Stolnitz for some very helpful corrections of my interpretation of Burke.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

[13] Trans. R. Hackforth, p. 134.

[14] 'Critical Reasons,' *Philosophical Review*, LXIX (1960), 386–93.

[15] Corresponding to what I have called General Canons (*Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism* (1958), pp. 465–69) and Primary Criteria ('On the Generality of Critical Reasons,' *Journal of Philosophy*, LIX (1962), 477–86.)

[16] 'Reasons in Criticism,' *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, XX (Summer 1962), 429–37.

[17] *Op cit.*, ch. XXIII, p. 49.

THE MEANING OF 'GOOD' IN AESTHETIC JUDGEMENTS

Hans Eichner

I

IN RECENT decades philosophic discussion of aesthetic judgements in terms of 'beauty' has gone out of fashion, mainly for the reason that the word is rarely applied to works of art. *King Lear* may be a great play, *Guernica* a great painting, but one would hardly call either of them beautiful.[1] The standard form of aesthetic judgements is something like 'This is good' or 'This is a good work of art'. There is extensive agreement that such propositions as 'This painting is good' or 'This poem is excellent' are not of the same type as propositions such as 'This painting is square' or 'This poem is a sonnet', and that the latter are *factual* in a sense in which the former are not; but there seems to be no agreement whatever as to the meaning of 'good' in such contexts nor as to the meaning and function of aesthetic judgements generally, whatever form they may have. The present paper is an attempt to remedy this situation. To this end I shall briefly examine some widely held theories of aesthetic judgement and then propose a theory of my own, which seems to offer certain advantages.

1. Until the last third of the eighteenth century the view prevailed that aesthetic merit consisted in the adherence to certain 'rules'. A work of art which conformed to these rules was judged good while a work which transgressed against one or more of them was judged correspondingly inferior. Thus a tragedy was judged good if it had five acts, obeyed the law of the three unities, was written in an elevated style, possessed 'verisimilitude', taught a moral lesson, and so on; or, quite generally, a work of art was evaluated positively if it satisfied a set of 'factual' (non-evaluative) criteria. This theory has the attraction that it enables us to infer that 'A is good' on the basis of a set of relatively easily verifiable

'factual' propositions;[2] but it lost much of its plausibility when, some two hundred years ago, critics ceased to be able to agree on the criteria. When it was shown by such writers as Diderot, Herder and the brothers Schlegel that there were no rules which had universal validity, and that no rule abstracted from one work of art could be applied to another, 'rules' went out of fashion. There would be no need to discuss this view were it not that it is periodically revived in a somewhat modified form. One such modification, which we shall regard as representative of the whole class, is put forward in Helen Knight's essay 'The Use of "Good" in Aesthetic Judgements'.[3]

Mrs. Knight asserts in her essay that we can clarify the use of 'good' in aesthetic judgements by 'considering the goodness-criteria relation', and suggests that such things as 'organization of groups, space composition, profundity, etc., are criteria of goodness'.[4] As Mrs. Knight herself points out, however, we praise different works of art for different, and quite frequently incompatible, reasons:

> We praise the brightness and clarity of an Impressionist painting, but do not condemn a Rembrandt for lacking these qualities. It is clear that we look for something different in each case. We praise a Botticelli for the poetry of its theme and a Degas for its realism. And how do we praise a realistic picture? We say that the artist has caught the exact pose, the kind of thing one might see at any moment. And the very banality of that pose (in the case of Degas) is a merit. But we do not condemn Botticelli because we fail to meet his goddesses and nymphs as we walk through the street. On the contrary, we praise him for imagination of the ideal. And we praise him for his flowing rhythm, but do not condemn Byzantine art for being rigid, nor Cézanne for being ponderous.[5]

But if we praise a Cézanne for its brightness and a Rembrandt for its chiaroscuro, a Degas for its naturalism and a Russian icon for its stylization, then neither brightness nor chiaroscuro, neither naturalism nor stylization, are criteria. Smallness is a criterion of merit in a lap-dog because bigness is incompatible with being a lap-dog, but if a painting can be good without being bright, brightness is not a criterion of goodness in paintings; and there is no property (other than 'goodness', if goodness is a property) which is common to all good paintings.[6]

Mrs. Knight tries to meet this objection by rejecting the notion of general criteria and substituting for them *specific* criteria, claiming that 'brightness' can be a criterion with a Cézanne without being a criterion with a Rembrandt, and concludes that the meaning of 'good' is determined in every specific instance in which it is used by the specific criteria which are applied:

> Suppose that two people are looking at a picture by Picasso, the kind in which we get abstract treatment of actual objects. One of them says 'this is good' and the other

'this is bad'. The first is judging by its form, and the other points scornfully to the representation (or lack of it). The appropriate comment is, I suggest, they are using 'good' with different meanings.[7]

But a theory according to which 'good' has one meaning when applied to a Cézanne and another when applied to a Rembrandt, one meaning when used by a person who likes abstract painting and another when used by a person who doesn't, is obviously unsatisfactory. If this theory were true, the proposition 'Rembrandt's self-portraits are good paintings' would be incomprehensible to me unless I were acquainted with these paintings or with the criteria employed in formulating the proposition.

In fact the whole theory appears to be based on a misinterpretation of the way in which aesthetic judgements are arrived at: if there are no *general* criteria of goodness, there are no criteria at all which can be used in making evaluations. We may think that we are employing criteria when we say that we like a certain work of art *for this or that reason*, or *because it has this or that property*, but such statements are misleading. When we praise a Botticelli 'for its poetic theme' or 'because its theme is so poetic', we are actually neither stating a reason nor pointing out a cause. If I want to see *Hamlet* at the Haymarket Theatre *and therefore*, in order to realize my intention, go to London, my wanting to see *Hamlet* is my reason for going to London. But I do not notice the poetry of the theme of a Botticelli *and therefore* decide that it is a good painting. On the contrary, it is because I approve of the painting that I find its theme poetic rather than theatrical or sentimental. When I describe the theme as poetic, I am not making a factual statement which entails an evaluation, but I am evaluating an aspect of the painting in the light of my experience of the painting as a whole.[8] Similarly, the statement 'This Botticelli is good because its theme is so poetic' is not analogous with statements such as 'I fell ill because I ate spoilt meat'. Eating spoilt meat causes illness, but poetic themes do not cause goodness: the relation between the theme and the goodness is not like that between eating spoilt food and being ill, but rather like that between having hepatitis and being ill (though the latter analogy is also not quite accurate).

2. It used to be fashionable to assert that the aesthetic judgement '*X* is good' means 'I like *X*'; but there are at least two objections to this view—one that is trivial and one that seems irrefutable.

The trivial objection is that 'liking' is not the kind of word which one tends to apply to great works of art: one might 'like' strawberry ice-cream, but one hesitates to declare that one 'likes' the St. Matthew Passion. It is far too weak a term for our appreciation of art—for the delight and the rapture, for the stimulation of all our faculties, the

'satisfaction of an intense need, the enlargement and enrichment of our complete personality, the enhancement and quickening of our total conscious existence'.[9] If it is understood, however, that 'liking' in our context is used as a kind of abbreviation for the whole range of emotions involved in a positive aesthetic response and that it implies no belittling of the experience, this objection becomes irrelevant. In the remainder of this essay we shall use 'liking' on such an understanding and thus spare our reader the embarrassment of a few purple patches.

A far more serious objection to the theory which asserts the equivalence of '*X* is good' and 'I like *X*' is that 'I like *X*' is true if I like *X* and false if I don't, while '*X* is good' contains no reference to me and can be true or false whether I like *X* or don't.[10] This objection is irrefutable. Nevertheless, one feels that there is a connection between 'I like *X*' and '*X* is good' and we shall have to return to this subject at a later stage of this paper.

3. Sometimes the attempt is made to explain aesthetic judgements in terms of 'commendation'. If we take this word to have its standard meaning of 'praise', such explanations are too vague to be of use. We can praise a work of art because of its moral message, or because of the skill which went into its making, without asserting its aesthetic value; it is neither unusual nor improper for a critic to praise *e.g.* a realistic painting of a cow for the skill involved in catching the pose of the animal, while in the same breath dismissing the painting as trivial and thus denying it aesthetic merit. Or one might praise the humanitarian intentions of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, while condemning the novel as sentimental. The only escape from this objection is to say that the aesthetic judgement '*X* is good' means '*X* is commendable on aesthetic grounds', but this is true only to the extent that it is trivial.

A similar objection can be raised against construing aesthetic judgements as recommendations. One can be fully aware of the aesthetic merits of Joyce's *Ulysses* and on moral grounds refuse to recommend it. Placing a book on the Index does not necessarily imply a denial of aesthetic merit. Or again one may be asked by a teenager whether *Faust* is 'really as good as people say it is', assure him that it fully deserves the praise commonly bestowed on it, and advise him against reading it on the grounds that he lacks the maturity to appreciate it: the statement 'This is a good work of art, but I cannot recommend it to you' is not contradictory.

None the less, there is a connection between calling a work of art good and recommending it and this theory too will have to be taken up again below.

4. A fourth theory which is sometimes suggested is that we learn the

meaning of such words as 'good' by observing their usage, and that they are not amenable to analysis or definition. Evidently the second half of this statement does not follow from the first. I am not aware that there is any evidence for it, and it would appear that it can only be refuted by providing an analysis. We shall now attempt to do this. It will be advantageous to begin by examining some situations in which we are interested in other peoples' aesthetic judgements and find them useful.

The fact that there are such situations makes it impossible for me to agree with the emotive theory of value judgements as formulated *e.g.* in Professor Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic*. If an aesthetic judgement is merely an expression of feeling and (as Ayer puts it in the introduction to the second edition of his work) not a proposition, and if it can therefore neither be true nor false, I should not be interested in Sir Kenneth Clark's evaluations of paintings unless I were his friend or his biographer. In fact I am neither and Sir Kenneth's judgements interest me quite simply because I am interested in art. In what manner they arouse my interest will be discussed in the next section of this paper.

II

Suppose, for a moment, that I feel like spending an evening at a cinema. There are half a dozen films being shown in the neighbourhood and I have to make a choice. If I am wise, I shall not trust to luck but make inquiries among friends or find out what my favourite film critic has written about the films. If there is a film amongst them which the critic declares excellent, I shall go and see it in the expectation of spending a pleasurable evening.

Suppose again—to meet the objection that films belong to the category of amusements rather than art—that there is a one-man show at a downtown gallery and that, the painter's name being a new one to me, I am not sure whether I ought to go. Clearly this situation is analogous to the one described in the previous paragraph. If I am told by a reputable source that the paintings are excellent, I shall go to the gallery in the expectation of a rewarding aesthetic experience. If I am told that they are inferior, I shall go only if I have nothing better to do or from some ulterior motive.

Finally let us consider the case of someone who has just heard Bartók's Violin Concerto for the first time and has found this a most unrewarding experience. If he is naïve in matters of art, he may jump to the conclusion that the Concerto is a bad piece of music, and refuse to hear it again. (This is the standard reaction of most people to 'modern art' and was the reaction of many of his contemporaries to Beethoven.) If he is a little

more sophisticated and is seriously interested in music, he will recall that the Concerto is very highly regarded by experts on modern music and he will conclude that his failure to enjoy it may be due to his own shortcomings rather than to Bartók's. He might now be prepared to take a little trouble. He may listen to the work again, study the score or inform himself about the thematic structure of the work. Gradually he may begin to understand the work; the passages which had first struck him as discordant noises may begin to form a pattern, to fall into place. And ultimately he may have the profound and satisfying aesthetic experience which had prompted the experts to call the Concerto a good piece of music.

It is easy to see what our three examples have in common. In every case the aesthetic judgement is accepted as a guide to action because it is understood to hold out a promise or to make a prediction. If a critic whose judgement I have on previous occasions found to be reliable tells me that this film or that painting is good, I go to see it in the expectation that I will like it; and if I am disappointed, I am likely to decide (perhaps quite mistakenly) that the critic was wrong. If a work of art is generally judged good and I don't like it, I tend to assume that I may learn to like it if I take enough trouble. We may thus risk the generalization that the proposition '*X* is a good work of art' means 'You will like it'—it being understood that the word 'like' is used in the 'strong' sense suggested above.

As we shall see, this generalization stands in need of considerable refinement. Lest it be rejected out of hand, however, I should like to interject at this point, at the risk of repeating myself, a few elementary illustrations. What can it conceivably mean if I assert that 'Acetone smells good'? It will hardly be denied that this is an aesthetic judgement, though it is not the kind of judgement commonly discussed in treatises on aesthetics; if it were, these treatises would be less lengthy. It cannot be discussed in terms of criteria: my liking the smell of acetone may be my reason for saying that it smells good, but cannot be the reason for its smelling good, nor can any other reason for this be advanced. Again if it is suggested that 'Acetone smells good' means 'I recommend the sniffing of acetone', we need only substitute a poisonous substance for our harmless one to show that this will not do; asserting that 'Hydrocyanic acid smells good' would at most expose me to the danger of being considered a crank, but *recommending* that people sniff hydrocyanic acid would render me guilty of culpable homicide. And while Professor Ayer might suggest that 'Acetone smells good' is merely emotive and neither true nor false, I venture to suggest that even he would be prompted to disagree—at least if he were caught off his guard—with the

assertion that rotten eggs smell good; yet if this were not a proposition, he could hardly disagree with it.

A related example will take us a step further. A wine expert, having tasted a sample of a consignment of *Châteauneuf du Pape*, reports to his client that it is excellent and is paid his fee. Is he really only paid for smacking his lips or emitting a grunt of approval? Far from it. He is paid because his evaluation has a non-subjective, practical significance. It indicates that people will be willing to pay a good price for this wine (and they will do so because they will like the wine well enough to make it worth the price). But of course not everybody will be willing to pay the price, and not everybody will like the wine. Connoisseurs will do so, while the kind of person who drinks wine twice a year will prefer a doctored and artificially sweetened *Liebfrauenmilch*. Thus we are faced with a question which is crucial for our whole inquiry: If '*X* is good' means 'You will like *X*', who is the mysterious 'You'?

The statement '*X* is good' is not necessarily, and in fact not normally, addressed to a specific person, nor is it necessarily, or even normally, addressed to everybody. It may be impolite, but it is hardly illogical, to tell the woman next door that 'this is a bad film but you will like it' or that 'this is a good painting but not the kind you like'. The prediction 'You will like this' applies only to people of similar interests, similar standards of education, a similar degree of concern with the art to which the given work belongs. In fact one may say that it only applies to people of *similar taste*—and this does not, as one might think at first sight, involve circularity. To come back to the first of the situations we outlined, if I want to go to the cinema and I consult a critic to help me choose a film, I do not consult just *any* critic but one with whose judgements I have frequently agreed in the past—*i.e.* a critic of similar taste.[11]

III

It might seem to follow from what we have said that aesthetic judgements are *only* a matter of taste; and the fact that there is a good deal of disagreement among critics tends to support such a supposition. There is, however, also a great deal of agreement, especially about works of art that have been around for a long time and have been the subject of extensive critical discussion. Few people would doubt that *Hamlet* is a good play or that the Venus de Milo is a better work of art than the Albert Memorial. The conclusions of the previous section are therefore in need of modification.

The lady next door, of whom we have suggested that she likes bad films, also likes Hummel-figures and lifelike water-colours of pet par-

rots. She unhesitatingly calls these paintings and ornaments 'good' (though she may be more likely to call them 'nice' or 'cute') and she evidently expects others to concur in her judgement: when I do not evince pleasure on seeing the horrors on her walls and shelves she is surprised, hurt and disappointed. She is hardly qualified, however, to judge works of art: her experience of art is narrow and she never looks very hard even at the things she 'likes'. She is not really concerned with art, but with decoration. She treasures her Hummel-figures because they lend a personal touch to the room and she likes paintings of parrots because she likes parrots and not because she likes paintings. Her lack of genuine concern for art and her limited range of aesthetic experience render her judgements worthless for anyone who is genuinely concerned with art. None the less her judgements are predictions, and as long as they are tested within the circle of her friends these predictions tend to be correct. Hence if we interpret the proposition '*X* is good' to mean 'You will like *X* if your taste in general is similar to mine', the local butcher's evaluation of Cézanne is as significant as Sir Kenneth Clark's; and if we interpret it to mean 'You will like it never mind who you are', Mickey Spillane is a better novelist than Henry James. We may call the meaning of 'good' thus defined its *trivial* meaning, and I am afraid it corresponds to common usage. (Witness the woman next door.) It is a very different matter, however, when the word 'good' is used in an aesthetic judgement by a serious art lover or a professional critic. On such an occasion a more specific set of conditions is attached to the prediction; the awkward reference to the speaker in the analysis ('if your taste is similar to mine') disappears, and the proposition '*X* is good' predicts that *if you are seriously interested in the art form to which* X *belongs, if your experience of art is wide enough, and if you are prepared to take trouble over* X, you will like it (or will ultimately get to like it; but as the prediction refers to the future anyway, this rider may be unnecessary). This may be called the 'expert' meaning of 'good'; I believe that it represents the proper use of the word and that aesthetic judgements whose predictions are borne out in this sense are intrinsically more valuable.

IV

While the analysis of aesthetic judgements outlined in the preceding section seems to afford a basis on which the role played by these judgements and by criticism in the traffic of the arts can be accounted for satisfactorily, there are certain objections to it which come readily to mind and which must be dealt with before we can proceed with our inquiry.

1. It may be urged that if aesthetic judgements are predictions, their truth or falsehood can never be verified; even an assertion such as that Shakespeare was a good playwright is, on that basis, at best probable; the future to which the prediction refers is always before us.

The answer to this assertion is that it is correct, but that it is a confirmation rather than a refutation. The history of the arts provides abundant evidence that there are no evaluations which enjoy the status of certainty. A theorem such as that there is no greatest prime number can be demonstrated once and for all; a law such as $s = \frac{1}{2}gt^2$ may be subject to further refinement, but it is hard to imagine that it will ever prove wrong; value judgements, however, are not of this type. Their verification is a process which stretches into infinity. But the greater the number of instances in which and the greater the variety of circumstances under which the prediction implied by them has proved right, the more certain can we feel of them. If a work has been 'liked' for a few centuries, it seems likely that it will continue to be 'liked'. Thus our theory accounts for the widespread feeling that time bestows a kind of sanction on the work of art—that aesthetic judgements, or works of art, have to stand the 'test of time'. (There is no test of time for $s = \frac{1}{2}gt^2$.) We can be reasonably certain that Sophocles was a great playwright, perhaps a little less certain that Shakespeare was, and—however great the enthusiasm his plays may arouse in us—we have to entertain serious doubts about Christopher Fry. Sophocles and Shakespeare are 'classics'; no contemporary of ours can be—as yet.

2. Our theory seems to run into difficulties when past *performances* are evaluated; no predictions with respect to them can be made. But of course we do not say of past performances that they 'are good'. We say that they *were* good; and it stands to reason that the propositions '*X* is good' and '*X* was good' should not have the same meaning. The proposition '*X* was good' (where *X* is a performance) means something like 'if you had seen *X* (it being assumed that you cared for this kind of art and had the necessary qualifications to follow it intelligently), you would have liked it'. Of course this proposition is unverifiable except by a complicated and unreliable process of induction; but so is the proposition '*X* was good'.

None the less evaluations of past performances are not necessarily worthless or uninteresting. Suppose that I have attended the performance of a piece of music which was at that time unfamiliar to me, and that I was bored. Unless I were arrogantly sure of my own judgement, I might wonder whether my lack of appreciation was due to my failure to understand the piece or to its poor quality or to its poor performance. A good critic could, with a reasonable degree of probability, tell me;

and—in spite of the uniqueness of the performance—I could even, to a certain extent, check his verdict. It might very well depend on his evaluation of the event whether I would henceforth avoid music by this composer or concerts by this performer or give them another try. If I did give them another try, I might very well, in spite of my first unfortunate experience, reach the conclusion that *X* really was a good sonata or *Y* a good violinist; or I might reach the conclusion that the critic cannot possibly have been right. In this way even evaluations of unique events are treated as predictions, and therein lies their function.

3. It may be asserted that, if our theory were correct, the best way of finding out whether a given work of art is good would be to take a census of expert opinion rather than seeing or hearing or reading it; yet this is not what the experts do.

The answer to this objection is that if the expert did this, there would be no expert opinion to take a census of. (They would not even take in each other's washing—no washing would be done.) But even 'established' works of art, where there would be ample material for a census, stand in constant need of re-examination—precisely *because* aesthetic judgements are predictions. A nineteenth-century judgement is less likely to prove correct today than a twentieth-century judgement—not necessarily because we are better critics but simply because the climate of sensibility has changed; and only time and constant re-examination can tell the difference between a fashion and a correct appraisal. Witness the eighteenth century's over-valuation of Johnson and its underestimation of mediaeval art. None the less the best way for an individual critic to find out whether a given work is good (if this is really all he wants to know) *is* a poll. On a somewhat trivial plane a poll of both expert and non-expert opinion of current films is regularly published by Consumers Union; and as films are ephemeral and rarely subjected to sustained and repeated critical examination, this poll ranks among the most useful guides for the movie-goer. On a less trivial plane most of our judgements are coloured by the consensus of the judgements of others. For some reason or other *King Lear* fails to move me. It is because of the consensus of informed opinion that I do not conclude that *King Lear* is a mediocre play, but assume that the fault lies with me. If I were asked, I would say that *King Lear* is a great play though I do not particularly care for it. Quite similarly I am reasonably certain that the *Divina Commedia* is a great poem though I have not read it; and my certainty is due to the consensus of informed opinion.

V

We are now in a position to re-examine four of the theories rejected in Section I of this paper and to show that they do, after all, hint at important truths. (If they did not, their wide appeal would be incomprehensible.) It will be convenient to discuss the four theories in a different order.

1. If, as I have attempted to show, the proposition '*X* is good' means —with the refinements noted—'You will like *X*', it is perfectly reasonable that this proposition is normally construed as a recommendation. If I assert that *Faust* is 'good' or, to use a less arid expression, that it is a great dramatic poem, I predict a rewarding aesthetic experience and hence, to this extent, I recommend it. If I am asked whether it is good and I say Yes but do not think it would be wise for the inquirer to read or stage it (or whatever else he may have in mind), I should mislead him if I did not add in the same breath that it was too difficult for him, or better suited to being read than performed, or whatever else may cause me *not* to wish to recommend it. Thus the interpretation of aesthetic judgements in terms of recommendation points to an important implication of these judgements.

2. Quite similarly there is a genuine and important connection between the aesthetic judgement '*X* is good' and the autobiographical fact or assertion 'I like *X*'. The prediction '*X* is good' applies, on the conditions set out above, to me as much as to everyone else; and the fact that I like *X* may be the reason for my asserting that *X* is good. (It is, in fact, the usual reason.) The first of these connections formed the starting-point of our discussion in Section II, while the second connection will have to be discussed in greater detail. It should be pointed out at once, however, that the intimacy of the connection between the aesthetic judgement and the autobiographical assertion depends on the context in which the former occurs. If somebody asks me to recommend a good novel to him, he does not want me to name a book which *I* happen to like but one which *he* will like; and it would be perfectly in order for me to recommend to him a novel which I have not read but which has the reputation of being good. But the undergraduate who is bored by Wordsworth's *Prelude* and who asks his English tutor whether it is 'really a good poem' does not wish to be told its reputation; he knows this well enough. He wants to know whether the tutor agrees with the current evaluation. What he is asking is: 'Do you, personally, think that the *Prelude* is a great poem? Or are not you too bored with it? Am I too impatient or too inattentive a reader—or are the literary pundits too cowed by the traditional evaluation of the poem to see it in

its proper light?' And the kind of answer which he expects is: 'I am convinced *on the basis of my own personal experience* that it is a great poem' or: 'I don't like it either, but I know that I have a blind spot for this kind of poetry' or: 'I don't like it either, and I think the traditional judgement is in need of revision'.

Such revisions occur all the time, although down-grading is usually not very interesting or dramatic; poems don't die, they just fade away. The more interesting re-appraisals are the discoveries and re-discoveries, such as the twentieth-century re-discoveries of baroque poetry and of Hölderlin. Such a re-appraisal begins when a critic finds that a certain work of art which does not enjoy a high reputation *does* provide him with a rewarding aesthetic experience or, to use less pretentious language, when he likes a work which is not generally judged good.

The wise critic who finds himself in this position will first of all test his experience: he will re-read the poem or re-visit the picture to make sure that he was not deluded by a passing mood. He will ask himself *why* he likes the work—and the answer to this question is autobiographical. (I like a certain kind of regional novel because it brings back childhood memories. If I do not take this personal bias into account in my critical pronunciations, I am a bad critic. The lowest form of criticism—to speak with Oscar Wilde—is a form of autobiography.)[12] If no source of personal bias becomes apparent, however, and if the positive aesthetic response stands the test of repetition, the critic will (at least tentatively) decide that the prevailing appraisal of the work is mistaken (that it is a mere fashion or reflects an incomplete understanding of the work), and he will assert, in spite of the consensus of experts, that the work is good. He will assert that it is good *because he likes it*[13] and because his experience with this and other works of art justifies his belief that other lovers of this form of art will also like it if they take another and closer look.

3. But of course the bare assertion that a certain work of art is good does not usually achieve very much.[14] Evaluation must be accompanied by interpretation and interpretation inevitably consists, at least in part, of the kind of statement—'the artist has caught the exact pose', 'there is a perfect unity of form and content', etc.—which is so easily mistaken as a reference to a criterion. As we have seen, however, the interpreter of a work of art does not tell us why or for what reasons he likes it. He tells us, to use a phrase coined by Fr. Schlegel, 'how' he likes it, or precisely what it is that he likes.[15] He tries to teach or cajole or persuade his readers to see the work as he sees it in the justifiable hope that if they see it as he sees it, if they 'understand it properly', they will experience it as he experiences it and thus come to share his enthusiasm.

To a considerable extent such interpretations will of course consist of

'objective' or 'factual' statements. The reader who complains of the artificiality of seventeenth-century verse may have to be told that this is intentional and that he must not expect to find in this kind of poetry the values to which he is accustomed from his experience of nineteenth-century lyrics, and the reviewer who complains that Thomas Mann's *Dr. Faustus* is 'written with glue instead of ink' must be told that the style of this work is a deliberate parody. Such information can be immensely helpful. Once we have the technique of a Bach fugue pointed out to us and learn to follow the voices, or once we learn to hear the inversions in certain Haydn quartets, these compositions no longer seem the same and provide us with a much more rewarding experience. Or again Kafka's novels may be read as psychopathological case histories, as religious allegories or as symbolic presentations of an existential situation, and if a reader is persuaded that one of these readings is more adequate to the novels than another, the resulting change in perspective is likely to lead to a change in evaluation. Conversely disagreement in evaluation may be due to the discernment of different patterns or to differing interpretations or to different degrees of comprehension, and such disagreements can be resolved by analysis in purely factual (non-evaluatory) terms. Thus factual statements can influence aesthetic judgements, though, of course, they can never logically entail them.

Purely factual statements are not, however, the most natural way of talking about works of art. The perception of a pattern or meaning in art is part of a total response to it, which includes the interpreter's emotional reaction and his spontaneous evaluation; and there is no special merit in abstracting from this emotional reaction in the process of interpretation. On the contrary: most effective criticism recreates the total response. To borrow another phrase of Fr. Schlegel, criticism *presents the impression* which the work of art (after the most thorough study) makes on the critic.[16] It is objective to the extent that the responsible critic tries, as best he can, to neutralize his personal idiosyncrasies; but it does not serve the same purposes and cannot have the kind of objectivity of *e.g.* a palaeontologist's description of a fossil. It is not a substitute for direct acquaintance nor is its ultimate purpose, as is the ultimate purpose of scientific writing, to establish facts. It little avails the critic (supposing that he can do so) to cudgel his reader into consenting to his evaluation of a work of art unless the reader has the experience that corresponds to this evaluation; but if the criticism leads the reader to the experience, his consent to the evaluation will follow.

In a recent book Dr. Prawer quotes a few lines from Heine's play *William Ratcliff* in which Ratcliff apostrophizes his double, and comments:

> This address to the 'Doppelgänger' has everything: the image of the vampire sucking ghastly nourishment from the living body, that of the hypnotist willing his subject into rigidity, of the spectre freezing the blood, of living men transformed into zombies or ghosts . . .

This is purely descriptive, and emotionally neutral. Quoted out of context it is quite ineffective criticism. It does not lead us to see the lines from Heine's poem in a new way, or in any way; it may be followed either by praise or condemnation. But Dr. Prawer continues:

> . . . and because it has everything it has, in the end, nothing. It collects together the trappings of the novel of terror and the 'Fate' drama, overloads the experience to be communicated, and like those films called *Brides of Dracula* or *The Curse of Frankenstein*, it makes us laugh where we ought to have shuddered.[17]

This also, at least in part, is descriptive, but it is no longer descriptive in neutral terms; and it is only now that the first, purely descriptive part of our quotation becomes effective, that it 'falls into place'. We now see the lines as Dr. Prawer wants us to see them, and consent to his judgement.

The relation between aesthetic judgements and interpretations should now be clear. The judgement predicts the aesthetic experience and the interpretation strives to make this prediction come true. The consensus of judgements establishes the *delectus classicorum*—the canon of works which promise the most rewarding aesthetic experiences and which the continuing process of re-appraising and re-interpreting prevents from ossifying. Judging and interpreting are logically distinct activities, but the logical distinction between them is no more important than the realization that they are usually part of the same psychological act.

4. The reader who has followed me so far may be prepared to admit that the equivalence of '*X* is good' and 'You will like *X*' which I have asserted *works*, on the conditions set out, to the extent that it enables us to account for the way in which aesthetic judgements and interpretations function; but it is only too likely that he will be left with a certain feeling of dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction seems to be due to the fact that, whatever may be said about the *cognitive content* of our two propositions, '*X* is good' does not have the same tone or atmosphere or 'feel' as 'You will like *X*'. It is this difference of tone, I believe, which is operative when it is asserted that no analysis can alter the fact that '*X* is good' is an evaluation, while 'You will like *X*' is factual, and that the two propositions therefore *cannot* have the same meaning.

As a rejoinder, I would first of all point out that such propositions as '*X* is good' should not be called evaluations: the word 'evaluation' denotes both the process of evaluating and the resulting judgement,

while '*X* is good' expresses the judgement only. And I would urge that the assertion of an unbridgeable gulf between aesthetic judgements and factual propositions is only an assertion and one which is rendered unlikely by the extent to which there is genuine communication and agreement between critics. If aesthetic judgements had no factual content, there would be little to communicate and nothing to agree on.

None the less the fact remains that '*X* is good' and 'You will like *X*' do not have the same atmosphere. It is this difference of atmosphere which gives the emotive theory its plausibility. I can say that the *Divina Commedia* is a great poem even though I have not read it (and hence the emotive theory is wrong: I do not smack my lips after not having eaten steak); but I do not speak of the *Divina Commedia* (which I have not read) in the same tone in which I speak of *Macbeth* (which I have read). My statement about the *Commedia* is atypical. Normally aesthetic judgements have emotive overtones which our equivalent lacks. This loss of overtones, however, is inevitable whenever we analyse or paraphrase or construct logical equivalents. Portia's 'The quality of mercy is not strained' expresses a factual proposition not a value judgement, and a paraphrase can be worked out which has the same meaning; such a paraphrase would be logically equivalent, but it would *only* be logically equivalent. We should not expect it to be a satisfactory substitute.

REFERENCES

[1] *Cf.* J. A. Passmore, 'The Dreariness of Aesthetics', in *Aesthetics and Language*, ed. W. Elton (1954), p. 50. This collection of essays will be referred to as 'Elton'.

[2] In fact the theory asserts that '*X* is good' can be reduced to the logical product of a set of factual propositions. If the proposition '*X* is good' is denoted by *p* and the criterion-statements '*X* has five acts', '*X* obeys the law of the Unities', etc., are denoted by C_1, C_2, . . . C_n, the theory asserts that *p* if and only if $C_1 . C_2, \ldots, C_n$.

[3] Elton, pp. 147–60.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 156.

[6] Of course one may assert that such properties as '*significant form*' are common to all good paintings; but such properties are not, properly speaking, criteria. To demonstrate that a given painting has significant form would be to demonstrate that it is a good painting. *Cf.* G. M. Matthews, 'Evaluative and Descriptive', *Mind*, LXVII (1958), pp. 335 ff. and Beryl Lake, 'A Study of the Irrefutability of Two Aesthetic Theories', Elton, pp. 100 ff.

[7] Elton, p. 158.

[8] In his paper on 'Reasons in Criticism' (*The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. XX, 1962, pp. 429 ff.), which has come to my notice after the completion of the present article, Prof. Morris Weitz argues that there are 'good reasons in evaluative criticism', and quotes as an example Coleridge's statement that 'Shakespeare's dramas are great because in them character, theme, plot, and language work together to form an integrated whole'. This statement (and the whole class to which it

belongs) seems to be open to a number of objections.

1. It is only too easy to imagine a play in which uninteresting characters, an uninteresting plot, etc., work together to form an integrated but insipid whole. This is the point of the Romantic revolt against 'faultlessness' as a criterion of aesthetic excellence. Of course, *inspiring* characters, a *great* plot, etc., would make a great play; but to admit this is merely to admit that aesthetic judgements of 'details' or 'constituents', coupled with the aesthetic judgement whether these details or constituents 'go with each other', may add up to an aesthetic judgement of the whole. This provides a clue as to how criticism operates, but does not help us to elucidate the nature of aesthetic judgements.

2. The statement that the elements of a work form an 'integrated whole' is itself an aesthetic judgement and stands in need of a criterion (*cf.* Matthew, *art. cit.* and Beryl Lake, *art. cit.*).

3. As the whole history of Shakespeare-criticism proves, Shakespeare is the very last dramatist whose plays one would normally describe as integrated wholes. On the contrary, it is the critics' prior conviction of the greatness of the plays which has driven them to search for principles of integration. To say that these plays are great because they are integrated is to put the cart before the horse. This seems to be the case with most 'reasons' in criticism.

[9] Edward Bullough, *Aesthetics. Lectures and Essays.* Edited by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson (1957), p. 87.

[10] *Cf.* A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (1958), pp. 109 ff.

[11] 'You will like *X* if your taste is similar to mine' does not mean 'You will like *X* if you are the kind of person who likes *X*' (which would be circular), but 'You will like *X* if you are the kind of person who likes things of the class to which *X* belongs'. Whether this class can be *defined* is another question.

[12] 'Any honest reader knows fairly well the points at which his sensibility is distorted, at which he fails as a normal critic and in what ways. It is his duty to take these into consideration in passing judgement upon the value of a work. His rank as a critic depends at least as much upon his ability to discount these personal peculiarities as upon any hypothetical impeccability of his actual responses.' (I. A. Richards, *Principles of Literary Criticism*, 1925, p. 224.)

[13] The liking is the reason for the assertion, not for the goodness.

[14] How much it achieves depends on the personal appeal of the critic.

[15] Fr. Schlegel, *Literary Notebooks*, 1797–1801, ed. H. Eichner (1957), Nr. 1044. The indebtedness of this paper to Schlegel's jottings on aesthetics is considerable.

[16] *Cf.* Oscar Wilde (Preface to *The Picture of Dorian Gray*): 'The critic is he who can translate into another manner or a new material his impression of beautiful things.' This does not mean, of course, as 'impressionist' critics such as Jules Lemaître have suggested, that one impression is as good as another. Impressions can be mistaken or recklessly subjective, but they need not be; their value depends on the honesty, the sensitivity and the range of experience of the critic and on the extent of his acquaintance with the work.

[17] S. S. Prawer, *Heine The Tragic Satirist* (1961), p. 3.

VICTORIAN THEORY OF ORNAMENT

Alf Böe

As the nineteenth century advanced, with its social upheavals and increasing industrialization, it became clear that Britain was no longer capable of maintaining her pre-Napoleonic position as leader of fashion and quality in the crafts and the industrial arts. Whatever its reasons this state of affairs was watched with concern by economists and traders, who saw exports dwindle under fierce competition from the French, and by men of taste who regretted such a development even from non-commercial reasons. A Parliamentary Committee was set up in 1835 'to inquire into the best means of extending a knowledge of the arts and of the principles of design among the people (especially the manufacturing population) of the country',[1] and as a result a 'Normal School of Design' was established at Somerset House in 1837 with branches in various parts of the country. Although new Parliamentary Committees, in 1847 and 1849, pronounced the whole thing to have been a failure, this School was important in providing conditions for experiment and turning the thoughts of teachers and others towards the principles of good design. Other events of perhaps even greater importance come from the same period. The writings of N. W. Pugin were published, with the early works of John Ruskin. The Society of Arts, with the Prince Consort at its head, took an active interest in design and awarded annual prizes. On the initiative of Henry Cole, a civil servant, a number of artists were brought together in support of a venture for the application of design to mass production in industry. The men behind *Summerly's Art Manufactures*, the name given to this enterprise, were also responsible for the publication of a *Journal of Design and Manufacture* which ran from 1849 to 1852. They were also largely instrumental in bringing about the Great Exhibition of 1851, from which in course of time grew the Department of Practical Art and the Victoria and Albert Museum.

Among the members of this group we meet the authors of books,

articles, addresses and lectures in which a contemporary theory of design was expounded. They were men like the painters William Dyce, R.A. and Richard Redgrave, A.R.A., the compiler of the 1846 official catalogue of the National Gallery, Ralph Nicholson Wornum and George Wallis, headmaster of the Manchester School of Design from 1844 to 1846, and were all in one capacity or another concerned in the Government School of Design. Then there were architects like Matthew Digby Wyatt, later the first Slade Professor at Cambridge; Owen Jones, author of a magnificent tome of drawings from the Alhambra and later Art Superintendent at the Department of Practical Art; and Gottfried Semper, already famous in Germany and a refugee since 1849 because of his activities during the revolutionary movements of the previous year. David Ramsay Hay, an Edinburgh interior decorator, completes the list of early authors. To a later wave of writers belong the designer Christopher Dresser, the architect C. L. Eastlake, the designers L. F. Day and Walter Crane and, of course, William Morris.

Despite their common interest some of these men were bitterly at loggerheads with one another. To most of them contemporary design meant adjustment to the fairly recent industrial situation where mass production by machines was rapidly supplanting the older craftsmanship. The School of Design and the subsequently organized Department of Practical Art were established to solve problems arising from the new and somewhat perplexing state of affairs. On the other hand to John Ruskin, who loathed the development going on around him, the work of Cole, Wyatt, Jones, Redgrave and others was based on an utterly false set of values—an outlook reflected in his words: 'the Professorship of Sir Henry Cole at Kensington has corrupted the system of art-teaching all over England into a state of abortion and falsehood from which it will take twenty years to recover'.[2]

Whatever the difference in their approach to the ethics of design, however, all were agreed in attaching high aesthetic importance to ornament. 'The love of ornament is a tendency of our being . . . ornamental design has had its birth long before the very conception of the fine arts,' said Dyce. It is called 'a necessity of the mind' and, according to Dresser, we 'act in accordance with an inward instinct or passion' when applying colour or ornament to the objects by which we are surrounded. Owen Jones laid it down as a general rule that 'construction should be decorated' and Ruskin held sculpture and painting to be the chief features of architecture, regretting the increasing 'prevalence of the lower part over the higher, to the interference of the constructive with the purity and simplicity of the reflective element'. Pugin, William Morris and others might be quoted to the same effect.

They were, therefore, no 'pioneers of the modern movement' at any rate as regards functionalist doctrines. True, Pugin wrote that 'there should be no features about a building which are not necessary for convenience, construction, or propriety'. But here 'propriety' relates primarily to ornament, which should 'consist of enrichment of the essential construction of the building'. It should serve as an 'embellishment of that which is in itself useful, in an appropriate manner'. In a similar vein William Morris wrote his famous sentence, which has frequently been given a functionalist interpretation: 'Have nothing in your houses which you do not know to be useful or believe to be beautiful.' It is quite clear that he himself considered the 'beautiful' to be of equal significance with the 'useful'. He defined architecture as 'the art of ornamental building', and wrote that we should 'clothe our daily and domestic walls with ornament that reminds us of the outward face of the earth . . .'.

Indeed we should not be surprised to learn that a considerable part of mid nineteenth-century writings on the reformation of design did not aim at bringing about a major change in its social or technical basis or even a change of purpose, but rather a purification and systematization of existing trends and chiefly of the subject-matter of ornament. The progressives found contemporary design marred by vulgar naturalism and an unenlightened use of period styles, by logical inconsistencies in the expressive content of ornament, and by coarseness resulting from shoddy workmanship or unrefined machine production. Their attempts at a clarification of principles were first and foremost directed against shortcomings such as these, certainly not towards the abolition of ornamental art.

Ornament, then, was a serious matter, not to be applied capriciously or purely for its own sake. It even had a purpose to fulfil which in this literary age was considered as important as its power to adorn: it was meant to tell a story, to canalize reflection, to provoke thought. It had to be reasonable and consistent in a purely literary sense as well as plastically. 'What madness, then,' Pugin wrote, '. . . to worship at the revived shrines of ancient corruption, and profane the temple of a crucified Redeemer by the architecture and emblems of heathen gods. . . . Is our wisdom set forth by the owl of Minerva, or our strength by the club of Hercules?' John Ruskin saw ornament as an aid to contemplation of the wonders of divinely inspired Nature and praised the Gothic style for its noble 'hold of nature', for its 'careful distinction of species, and richness of delicate and undisturbed organization, which characterize the Gothic design'. In it he found expressed 'the history of rural and thoughtful life, influenced by habitual tenderness, and devoted to subtle inquiry'.

Neither was his pupil William Morris an advocate of art for the sake of pure colour, line and form or of pattern as an end in itself. 'I . . . must still insist on plenty of meaning in your patterns; I must have unmistakable suggestions of gardens and fields, and strange trees, boughs and tendrils, or I can't do with your pattern.' . . . 'To have a meaning and to make others feel and understand it, must ever be the aim and end of our Western art.' Pure pattern-making, or 'colour for colour's sake only' he held to be 'uncivilized'. The narrative element counted for much even with men like Dyce, Redgrave, Cole, Gottfried Semper and others who worked in the Governmental Schools from the eighteen-thirties to the eighteen-fifties. Through Cole's interesting venture, the *Summerly's Art Manufactures*, some among them became authors of works like 'A Bride's Inkstand' adorned with a little Cupid in cast metal or a glass vase called 'The Well Spring', with ornaments 'of waterplants coloured and enamelled on the glass'. Objects like these illustrate the real sense in which the Victorians understood the thesis that 'form follows function', *form* must be read as *ornamental form*, which by means of easily grasped symbols or pictures should suggest the function of the object adorned. As Gottfried Semper was to point out: 'Tritons, Nereids, and Nymphs will always be meaningful by a well, Venus and the Graces by a mirror, trophies and combats with arms'. This is what, in another context, was described as 'appropriate detail relating to its (the object's) use'. In his *Official Report of the Jury* for the 1851 Exhibition, Redgrave gave ample proof that the term 'appropriate form' was by no means understood to mean anything like the modern 'functional form' and that many a modern-sounding, seemingly functionalist sentence must be read in a symbolistic sense. It seems necessary to stress this point because we are so frequently apt to judge Victorian design on our own premises, giving a twentieth-century interpretation to their theoretical statements. It may even be that our research into the architecture and design of the last century has to a considerable degree been programmatic, in the sense that too often stones have been turned in order to find forerunners and create a history for modern functionalism, while interesting parallels of a contrary nature have been ignored.

Without enlarging further on this, we revert to our main theme. From the mass of theoretical speculation some particular points will here be singled out for discussion—such as, to start with, the attitude of various writers to the ornament and period styles of the past.

The age which witnessed the earliest publications of writers mentioned above had already lived through the first phases of stylistic copyism which was initiated by mid eighteenth-century Gothicists and became an outstanding characteristic of nineteenth-century decorative art. By

1850 the whole gamut had been exploited, from various phases of Classicism through Gothic, Elizabethan, Louis XIV and XV, with Persian, Turkish or Moorish as the most cherished exotic adjuncts. Employed very often with scant knowledge of correct detail and with little sense of appropriate composition, early nineteenth-century pseudo-styles present themselves with a peculiar flavour which makes them easily discernible.

Today it may be noted with surprise that few if any among our reformers rejected period styles out of hand. Despite many apparently radical-sounding statements, Pugin practised throughout his career, and on principle, in Gothic. To him as a Catholic this remained the sole manner of building expressive of true religious principles: 'in it alone we find *the faith of Christianity embodied, and its practice illustrated*'. His love of Gothic or 'Christian' architecture was complemented by his contempt for classical tradition, as quotations given above clearly demonstrate. Pugin even preferred Gothic on structural and other technical grounds—a fact hardly to be marvelled at in an age which had yet to learn of the Crystal Palace and of reinforced concrete building. But he was by no means averse to improvements. 'The Christian architect', he says, 'should gladly avail himself of those improvements and increased facilities that are suggested from time to time,' such as for instance, 'the great improvements in the working of metals for constructive purposes'. Again: '*It is the devotion, majesty and repose of Christian art, for which we are contending*—it is not a *style*, but a *principle*.'

If Pugin's preference for Gothic was founded largely on its narrative and expressive properties, so was that of John Ruskin. But while Pugin stressed the Catholic character of the style and insisted on a scheme of ornament in the Catholic tradition of Gothic building, Ruskin was a Protestant Pantheist. Praising, like Pugin, the style for its practical and constructive advantages, in its ornament he sought an expression of Man's joy in the Creation of God. His philosophy concerning these matters was adumbrated in the first volumes of *Modern Painters*, and subsequently elaborated in *Seven Lamps of Architecture* and *Stones of Venice*. Ruskin's rejection of the Classical tradition was consequent on the assumption that art and architecture should mirror man's wonder and delight before the visual creation of God, since this demanded a freely inspired and naturalistic style to which he felt that Gothic, and Gothic only, was really suited. The creation of ornament, then, was an act of faith. To Ruskin, as to Pugin and indeed to numerous contemporaries, this was no trivial matter.

Unlike Pugin and Ruskin the men connected with the Governmental Drawing-Schools and related enterprises did not single out any one

among the period styles as the only safe basis for contemporary exploitation and possible development. Their attitude, clarified in numerous written passages, may be summarized as follows: Styles from the past, and from foreign cultures, should be subjected to the closest study, but not in order to imitate them. Rather they should be considered to embody 'facts and conclusions already arrived at' concerning proportion, the use of colour, the form or disposition of ornament, etc., etc.—in short, the well-established authority of ancient art 'may be proved to be founded on the most accurate perception of the *objective* causes of natural beauty' (Dyce). This attitude was later reflected in the custom of setting museums and schools of design in close proximity. In the words of Christopher Dresser, modern work might employ 'the vigour of the best Gothic ornament, the severity of Egyptian, the intricacy of the Persian, the gorgeousness of the Alhambra, and so on, only it must not imitate in detail the various styles of the past'.

The practice of Owen Jones, M. D. Wyatt and others shows, however, that it was by no means easy to win free at a stroke from the dominance of electicism; so we frequently find an insistence that, when employed, borrowed features should at least be correctly used. The feeling, however, was widespread that a new ornamental art should be founded on the judicious study of *forms in nature.*

John Ruskin's preference for naturalistic ornament has already been mentioned. He is interesting for his introduction of a strange and highly personal scale of expressive value in ornament based on natural form. This gradation he justified by his belief that those forms are '*most* natural which are most frequent; or, rather, that on the shapes which in the everyday world are familiar to the eyes of men, God has stamped those characters of beauty which He has made it man's nature to love'. Thus 'the noblest ornament' is that which represents 'the highest orders of existence. Imitated flowers are nobler than imitated stones; imitated animals, than flowers; imitated human forms, of all animal forms the noblest'. In *Stones of Venice* a more elaborate list of precedence was given, starting with the forms least frought with divine association: 'Abstract Lines; Forms of Earth (Crystals); Forms of Water (Waves); Forms of Fire (Flames and Rays); Forms of Air (Clouds); Organic Forms (Shells); Fish; Reptiles and Insects; Vegetation (*a*) Stems and Trunks; Vegetation (*b*) Foliage; Birds; Mammalian Animals and Man.' We shall see later how its placing on this list came to influence the position and employment of any single motif when used for decorative purposes.

The contemporaries of Ruskin expressed themselves in far less philosophical terms. An early writer, the Edinburgh designer David Ramsay Hay, in a *Report on Design* before a Royal Commission in 1836, had

recommended that inspiration for ornament and design be found in nature, thereby forming 'a school peculiar to this country'. William Dyce expressed it as his opinion that 'nature must be held up as a source from whence . . . all the forms of beauty applicable to the uses of the ornamentist must be derived'. Similar views were held by Richard Redgrave and Owen Jones, and were voiced in *The Journal of Design* as well as in Henry Cole's pamphlet for *Summerley's Art Manufactures.* Almost a generation later than this William Morris held that the designer's teacher 'must be Nature and History'. His own design is full of fanciful renderings of flowers and greenery with nothing much besides, while the influence on his composition of specimens of old Sicilian and Near East textiles in the Victoria and Albert Museum is evident. His contemporary, Christopher Dresser, being educated as a botanist, employed natural form for his ornamental design throughout his career almost to the exclusion of other elements; while throughout the latter half of the century series of books and articles published in England and abroad on the subject of natural forms as a model for ornament testify to the importance of the principle.

It was a principle which, as we have already pointed out, was not by any means new or at that time held only by the thoughtful few. What makes the naturalism of our reformers stand out as something apart is their insistence on some sort of stylization as opposed to realistic reproduction of natural form and their belief that certain principles could be found to guide them in the process. We find this point elaborated fairly early. Pugin, for example, in a publication of 1849 relates that at some time in the course of his studies he had noticed how the foliage work in Gothic architecture had obtained its peculiar character 'chiefly owing to the manner of their arrangement and disposition' . . . 'it is the *adaptation* and *disposition* of it which stamps the style'. The observation was further reflected upon. Whereas 'a modern painter would endeavour to give a fictitious idea of relief, as if *bunches* of flowers were laid on', thereby producing 'an appearance of cavity or projection . . . on a feature which architectural consistency would require to be treated as a plane', the ancient Gothic artists 'disposed the leaves and flowers . . . into geometrical forms and figures, carefully arranging the stems and component parts so as to *fill up* the space they were intended to enrich; and they were represented in such a manner as not to destroy the consistency of the peculiar feature or object they were employed to decorate . . . for instance, a panel, which by its very construction is flat, would be ornamented by leaves or flowers drawn out or extended, so as to display their geometrical forms on a flat surface'. Ornament, in fact, should be treated and employed in a *reasonable* manner, and should affront neither feeling

nor good common sense. 'Nothing', Pugin continues, 'can be more ridiculous than an apparently *reversed groining* to walk upon, or highly relieved foliage and perforated tracery for the decoration of a floor.'

With one notable exception similar considerations were voiced by all those among Pugin's contemporaries with whom we are concerned. William Dyce declares: 'Ornamental art is rather *abstractive* and *reproductive* than imitative.' The designer must 'anatomize' the works of nature, and 'the power of representing objects in the form of diagrams is to him far more necessary and valuable than that of imitating them with all their effects of light and shade, of surface or of material'. Hay, in 1844, had written a book to elucidate 'the princples of combinations which constitute beauty', insisting on flatness of design and conventional treatment of ornament. Throughout the series of important theoretical writings which followed during the latter half of the century, the theme was elaborated and various manners and degrees of stylization recommended to make ornament fit its material, the function of the object to which it was applied and the technique by which this object was produced. And already during the period between the 1851 and 1862 World Exhibitions a notable change took place in the look at least of British design for flat-surface pattern in wallpapers and textiles.

It would lead us too far afield to trace the multiple variations on the theme of stylization, but it must be noted that the principle was not left unquestioned by all. Dyce for one objected to what he called the 'crude and hazy notion that, as *a general rule*, flowers and all other objects must undergo a *conventionalizing* process before they can be employed as matter of ornament. . . . There is no general rule. Each case must be considered by itself.' Professor M. D. Wyatt gave his support, finding that 'the tendency of the chief directors of taste has been . . . to tie the decorative artist's hands somewhat too dogmatically. The result will be that . . . our productions will grow dry and arid.'

The most direct opposition, however, was voiced by John Ruskin, who was sceptical of the basically commercial aims of Cole's design policy; this was a field where in Ruskin's view moral considerations were the only ones to be taken into account. As we have already seen, the act of reproducing in ornamental art the divine forms of nature was to him an act of faith and piety, inconsistent not only with any mechanical means of reproduction or multiplication but even with any not strictly necessary simplification or transformation of form for ornamental purposes. To him conventionalization or stylization of ornament represented '*not* an improvement of natural form into something better and purer than Nature herself . . . in all cases whatever, right conventionalism is either a wise acceptation of an inferior place, or a noble

display of power under accepted limitation'. Consequently, 'the only essential distinction between Decorative and other art is the being fitted for a fixed place; and in that place, related, either in subordination or in command, to the effect of other pieces of art'. Stylization was permissible where decoration was placed too far out of sight for details to show or when so placed as to be subject to wear and tear; or when ornament was used to decorate for instance dress materials, which would fall into folds so that the decoration would not show properly anyway except as masses and pure pattern of form and colour. His rule for conventionalization, when of necessity this expedient had to be resorted to, was, however, 'perfectly simple': 'If the designer of furniture, of cups and vases, of dress patterns, and the like, exercises himself continually in the imitation of natural form in some leading division of his work; then, holding by this stem of life, he may pass down into all kinds of merely geometrical or formal design with perfect safety, and with noble results.' It follows without further documentation that his scale of preference as regards ornamental subject-matter, quoted above, was worked into this scheme, less noble motifs being preferred for materials, uses, or place of least distinction.

It is interesting, although not surprising, to find in the theory and practice of William Morris an echo of the more technical aspect of Ruskin's views. Having obviously profited as an artist from the activities both of the Governmental Schools and of the collections at South Kensington, he believed the Schools of Design to be necessary but felt at the same time that 'when people talk most about Works of Art, generally speaking at that period they do least in art'. He was concerned more with creating a society in which art could grow than with expounding theories for the fashioning of that art—this was to him a matter of feeling rather than of theory. The 'scientific' approach of the Schools of Design he deeply distrusted, talking of 'a sham science of design' and holding that '*designing* cannot be taught at all in a school'. His own comments on various crafts were always given the form of technical, professional advice, rarely narrowing into definite rules on matters of form. Undiluted naturalism in ornament he rejected, but maintained at the same time that 'your convention must be your own, and not borrowed from other times and peoples'.

This insistence on 'conventionalization' in one form or another forms perhaps the most outstanding achievement of Victorian theory of ornament. Its impact was to be considerable, first on Art Nouveau at the turn of the century and then on the activities of designers and studio craftsmen to this day. It is particularly interesting that such principles should have influenced the 'minor' art of design at a time when painting

and sculpture were passing through a blatantly naturalistic phase, to be superseded only towards the close of the century by tendencies comparable to early Victorian trends in design.

It may seem difficult to find two theoretical tendencies in sharper opposition to each other than on the one hand the mid-Victorian attitude as demonstrated here and on the other recent doctrines of formal Puritanism which for convenience's sake may be given the label of Functionalism. True, to a very limited degree parallels may be found in Victorian times to the purist attitude of twentieth-century theorists. Before a Parliamentary Committee of 1835 James Nasmyth, inventor of the steam hammer, stressed the importance of 'the entire reconcilability of elegance of form with bare utility'; it may, however, be questioned whether, in an age when Gothic or Classical styling was commonly applied even to machinery, this can be understood to imply a distaste for ornamental design. But be that as it may among critics, for instance, of the 1851 Exhibition praise is fairly generally given to the unadorned, strictly functional appearance of horse carriages and even of kitchen ranges or machinery and in this we may see a very early and very real, if fairly insignificant, anticipation of twentieth-century Functionalism.

Through what other links are our Victorian theorists related to their colleagues of the early twentieth century? Most directly, I believe, through Art Nouveau. In the early continental manifestations of the style a debt to Britain has been universally recognized, and in a great many instances personal contacts are known to have existed between prominent followers of the advanced British line and Continental *avant-gardistes*. It may be mentioned as a curiosity that in his youth even Le Corbusier was educated on the principles of John Ruskin supplemented by Owen Jones's *Grammar of Ornament*. He later worked under Peter Behrens, a founder member of the Darmstadt colony of artists, inspired largely, and not only through its Viennese leader Olbrich, by British trends.

Quite soon, however, the Puritan outlook made itself more strongly felt until, under the slogan of 'Neue Sachlichkeit', important *avant-garde* architects and designers came to regard ornament as incompatible with contemporary trends in production and with what was loosely termed 'the modern spirit' in general. In 1908 Adolf Loos, Viennese architect and critic, wrote his essay on *Ornament und Verbrechen*, in which he maintained that ornament belongs to less mature stages of cultural development and that contemporary ingenuity should be reserved for higher things—an anticipation, it seems, of Le Corbusier's conception of modern man as a contemplative being whose intellect should be captivated by more subtle devices than ornamental art in the traditional

sense. Among the many radical trends towards a new conception of form in the major and minor arts during the following decades few were more insistent upon a new style based on pure line, surface and form than the Dutch Stijl-Group. The Deutsche Werkbund committed itself to a similar position by the publication in 1924 of its book, *Form ohne Ornament*, and the Bauhaus, after some initial flirtation with less austere projects, became a centre for the propagation of the modern Puritan principles in design. The twenties and thirties saw the dramatization of the sleek beauty of the automobile, the steamboat or modern men's wear.

Although Puritanism has dominated twentieth-century *avant-garde* thinking until now, it has not been alone in the field. From time to time revivals have produced work of high quality and interest—Neo-Baroque superseding Art Nouveau, with Neo-Classicism reigning throughout the twenties; while constantly attempts to create new forms of ornament and to use contemporary materials and techniques for new expressive effects have stimulated interest and enriched a number of works and trends. The *Wendingen* group of Amsterdam, the German expressionist architects, the later phase of Hoffmann's *Wiener Werkstätte* with the works among others of Dagobert Päche may be cited as interesting examples of tendencies which have been overlooked or treated with less than justice by scholars imbued with the modern puristic spirit.

Where do we stand today? Leaving aside the perpetual interest—and money—which an undiscerning public squanders on bad or eclectic ornament, it seems clear that contemporary taste is again swinging towards the ornate, if not the ornamental. In shape and colour the less technical and less austere branches of design are now often charged with emotion in a manner that would have been unthinkable during the thirties. Our studio craftsmen, direct descendents of nineteenth-century forerunners like William Morris, William Morgan, Emile Gallé or Jean Carriés, are still free to work along the most fanciful lines; and if their output is restricted, their work is made influential through publication in periodicals and books, which today are more numerous than ever before. The studio craftsman may even be capable of influencing mass production, using his understanding of material and artistic experience for the benefit of mechanized industry as in the case of Bertel Gardberg, the Finnish silversmith, Gertrud Vasegaard, Danish potter, or Tias Eckhoff, Norwegian ceramics and general designer—to mention only a few.

But what about *ornament* in the production of today? It seems extremely likely that ornament, in the sense of 'embellishment' or 'fea-

tures or work added for decorative purposes' (*The Concise Oxford Dictionary*) in one form or another will always force itself upon us, and that we might as well meet the challenge and avail ourselves of it to give added interest to material life. It is doubtful whether any consistent schemes of ornamentation comparable to the period styles will ever be resuscitated, and it is probably right that migrant modern man should construct the interiors of his dwellings neutrally with regard to formal expression. How resplendent, however, may be the furnishings which he moves along with him from place to place! Carpets, intricately patterned if he wishes them so, their material coloured in the pure and lasting tints procured by modern dyes; if furniture will probably never again be the same by Baroque or Rococo standards, both the materials and techniques of production could make possible far greater freedom of expression than is the case today. Wherever material is being woven and surfaces stencilled or printed, or form moulded, pressed or cast, there are the possibilities of creation within the limits set by industrial mass production; while for special commissions artists and craftsmen outside industry will always be able to work for a price well below that of even second-rate antiques.

Though it seems evident, however, that doctrinaire Functionalism has by now 'fulfilled its historic mission', there is no telling where our new sense of drama will lead us—and in no case should the useful lesson of *Neue Sachlichkeit* be forgotten. Austerity of form and the elegance of bare simplicity are fitting not only for our technical equipment like refrigerators, heating installations and the rest, but indeed for our furnishings and objects of ease and luxury. Nor should it be overlooked that the last generation has learned consciously to exploit the aesthetic properties of materials in a way unknown before; the register of expression has thus been widened without resort to ornament in the traditional sense of that word.

Things are doubtless happening in the 'useful arts' of today that would have shocked a purist of the early thirties. In this situation our overriding concern must be that ornament, whatever form it may take, should really add something of value and not be introduced to spoil a good design or to gloss over a bad one. The non-functional elements of design should be welcomed only in so far as the designer knows their proper place and restricted use. The strictest standards of quality should be applied—as a matter of course; the form should be suited to the material and technique; if ornament is representational, its subject should be reasonably well suited to the circumstances in which it is employed. In short, it seems not unlikely that our old Victorian authors are due for a revival—which, to be sure, would have pleased them vastly.

REFERENCES

[1] *Report of the Departmental Committee on The Royal College of Art* (London, 1911), pp. 27 ff. The quotation has been taken from Nikolaus Pevsner, *Academies of Art Past and Present* (1911), p. 247. I take this occasion to stress my indebtedness to the pioneer works of this author. Since the period before World War I he has been the first to take serious interest in this aspect of nineteenth-century aesthetics. Books like *Pioneers of the Modern Movement*, *High Victorian Design*, with numerous shorter treatises, have done far more than sketching the outlines. Of equal significance has been the work done at the Victoria and Albert Museum Department of Circulation under the leadership of Peter Floud and Hugh Wakefield. Their exhibition in 1952 of *Victorian and Edwardian Decorative Arts* must be singled out for especial praise.

[2] *Fors Clavigera*, Letter 79, 8th July, 1877. *Collected Works* (Cook and Wedderburn), vol. XXIX, p. 154. Quoted from Alf Böe, *From Gothic Revival to Functional Form. A Study in Victorian Theories of Design* (Oslo, 1957) p. 93. My present essay has been based on this book; where no references are given in the present text, sources of quotations may be found there by way of the index. The book also contains a fairly adequate bibliography.

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'THE ONWARD MARCH OF THOUGHT' AND THE POETIC THEORY OF E. S. DALLAS

R. A. Forsyth

I

WHILST IN the process of formulating his poetic doctrine, Matthew Arnold wrote despairingly to his friend and fellow-poet A. H. Clough that he felt 'more and more, in spite of all the nonsense some people talk, how deeply *unpoetical* the age and all one's surroundings are. Not unprofound, not ungrand, not unmoving: but *unpoetical*'.[1] In statements such as this Arnold reveals his awareness of his own incipient romanticism, against which from one point of view his poetical theorizing is a defence, and through that awareness his realization of the nature and extent of contemporary cultural changes. It was the 'multitudinousness' of life that appalled him, the overwhelming changes in the tempo and quality of living which had resulted largely from the application of scientific discoveries to industry, and the difficulty for the artistic or sensitive person of understanding or interpreting the consequent fragmentation of his culture. For by 1853, when Arnold published the famous Preface to his Poems, the advance of science had been so considerable and its practical effects on society so manifest that the scientific method had tended to gain a disproportionate prestige as a means of inquiry. The scientific habit of mind impinged on virtually every aspect of thought and speculation so that only slightly later in the century, for instance, J. S. Blackie in *his* Preface 'A talk with tourists' to a volume of poems *Lays of the Highlands and Islands* was able to address his contemporaries in a way that would have struck earlier generations as curious and perverse: 'The man who spends a week in Skye, without learning to distinguish these three great classes of rock by their mere outward configuration has received the gift of sight in vain.'[2] And Leslie Stephen

indicates even more clearly the trend of denigrating the creative perception of the imagination in favour of the 'truth' of scientific observation when he states dogmatically: 'Before anybody had ever looked into the mountains closely, classified their flora and catalogued their strata, it was impossible for a poet to do better than make a few vague shots at their most obvious features.'[3] It was the currency of such ideas that led J. C. Shairp in theorizing on the poetic interpretation of Nature to regard the contemporary poet's position as compromised, if not hazardous, and to suggest that 'if Poety were to leave large regions of new thought unappropriated, *being thus divorced from the onward march of thought*, it would speedily become obsolete and unreal'.[4]

Some years earlier than Arnold's complaint to Clough, at the establishment of Benthamite Utilitarianism as a widely accepted philosophy, a writer of very different temperament to the serious Arnold had 'mourned' in his best vein of mockery the demise of poetry in favour of 'solid and conducive studies' and 'the progress of useful art and science'—'A poet in our times is a semi-barbarian in a civilized community.'[5] Peacock's true sentiments in *The Four Ages of Poetry* stand out clearly enough in the ironic excess of his suggestions; and he states his mind on the matter openly in a letter to Shelley in 1820: 'The truth, I am convinced, is that there is no longer a poetical audience among the higher class of minds; that moral, political, and physical science have entirely withdrawn from poetry the attention of all whose attention is worth having; and that the poetical reading public being composed of the mere dregs of the intellectual community, the most sufficing passport to their favour must rest on the mixture of a little easily-intelligible portion of mawkish sentiment, with an absolute negation of reason and knowledge.'[6] The situation is further defined by the experience of John Stuart Mill, who in 1828 overcame the dejection which inevitably resulted from the spiritual barrenness of his Benthamite education by a timely reading of Wordsworth, whose poems 'seemed to be the very culture of the feelings, which I was in quest of'.[7]

The cultural situation in this context, then, has two main aspects—on the one hand a rapidly expanding scientific industrialism, powered both by new discoveries and by Utilitarianism which appeared to sublimate into philosophical consistency the resultant social and cultural changes; and on the other hand a hard core of percipient humanists who were aware of those changes and fought to humanize their inexorable processes and to establish a principle of taste among the urban masses. Much early Victorian theorizing on poetry is indirectly concerned with the problem of redeeming literary and spiritual values and of accommodating the predominantly Romantic theory of the time to the hard-headed

claims and standards of science. Arnold thought he had discovered in poetry a discipline that would serve as a defence, at once humanistic and aesthetic, against the confusing and excited pressure of contemporary living. In a changing society a poetry full of 'high seriousness' and purified of Romantic excess would become, he thought, a 'magister vitae' and eventually a substitute for religion. He opposed, in fact, his concept of 'Culture', based on the broad humanist platform of the Classics, to the narrowness of specialization and a brash definition of what was 'useful' to man. He would have endorsed Wordsworth's mockery of 'These mighty workmen of our later age', the Benthamite educationalists,

> . . . who have the skill
> To manage books, and things, and make them act
> On infant minds as surely as the sun
> Deals with the flower; the keepers of our time,
> The guides and wardens of our faculties,
> Sages who in their prescience would control
> All accidents, and to the very road
> Which they have fashioned would confine us down
> Like engines.'[8]

For Arnold's insistence on 'knowledge' was totally different from the contemporary demand for, and reverence of, facts. He would have had severe reservations, for instance, regarding the statement in the *Quarterly Journal of Education* that 'one of the most important duties in conducting education is to foster aspirings after higher intellectual attainments, to infuse a rational desire to acquire useful knowledge, and a laudable curiosity to dive into the depths of learning and science'.[9] His insistence was rather on the creation of significant 'currents of ideas', through which he hoped to combat indirectly the subjectivism which often served as the standard for literary criticism at the time. Indeed it stems precisely from his awareness of the possible danger 'that a nation can never be a too cultivated, but may easily become an over-civilized race', thereby bringing about 'the permanent distinction, and the occasional contrast between cultivation and civilization'[10] against which Coleridge had warned some twenty years earlier. The vast dissemination of practical information was one factor which had helped to effect this contrast; and another, closely related to it, against which Wordsworth had sounded warning, concerned 'the great national events which are daily taking place, the increasing accumulation of men in cities, where the uniformity of their occupations produces a craving for extraordinary incident which the rapid communication of intelligence hourly gratifies'.[11] Together with Arnold, Newman was amongst those who per-

ceived that these dangers had by their day been realized. For his significantly comprehensive definition of the function of a university education stems from a similar sense of assault against spiritual and imaginative values that led Arnold to throw up defensive barriers against the encroachments of the 'great march of intellect'. Its breadth reveals the nature and scope of the encroachments; and in seeming to be almost a direct response to those warnings from the beginning of the century it shows in brief the historical development of cultivated taste, which had as its main outcome the idea of Culture emerging as a protective device against the despiritualizing tendencies of industrialism: 'a university training . . . aims at raising the intellectual tone of society, at cultivating the public mind, at purifying the national taste, at supplying true principles to popular enthusiasm and fixed aims to popular aspiration, at giving enlargement and sobriety to the ideas of the age, at facilitating the exercise of political power, and refining the intercourse of private life.'[12]

The relation between science and poetry had been a matter of central concern to the Romantic aesthetic. Despite the cogent formulations of Wordsworth in his *Preface*,[13] and Coleridge's attack upon them—a conflict that symbolized the central difference between their approaches—the question remained unresolved. In fact their distinct criteria as to the end of poetry being either truth or beauty pointed to the subsequent irresolution of critics in the early Victorian period about the issue. And the rapid rise of science, together with the establishment of 'useful knowledge' as a criterion of value, made it apparent that 'Beauty is truth, truth beauty' was very far from all one need know in order to live a full life in 'this most grown-up and unchildlike age',[14] and made urgent a more acceptable solution to the problem. Certainly it was extensively discussed; and behind most of the discussions lay the Romantic formulation in which the role of the poet in his relation to the scientist, and his attitude to the latter's methods and discoveries, were highly coloured by exceptional claims for the Imagination, and for the poet as visionary. The poet, in Shelley's words, grasped the ultimate reality, stripping 'the veil of familiarity from the world, and (laying) bare the naked and sleeping beauty, which is the spirit of its forms'.[15] For as Keats asserted: 'What the Imagination seizes as Beauty must be Truth.'[16] Because of the increasing worship of facts, however, the veracity of the poet's claim that at moments of mystical intuition he could perceive a transcendant Reality through the forms of Nature tended to be judged against the measurable accuracy of the natural sciences. This may be deduced from Thomas Huxley's statement in a public lecture in 1868 that 'the thoughts to which I am now giving

utterance, and your thoughts regarding them, are the expression of molecular changes in the matter of life'.[17] Only the measurable, in short, had any association with the truth; and truth, in turn, came to be regarded as objective and absolute, its sole method of attainment being experimental verification of factual data. In the face of this imperious trend it became more difficult to regard poetry as 'the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all science'.[18]

Most debates about the problem revolved around the 'naturalist' and 'idealist' theories of poets' attitudes to external reality. The centrality of the problem to the Romantic credo is apparent in Coleridge's typical statement: 'Believe me, you must master the essence, the *natura naturans*, which presupposes a bond between nature in the higher sense and the soul of man.'[19] Together with Coleridge it was Wordsworth who had given the ancient issue its most recent formulation—and their difference here, too, is characteristic. Wordsworth, the 'naturalist', held to the value of poetry's close resemblance to reality because of the exquisite accommodation of the sensitive human mind to the external world, and vice versa. Coleridge, on the other hand, although not agreeing with Sir Joshua Reynolds's concept of 'general nature', nevertheless held poetry to be 'ideal'—'that it avoids and excludes all *accident*; that its apparent individualities of rank, character, or occupation must be *representative* of a class'.[20] Does the poet, then, to reformulate the issue, represent from his detailed personal observation an accurate portrayal of external nature; or does he, by virtue of the correlating and harmonizing powers of the imagination, impose a mental pattern on an otherwise formless mass? And the issue is complicated precisely because external nature is also the source of scientific data. This may be seen, for instance, in that the prestige of the scientific method through the constant 'Progress' resulting from its practical application, and the concomitant belief in the objective reality of the 'Truth' it discovered, constituted at least one important reason for the contemporary popularity of Ruskin's aesthetic theories with their strong 'scientific' bias. As P. G. Hamerton was later to observe: 'No imaginable theory of fine art could have been more agreeable to the English mind. People who all their lives long had felt an uneasy self-consciousness that they really knew nothing about the matter, and could not see into it with the most patient looking, were delighted to be told that art, after all, was merely the representation of nature as it is, and that whoever would carefully observe what nature is, might become like that fortunate young man of Goethe's who knew "what art is".'[21] A glance at J. E. Marr's introductory treatise on geomorphology, *The Scientific Study of Scenery*, will help to define further the extent and quality of that complication in the

light of Ruskin's powerful influence. The book opens with the smug suggestion that the Victorians were the first to discover and appreciate natural beauties: 'A widespread appreciation of the beauties of nature is not the least of the many beneficent changes which have marked the Victorian era.'[22] And Marr, to whom Ruskin's theories were most 'agreeable', bases his contention, as one would expect, on a curious combination of scientific fact and aesthetic appreciation—the natural sciences 'are too frequently regarded from a purely philosophical or a merely economic standpoint, and their aesthetic side is ignored, though this is very valuable as a means of education'.[23] The issue is clearly revealed when, after quoting with relish a vivid, 'Biblical' description of lichens—'Strong in lowliness, they neither blanch in heat nor pine in frost'—Marr goes on to explain that Ruskin's 'silver lichen-spots' and 'the gathering orange stain upon the edge of yonder western peak' are due to 'the presence of organic matter, or of some compound of iron . . . the peroxide of iron produces a rich red, so well known in the red sandstones of Britain, the hydrated oxide gives yellow, orange, or rust-brown hues'.[24] And later, at the conclusion to a chapter 'On the nature of the earth's exterior', he can greet the results of Ruskin's observation with cordial and verified affirmation: 'it will be seen that the distinctions above given enable the rocks to be separated into classes closely comparable with those adopted by Ruskin. The igneous rocks largely contain his massive crystallines. . . .'[25]

This trend of denigrating the creations of the 'idealists' had stemmed indirectly from Wordsworth, who was as much prized for the satisfying way in which he dealt with real objects in simple language in an uncomplicated world as for his imaginative philosophy or his mystical intuition. He was, in the words of James Russell Lowell, 'most successful . . . in vivid expression of the effect produced by external objects and events upon his own mind . . . (he) never saw, and I think never wished to see, beyond the limits of his own consciousness and experience'.[26] And the trend led through Ruskin, who greatly admired Wordsworth, directly to the accuracies of Pre-Raphaelitism, concerning the temper of which movement (in connection with a particular painting tour) one artist recorded: 'It came much more from a scientific motive than from any purely artistic feeling, and was a part—though we were not ourselves aware of it—of that great scientific exploration of the realm of nature which this age has carried so much farther than any of its predecessors. . . . We went in search for rigorously accurate truth, and for new truth, which is an entirely scientific state of mind. Our pictorial work was as much a scientific exposition as the chapters on the structure of the Alps in the fourth volume of *Modern Painters*.'[27]

II

In the general cultural context outlined above the poetic theory of Eneas Sweetland Dallas is of peculiar interest; and his critical awareness of the problems of his day deserves wider acclaim, not only for its insight, but also because of the novel 'remedy' he suggested. For it was his contention that the crisis was one both of intelligence and taste, and that science, the main causative factor, would prove to be the only effective curative one as well.

Dallas (1828–1879) studied philosophy at Edinburgh University under Sir William Hamilton and there acquired, as the contributor to the *Dictionary of National Biography* suggests, 'the habit of applying notions derived from eclectic psychology to the analysis of aesthetic effects in poetry, rhetoric, and the fine arts'. This habit of mind informs Dallas's critical intention to place 'criticism upon something like a scientific footing'.[28] And he was urged to do so because of his recognition of the current prestige of the scientific discipline. From this he reasoned that the only way to preserve criticism from the morass of idiosyncrasy and subjective opinion—'We have critical opinions in great abundance, often of great value, but we have no critical system' (P. 3)—was to orientate its 'chaos' to the 'norm' of science, thereby endowing it with the 'dignity of Science'. (*G.S.* I, 40). Unexpectedly, however, he does not align himself with Aristotle and the theory of poetry as 'imitation'. This would have seemed the obvious choice at a time when aesthetic theorizing was strongly influenced by Ruskin's demand for the accurate and reverent observation of natural detail. As we have seen, this trend, according to Hamerton, could be regarded as scientific as well as purely artistic. Dallas's importance in this regard lies in that he was able to diagnose what Hamerton perceived only with the hindsight of experience. For in Dallas's view the Aristotelian principle of imitation 'is demonstrably false, has rendered his Poetic one-sided . . . and has transmitted to all after criticism a sort of hereditary squint' (*G.S.* I, 26). As a result it became his intention to adjust the aesthetic vision of his contemporaries, not by attempting to make poetry more 'accurate', but by attempting to construct a systematic comparative theory on what 'has always (been) accepted as the one universal and necessary law of art, the law of pleasure' (*G.S.* I, 41). Nor does he shrink from the vast implications of the undertaking. For he was aware that 'we have to extend the area of comparison before the possibility of science begins to dawn. The comparison required is threefold; the first, which most persons would regard as in a peculiar sense critical, a comparison of all the arts one with another, as they appear together

and in succession; the next, psychological, a comparison of these in their different phases with the nature of the mind, its intellectual bias and its ethical needs as revealed in the latest analysis; the third, historical, a comparison of the results thus obtained with the facts of history, the influence of race, of religion, of climate, in one word, with the story of human development' (*G.S.* I, 40–1). Only by being based on such a comprehensive framework, he thought, could the humanist activity of literary criticism achieve the dignity and prestige of science in a land in which the latter 'is now imbibed as universally as tea', and at a time when 'London tailors profess to cut their shirts scientifically', not, he adds with caustic edge, 'not unlike the tailors of Laputa' (*G.S.* I, 53–4).

Although Dallas acknowledged the validity, and consequent prestige, of scientific procedure as a method, it would be quite false to deduce that his attempt to establish a 'science of criticism' indicated a simple-minded obeisance to its eminence. This is apparent in his consistently stressing the unconscious origin and nature of pleasure, which he defines as 'the harmonious and unconscious activity of the soul' and closely associates with the imagination. For it is precisely the artistic values of the imagination that he is attempting to rescue by a methodical inquiry into their nature, there being in his opinion 'at the stage which criticism has now reached . . . nothing so much wanting to it as a correct psychology' (*G.S.* I, 42). Dallas's attempt to preserve these values against the 'great march of mind' by means of the very scientific method which had led to their 'disrepute', stemmed, in fact, from his effective realization that the scientific activity of the age had been almost exclusively devoted to the natural and physical sciences. Man's attention had been turned away from himself and from the speculative uncertainties of such branches of study as metaphysics to the acquisition of information about things definite, practical, and real. The verifiable results, as we have seen, assumed for many the status of 'Truth'. But Dallas, while accepting this situation from one point of view, from another would have had crucial reservations. These would have been the same that would have prevented him, for instance, from sharing Maria Edgeworth's delight at the salutary effect on one of her pupil's thinking of reading Mrs. Marcet's *Chemical Dialogues*: 'Romantic ideas, poetic images, and some disdain of common occupations, seemed to clear away from her young mind; and the chaos of her thoughts formed a new and rational arrangement.'[29] Dallas's reservations would have rested exactly on this implied unimportance of such studies as seemed not susceptible to the scientific method. And prime among these he placed the study of man. 'We believe in insects as fit objects of science', he wrote, 'but the mind of man is beyond our science, and we give it up in despair' (*G.S.* I, 48). And in

that despair those sciences to which men devoted their best intellectual endeavours were automatically elevated, with the disastrous consequence that 'the proper study of mankind' was relegated to the shelves of superstition, and would ultimately be disregarded as a fit subject of study. This was the tacit rebuttal of those civilized values, to which the 'science of criticism' is fundamental, which Dallas saw in every act of the natural scientists who, like Charles Kingsley, 'set upon the Deity like a tribe of Mohawks, to hunt out his trail, to pounce upon his footprints, to fathom his designs, to see everywhere the hand, and to acknowledge the finger of God' (*G.S* I, 49).

Dallas in turn pursues this trail himself, but with intentions opposite to those of the 'tribe of Mohawks'; indeed precisely to pounce on 'all this cant of finding God in the material and not in the moral world' (*G.S.* I, 49). This is the essence of his charge against contemporary science: it 'makes an antithesis between God and Man . . . History, politics, language, art, literature—these are the works of man. Animals, vegetables, and minerals—these are the works of God' (*G.S.* I, 48). Dallas was insistent that the practical advances made in the study of the latter had meretriciously attracted an aura of veracity which was based on, and resulted in, false values and standards and which should have crowned instead the study of man, the 'science' of humanity. The significant point here is that Dallas's attack against the unbalanced disposition of scientific interest was also an attack on the early Ruskinian aesthetic of accurate observation and imitation of natural forms, part of whose popularity he rightly correlated with the experimental scientific temper of the times. And in his campaign for a more humane culture, the cultivation by study of the whole man, he laid the immediate blame on Wordsworth's constant assertion of 'the opposition between nature and humanity' (*G.S.* I, 51). This was a trend, he perceived, that had been continued through the powerful writings of Ruskin, in which, together with the work of landscape painters, Dallas claimed: 'men of science will find some sanction for the hollow antithesis which sets the works of God against those of men' (*G.S.* I, 51). And he extends this refutation of an established tradition, with the re-balancing of values that it implied, by linking it intimately with his theory of poetry. For Dallas 'poesy, on the one hand, is the record of pleasure, and, on the other, is intended to produce pleasure in the reader's mind' (P. 12). And we have seen that he defined pleasure as 'the harmonious and unconscious activity of the soul'. Now these statements are ordinary enough, and not without precedent. But they become most significant in the light of Dallas's 'Freudian' theory of the unconscious. For him the 'imagination is but a name for the unknown, unconscious action of

the mind—the whole mind or any of its faculties—for the Hidden Soul' (*G.S.* I, 196). And further, this Hidden Soul is 'a secret flow of thought which is not less energetic than the conscious flow, an absent mind which haunts us like a ghost or a dream, and is an essential part of our lives . . . and bears a wonderful resemblance to the supposed features of the imagination' (*G.S.* I, 199). This is clearly in direct opposition to the theory of poetry as imitation. True poetry results not from an admiring copying of external reality, but emerges from the creative flow of the unconscious. Nor, in his view, could poetry be fully enjoyed if the reader was consciously alert—the sharp, analytic, 'scientific' mind, in fact, was antipathetic to pleasure, because 'perfect joy will not keep house with perfect knowledge' (*G.S.* I, 30). Poetry should be read with a faith 'excited under a press of imagination' (*G.S.* I, 74). Dallas's was an extreme demand for Coleridge's 'willing suspension of disbelief', for 'poetry is poetry only so long as we believe it' (*G.S.* I, 72). And it is characteristic of his thought in this connection that he should criticize the false readers of poetry, the unbelievers, by an ironic illustration of the 'pathetic fallacy', for they reduce poetry to 'a mere word-game, a kind of leasing where we utter self-evident lies by way of amusement, as when we speak of rage boiling when everybody knows that it cannot boil' (*G.S.* I, 72).

Dallas's poetic theorizing, as I have stressed throughout, must always be placed firmly in its cultural context, because it rests finally on his awareness of the limitations of contemporary life which led to 'the modern disease—excessive civilization and overstrained consciousness' (*G.S.* II, 118). Like D. H. Lawrence, Dallas believed that 'you destroy life by thinking of it' (*G.S.* II, 115) and naturally, therefore, he thought that Arnold's statement that 'the essence of life lies in thinking, and being conscious of one's soul (was) but the strut of philosophy much enamoured of itself, and setting up its own methods as the standard of living' (*G.S.* II, 114–15). It is in relation to observations such as this that his 'remedy' of a scientifically-based criticism for the cultural crisis of the times must be judged. For he realized that an important result of the rapid and vast social changes that were taking place was an equivalent change in the social function of literature. As he perceptively noted: 'The development of literature in our day—the new power which we possess of acting on the masses and of being acted on—has led and is leading to many changes, but none more important than the withering of the individual as hero, the elevation and reinforcement of the individual as a private man.'[30] The moral power of literature over an increasingly literate population made it imperative to his mind, therefore, that sound principles of taste be established by a consistent method,

of repute both in itself and in the eyes of the populace. This Dallas attempted to bring about by applying 'scientific' principles to the hitherto unexplored fields of the unconscious, thereby hoping, as he saw it, to rescue imaginative values through reinstating on a new and firmer foundation the validity of the creative process.

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A NOTE ON VERSIFICATION

Richard Kell

I

IN THIS discussion I shall be concerned with language whose structure is on the borderline between prose and verse: language that would be acceptable in a continous layout, but which on careful examination will be seen to possess a sufficiently unprosaic rhythm to justify a line-arrangement. I shall try to show that versification can bring to the reader's attention qualities subtle enough to be overlooked in a continuous layout.

Here is a phrase extracted from a prose passage: *Two stones dropping in a silent chasm.* We can achieve different emphases and rhythmic proportions by laying out these words in different ways. To begin with there is duration as well as stress to be considered. The phrase can be read either as the equivalent of four bars of music:



or as the equivalent of five bars, by increasing the duration of the first two words:



The first version trots too much. In order to indicate the second without laying out the phrase in two or more lines, we should have to mark the first two words like this: *Tŵo stônes dropping . . .* or like this: *Two stones dropping . . .* and even then the reader might merely stress those words

without increasing sufficiently their duration. He is more likely to get the right feel of the rhythm if the words are laid out like this:

Two stones
Dropping in a silent chasm.

But there is something more here than an indication of rhythmic proportions. By isolating the words 'two stones' we isolate, as it were, the stones themselves, articulating in the most effective way not only the rhythm of the passage, but also its image. We emphasize the separateness of the stones from their environment, the contrast between their clattering mobility and the stillness of the rock faces on which they rebound. The layout ensures that the reader will 'think' the image as vividly as possible.

The writer is free to lay out the passage in any way he wishes, to achieve the emphases he has in mind—free to bring out to the full the evocative quality intrinsic in the verbal relations. Ideally, perhaps, there will be only one correct way of reading the passage, but in practice it will probably be beyond human judgement to distinguish between the ideal and other good ways. Here are five ways in which the phrase given above could be versified:

1. Two stones
   Dropping in a silent chasm.

2. Two stones
   Dropping
   In a silent chasm.

3. Two stones
   Dropping in a
   Silent chasm.

4. Two stones dropping
   In a silent chasm.

5. Two stones
   Dropping
   In a silent
   Chasm.

And so on. By this means we can vary both the timing and the shape, so to speak, of the reader's thought (because words isolated or placed at the beginnings and ends of lines are emphasized—though this is not always true of prepositions, conjunctions and articles, which I shall deal with in the next section).

The timing and the idea-emphasis combine to produce the total effect. Thus in Version 2 the dropping of the stones is stressed, both by the isolating of the word itself and by the pause (longer than that after the first line) which follows it. This is a layout the writer might choose if he wanted to suggest that the stones had a long way to fall before they struck rock and broke the silence. As for the rhythm, it is more subtle and expressive here than in Version 1. In musical notation the pattern would be something like this:



The values shown in musical notation, however, should not be insisted on too strongly. Here, for example, the most one can claim is that two half-notes (minims) are a better *guide* to the rhythm of the opening words than two quarter-notes (crotchets). Though the musical notation, like any other form of scansion, may be useful for analytical purposes, ultimately the verse layout alone will probably be a more helpful diagram: it will suggest the durations and pauses indicated by the musical notation, but will leave the reader some initiative. The closest approximation to this in music is the freedom indicated by the word *rubato*.

II

As for the amount of stress to be put on connectives, this is something that must often be left to the judgement of the reader. For example, in Version 3 it is clear that the words 'in a' are placed at the end of a line not to give them emphasis, but because 'silent' must come at the beginning of a line. Similarly, in Version 2, the words 'in a' are not stressed by being placed at the beginning of a line: they occupy this position because 'dropping' has been placed by itself.

But there are occasions when connectives may be deliberately emphasized, as people sometimes point an exception or contrast in an argument by saying 'but' explosively and then pausing for a moment before introducing the new material. Here is an example that might occur in light conversational verse:

He's a nice fellow but
A shocking bore.

This is obviously different in effect from:

He's a nice fellow
But a shocking bore.

In the first version the stress on 'but' and the slight pause following it provide the tension of expectancy, of curiosity, which the second version lacks, and give the last line much more force. The same applies here:

1. He never came without
His green umbrella.

2. He never came
Without his green umbrella.

The first version makes the green umbrella a more comical and unexpected object than the second.

Or consider this, by T. S. Eliot:

When lovely woman stoops to folly and
Paces around her room again alone. . . .

Clearly one could spoil the effect, and make the iambic stressing seem grotesquely mechanical, by emphasizing the 'and' too much. All the same its very strong position in an iambic pentameter, enhanced by the fact that it rhymes with 'hand', forces the reader to give it more weight than it would normally have. Presumably the intention here is to point the ironic contrast between the old-fashioned eloquence of the quotation in the first line, with its general and euphemistic reference to misbehaviour, and the flat, everyday, specific language of the second line. If you put 'and' at the beginning of the second line (and Eliot is surely a good enough craftsman not to have avoided this simply because of metrical considerations), some of the effect is lost:

When lovely woman stoops to folly
And paces around her room again alone. . . .

III

Verse layout, then, can articulate rhythm, images and ideas more precisely than prose layout, and this is true even when the language has little poetic quality.

Conversely, however, we should allow that language of high poetic quality need not always be in verse. Prose poems (so called by the authors themselves, and laid out as such) are still written in this country, and bits of poetic prose sometimes occur in novels, essays and plays (and I am not referring to purple passages). So the popular distinction between poetry and prose—supported as recently as 1956 by the American critic Yvor Winters ('Poetry is written in verse and prose in prose')—remains a misleading one. It would be better to distinguish only between verse and prose—referring merely to structure—and to acknowledge that either may possess a quality ranging from the unpoetic to the highly poetic.

But once this much is clear we can fairly safely claim that more often than not poetry does require verse layout, either because its rhythm is measured or because its rhythm is so subtle and so closely related to its

meaning that versification is necessary to ensure that nothing is overlooked or distorted.

Poetry might be roughly defined as the most exact and concentrated way of reflecting human experience in words—experience at its fullest being a complex of intellectual, imaginative, emotional and sensory perceptions. Poetry will exploit fully the three aspects of verbal language: meaning, sound, rhythm. The further you go along the language scale from the unpoetic to the poetic, the more difficult it will be (hence the great labour involved in writing poetry) to find satisfactory verbal alternatives, until the stage is reached where the words are so 'right' in every way that form is inseparable from meaning—where a paraphrase (though legitimate and often useful) bears no more relation to the poetry than a guidebook to a historic building.

Where there is a high degree of poetic skill most readers will find it possible to agree: 'This is poetry'. They will say it in the first place not because they have recognized the precision of the workmanship as such —this recognition, at least in detail, is the result of analysis—but because they have caught that quality (variously referred to as magical, inspired, sublime) which belongs to 'the best words in the best order'. And more often than not the order will benefit from versification.

AN IMAGE SHARED BY BLAKE AND HENRI ROUSSEAU

John Ingamells

A LION watching over a girl who lies sleeping in a desert is the subject of both a poem by Blake, 'The Little Girl Lost' from the *Songs of Innocence*, and of a picture by Henri Rousseau, *La Bohémienne Endormie*. The poem was first published in 1789 and the picture was first exhibited in 1897. The image they share is an unusual one, a fact which lends added interest to this unexpected link.

The purpose of this essay is to note the derivation of the image, to examine it as used by Blake and Rousseau, and to assess the likelihood of there being any connection between the two men.

The most immediate attraction of the lion as an image has nearly always been its identity as the King of the Beasts. This ancient belief is at the root of such identities as The Lion of the Tribe of Judah, The Messiah, St. Mark and Christ himself. Although this identity is undoubtedly involved in the image used by Blake and Rousseau there are other apparent and more complex meanings as well.

Their lion image shows two apparently unnatural qualities, protectiveness and respectfulness towards a person. The power of the whole image derives from the extreme contrast between the lion's strength and human innocence, which peacefully co-exist. We shall note these elements from amongst the many lion symbols, images and fables which have abounded since the beginning of historical time.

The lion was a frequent religious symbol and image, and in Babylonia and Egypt we find it used as a guardian, the first attribute of our image. The lion's strength and majesty would commend him for such a task. In Western art the lion was used in funerary monuments, for example those recorded in Etruria in the fourth and third centuries B.C. Here again it is used as a guardian, protecting the tomb. The lion appears on such monuments as late as the fifth century A.D.

The second element of our image is respectfulness. Aesop portrays in his Fables[1] a lion who having killed a bullock refuses to share it with a bandit but later divides it with an inoffensive traveller. As with many of Aesop's fables we may suppose an older oriental source. In later Christian legend SS. Daniel and Mamas were left unharmed by lions who respected their saintly characters. It was this quality of respect also which led to the lion's adaptation in heraldry; in the early Middle Ages it was believed that the lion would not harm a royal personage. This belief is clearly allied with the earlier connection of the lion with the Messiah.

The third element of contrast between a lion's strength and human weakness peacefully co-existing is illustrated in Isaiah: 11, 6–7:

> '... the young lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall lead them ... and the lion shall eat straw like the ox.'

This is one of the most easily understood descriptions of paradise and reveals the important element of our image. When strength co-exists peacefully with weakness, and experience likewise with innocence, then the state of the eternally innocent paradise has been gained. This conception was an important part of Blake's philosophy.

Before passing to Blake himself mention must be made of the anonymous quotation which appears in Maturin's *Melmoth the Wanderer* in 1820 (Vol. iii, p. 117):

> 'The aweful lion couches before the maid in her purity.'

which clearly refers to a third version of our image which, if it could be located, would undoubtedly be the oldest.

II

Blake was an artist of the Romantic era, but in many ways he is a figure apart from any movement. His work today is regarded with either enthusiasm or suspicion for his visionary reactions to a disagreeable reality are not easily accommodated in a rational age. Blake turned his role of poet into that of prophet. He claimed to see mysteries which he communicated in his art as prophecies: so the desert of the Fathers became the ugly society of the early nineteenth century. In this hostile world Blake believed that a dialectic should govern a man's life: initial innocence, experience and finally innocence with wisdom were the three stages involved. It will come as no surprise that such a Biblical poet should use an image which we have already found so effectively used in the book of Isaiah.

The Songs of Innocence concern the first stage of life, before experi-

ence is known. 'The Little Girl Lost' takes the most innocent of subjects and it is written in a spirit of utter simplicity.

> In futurity
> I prophetic see

—the first couplet takes us to a mystical world which will need imagery for its description.

> And the desart wild
> Become a garden mild

—paradise is immediately invoked in the same idiom as Isaiah. Both these quotations come from the two introductory stanzas, the headlines of the prophecy. The parable to illustrate the vision follows.

Lyca, a seven-year-old girl, wanders in the desert fearless of its wildness, while her parents worry for their experience has taught them the hazards of the wilderness. At length Lyca falls asleep.

The lion image from Isaiah is dramatized with elements from Babylonia and Egypt, Aesop and heraldry, admixed. Blake was the conscious inheritor of the rich tradition of the lion image and it would be wrong to argue that the poem is a straightforward translation of a Biblical image. By the end of the eighteenth century it was impossible for anyone to use an image with such simplicity. Blake was eloquent on the subject of his symbols as we shall see, but before passing to his critique we must notice the sequel poem, 'The Little Girl Found'.

This poem tells how Lyca's parents seek their child and are led by the lion back to their daughter. This completes Blake's dialectic as the parents' experience leads them back to the child's innocent state after they have learnt wisdom. They encounter the lion, as Virgil met a lion at the beginning of the *Purgatorio* when they find it barring their way.

This makes clear to us that Blake's lion, *a spirit arm'd in gold*, is not exactly Isaiah's. It is more humane in that it is not merely symbolizing strength but also guidance, protection and experience.

Blake's visions came from his corporal eye, which he questioned no more than he questioned a window concerning a sight.[2] Of his visionary images he wrote:[3]

> Vision or Imagination is a Representation of what Eternally Exists, Really & Unchangeably. . . . The Hebrew Bible & the Gospel of Jesus are . . . Eternal Vision or Imagination of All that Exists.

And again[4]

> The Nature of Visionary Fancy, or Imagination, is very little known, & the Eternal nature and permanence of its ever Existent Images is consider'd as less permanent than the things of Vegetative & Generative Nature; yet the Oak dies

> as well as the Lettuce, but Its Eternal Image & Individuality never dies, but renews by its seed; just so the Imaginative Image returns by the seed of Contemplative Thought; . . .

In order to see how Blake has used the lion image it is necessary to realize something of its ancient power. This was immense for it referred to supra-natural forces which were believed to control all things. The lion who guarded the Tree of Life before the home of the Gods in Babylon was infinitely more awe-inspiring and fearful than the lions in Trafalgar Square. We can no longer have such symbols for what was then reality has often passed into mere superstition for us.

We find that the main difference therefore between Blake's symbols and those of antiquity lies in the fact that he is aware of imagination and inspiration, which are individual attributes separating man from man. His symbols, references to a supra-sensory world, have a correspondingly personal import. When individuality came to be recognized in the Romantic sense then symbolism could only be meaningful to the individual, compared with the whole society in Babylon. The lion who guarded and guided Lyca is correspondingly more humane than his iconographical predecessors. He is a Romantic as his creator:

> From his eyes of flame
> Ruby tears there came;

Blake's sense of reality did not allow him to understand that Biblical imagery could have little relevance in the society ready for the industrial revolution, or if it did he did not allow it to influence his work. There was no necessity for his lion to exist. Blake did not possess himself enough innocence to make his symbols completely convincing even to those prepared to penetrate into his private world. His intellect was immense and his hieratical choice of communicating in symbols and prophecies was psychotic rather than necessary. It was exactly this quality of innocence that Henri Rousseau possessed in abundance.

III

A further century passes before we reach Rousseau, a century admitting less and less use for mystery in art as Blake correctly foresaw. For example the publication of Twining's *Signs and Emblems in Christian Art* in 1857, and Mrs. Jameson's *Sacred and Legendary Art* in 1885, popularized the appearance and exposed the whole basis of large-scale symbolism. Knowledge was effectively displacing all mysticism. Yet it was possible for Rousseau to revive an image in the same way that a child will not

walk under a ladder; he had the necessary innocence which might be termed ignorance now.

We may cite three examples, all given by Apollinaire, of Rousseau's unaffected childishness. He had so strong a sense of reality that when he painted a fantastic subject he sometimes took fright and, trembling all over, had to open the window.[5] He claimed to be, and therefore was, haunted by a phantom when he was collecting money at his toll gate in Paris; it disappeared when he chased it and gave out a disgusting smell: he tried to shoot it; finally its visits ceased.[6] When he painted the double portrait of Apollinaire and his wife he took the most careful measurements of his sitters' features.[7] His sense of reality was vivid, greedy and to us indiscriminate. The distinction between a poet and a lunatic has long been recognized as being very narrow and argument will persist as to the quality of Rousseau's imagination. We propose to consider him here as a poet for no lunatic ever achieved his lyricism or constant level of competence.

Rousseau, *ce pauvre vieil ange*, as Apollinaire called him, was a naïve and ingenuous painter. So extreme were these characteristics, and so much have they been subsequently imitated, that it is only with difficulty that we can begin to apprehend them. In his own lifetime Rousseau was for the most part ridiculed but in his final years, 1908–10, Apollinaire, Picasso and their circle came to realize his great primitive talent. Formerly it was believed that he had served in Mexico as a bandsman from 1862 to 1866, but this is now known as an Apollinaire invention. The exotic character of most of his pictures can as well be explained by his many visits to the Jardins des Plantes.

It was relatively easy to discuss Blake's poem which used words; the language of *La Bohémienne Endormie* is not easily to be translated. In a letter written to the Mayor of Laval,[8] his native town, in 1898 Rousseau described the picture himself. It is, he writes:

> . . . a genre painting which measures 2·6 metres in width and 1·9 in height. A wandering Negress, playing her mandolin, with her jar beside her (a vase containing water), sleeps deeply worn out by fatigue. A lion wanders by and doesn't devour her. There is an effect of moonlight, very poetic. The scene takes place in a completely arid desert. The Gypsy is dressed in oriental fashion.

We may note in this description the change from Negress to Gypsy; the girl had no fixed identity: the *lion doesn't devour her*, an unexpected occurrence. Finally the poetic effect of the picture which he notes indicates that the picture was innocently conceived, from our present point of view.

Rousseau was not aware of the tradition of the image. No attempt was made to equate the lion with any abstract force. It is a factual and serious

description of a painting which is perhaps the most mythical of the last hundred years. It would be irrelevant therefore to seek the meaning of this lion. We have to ask rather why did Rousseau use a lion at all? There is the obvious inspiration from his visits to the Jardins des Plantes. There is also the recent discovery of Rousseau's having used a children's paper, *Les Belles Images*, as a source for many of his animals.[9] (It was running a serial on explorers in a jungle.) Exoticism was a favourite theme and the lion is therefore quite expected in Rousseau's work. Why then did he place the sleeping girl in the picture?

No certain answer can be given but it would seem almost definite that his reasons were the same as Isaiah's; in order to obtain an extreme and memorable contrast and to express a vision of peace. The great difference between the prophet and the painter is that for the one the lion was a symbol and for the other the lion was a lion.

The mystery of *La Bohémienne Endormie* is lent by the spectator.

La Bohémienne Endormie is an uncomplicated statement by a primitive painter which we make into a mystical poem through our developed sense of reality. It is this same developed sense that has ensured the demise of the symbol in the history of art.

IV

Blake and Rousseau used the image as a result of very different processes; Blake's was wilful and symbolic, Rousseau's innocent and pictorial. The two men were separated by one hundred years and temperament. Blake was a prophet, loving the future like a mistress, and was consequently denied a true understanding of his own time; Rousseau was a paranoid, confusing his vivid imaginings with reality, with the result that his visions have substance and definition. The world of imagination was for Blake the world of Eternity while for Rousseau it was reality.

Having established the differences we must also define the similarities between the two. They were both of the Romantic era and both used the image to express a concept foreign to the actual world. Both had a vision of innocence to present, a quality conspicuously absent from the world around them.

Their opinions on art also coincide. They agreed on the significance of every grain of sand and every blade of grass.

> General knowledge is remote knowledge; it is in particulars that wisdom consists, and happiness too. Both in art and life generally masses are as much art as a pasteboard man is human.

wrote Blake.[10] We may summon Haftmann to answer for Rousseau

when he says the primitive painter takes possession of the visual world by defining it.[11] Again in Blake we find:[12]

> The great and golden rule of art, as well as life, is this; that the more distinct, sharp and wiry the bounding line, the more perfect the work of art; and the less keen and sharp, the greater is the evidence of weak imitation, plagiarism and bungling.

There is no need to gloss this quotation in relation to *La Bohémienne Endormie*. It may be matched with Apollinaire's description of Rousseau's method of working:[13]

> (Il avait) la faculté de garder la conception primitive et définitive de son tableau jusqu'à ce qu'il l'eût achevé et aussi il n'abondonnait rien au hasard et rien surtout de l'essentiel.

There are no conclusions to be drawn from this brief analysis though the differing degrees of abnormality may perhaps be taken as an index to the social irrelevance of the image at the time it was produced.

Having brought Blake and Rousseau together it would be a pity to disregard entirely a suggestion that Rousseau was familiar with some of Blake's prints.[14] *La Guerre*, a painting of 1894, does have some similarities with Blake's engraving, *Pity*. It would appear possible that the image of a woman riding a galloping horse was an inheritance for both artists as the lion image we have examined. At present it is impossible to pronounce whether Rousseau knew of Blake's work. If he did he would scarcely have understood its meaning, but he could well have been influenced by its imagery. This is another subject and its outcome could scarcely modify any of the judgements we have already made on the two men.

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[11] W. Haftmann, *Painting in the Twentieth Century*, 1960, Vol. I, p. 170.
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SCULPTURAL THINKING—I

ROGERS ON SCULPTURAL THINKING

Donald Brook

EVERYONE LIKES to be understood (up to a point), but sculptors have on the whole suffered from a shortage of spokesmen of evident intellectual probity who are able to dust off the grime of the studio and make pellucid utterance. Sculptors are silent, or they speak darkly in parable and paradox, or (like all artists) they chatter the last cry, and the cry before that, like budgerigars. Theirs is the high mystery of hand and eye, and their intellectual offerings to that overwhelming majority of the human race which cannot drive a nail in straight are limited to occasional apologiae such as that of L. R. Rogers (this Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4; Oct. 1962, p. 291). It is therefore disappointing that he should have chosen an artificial problem and dealt with it so plausibly that it almost seems real.

For what is Rogers's problem? He says that it is the problem of explaining to laymen the nature of 'sculptural thinking'. 'Sculptors', he says, 'sometimes think very hard, *in their own terms*'; and 'without some insight into sculptural thinking, without some capacity for following the thought that has gone into a work of sculpture as one would "follow" an argument or a blue-print, all attempts at critical evaluation are likely to be irrelevant and impertinent.'

There are snarls worth untangling here, but they are not the layman's. This irrelevant and impertinent fellow usually says that he doesn't have to be a hen to recognize a bad egg. At the same time, of course, his sympathetic insight into the biological limitations of the hen might enhance his respect for an unusually *large* egg—seen as an oviparous feat rather than as an oviform *objet trouvé*. A sculpture student, too, might make a clay egg, and his teacher might judge his performance. He might also judge the object, and it is important to distinguish these situations

since they are easily conflated by the single approval-formula 'That's a good egg'. (Congratulations!) But suppose that the student had been trying to model a sphere; what should the teacher say? That the student had made a good sculpture *by accident*? That he was really rather an unpromising sculptor? Suppose that the student often did this: suppose, for example, that he made some obsessive distortion (this actually happens) which was the despair of his teachers, and yet won all the prizes when the judges were strangers. This whole mess of problems associated with the question whether, and how, works of art are to be taken as performances, or are to be seen as themselves (whatever that means) is one of the trickiest in aesthetics, and Rogers might have helped us with it. Instead, he *assumes* that sculptures must be judged as performances, he *assumes* that they are all the same kind of performance, and he sets out to help us 'from the inside' by explaining just what kind of performance they all are.

This programme is necessarily abortive, for if there is one thing which emerges clearly from any thorough and protracted study of human artefacts it is that sculptures are *all kinds of performances*. The only thing they all have in common is, trivially, their attributes of spatial and temporal extension, which they share with human heads and public clocks. For the rest, they differ in as many ways as may be imagined. They were made to frighten bad spirits, to weigh gold, to decorate the structural members of stone- and wood-work, to imitate and to surpass nature, to delight a patron, enhance a harpoon, to astonish the native and win competitions, to be seen from one side, to be seen from all sides, and even not to be seen at all, like Butler's enigmatic what-is-it-in-the-iron-box. They were made to be hung on trees, hung on necks, to have nails driven into them, to be chopped up at Dada exhibitions, to provide houses for the ghosts of ancestors and 'atmosphere' for the board-rooms of insurance companies. 'Sculptural thinking', if it is to embrace the activities of *all* sculptors, can only mean 'whatever it is that goes on in sculptors' heads (hearts? hands?) when they make what they make'. And since they make the most extraordinary variety of things, they must be supposed to harbour the most extraordinarily various thoughts. The entire 'thinking' suggestion is in fact grossly misleading (along with reading blue-prints, following arguments, and so on). The art of sculpture is an art of *making* things, and the difference between what goes on 'in' a man who is making a portrait head and 'in' a man who is making a table is not a difference between 'sculptural thinking' and 'tabular thinking' as if these were, say, different coloured thoughts, or thoughts with distinctive labels attached. Sculptors and carpenters have a different training, and different habits, interests and

immediate purposes. They acquire what have been called 'dispositionals', not all of which become 'occurrent' in the act of making each and every thing that they make. Some sculptors may give themselves instructions while they work; others may be quite unable to say, if asked, what they are thinking or (a more intelligible question) what they are doing.

But of course sculptors think, if this is taken to mean that they teach and are taught, that they arrive at opinions and try to act consistently with the opinions that they hold. And this sort of thing—lore and precept, jargon, slogan and trick of the trade—might be called 'sculptural thinking' so long as it is remembered that what is peculiarly *sculptural* about it is merely that it is thinking about sculpture, and that sculpture is not one kind of thing which differs from all other kinds of thing in any one essential way.

Rogers's own 'sculptural thinking' has led him to the (mistaken) conviction that sculptors do not 'combine innumerable silhouettes or projective views'. Well, *he* may not, but many others do and did. It was standard carving technique for at least a millennium to cut out the front profile, and then the side, and then to round off the corners; and Cellini (for example) says, in a letter dated 28th January, 1547:

> These views are not only eight, but more than forty because even if the figure be rotated no more than an inch, there will be some muscle showing too much, or not enough, so that each single piece of sculpture presents the greatest variety of aspects imaginable. And thus the artist finds himself compelled to do away with that gracefulness that he had achieved in the first view in order to harmonize it with the others. The difficulty is so great that no figure has ever been known to look right from every direction.

What Rogers is giving us is not (and could not be) what he promises —an account of 'sculptural thinking'—but an *example* (his own example) of sculptural thinking. This is, in its way, quite valuable; for although it does not go to the heart of any important aesthetic questions (just as Cellini's observation does not) it nevertheless helps us to see that if we are committed to the view that works of art must be judged as *performances*, then we do well to ask their authors what kind of performance they are. We may be able to make inferences from the sculpture itself, or we may not, but in neither case is there reason to disdain a glance inside the horse's mouth when it is obligingly held open for us.

A kind of contemporary sculpture, approved by Rogers, is evidently neo-constructivist and has a pseudo-intellectual rationale (derived ultimately from Bauhaus teaching) which provides its students with hearteningly no-nonsense, lets-get-down-to-business phrases such as

'advanced thinking in 3-D', 'high-level spatial thinking', and 'the "logic" of form'. Those quotes around 'logic' are disarming: in Rogers's text they give the impression of resulting from a desire to say outright 'the logic of form', restrained by a—wholly understandable—misgiving as to the propriety or sense of such a phrase. ('So-to-speak' quotes are each-way bets on a small field.) The kind of language in which this contemporary sculptural thinking is conducted is clearly illustrated in Rogers's treatment of West African sculpture. He says:

> Take, for example, the forms of the best West African wood-carved figures [*how do we know which are the best?*]. They are perfectly articulated [*just what is that?*], completely three-dimensional [*since Rogers refers elsewhere to sculpture which is 2½-dimensional, there is no point in making protest here*] and free from all vagueness [*what's vague? Medardo Rosso? But in his case that's good!*]. . . . These sculptures are conceived with the utmost clarity [*conceived, or made, or both? What's the difference?*] and impeccable formal logic [*!*] but abstract construction predominates in them [*they are what is usually called 'stylized'?*] and builds a perfect design [*in the best ones, of course!*] out of a minimum information about the forms of the figure. Their method of articulating arms and shoulders, for example [*ah! so articulating is joining together*], has nothing to do with anatomical structure [*no?*] but as a logical method of construction it is faultless.

The faultlessness of a logic which joins two arms on to the shoulders of a stylized human body is scarcely a matter for such enthusiastic congratulation. A West African wood carver would find it rather patronizing, unless—more likely—he saw it as a huge joke. Of course, it may not be the mere joining which is faultlessly logical, but the *way* of the joining (the shape of the region of junction). This carries us no further forward, however, since we need above all things a way of distinguishing between logical and not-logical (or illogical?) shapes and junctions. It looks rather suspiciously as though 'logical' means 'approved', and the hint of a basis of approval ('a shape like a correct argument') is a hint at the unsayable.

The message Rogers has for us is, surely, not that the vocabulary of the new advanced thinking in 3-D is effective in the interpretation of alien sculpture—for it is only too patently nothing of the kind—but that we have available for art criticism a vocabulary which deliberately aims to be cool, neutral, objective, scientific-sounding, and that this vocabulary must have some relevance to the sort of sculpture Rogers makes and teaches. It will be surprising indeed if, when we come to criticize those perspex constructions which are hinted at in his text, we do not find that they will be best and most sympathetically interpreted in terms not unlike those that Rogers urges.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS:

(1) Rogers has a pseudo-problem. There is no such thing as 'sculptural thinking' in the sense in which he is trying to explain it to us. There is only the way this sculptor thinks, and the way that sculptor thinks—as well as the things this sculptor makes and the things that sculptor makes.

(2) Although there is no puzzle about 'sculptural thinking', there are often puzzles about how this sculptor or that sculptor thought, and they are bound up with more evidently *aesthetic* problems about works of art seen as performances by artists. If the artist's intention does count in correct criticism, than we may well want to know (as critics) what Cellini thought, and what Rogers thinks.

(3) The kind of sculpture that Rogers seems to favour has developed in parallel with a critical vocabulary, or bag of nostrums, derived from various respectable intellectual and scientific disciplines. Geometry (pre-Lobachevsky) and Logic (Aristotelian) are exploited rather than, say, Topology or Cybernetics, in spite of the desire to be 'more in tune with the modern spirit'. No doubt there is some need also to appear reliably old-established; but it would be pleasant to meet a few convincingly modern terms like 'bits' or 'isomorphous' in this kind of art-talk. Perhaps that is the *next* cry?

SCULPTURAL THINKING—2

A REPLY

L. R. Rogers

I SHALL deal with Brook's rather over-confident misunderstandings one by one, as they occur, and in doing so I shall try to bring out the underlying cause of the breakdown of communication between us.

(1) Having completely failed to recognize the problem I was dealing with, Brook has tried to give it a familiar look by recasting it in the mould of one of the Standard Aesthetic Problems—whether works of art should be judged as performances. But I did not say that works of art should be judged as performances. I was not concerned with works of art or with judging them, but with works of sculpture and understanding them. Nevertheless, it is true that without some understanding of what kind of performances they are we cannot even begin to judge them. We should be like the Chinaman at the concert who clapped after the tuning up.

Now although I was not concerned with judging works of sculpture but with understanding them, I did consider them as performances of a certain kind. This, I think, brings us to the heart of the matter. Brook's main points seem to be that general statements about sculpture must deal with trivialities and that general statements about the thinking of sculptors must be nonsense; we can only say worth-while things about particular pieces of sculpture or sensible things about the thinking of individual sculptors. Sculptures, he writes, 'are *all kinds of performances* (Brook's italics), the only thing they all have in common is, trivially (!), their attributes of spatial and temporal extension, which they share with human heads and public clocks'. Exactly! Brook has inadvertently revealed the source of his own confusion. The attribute of spatial extension, whether of human heads, public clocks, African wood carvings or cauliflowers, is just what sculptors get excited about. They call it 'form'; and they call the capacity for grasping the 3-D spatial properties of things the 'sense of form'. The ability to apprehend things as form is not highly developed in many people nowadays, particularly in those who have undergone the spiritual leucotomy that passes for education in some university departments. It does not appear to be very highly developed in Brook, since *the mark of somebody who lacks a sense of form is that he cannot see what there is to be excited about;* he thinks it is trivial.

Those who have not learned to perceive sculpture as form usually adopt one of two attitudes: either they stand in front of it pathetically trying to 'intuit' it, to attain a state of 'pure receptivity' which they hope will enable them to soak it up immediately and unthinkingly; or they stand in front of it asking themselves questions about its antecedents, its dates, the mathematical relations between its parts, its significance as a document for psychoanalysis or anthropology, etc., etc. The first is the failure of the simple-minded, who pray that some unimaginable aesthetic rapture will fall upon them in a golden shower or creep up on them like an attack of vertigo. The second is the failure of the scholar, who wanders round and round the railings of the park watching the people inside having fun but cannot find the gate. Works of sculpture cannot be properly appreciated by gaping at them with our intelligences idling or by thinking *about* them. Appreciation demands that we penetrate the work on its own terms. All sculptures, and all things that sculptors are interested in, have form and however efficient we may think they are as harpoons, magic charms or doorstops, we cannot begin to assess them until we have apprehended them as performances in the realm of 3-D form. If we are concerned with giving them marks we may have to be sensitive to all sorts of other things

as well, but these are expressed in or communicated through the forms or are qualities of the forms.

(2) Brook objects to my saying that sculptors *think* in terms of 3-D form. He assumes that what I mean by 'thinking' is something that goes on 'in' a sculptor's head while he is working, and he more or less accuses me of trying to bring back into the machinery of sculptors' heads the ghosts that Gilbert Ryle has exorcized. On the principle of 'heads I win, tails you lose' Brook has inverted Ryle's arguments to demonstrate that sculptors do not think, they make. The whole point of Ryle's chapter on 'Knowing How and Knowing That' seemed to me to be that intelligent practical activities, such as making sculpture, are as much a manifestation of thinking as the production of philosophical or scientific theories. One man produces theories, another produces sculpture; they both think. A piece of sculpture is as much a record, expression or embodiment of a sculptor's thoughts as a philosophical paper is of a philosopher's thoughts. They think in different terms and of different things, but they both think. I was not trying to prove that sculptors are *intellectuals*. Heaven forbid! They think *in terms* of form and think *about* form only when they are reckless enough to try to do what I am doing.

In any case, actually making sculpture is only one way in which a sculptor's spatial concepts are employed; it is only one part of his skill. When I wrote that sculptors *think* in terms of 3-D form I meant that they can perceive and conceive form; that they can recognize, remember, imagine, make, talk about and, to a certain extent, describe form; that they can analyse the forms of things and invent forms of their own; and, moreover, that they are more expert at this than anybody else. Whether one accepts a dispositional analysis of these mental capacities is beside the point. I imagine we may still say 'he is thinking' rather than 'his dispositions are becoming occurrent'.

Why Brook has difficulty with my phrase 'sculptural thinking' comes out clearly when he refers to 'the kind of language in which this contemporary sculptural thinking is conducted . . . etc.', and confuses the verbal terms in which I inadequately tried to describe pieces of sculpture with the 'terms' in which sculptors conceive and understand them. My whole point was that thinking in terms of 3-D form is a kind of thinking that is conducted by means of spatial concepts which are not necessarily verbalized. Non-verbal thinking is presumably inconceivable to Brook and must therefore be made to disappear, like other awkward problems, by linguistic sleight of hand and abracadabra.

(3) Brook's difficulty with my phrase 'the logic of form' is rooted in the same incapacity. Not to know that stylized arms and shoulders

may slither sloppily into each other or be clearly, intelligibly or 'logically' articulated or constructed, and not to be able to see through the term 'logical' (which is commonly used in this way by sculptors and others) to what I was trying to say with it are indicative of a lack of sense of form. Words are always opaque if we do not know the experiences they refer to. But if Brook is going to disallow analogy, how can we talk to people about what they have not experienced?

Rodin said, 'When I have a beautiful woman's body as a model, the drawings I make of it also give me pictures of insects, birds and fishes. This seems incredible but I did not know it myself until I found out. . . . A woman, a mountain and a horse are all formed according to the same principles.' As one's knowledge of form grows one becomes aware not simply of a superficial similarity of shape but of an identity of formal principles in the structure of things. This is what Rodin is referring to. One develops what might be called *morphological insight*, a sense of some sort of logic behind the forms of things. I am sorry if my use of the term 'logic' is offensive but I know no other way of conveying what I mean. Some scientific writers, *e.g.* the plant morphologist Agnes Arber, the psychologist R. Arnheim, C. H. Waddington and the great D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, have this insight.

(4) Brook's point about the profiles and silhouettes is based on a piece of misquotation by omission. What I wrote was: 'It is often supposed that *in order to grasp forms in their "full spatial completeness"* sculptors somehow combine innumerable silhouettes or projective views. They do not.' And in case the phrase 'full spatial completeness' was mystifying I quoted the passage from Henry Moore in which it occurs.

Of course sculptors look at silhouettes and of course they are relevant to the making of sculpture. I was trying to distinguish a highly developed sense of form from an undeveloped one. The special perceptual and creative skills required for appreciating and producing sculpture may be developed to a high or low degree. We may be skilled or unskilled performers or observers. The most developed sense of form is one which knows forms in their 'full spatial completeness'. Only those who can conceive and perceive form in this way will *know* what I mean. The Greeks started out with quadrature—projecting the profiles of the figure into the sides of a block—and took nearly 200 years to master the forms of the figure so that they could conceive them in their 'full spatial completeness'. A potter throwing a pot on a wheel may appear to be concentrating on the silhouette of his pot, and in a sense he is, but if he is at all advanced in his craft he is using that silhouette as a clue to the subtle concentric volumes it defines. It is the volumes, their weight, mass, proportion and articulation that he is really concerned with and is

thinking of. Profiles may be a useful means of checking the accuracy of a form or of starting a carving from a flat-sided block. Again, with certain kinds of sculpture intended to stand in a niche or in the open air profiles may be very important. But profiles are something that forms *have*, rather as they have light and shade on their surfaces, because they must. Sometimes this property calls for special attention, sometimes it does not. But to be sensing or creating profiles or illuminated surfaces is to be doing something very different from sensing or creating 3-D forms. Different kinds of sensibilities are involved. However, there is no point in trying to say in a few lines what Moore in his essays and Read in *The Art of Sculpture* have said so much more eloquently and expertly. I will let Gabo have the last word. 'To think about sculpture as a succession of two-dimensional images would mean to think about something else, but not sculpture . . . sculpture is three-dimensional *eo ipso*.'

Finally I should like to make two points of general interest concerning the relations between philosophers of art and artists:

(a) Brook calls my article an apology and appears to subscribe to the common fallacy that all an artist ever writes about art is an apology for his own work. R. H. Wilenski said the same thing more dogmatically in his *The Study of Art* (pp. 153–4). According to him artists are incapable of an objective outlook on aesthetic matters and their writings must therefore be distinguished from those of the philosopher: 'Any piece of writing on aesthetic by an original artist is always inevitably a defence of his own personality and a rationalization of his own limitations.' Anyone who accepts such an argument must be badly in need of comfort. Obviously what applies to the artist applies equally to philosophers, or to philosophically inclined art historians like Wilenski. How could they produce any aesthetic ideas that showed that they were immoral, perverted, or blind, deaf, or otherwise insensitive to man's most valued possessions? They can no more get outside the limitations of their own sensibilities and personalities than the artist can, as we have seen. One might just as well argue that everything a philosopher writes about philosophy is an apology for his own work. Obviously, if somebody produces wrong ideas it may be useful to inquire why he did so; but the important thing is not why a thing is said but whether it is true. Otherwise we might as well all give up any attempt at objectivity and hand everything over to the psychoanalysts. And what they are apologizing for is anybody's guess.

Artists do know something about art, other people's as well as their own. The 'apology' argument is part of the romantic notion of the artist as a brainless practitioner of 'the high mystery of hand and eye',

a creature who is all emotions and muscular skills: a divine idiot if he is good, a plain idiot if he is not.

(b) Now I am afraid I shall have to speak darkly or not at all. A growing love of form often leads to a kind of mysticism, a feeling that contact has been established with some deeper level of reality—what used to be called an 'intuition of being'. In the words of an embryologist (A. M. Dalcq), form can 'entice us to the verge of frenzy. Form is never trivial or indifferent; it is the magic of the world'. Sculptors, like other people, sometimes try to express their experiences in words and to seek philosophical understanding of them. That they often talk a great deal of what disenchanted and unexcitable contemporary philosophers regard as highfalutin metaphysical nonsense or seem to chatter like budgerigars is not surprising. They try to match the importance and excitement of their experiences with important and exciting-sounding ideas. The dry sandy wastes of fashionable British philosophy have little to offer them. At least the metaphysicians recognized these experiences; they were not frightened by them or seduced by a passion for clarity into denying them and spending their lives inside a linguistic goldfish-bowl. What they wrote may not in fact have been an explanation, but it did have the virtue of at least seeming like one.

SENSE AND REFERENCE IN AESTHETICS—I

Ninian Smart

THE SUBJECT-MATTER of aesthetics is often taken to include literature, music and the visual arts. Games rarely if ever are counted in. I wish to outline here an argument to show that some games, notably cricket, must be included. The argument is this: Professor Ruth Saw, in an article entitled 'Sense and Nonsense in Aesthetics',* has listed facts which a satisfactory aesthetic theory must explain. Though philosophers might argue about the list, it has good *prima facie* plausibility: hence, her facts must be seriously entertained by an aesthetic theoretician. But it turns out that her facts clearly refer to cricket as well as to the visual arts, etc. Consequently aesthetic phenomena and judgements in and about cricket are properly part of the subject-matter of aesthetics.

In case anyone thinks that this is meant to be a *reductio ad absurdum*, let me state clearly at the outset that I do not intend it as such. Cricket, for me, is one of the great delights of life. And if there is reason in Professor Richard Hoggart's plea that academic English Literature should take account of *Z-Cars* and the like, there is surely reason in not neglecting games, some of which constitute the major aesthetic experience of great masses of folk in this and some other countries.

Professor Saw's facts, together with my comments, are as follows:

1. *Some people give up time and energy—in fact, their working lives—to the making of objects intended for delighted contemplation.*

This is true of first-class cricketers.

2. *Many people spend time and energy in contemplating such objects.*

This is true of cricket spectators—though once you get to Lord's not very much physical energy need be expended (but neither need it be in art galleries).

* *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 1, No. 2., March 1961, p. 109.

3. *It is possible to be trained to look at or listen to these objects with increased enjoyment.*

This is true of cricket, a highly sophisticated and technical game. Americans, unacquainted with this art-form, need schooling in its discriminative contemplation as well as in the rules.

4. *These objects fall into kinds, some of them being made by the artist himself in the form in which they are presented to the public. Others, musical scores, blue prints, scripts, etc., need a second set of actors who will then make the object or perform it for the public.*

Cricket matches fall into the former class, rather like much Indian music.

5. *Even when objects are intended for use, their makers sometimes consider their value for contemplation as well as for use, and they are then enjoyed in the same manner as works of art.*

Cricket matches are not for use. But it is worth noting that there is, for each side, an end built into the game, namely winning. There are ways of winning which are aesthetically unsatisfying, and this is often what is meant by saying: 'It was a poor game'.

6. *Most people agree that it is 'a good thing' that people make and enjoy such objects.*

Admittedly there are cricket-haters and games-haters. But this is because games are sometimes imposed or obtruded upon the unwilling, as sometimes are music and art lessons at school. More people think cricket a good thing than modern painting (I have not done a Gallup Poll, but it seems likely).

7. *It is possible to enjoy natural objects in the same way as works of art, and there is some connection between the beauty of some of the arts and the beauty of nature.*

Sunshine, the trees at Canterbury and the green turf—such objects enter into cricket matches as aesthetic objects. And there is a likeness between the grace of a Keith Miller and the lithe movements of an animal.

8. *There are experts in the arts.*

There are top practitioners in cricket, like Dexter; and there are perceptive commentators, like Arlott, Cardus and Alan Ross.

9. *'Beautiful' is a word suitably applied to the objects described above, and 'aesthetic' to the experience of their delighted contemplation.*

Very frequently (and perhaps more frequently than in the case of the visual arts like painting) one hears contemplators and commentators using 'beautiful', etc. Consider 'beautiful stroke-play', 'a beautiful action', 'ugly style', etc. It is hard to deny that the delighted contemplation of cricket is correctly called 'aesthetic'. Not only is the word some-

times used in this connection, but also it would be odd if it were not, in view of comments 1–8 above.

10. *It is better to enjoy worthy objects than inferior ones.*

This is exactly what Benaud and Dexter recently were saying (if not always practising) in Australia.

11. *There are many common beliefs inconsistent with one or more of the above.*

No doubt. It may well be that it is commonly believed that cricket is not referred to by such facts.

It may be replied to all this that compared with, say, painting, cricket is rather unimportant. This may be so: but a caste-system in the arts does not prevent the lower castes being arts. It appears, then, that the scope of aesthetics ought to be widened, to include reference to at least some games.

SENSE AND REFERENCE IN AESTHETICS—2. A REPLY

Ruth Saw

PROFESSOR NINIAN SMART is right, and I welcome his conclusion. The playing and watching of some games are aesthetic phenomena. I should like, however, to ask some questions and make some distinctions.

1. Would there be any inconsistency in saying of a batsman who made few or no runs, that he had a beautiful action? Must he not only *look as if* he would make runs, but also actually make runs? (It will be no answer to say that as a matter of fact the two usually go together.)

2. Is there the kind of unity proper to a work of art in a cricket match? As Professor Smart points out, unity is imposed by the end of winning, which is built into the game. This end, however, is not held in view by any artist, though the captain may, in a general way, plan a policy. But there is no script, no choreography, and the skilful player is trained to meet all kinds of fields and all kinds of emergencies. It is as if Dame Margot Fonteyn never knew for sure just what her partner would do, but had to be prepared to meet all kinds of attack. It might be that we could have a new and exciting form of art in which dancers and actors were given a theme and improvised together. (I am told that this is what jazz players do.) Even then it would lack the essential of a cricket match, the rivalry of two opposing teams.

3. How does the enjoyment of watching cricket differ from the

enjoyment of watching any skilful craftsman at work? I remember once deriving great pleasure from a porter at Victoria Station, who first wheeled a loaded truck up to the closed door of a luggage van, then went in by another door and came to meet and admit his own load. His action, however, was not particularly beautiful. What I enjoyed was the clever adaptation of means to end. The action of a cricketer involves the using of his whole body and there are two sets of criteria, one connected with the end and one with the physical means employed to bring about the end.

4. Professor Smart speaks of the sunshine, the trees and the green turf at Canterbury. How does this background compare with the glittering lights and the dresses of a theatre auditorium? The cricket field and its surroundings belong to the match in a way that the auditorium does not belong to the play or ballet, yet it is not quite like the scenery. The spectators of the match are literally sitting in the same field as the players and are metaphorically in the same world. The audience and actors are literally in the same building, but metaphorically in different worlds. In the intervals the playgoers come back to this world and look around but the matchgoers stay where they were. The knowledgeable ones may even stroll out and examine the pitch, and everybody goes on enjoying the sun and green turf.

There seem to be pleasurable experiences ranging from the sheerly aesthetic, in which we are hardly aware of our bodily presence at the spectacle, to those in which there are aesthetic elements but in which our physical sensations play an important part. In the latter experiences we may be said to be enjoying ourselves, as in walking in beautiful country, but we do not enjoy *ourselves* at the theatre, we enjoy the play. I should place the pleasure of watching a cricket match about half-way between the two extremes.

BOOK REVIEWS

Preface to Plato. By ERIC A. HAVELOCK. Blackwell. 1963. pp. xii + 328. 32s. 6d.

IT HAS been a source of much puzzlement that Plato, himself the greatest artist in words among the great writers of philosophy, repudiated poetry and the plastic arts with such eloquence and conviction as to defy the ingenuities of Platonic scholarship which has tried to explain the paradox away by exegesis showing either that Plato did not mean what he said or that he did not really say what he seems to say. Professor Havelock has written the book for which we have been waiting. It is more than an introduction to Plato's aesthetic and social philsophy; it throws fresh light upon the emergence in the classical age of that rational habit of mind which has been seminal to the development of much that is most characteristic to the European ways of thought. His merit lies in an uncompromising ability to look at the facts squarely—facts which we all know, or should know, but have been reluctant to see steadily without romantic distortion—and fit them into a new pattern.

He rightly accepts Plato's repudiation at its face value. 'Plato's target seems to be precisely the poetic experience as such. It is an experience we would characterize as aesthetic. To him it is a kind of psychic poison. You must always have your antidote ready. He appears to want to destroy poetry as poetry, to exclude her as a vehicle of communication. He is not just attacking bad poetry or extravagant poetry. . . . In short, Plato's target in the poet is precisely those qualities we applaud in him; his range, his catholicity, his command of the human emotional register, his intensity and sincerity, and his power to say things that only he can say and reveal things in ourselves that only he can reveal. Yet to Plato all this is a kind of disease, and we have to ask why' (pp. 5–6). The first rung in Professor Havelock's explanation is the negative thesis that Plato, in common with the Greeks of his time, did not take up towards poetry and the arts what we should nowadays call an aesthetic attitude of appraisal. 'In fact, it is not too much to say that the notion of the aesthetic as a system of values which might apply to literature and to artistic composition never once enters the argument. Plato writes as though he had never heard of aesthetics, or even of art. Instead he insists on discussing the poets as though their job was to supply metrical encyclopaedias. . . . This is a way of looking at poetry which in effect refuses to discuss it as poetry in our sense at all. It refuses to allow that it may be an art with its own rules rather than a source of information and a system of indoctrination' (pp. 29–30). This aesthetic blindness of the Greeks in the classical period, great creative artists as they involuntarily were, is not a new fact. F. P. Chambers says: 'On the basis of their own records it could well be argued that the Greeks at the height of their greatest

creative period were all unconscious of the kind of aesthetic values which we ourselves accept and understand.' (*Perception, Understanding and Society*, p. 183.) Rudolf and Margot Wittkower note that 'the technical rather than the creative achievements were valued in a work of art' (*Born under Saturn*, p. 4). As Professor Havelock mentions in a note, R. G. Collingwood observed that the words 'art' and 'artist', as we use them, do not translate into classical Greek and: 'If a people have no word for a certain kind of thing it is because they are not aware of it as a distinct kind.' For Plato also art and craft were one and were assessed by the twin standards of utility and technique.

Having cleared away the anachronistic aesthetic presuppositions which impede understanding, Professor Havelock emphasizes the positive function of poetry as central to the Greek educational apparatus. For the Greeks poetry was not 'literature' in our sense of the word but a necessary mechanism for the preservation and transmission of mores in a pre-literate society, the instrument of 'a cultural indoctrination, the ultimate purpose of which was the preservation of group identity'. By a careful analysis of Homer and Hesiod he substantiates his main thesis that a poetic tradition rooted in an oral culture served to perpetuate the formulaic, episodic, 'image-thinking', mythological, panoramic state of mind which he calls 'Homeric' and which was the main obstacle to the development of scientific rationalism. He argues that in his doctrine of *mimesis* Plato stigmatizes the authoritarian influence of this oral tradition. The word *mimesis* 'focuses initially not on the artist's creative act but on his power to make his audience identify almost pathologically and certainly sympathetically with the content of what he is saying' (p. 37). Poetry which was made to be performed and memorized, not read, encouraged a high degree of identification and was 'a form of hypnosis in which emotional automatism played a large part'. One is inclined to think of Max Scheler's view of tradition as a form of emotional infection, where a man believes, '*because* the other person does so, but *without knowing that* he does so; I simply share his opinion without distinguishing the act of understanding the sense of his belief from my own act of opining'. (*The Nature of Sympathy*, p. 37.) It is Professor Havelock's thesis that Plato was a man with a mission to smash this power of tradition to enthrall the intellect.

If the *Republic* is seen as an attack on the traditional Greek *paideia* and the mentality it stood for, the repudiation of poetry falls into place. Plato emerges as the protagonist of a new logic and inventor of the language of abstract and conceptualizing thought, herald of the modern scientific mind. 'He thinks the unconscious thoughts of his contemporaries. He can predict the thoughts they will wish to think but which they do not yet know that they wish. We might say that he gives to the intellectual currents of his age their direction and drive. It would be better to say of his peculiar and pioneering task that it sought to create the current of intellectualism itself, by charting and digging the channel along which similar efforts previously dispersed might now flow in full tide.' And for this he had perforce to eliminate the aesthetic. The exposition is brilliant and perhaps as close to truth as one can expect to get. And yet. . . .

One cannot do justice while staying blind to another strand of Plato's thought. In the *Laws*, the last thing he wrote, Plato mentions and rejects a theory current in his day which traced the origin of poetry, music and all the arts from the instinct to gambol and undisciplined utterance which human infants share with the young of other animals (653*d*; 672*c*; 673*d*). Against this view Plato maintains that the arts, together with ritual, ceremonial, gymnastics and dance, originate in man's inherent love for order, rhythm, discipline and proportion. So in the legend at the be-

ginning of *Philebus* music and dance result from the imposition of order and number upon the *apeiron* (we have no exact equivalent of this concept). In the earlier dialogue *Protagoras* the educational value of music and poetry are recognized (326*b*) for their influence in forming a balanced and well-adjusted character: 'for rhythm and harmonious adjustment are essential to the whole life of a man'. That the idea of human personality as a harmony or tempering of elements was seriously taken may be gathered from Aristotle's remark in *Politics* VIII, when he is discussing the place of music in education and says: 'many experts say that the soul is a harmony, others that it has harmony'. As manifestations of rhythm, order, proportion, the fine arts rank for Plato on the side of reason and enlightenment against ignorance and undisciplined emotionalism. This facet of his thought, inconsistent as it is with the main theme, is not entirely absent from the *Republic*. One should perhaps recognize that here was a conflict not only between impulse and reason but among the dictates of reason itself concerning the ethological effects of the arts.

H. OSBORNE

The House, the City, and the Judge. By RICHARD KUHNS. Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1962. pp. xi + 164. $5.

IN PLATO'S tripartite psychology, symbolized by the figure of the Chariot, the appetities and emotions are represented as a force repugnant to good reason and requiring continuously to be held in leash. This was the source of his severest indictment of poetry and the theatre, that they foster emotionalism, to which the Greek temperament was unduly addicted. But Aristotle as it were transferred the emotions from the place of the ignoble steed in Plato's scheme to that of the noble steed, regarding them as basically amenable to reason because they involve situation-appraisal which is an aspect of rationality. Hence Aristotle inclined to the idea that character training demands a balanced organization of emotion rather than its mere suppression and many of his remarks when discussing the educational uses of the arts gain new point when read as a deliberate correction of Plato's doctrines on this score. (This contrast is of course over-simplified but serves to indicate an important difference in their approach to the same problems.) So in the Eighth Book of the *Politics* Aristotle ascribes a therapeutic effect even to induced emotional frenzy. 'Mental disturbances,' he says, 'which are pathological in some cases, afflict us all in reduced or acute measure. Thus we find pity and fear in the former instance and pathological disorders in the latter. Persons who are a prey to such disorders are seen to be restored when they listen to the delirious strains of sacred song, just as though they had been medically treated and purged. In precisely the same way, pity, fear, and other such emotions, in so far as they affect each of us, will yield to the purificatory effect and pleasurable relief produced by music.' (I use the translation of J. G. Warry in *Greek Aesthetic Theory*.) The word 'catharsis' (purification) which he here uses has associations both with medical purging and with religious purification. He is resuscitating the 'homoeopathic' theory which had been ridiculed by Heracleitus (Diels, *Frag.* 5: 'The blood-guilty vainly seek purification by blood as if a man should try to wash off mud with mud.'). Aristotle does not in his surviving works fulfil his promise to develop this theory in relation to poetry. In the *Poetics* the word 'catharsis' occurs only twice, and only once as an aesthetic term.

In the fifth chapter of his book Professor Kuhns has a cursory survey of the four main types of explanation which have been put forward for Aristotle's concept of catharsis. He himself inclines to the view of G. F. Else (*Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument*) that the concept of catharsis in the *Poetics*

differs from that of the *Politics*. In the *Poetics* catharsis is effected not—or not directly—through emotions aroused in the spectators but is conceived as a process operated by the poet in the course of the dramatic plot. The primary analogy is said to be the power of a court to determine the taint of blood-pollution by an act of acquittal. On this interpretation, says Else, catharsis is not 'a change or end-product in the spectator's soul' but a 'transitive or operational factor within the tragic structure itself'. Alluring as this theory is made to seem, it does diminish the universal validity of the concept by interpreting it against the background of a society in which guilt was still regarded as a quasi-physical infection not easily or automatically cancelled by the absence of moral culpability. Professor Kuhn, who does not avoid conflicting or contradictory statements in putting his own slant on the theory, argues that 'catharsis' is Aristotle's term for the function which is essential both to the arts and to orgiastic religious celebrations of tranquillizing by providing release to strong emotional frenzy. His social interpretation concludes with the odd thesis that 'Reconciliation of the guilty individual is possible not because he is deemed "innocent" . . . but because he is . . . worthy of being accepted in the city.'

If his interpretations of Aristotle lack something of convincingness, his own aesthetic pronouncements strike even more nebulously. What is one to make of such sentences as: 'The artist composes a world out of memory and desire, shapes it according to need and necessity, animates it with the metabolic, the inspirational, and the daimonic. From cosmic necessity and human caprice he brings a new order of possibility to the world and ineluctibility to action'? H. OSBORNE

Schriften zur Ästhetik und Poetik. By KARL PHILIPP MORITZ. Kritische Ausgabe. Edited by HANS JOACHIM SCHRIMPF. Max Niemeyer Verlag. Tübingen. 1962. pp. xxxviii + 411.

KARL PHILIPP Moritz (1757–93) is mainly known—not only here but also in Germany—for his psychological Bildungsroman *Anton Reiser*, for being Goethe's companion on the Italian Journey, and for his essay *Über die bildende Nachahmung des Schönen* ('On the Creative Imitation of the Beautiful') which first appeared in 1788 and deeply influenced German aesthetic thought. This essay occupies in the German context a comparable position to Edward Young's (considerably earlier) *Conjectures on Original Composition* in England, stressing for the first time the implications of an 'organic approach' to the 'living nature' of the beautiful configuration for both the creative and the appreciative process. But apart from this essay, more often quoted than studied, Moritz's aesthetic work has been allowed to sink into an obscurity it hardly deserves. That becomes amply evident from this fine Critical Edition (the first ever devoted to Moritz) of his writings on aesthetics and poetics. Writing as a contemporary of Kant and Schiller, antedating their main aesthetic works with essays covering the entire range of problems systematized by the better-known thinkers, Moritz provides the best possible point of departure for an investigation into the foundations of classical German aesthetics from the twin roots of creative organicism and traditional theory of beauty. His work absorbed all germinal ideas from the critical, philosophical and psychological concern with questions of the creative imagination which had made the three decades before Kant's *Critique of Judgement* such an exciting period. It contains the basis for the 'autonomy of the aesthetic', combined already with the tendencies, so painfully evident in later German aesthetic thought, to exaggerate the findings into a speculative metaphysics in which the aesthetic faculty took the place of traditional Reason as the capacity to grasp the universe *in toto*.

The first essay in this collection is of particular importance. Its cumbersome title, summarizing the thesis in good eighteenth-century tradition, is *Versuch einer Vereinigung aller schönen Künste und Wissenschaften unter dem Begriff des In Sich Selbst Vollendeten* ('An attempt to unite all fine arts and sciences under the concept of that which is complete in itself'). It was written in 1785, and works out with admirable clarity the intricate conception of the autonomy of a beautiful thing, clearly stating Kant's principle of 'purposiveness without purpose', in Moritz's own terms of finding in the interdependence of parts and inner perfection of the beautiful so much purposiveness 'that I forget to ask what the purpose of the whole thing is'. Moritz's approach to beauty emerges from the rather involved and overloaded *Bildende Nachahmung* as far superior to Kant's rigid separation of *pulchritudo fixa* and *vaga*, defining beauty as 'that which is beautiful not because it is useful, but because it need not be useful'.

It is impossible to do more here than to draw attention to the riches of this packed volume of essays, criticism, and aphoristic remarks which leave hardly a topic of eighteenth-century aesthetics untouched, or a problem of the newly emerging romantic consolidation of the aesthetic creed unforeshadowed. Hans Joachim Schrimpf, the editor, has put scholars for years to come in his debt with this thorough and immaculately produced edition of a pioneer in aesthetics.

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The Shape of Time. Remarks on the History of Things. By GEORGE KUBLER. New Haven and London. Yale University Press. 1962. pp. xii + 136. 30s.

GEORGE KUBLER is the Professor of Art History at Yale and the Editor of the Yale Publications in the History of Art. That fact and the claim of the blurb that 'this book presents a radically new approach to the problem of historical change' raise large expectations. Unfortunately I do not feel that these are entirely fulfilled. For Kubler is not writing a straight history of art in this book but has yielded to that insidious temptation of the specialist to generalize about his subject and apply his generalizations to history as a whole. In other words what we are presented with is not history but what Popper would call historicism. Finding 'the clue to history' is the historian's occupational hazard. It must be exciting to find it, but sadly disillusioning to find that the clue consists of a generalization so broad that if true it is trivial, and if not trivial is inapplicable without distortion and misrepresentation of the facts. Kubler's 'radically new approach' is no exception. Where his thesis is stated clearly (it is often expressed so imprecisely and vaguely that it is difficult to see what it entails) and seems to be correct then nothing very new or surprising is revealed.

History, he maintains, consists of two rhythmic processes, of change and regularity. 'Without change there is no history; without regularity there is no time.' The pattern of history and 'the shape of time' is determined by the interplay of these two processes which are revealed in an examination of man-made things from tools to works of art. Without change there would be no cleavages in the continuity of time; without regularity and repetition there could be no intelligible communication. This can be illustrated in the history of language, where, by comparing the development of cognate languages, we can perceive the pace of change, which may be sudden or slow. Thus the differences today in the Romance languages are due either to the introduction of new words or the result of slowly accumulating minor linguistic changes. This sort of process is at work in the history of all fabricated things, whether they be useful articles like instruments or technical equipment or those

'least useful and most expressive products' we call art. So the structure of any individual article is determined by the position it occupies in a sequence or series of similar articles. This series begins with a 'prime object' which initiates the series followed by a sequence of replicas of that object, which may differ in some minor way from it until finally the 'drift' of such changes leads to a more drastic reorganization of the component parts of such objects. In the history of technology and art, we are thus presented with a 'linked succession of prime works with replications, all being distributed in time as recognizably early or later versions of the same kind of object' (p. 130). To appreciate a work of art therefore we must locate it in its proper place and time, to decide whether it is a prime object or replica in an early, middle or late phase of the series to which it belongs. Time, says Kubler, is 'like a sea occupied by innumerable forms of a finite number of types' (p. 32) and into this sea we must dip a net which has a different sort of mesh from those currently in use: such, for example, as those who dip into that sea with nets whose mesh is constructed to catch those forms and types we call 'style' and 'biography'. His net is an improvement on these, he claims, because both are too concerned with time as chronology. Style, for example, is too static a concept. It fails to see the significance of the variety and nature of the changes in the practice of a craft. And this can only be done if we assimilate the history of art to the history of technology. We do not adequately treat the history of cathedrals, for example, if we only discuss them in stylistic terms, like Romanesque, Norman, Gothic, etc. We should study a particular specimen by reference to the development of building techniques, by comparing 'rib-vaulting segmented structures' with 'barrel-vaulted structures' (p. 37).

Similarly a history of any art-form based on biography relies too much on such subjective factors as the temperament and talent of individual artists. This omits the crucial factor, viz. the 'entrance' of the artist into a 'series'. The achievement of any artist is determined not merely by his own innate powers but by the conditions of his craft in his period. And these depend on the antecedents of that craft, that is to say on the limited possibilities opened up by the achievements of his artistic predecessors. An artist may be highly talented but be frustrated by the technical state of the art-form he practices in his time and society. The world's great artists have been the lucky ones. They were born in the right place at the right time and their temperament, interests and gifts matched their opportunities.

A work of art is an achievement inasmuch as it is the solution of a problem. But the nature of the solution is determined by its 'systematic age'. It is not an isolated thing. Each poem in an anthology of verse has its own systematic age in the same way as pots in a museum. An object such as a country-house may comprise a cluster of traits which have different 'systematic ages'; such as the ceiling, the staircase, or the fire-places.

This, then, is Kubler's 'radically new approach' to the history of art. We need to ask 'how radical is it?' and how much of an improvement is it on our accepted forms of historical interpretation.

One difficulty is his conception of a 'prime object'. All series begin with such objects, which are fundamental innovations because they cannot be accounted for in terms of any antecedents. Therefore their occurrence is unpredictable. They are distinguished from those inventions which occur at the end of a series when the innovators gather together and resynthesize the many minor changes in the intervening sequence of replicas. But Kubler later qualifies this by insisting that no innovation is so completely novel that it has no connection at all with some precedent. For how could such a concept apply in the history of language which also

reveals the 'shape of time' in its development? Surely no linguistic changes are so revolutionary that there could be no connection between them and what has gone before them. Still less could this be so in the evolution of implements or works of art.

But how does his modification of the conception of a 'prime' object differ from the so-called later innovations, for both of them are similar in this respect, *i.e.* in the sense of being a substantial modification of objects similar in structure and function but preceding them in time?

A more fundamental difficulty is raised by the logical status of a statement which refers to an object as 'prime'. In art the examples he gives are the Parthenon, the Raphael frescoes and the portal statues at Reims. Surely in such a category we have an evaluative as well as a descriptive component. To be a prime work of art is to have an aesthetic value over and above the significance of beginning a series of replicas.

And if he is in difficulties in telling us how a series commences, he is also in a predicament when it comes to telling us how it ends. For he distinguishes between an 'open' and a 'closed' series. By the latter he apparently means one which has achieved a final solution in which no further development is possible. By the former he refers to those in which change is still occurring or could occur. Now this is plausible enough in the history of technology. There could be sense in speaking of finality here in the sense of being obsolete or obsolescent. We discard what is instrumentally obsolete for we can satisfy our needs more efficiently. Therefore we can reasonably talk of progress in technology. But is there progress in art? Works of art are not discarded in this sense. We may lose interest in an art-form, so that some art-forms (like vase-painting) may no longer be actively pursued (though even here the versatile Picasso has tried his hand). Kubler himself is uneasy on this point and refers rather vaguely to an 'intermittent' series. In this sense all art-forms are intermittent. Men may even be driven back to cave-painting.

His major thesis therefore does not sustain the claim that it is giving 'access to previously invisible portions of the historical edifice' (p. 36). We knew before that in the histories of art and technology some things were more original and novel than others; and that the evolution of a craft consists largely of copies and minor modifications, that a word like 'style' refers to repetitive features which are sufficiently distinct to be recognizable and identifiable. And we also knew that artistic and technical achievement are dependent on the confrontation of an individual talent and temperament with the conditions obtaining in a craft or an art-form or a technology in a given period at a given time.

Kubler's new net is not so different after all to such old ones as style and biography.

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Born under Saturn. The Character and Conduct of Artists: a Documented History from Antiquity to the French Revolution. By RUDOLF and MARGOT WITTKOWER. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1963. pp. xxiv + 344 + 89 illustrations. 48s.

THE INAESTHETIC jacket of this book is a suitable preparation for its contents, though conveying nothing of the naïvety enshrined inside. The authors set out on a quest 'for the artist's personality from the historical angle' and they have provided a very lengthy demonstration of the fallacy of this method—at least as practised by them. Whatever beast their chase had in view it eluded these quite astonishingly clumsy nets and weapons, alerted doubtless by the clump of the authors' heavy tread down the corridors of history. Pedestrian is the word for this approach. Through the relentless accumulation of

anecdote and truism no ray of illumination makes its way, while the leaden cliché-ridden style in which the inquiry is conducted through nearly 300 pages deprives the book of even popular interest. The result is an explanation in which nothing is explained, a conclusion in which nothing is concluded. The springs of artistic conduct (never mind art itself) are naturally not accessible to those whose thoughts tend to issue in statements like this about Michelangelo: that he 'certainly was an uncomfortable man to live with'. It is typical of our authors that a chapter announced as on artists' attitude to their work (a fascinating subject) turns into being diffuse talk about 'the lure of Rome'. They never for a moment touch the nerve of their subject, and history for them remains a cloak of respectability under which they are not going to pry—hence their entrenched old-fashioned anti-psychological attitude. For them it is enough to dub characters 'colourful'; to tell us importantly 'Obscenity and indecency were not confined to Renaissance society'; to state that Guido Reni had 'an extraordinarily unpredictable mind' (whatever *that* may be). Both Caravaggio and Cellini, we are assured, are 'remarkable by virtue of the quality of their work rather than by virtue of their ill deeds' ('virtue' is a happy example of the Wittkowers' inept style, and the whole pronouncement is typical of their robust assertions of what nobody would deny). If this book represents art history, then only the late Henry Ford could do it justice.

Although the anecdotes which pepper the pages are culled from sources that range from Pliny to Nollekens, the truisms which sew them into a shapeless patchwork are patently the authors' own. Charitably ignoring these, one still does not find useful social history, because snippets of varying veracity are merely cut out and laid side by side, and whole areas within the absurdly overbroad scope are just suppressed. Instead of the feeble stuff about the artist in antiquity (Pliny writing about painters dead over three hundred years before is hardly relevant), we might have had some facts about artists in, say, the Netherlands during the Renaissance. The status of Jan van Eyck as courtier alone would have seemed too obvious to neglect; but it and he are utterly neglected here.

Art and artists live in this book chiefly as the material for police reports and gossip. Actions speak louder than creations; it's all conduct and no character. The real obtusity of the authors is not so much before the spectacle of artistic mentality as before that of the human mind and behaviour at the most ordinary level. It would be easy to find more insight in a popular newspaper feature on 'The Courts Day by Day'. The boastful lack of any psychological awareness prompts a doubt as to whether beings possessed of psyches wrote the book. Their ingrained attitude, masquerading as historical impartiality doubtless, makes painful reading and gives an air of philistinism to the whole venture. When the authors set about correcting Freud's errors (it's been done before but they so enjoy the task) one remembers his constant enormous respect for art and artists, and wishes it had been emulated here. Of his other gifts compared with those of his two eager critics it is kinder not to speak. This reviewer, however, will long remember the authors' nasty glee as they convict Ernest Jones of being wrong in his deductions about Andrea del Sarto's *Madonna of the Harpies*. Somebody has been using his mind again; stand up that boy and go and see the Wittkowers in their study.

Of course it is only in their study that history and imaginative insight are enemies. History presented neither as pure documentation nor critically is as tedious —nearly—as this book. The result is a work not only inessential and largely irrelevant but basically irreverent. What a living artist would feel as he read it one can only guess (there's a smug gibe on the last

page at living named artists who won't fit into the 'historical' pattern) but the book justifies every reserve felt by creators for the uncreative. It concludes with one truism that is not the authors' but Turner's: 'Art is a rum business'. But Turner was not undertaking a history of the character and conduct of artists from antiquity to the French Revolution. He growled out his incomprehension before the mystery of which he was a part. Just so might Shakespeare have mused when reading Bradley. The Wittkowers have reduced their whole enterprise to pointlessness by abdicating the critic's role and adopting the artist's assumption. If they have no more profound conclusion to offer but that art is 'rum', were they the proper people to inquire into the character of artists?

MICHAEL LEVEY

The National Gallery

Painting and the Inner World. By ADRIAN STOKES. Tavistock Publications. 1963. pp. 90. 18s.

IT IS a pity that Mr. Stokes has allowed this book to go to press in its present form, for it does not do justice either to himself or to Kleinian theory. He handles here the psychoanalytic concepts with less sensitivity than he displayed for instance in his valuable study on Michelangelo or in his delightful paper: 'Listening to clichés and individual words'. He has always had a tendency to express himself in evocative rather than lucid language—a style which serves well the attempt to recreate the emotional impact of a painting and the subjective reaction it has produced in the viewer, though it may be less suitable for handling concepts and theories. But in this last book Adrian Stokes's style has become turgid and at times quite obscure. For instance, what can be the meaning of the following sentence which I offer as a sample of his style? 'This role assigned to aggression in art, also the enveloping aspect of form in general, has some connections with an inchoate or unlimited value that transports the "soul" (whose fund of feeling is equally vast), attributed by some aesthetic theories between Addison and Kant to what was called "the sublime", a value that came to be opposed, particularly in the guise of contemplated terror and discomfort by Burke in his treatise of 1756 or 1757, to a "composure of the parts" reserved for the character of beauty, more connected, it seems, with self-sufficiency than with the overwhelming or enveloping character of a part-object.'

The literary failure of this particular volume makes it difficult to be quite sure that one has really understood what the author tries to convey. However, the very flaws of this book may make it valuable, for the reader is challenged to re-assess the merits and demerits of the Kleinian contribution to aesthetics, to observe any weak points in this theoretical structure and to note how it may be distorted by either its friends or its foes. If my comments and criticism should at times appear unjustified, I make no apologies, for Mr. Stokes's writing invites projection. The bringing into the open of actual defects of the Kleinian view or of the projections and distortions it makes possible is, so it seems to me, the potential value of a critical review of this book.

Painting and the Inner World is a collection of three essays; the first carries the title then given to the book as a whole; the second consists of a dialogue between Stokes and a psychoanalyst, Dr. Meltzer; while in the third essay Stokes, once more alone, discusses the art of Turner. It is the purpose of this book to uncover the roots of that creative impulse in man which leads him to paint pictures or to look at pictures. There are many fascinating points in it which challenge thought and comment. But I must restrict myself to only a few and shall concentrate mainly on the first of the three essays.

While trying to analyse the creative impulse, Adrian Stokes appears to be much impressed and much preoccupied by what one might describe as the 'katabolic' functions, such as excretion, aggression and destructiveness. He seems to think of the nether regions of the body as producing only faeces and urine, but apparently no semen and no babies. Yet he approaches these katabolic functions with a univalent system of values which appears to carry the imprint of the English protestant culture-pattern. He seems, for instance, to find it difficult to think of faeces and urine as anything else but poisonous, scalding and destructive. (This is not so in his earlier writings.) Undoubtedly these qualities form part of the total symbolic meaning that the unconscious gives to these substances. But the study of infant behaviour, a re-reading of the works of Freud and Jung and familiarity with the variety of human attitudes to excreta described in anthropological field study reports must convince one that in the unconscious these products are experienced not only as poisonous and destructive but also—though not necessarily in the same person—as gifts of love and trust, as cherished tokens of an inner life and activity, or as a sign of the achievement of control over both the inner and the outer world.

Of course the psyche engages in such processes as splitting, aggression and destructiveness, and it entertains morbid and terrifying phantasies. But I question the over-riding importance that Stokes seems to attribute to them; I question that these are always and necessarily antithetical to progress and development. After all an attack on the mother's body occurs quite really in the very act of birth and so it remains perhaps a constituent of the emotional and symbolic experience of all growth towards independence. This inevitable association of growth and pain cannot of course spare man from the experience of guilt.

I find it amazing that a psychological discussion of artistic creativity should make so little mention of the phantasies of copulation and parturition. Surely such phantasies are relevant and crucial and the diaries and introspective comments of many artists suggest this. Nor can the defect be blamed upon the Kleinian School as a whole. Hanna Segal and Marion Milner for instance insist on the importance of these phantasies. Segal writes in her paper 'A Psychoanalytic Approach to Aesthetics': 'Creating a work of art is a psychic equivalent of procreation. It is a genital bisexual activity, necessitating a good identification with the father who gives, and the mother who receives and bears the child.' (*New Directions*, p. 392.) And Marion Milner believes that once the parents' genital creative function has been perceived, the phantasy of their sexual life becomes the pre-verbal symbol for thinking about one's own creativeness.

By avoiding to relate man's procreative phantasies to art Stokes has tinged his theories with a sterile quality. The artist, so he seems to believe, at best merely repairs, repairs that which has already been, the mother. More usually he tends to describe artistic activity as an expression of unconscious destructive urges. Discussing for instance painters painting nudes, he uses such evocative words as 'omnipotent handling', 'attack', 'sadistic intercourse', 'conflagration', 'wreckage'. The artist making marks for the folds of the stomach is said to be in phantasy 'digging into it', while the carver 'in a manner more nearly concrete is jabbing into a figure's stomach'. One might also wonder whether this particular over-emphasis on destruction does not rob him of appreciation of some of the modern art movements. I suppose that he is referring to abstract art when he writes: 'But many appreciators today seem to find it more exciting if formal elements can be observed barely to survive a monstrous expression of, say, greed. What is entirely negative or chaotic or merely unfeeling can never be art, and what is near to it is

never great art.' The first question that one feels like asking is whether Mr. Stokes is here making an aesthetic or a moral judgement. In any case the dissolution of representational form in modern painting may have multiple meanings, and probably a different one for each particular artist.

Mr. Stokes then really gives no hint that the artist stands between the yesterday and the tomorrow, between the ancestors and the future. And so we hear much about restitution and repair, but little about discovery, invention, the new. Marion Milner has declared herself forcefully against such a conservative approach to art; she insists that in art the primary role is the creation of objects, not their re-creation; she insists that the essential in art is the new bit of external world the artist has made significant and real by endowing it with form. Fairbairn makes a similar point when he defines the aesthetic experience as 'the experience which occurs in the beholder when he discovers an object which functions for him symbolically as a means of satisfying his unconscious emotional needs. Discovery rather than re-discovery is the essential feature of the experience'. (*B.J.P.*, 29.)

Stokes in this particular book paints the picture of man's inner world from far too restricted a palette. After all, the life of the body alone gives us an enormous complexity of experiences, which, quite apart from the production of faeces and urine, include rhythm, tension, movement, breathing, touch, pain, sleep, and many others. All these experiences are likely to contribute to the making of form and art, and they contribute to the multi-dimensional meaning of all symbols.

It is the wealth and variety of forms that man has created out of that sparse raw material—the basic facts of his life—which constitutes the mystery. By exploring the psyche in ever greater depths psychoanalysis can deepen our reverence and our sense of wonder, unless its exponents are tempted to simplify or to abbreviate psychoanalytic thinking; Ernest Kris has warned against this very danger. For this would destroy the capacity to marvel, a capacity which, as Professor Gombrich writes, is the beginning of all knowledge, and 'where we cease to marvel we may be in danger of ceasing to know'. Only in this book has Adrian Stokes given me the impression that for him the creative impulse is no longer much of a problem and that we possess nowadays if not all at least most of the answers. I hope he will soon write another book to contradict this impression.

ROSEMARY GORDON

The Moment of Poetry. Edited by DON CAMERON ALLEN. The Johns Hopkins Press. London: Oxford University Press. 1962. pp. 135. 28s.

THE LECTURES collected in this book were delivered in the autumn of 1961 at The Johns Hopkins University by five specimens of that flourishing American hybrid, the poet-academic. The book, naturally enough, displays the strengths and weaknesses common to the breed. The talented poet-academic is strong at the restricted task of appreciating a particular poem. In this collection Randall Jarrell is strongest. He offers no general statements about poetry or poets but gives a thirty-three page detailed descriptive analysis of Frost's dramatic poem *Home Burial*. It is a thorough and illuminating investigation.

Richard Wilbur's is also a strong, and more elegant, appreciation. He uses an analysis of Housman's *Epitaph on an Army of Mercenaries* to plead for tactful allusion in poems. A tactful allusion is, I suppose, one that is evident but unobtrusive. In eight lines of Housman Mr. Wilbur tracks down references to the sixth chapter of the *Epistle to the Romans*, to the second battle in the sixth book of *Paradise Lost* and to the eleventh labour of Heracles. Mr. Wilbur says of the *Epitaph*: '. . . a reader *can* arrive at a just sense of its tone and

drift without consciously identifying any of its references. It *all but* delivers its whole meaning right away. . . . Housman's allusions must unconsciously affect anyone's understanding of the poem, even upon a casual first reading' and 'once one is aware of them, [they] are not decorative but very hard working.' Having established Housman's poem as a model of tact, Mr. Wilbur briefly turns his attention to the 'supremely tactless' *Cantos* of Ezra Pound and names the excellences and defects of Pound's writing. Mr. Wilbur is an expert instructor in tact.

With the other three lecturers generalization is more the drill and the weaknesses poet-academics tend to have in common take over. Poet-academics are, as a rule, extremely impressed by English baroque poems. The English baroque poet was peculiarly excited by paradox and by its expression in the pun and the conceit. The modern poet-academic is excited by a similar, but not identical, concept—polarity—and by its expression by means of irony or tension or ambiguity or whatnot. 'Dichotomy' is Richard Eberhart's version of polarity. His essay is a rather careless examination of the relation of Will and Psyche to poetry. He conceives these terms as 'opposite poles of a modern dichotomy, but they may lie at the root of the mind itself and go back to the beginning of thought'. The chief value of his paper rests in an analysis of a Psyche poem, Poe's *To Helen*.

May Sarton's lecture partially takes leave of the poem and attempts to give equal weight to it and the poet. Hers is a lecture of delicate balances. It is a teeter-board with the poet on one end and the poem on the other. The poet himself is a teeter-board with the poet as public person on one end and as private person on the other. The poem is also a teeter-board balancing changing pairs: past and present, music and meaning, silence and words. *Intelligence* is Miss Sarton's distinguishing characteristic, in the same sense that intelligence was the remarkable fact about Paul Valéry and Wallace Stevens. This sort of intelligence is a no-man's-land between the materials of the poem and the poem itself. When the creating intelligence pushes on into the poem it imbues it with a sense of self-awareness. Miss Sarton seems to believe (along with Robert Graves and Laura Riding) that, contrary to the view of validity in experimental science, in poems the most difficult meaning is the most final and, as she says, 'that facility (lack of tension) is the enemy of poetry'. Miss Sarton's mode of thought would, to my mind, be most productive when applied to the poem's functions of *mimesis* and *katharsis*, of seduction and release. Her point of view is limited in that it values good poems of one sort and dismisses, by implication, good poems of other sorts. I would like to construct a see-saw polarizing agreement with her and disagreement with her. I'll ride one end; you ride the other.

John Holmes's attention locates squarely on the poet and not on the poem. We are given a pseudo-religious view of the Poet as purveyor of Secret. His lecture offers little to the reader interested in techniques and aesthetics of poetry. But in at least two of the other lectures there is a great deal for such a reader.

KENT GARDIEN

The Language of Modern Music. By DONALD MITCHELL. Faber and Faber. 1963. pp. 133. 21s.

DONALD MITCHELL, a critic on the music staff of the *Daily Telegraph*, has given us a penetrating study of an artistic epoch in his *The Language of Modern Music*. The title gives little clue to the contents of the book; a sub-title such as 'Schoenberg and Stravinsky: Their place in evolving style' or 'Main currents in art and music in the first half of the twentieth century' would have been more revealing. The author

discusses how in reaction against the cult of 'freedom' of the last part of the nineteenth century Schoenberg searched for a new means of organization and developed his 'Method'. Mitchell explains why his music met with such violent opposition from the public, while at the same time it exerted such a strong influence on a small group of composers including Webern and Berg. The analysis of the similarities between cubism and serial technique is clear and convincing. As the composer abandons tonality the painter abandons perspective. Implicit in these two new approaches to artistic creation is the germ that leads to abstraction. This theory gives a new comprehension to many artistic works of the period. Since the eye is able to assimilate new modes of expression more quickly than the ear, understanding of innovations in music is slower than in the visual arts.

Stravinsky and Picasso are two creators whose works have passed through many 'periods'. Stravinsky does not copy the past but expresses feelings about the past. His turning to serial technique after 1953 is his expression of another 'past'. Mitchell points out that it is the preoccupation with melody that is a common bond between Schoenberg and Stravinsky. He pleads for an acceptance of any music because of its intrinsic worth, its high artistic achievement, not as an example of any method or system.

The short 'Postscript' raises questions about the trend that music is taking in the last half of this century. Did Schoenberg and Stravinsky close a period rather than herald the birth of a new one? He concludes that 'the choice today would seem not to be between serial or non-serial but between comprehensibility and incomprehensibility'.

LESLIE P. SPELMAN

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Roman Architecture. By FRANK BROWN. *Gothic Architecture*. By HENRY MILLON. *Baroque and Rococo Architecture*. By HENRY MILLON. *Modern Architecture*. By VINCENT SCULLY. Prentice Hall. 1962. 30s. each.

Modern Architecture in Mexico. By MAX CETTO. Tiranto. 1961. 18s.

THE FIRST four titles are the commencement of a series on the great ages of world architecture, with a text of some forty pages, and 100 illustrations including photographs, plans and drawings. Into these forty pages the authors have had to get a resumé of the periods which range in span from the hundred years of the modern volume to the fourteen hundred years of the Roman volume. This is a difficult task, and the authors have, on the whole, succeeded very well in giving an outline of the chief characteristics of each period. The style is rather jarring to English readers, having too many made-up words; the clearest in exposition is Branner's *Gothic Architecture*. Being historical in treatment it has been necessary to find a unifying theme for each period which can suggest why each is great in its own right. The 'grandeur that was Rome' reflects the growth and decline of the Roman Empire, the Gothic is seen as an expression of the glory of God, and the Baroque as the expression of the glory of king, court and empire, but with a certain romantic uncertainty added. 'Perhaps the greatest discovery of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries', concludes Professor Millon, 'was the acceptance of a viable existence that included diverse opinions, intellectual contrasts, and even open strife.' This strife is seen by Professor Scully to result in modern times in two movements, one of which he calls 'Romantic-Classicism', the other 'Romantic-Naturalism', and it is in terms of these two that he sees the varied aspects of modern architecture. More stress should perhaps have been laid in these volumes on changes in social life

and human use, and on the changing use and character of building materials. Without it we tend to get a rather on-sided view of the causes of architectural characteristics, but it is perhaps asking too much of a writer to get all this in only forty pages.

Max Cetto's book on Mexican architecture is really a picture book with several hundred photographs and plans covering more than one hundred buildings of a great variety of uses, ranging from churches and hospitals to office buildings and private houses. There is a brief historical introduction with photographs of some of the ancient sites and temples, and the recent O'Gorman house and the mosaic exteriors of the University City. Those who think of modern Mexican architecture as consisting entirely of Diego Revera exteriors will be surprised by the variety, which is chiefly 'international modern' and lacks any particularly Mexican characteristics. Most of the elegant country houses and towering office blocks could be situated in almost any country. There are some delightful examples of the uses of poured concrete on parabaloid shapes, but even the Mexican passion for decoration on the exteriors of buildings is overdone, and loses its effectiveness, in such buildings as the Ministry of Communications.

PETER STOCKHAM

THE BRITISH SOCIETY OF AESTHETICS

The Society will hold the following lecture meetings during the Session 1963–64 at the Holborn Central Library, 32–38 Theobald's Road, W.C.1. Lectures begin at 7.45 p.m. and are open to the public.

Oct. 2	THE POET AND HIS MUSE	Sir Herbert Read
Nov. 6	THE DIFFERENTIATION OF VALUES: AESTHETIC AND ARTISTIC	Professor Roman Ingarden (Kraków)
Dec. 4	A REDEFINITION OF FUNCTIONALISM	Robert Maxwell
Jan. 1	THE UNDERSTANDING OF NEW MUSIC	Hans Keller
Feb. 5	DEVELOPMENTS IN ART EDUCATION (with film: *The Next Step*)	Ellis Miles
Mar. 4	LITERATURE AND MORALS	David Pole
April 1	VULGARITY	John Bayley
May 6	THE LOGIC OF CRITICISM	Professor Isobel Hungerland
June 2	Title to be announced later	Barbara Hardy